arab uprisings Yemen: The Final Days of Ali Abdullah Saleh? March 24, 2011 3 POMEPS Briefings Contents See Ya, Saleh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Worst and Best Case Scenarios for Yemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Bloody Days in Sanaa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Our Man in Sanaa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Yemen’s 15 Minutes of Fame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Ignoring Yemen at Our Peril . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Don’t call Yemen a “failed state” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Yemen: not on the verge of collapse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Special operations in Yemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Treating terrorism in a vacuum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 What if Obama’s Yemen policy works? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Al Qaeda Bombings, Drive-By Shootings, and Penalty Kicks? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 The Project on Middle East Political Science The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) is a collaborative network which aims to increase the impact of political scientists specializing in the study of the Middle East in the public sphere and in the academic community . POMEPS, directed by Marc Lynch, is based at the Institute for Middle East Studies at the George Washington University and is supported by the Carnegie Corporation and the Social Science Research Council . It is a co-sponsor of the Middle East Channel (http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com) . For more information, see http://www .pomeps .org . Online Article Index See Ya, Saleh http://www .foreignpolicy .com/articles/2011/03/23/see_ya_saleh Bloody Days in Sanaa http://www .foreignpolicy .com/articles/2011/03/18/bloody_days_in_Sanaa Our Man in Sanaa http://www .foreignpolicy .com/articles/2010/10/01/our_man_in_sanaa Yemen’s 15 Minutes of Fame http://www .foreignpolicy .com/articles/2010/02/26/yemens_15_minutes_of_fame Ignoring Yemen at Our Peril http://www .foreignpolicy .com/articles/2010/10/31/ignoring_yemen_at_our_peril Don’t call Yemen a “failed state” http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2010/03/30/don_t_call_yemen_a_failed_state Yemen: not on the verge of collapse http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2010/08/11/yemen_not_on_the_verge_of_collapse Special operations in Yemen http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2010/05/13/special_operations_in_yemen Treating terrorism in a vacuum http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2010/04/06/treating_terrorism_in_a_vacuum What if Obama’s Yemen policy works? http://mideast .foreignpolicy .com/posts/2010/09/22/what_if_obama_s_yemen_policy_works Al Qaeda Bombings, Drive-By Shootings, and Penalty Kicks? http://www .foreignpolicy .com/articles/2010/11/09/al_qaeda_bombings_assassinations_and_penalty_kicks 2 Yemen: The Final Days of Ali Abdullah Saleh? he thirty-three year reign of Ali Abdullah Saleh as President of Yemen appears to be T in serious jeopardy . Protests continue to spread through the country, even in the face of harsh repression . A wave of resignations from Saleh’s government suggests serious splits at the heart of the regime . The President’s offers to step down at the end of the year and to commence wide-ranging political reforms seem to be falling on deaf ears with a society which has grown skeptical after years of unmet promises . While nobody can predict how long the struggle will continue or how bloody it might become, it is becoming increasingly likely that major political change is coming sooner rather than later . The prospect of political change in Sanaa has sent tremors through Washington DC, which has relied on Saleh as a key partner in counter-terrorism, and across the Gulf . But as the Middle East Channel essays collected here suggest, this concern may be misplaced . Saleh’s regime has been as much the problem in Yemen as the solution . His regime’s corruption, insularity, political repression and cynical manipulation of the country’s fault lines have contributed to the manifold problems which have undermined Yemen’s stability and prosperity . His departure may pose a problem for counter-terrorism narrowly defined, but may in fact be a requirement for meaningfully addressing the underlying problems which render Yemen an attractive environment for al-Qaeda . These essays demonstrate powerfully the extent to which Saleh’s regime has privileged his own political survival needs over both American counter-terrorism concerns