COMING TO TERMS: ZIMBABWE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA (1980-1994) Richard David Schwartz Ph.D The London School of Economics and Political Science UMI Number: U615421 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615421 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 I S F 7412 2 “How much have I forgotten that I thought I knew; how many things am I perplexed about, which once were as clear to me as sunlight? ” Elias Canetti, 1955* * The Human Province (London: Picador) 1986 Abstract At independence, a government of a third world country inherits a set of international economic relations and a set of international political relations. The latter, being dominated by intergovernmental links, are more easily refashioned to the design of the new regime. The former, having been forged by a combination of external factors (international markets, international commodity regimes, trade treaties, transport routes) and diverse internal factors (private sector and public sector actors, production patterns, import necessities and export opportunities) are less responsive to government intervention. International economic relations will therefore almost inevitably remain at variance with the pattern of political relations and alliances that the new regime wishes to develop. The inevitability of this discrepancy does not lessen the dilemma for the government of a newly independent state, especially one with a revolutionary or radical public posture. The problem for a third world government in such a situation is not therefore to reconcile its international political and economic relations, but to develop a coherent and plausible explanation for the discrepancy between them which does not at the same time diminish the regime’s credibility. On 18 April 1980, Zimbabwe became independent. Since then, Zimbabwe’s cabinet has been dominated by a party, ZANU(PF), that came to power with a revolutionary ethos and an avowedly Marxist- Leninist world view. Today, Zimbabwe's role on the world stage and its network of international political and economic relations only very partially reflects ZANU’s pre-independence positions. Despite its inevitably unique aggregation of experiences, Zimbabwe shares political, economic, social and historical characteristics with a number of other countries. This study attempts to delineate the principal factors, whether individual or common to other third world states, that shaped the way Zimbabwe forged its international links in the first fourteen years after independence. It argues that government attempts to restructure international economic relations since independence have largely failed. While such failure has been recognised, it has been neither acknowledged nor adequately explained to the Zimbabwean electorate. 4 CONTENTS Introduction 6 An outline of the domestic and international events that brought Zimbabwe to independence. The expectations engendered by a ZANU(PF) victory. The “inevitable discrepancy” between economic and political relations. Chapter one; Zimbabwe’s inheritance 26 The foreign relations of the Smith regime and the nationalist movements prior to independence Chapter two: Constraints 47 Domestic and international constraints on policy action of LDC governments and Zimbabwe in particular. Trade, aid, investment, debt and Lancaster House. Chapter three: Policy making 65 Competition and co-ordination among ministries, the Cabinet, the party and the Prime Minister/President. Declared guidelines for Zimbabwe’s international relations. Chapter four: Patterns of involvement 80 A panoramic view of Zimbabwe’s international links as they have developed since independence. Major bilateral ties. Membership of and participation in international organisations. High profile foreign policy issues. Chapter five: Zimbabwe in the region 102 a) South Africa 102 Political will and economic imperatives. Changing trade patterns. Transport links. Sanctions. b) Mozambique 114 Mozambique as a frontline state before and after Zimbabwe’s independence. The Beira corridor. Renamo. The limits of solidarity. c) Regional organisations 121 SADC, PTA: aims, achievements and Zimbabwe’s role therein. Chapter six: Zimbabwe and Britain 135 Adversity and co-operation in the transition to independence. Bilateral links. Clashes and co-operation on the international stage. Chapter seven: Zimbabwe and the major powers 144 a) USA 144 Diplomatic and trade links. Aid: generosity and manipulation. Bilateral quarrels on third issues. b) The USSR 156 c) People’s Republic of China 160 Contrasts, pre- and post-independence. Trade and aid agreements. Chapter eight; Zimbabwe and Europe 171 Western and Eastern Europe: changing patterns of involvement. The cases of Sweden, France and Romania Chapter nine: Zimbabwe and the Middle East 206 a) Israel/Palestine 206 Support for PLO positions. Trade with Israel. Palestine and the official media. b) Iran/Iraq 215 Responding - or not - to pressure. Constraints of the NAM environment. c) Iraq/Kuwait 217 Taking sides. Chapter ten: Zimbabwe in IGOs 226 UN General Assembly and Security