and the interests of the Yemeni people . His ongoing battle with an insurgency in the south and his ham-fisted response to the Huthi rebellion in the north both mattered far more to his regime than did the AQAP problem for which he collected international assistance . Military and security assistance aimed at AQAP was too easily redirected to his domestic political foes, often facilitated human rights abuses and political repression, and did little to combat urgent problems such as declining oil and water supplies, poverty, and unemployment . U .S . officials must now think more creatively about a future which is coming regardless of American preferences . Yemen without Saleh should not be considered an inevitably “failed state,” as Lisa Wedeen astutely notes in her Middle East Channel contribution . There is a deep reservoir of civil society, tribal networks, and NGOs upon which to construct a civil, democratic and accountable Yemeni state . International attention should not focus exclusively on terrorism and al-Qaeda, as important as such threats might be . Instead, it should seek to empower and engage a Yemeni society which has been poorly served by decades of Saleh’s rule and to help a post-Saleh government begin to seriously address these long unresolved issues . Marc Lynch, Director of POMEPS 3 See Ya, Saleh Yemen’s embattled president struggles on the brink of collapse. By Gregory Johnsen, March 23, 2011 The writing has been on the wall in Yemen for weeks . powerful Hashid confederation at a conference in the In Taiz, a highlands city of half a million, people painted northern governorate of Amran . In a fiery speech, the it on huge banners; in Sanaa they baked it into bread; young tribesman denounced Saleh as a corrupt ruler no and everywhere they chanted it: Irhal . Go . That single better than the imams that ruled north Yemen for much Arabic word has united Yemen’s fractured political of the past millennium . Behind him other men threw their opposition, turning old enemies into temporary allies membership cards from Saleh’s ruling GPC party in the and pushing President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime to dust as proof of their resignation . the brink of collapse . The president, who has remained in power for more The protest movement against Saleh’s 32 years of rule than three decades largely by deftly playing opposition has been growing since Feb . 11, when Hosni Mubarak groups off one another, attempted to stem the tide of tribal stepped down in Egypt . That day, for the first time, student defections by doling out bags of cash and distributing activists and pro-democracy demonstrators took to the complimentary cars . Hussein al-Ahmar, Hamid al-Ahmar, streets outside the umbrella of Yemen’s largest opposition and the rest of their eight brothers countered Saleh by grouping, the Joint Meeting Parties . In much the same opening their own bank accounts to tribesmen . As the way Egypt’s 1952 revolution shaped and inspired Yemen’s auction for tribal support continued in the north, the own uprising a decade later, so too has Egypt’s January protests continued to grow across the rest of the country . 25 Revolution found an echo in Yemen . In addition to demanding Saleh’s resignation, protesters are also calling In Taiz, the intellectual and activist capital of the country, for key members of his family to surrender their positions protesters gathered in the thousands, camping out in the military . downtown and entertaining each other with poetry and chants as they waited for Saleh to get the message . In fits and starts, for the past six weeks, the protests have The president tried to stay ahead of the protesters by gradually incorporated most of Saleh’s domestic opponents anticipating potential moves . Like Cairo, Sanaa has a into their ranks . Across the south, in Aden, Lahj, and al- Midan al-Tahrir -- Liberation Square . Worried about Mukalla, pro-secessionists have slowly dropped their calls the precedent from Egypt and the optics of thousands of for a separate state, at least for the moment, and gone on people demonstrating in the square, Saleh dispatched paid the record stating that their only wish is for Saleh to go . In supporters to occupy the area . Undeterred, the protesters the far north, where the president has been waging a brutal set up a tent city outside Sanaa University, dubbing it Sahat seven-year civil war against a group known popularly al-Tagheer -- the Square of Change . as the Houthis, the rebels added their voice to the mix, marching for the fall of the regime . Many of Saleh’s Increasingly desperate to disperse the protesters after parliamentary allies have deserted him as well . Some weeks of watching their numbers grow, Saleh fatally resigned with open letters to the press, while others, like miscalculated on March 18 . Shortly after noon prayers influential tribal leader Sheikh Hussein al-Ahmar, arranged on that Friday, snipers surrounding Sahat al-Tagheer their announcements for maximum publicity . opened fire, killing 52 protesters in several minutes of concentrated shooting . There had been several instances On Feb . 