Council. OAU. Conclusion 242 Bibliography 251 6 Introduction Zimbabwe: one of a kind? A brief outline of the domestic and international events which brought Zimbabwe to independence in 1980 and the expectations that a ZANU(PF) victory engendered. Demisting the analytical window. At independence, a government of a third world country inherits a set of international economic relations and a set of international political relations. The latter, being dominated by intergovernmental links, are more easily refashioned to the design of the new regime. The former, having been forged by a combination of external factors (international markets, international commodity regimes, trade treaties, transport routes) and diverse internal factors (private sector and public sector actors, production patterns, import necessities and export opportunities) are less responsive to government intervention short of diktat. International economic relations will therefore almost inevitably remain at variance with the pattern of political relations and alliances that the new regime wishes to develop. The inevitability of this discrepancy does not lessen the dilemma for the government of a newly independent state, especially one with a revolutionary or radical public posture. Recognising the inevitability would be tantamount to admitting an unacceptable degree of powerlessness. While structuralist explanations of the international system (a controlling core, a controlled periphery) lend intellectual credence to such admission, they are not - at least overtly - a viable basis for government policy. Non-Alignment - one of the declared cornerstones of Zimbabwean foreign policy - would also lose much of 7 its symbolic attraction if its parameters of action were seen to be externally defined. On the other hand, a refusal publicly to recognise external constraints could lay a government open to charges of hypocrisy or incompetence. The problem for a third world government in such a situation is not therefore to reconcile its international political and economic relations, but to develop a coherent and plausible explanation for the discrepancy between them which does not at the same time diminish the regime’s credibility. This problem is admittedly felt less keenly by those governments adopting an ideological approach of non-intervention (or retreat from intervention) in the economy. Even where a government has no ideological preference for non-intervention, it may be able to invoke the strictures of a “structural adjustment programme” which will ultimately lead to more jam tomorrow. Yet given the awesome array of unmet social needs in the countries of the South, such a hands-off approach is not generally received with spontaneous enthusiasm by the local citizenry. Most governments - at least those working within systems that demand some degree of accountability to the population - will feel most pressured to reconcile their rhetoric on international affairs with domestic political and economic initiatives . That is not to suggest that they feel obliged to act on principle. The so-called rhetoric-reality gap is often evoked in a way that conflates rhetoric and principle. It is worth bearing in mind that rhetoric can equally be used to mask a diversion of action from principle. As far as international relations are concerned, Claude has spoken eloquently of the academic preference for inter-state dealings to be governed by principle. The preference is stated wistfully or plaintively, 8 he suggests, as an ideal far from realisation: “We like intellectual tidiness, the kind of regularity and uniformity permitting generalisation.”1 The effort which a government puts into developing explanations for its international behaviour may, however, simply reflect the extent to which domestic pressure exists for one and the degree to which pressure is perceived from counterparties in the network of international economic and political relations, either for overt positions on specific issues or for more general declarations in bilateral or multilateral meetings. Third world governments may tend to overestimate the importance of foreign relations to their citizens since the world stage provides public relations opportunities to demonstrate a government’s international standing. Leifer observes, for example, that: The practice of foreign policy within South East Asia has been confined to elite circles with only limited response. Where popular response has played a role in the foreign policy process, it has usually been the product of governmental initiatives which seek to utilise foreign policy for domestic political purpose.2 The case of Zimbabwe On 18 April 1980, Zimbabwe became independent. As Southern Rhodesia, it had, since 1923, officially been a self-governing British colony, but with power firmly entrenched in the hands of the white minority. Although Britain retained certain reserve powers allowing it to veto any discriminatory legislation, it never exercised them. Pressure for change grew, however, both internally, from the majority and externally, from the independent former colonies of