26, Ahmar joined several other sheikhs from the of brutal violence previously in the protests, most notably 4 Yemen: The Final Days of Ali Abdullah Saleh? in Aden, where handfuls of demonstrators have been killed made similar announcements, scrambling to avoid -- but nothing like this . Even with French warplanes in the being the last one off a sinking ship . Ahmar’s decision sky over Libya, Al Jazeera devoted hours of its coverage also reverberated through Yemen’s civilian leadership, on Friday to the horrific images of bloody corpses being as diplomats abroad and local politicians spent much of carted into mosques and hospitals near the university . Saleh’s birthday calling into Al Jazeera to announce their Most of the young men and boys had bullet holes above resignations live on the air . their eyes or in the back of their heads . Backed into a corner, Saleh dug in . He surrounded the Saleh tried to limit the damage, holding a news conference presidential palace with tanks from the Republican Guard that evening . He expressed regret at the killings, even under the command of his eldest son Ahmad and sent his calling the dead “the martyrs of democracy,” but brazenly fired, but still serving, foreign minister, Abu Bakr al-Qirbi, insisted that the opposition be blamed for the bloodshed . to Riyadh . Few in Yemen seemed convinced . Saleh also stated he was implementing a state of emergency in Yemen, a move that Ahmar’s move was a carefully calculated political decision suspends all law in the country and allows the president to designed to separate most of the Sanhan tribe from take whatever steps he deems necessary . It quickly became Saleh, Ahmad, and four of the president’s nephews, all clear that even that wasn’t going to be enough . Led by of whom hold high positions in the military . By coming Faisal Amin Abu Ras, Yemen’s ambassador to Lebanon, out in support of the protesters now, Ahmar believes he more resignations started to trickle in . Late Sunday night, can save his lucrative job as well as those of key allies, Saleh fired his entire cabinet in an effort to prevent its while letting Saleh and his five heirs take the fall for three members from resigning en masse . decades of misrule . Many of the protesters who have been demonstrating for weeks are wary of Ahmar and But the big blow came the next morning on Monday, his intentions, but appear willing to accept his support in March 21, Saleh’s 69th birthday, when Ali Muhsin al- order to get rid of Saleh . Ahmar (no relation to Hussein al-Ahmar), the commander of the 1st Armored Division and the most powerful figure The president, who still commands the loyalty of the Air in the Army, read out a statement on Al Jazeera, saying Force, most of the Republican Guard, and the Central that he supported the protesters and that his troops would Security Forces, is also counting on Saudi Arabia . He is protect them . His understated performance opened the hoping that King Abdullah is more worried about what the floodgates . Ahmar, who also commands one of Yemen’s fall of another regime in the region will mean for Bahrain four military zones, is from the president’s own Sanhan and political dissent in Saudi Arabia than he is about the tribe . For most of the past three decades, he has protected potential for chaos or armed conflict in Yemen . If March the president and his interests in the military . His defection 22’s animated speech, in which Saleh warned of civil war, was a crushing blow . Shortly after Ahmar’s statement, the is any indication, the president believes he has the Saudi commander of the eastern military zone, Muhammad Ali monarch’s support . And that makes the current standoff in Muhsin, announced his support for the protesters . Within Yemen very dangerous . minutes two commanders responsible for half the country had abandoned Saleh . Gregory Johnsen, a Ph.D. candidate in Near Eastern studies at Princeton University, Many of their colleagues followed their lead, and by writes the Yemen blog Waq al-Waq. the end of the day more than a dozen top commanders 5 Worst and Best Case Scenarios for Yemen Sheila Carapico, March 23, 2011 Yemen’s current political crisis is too fast-moving and too to public squares . Although in contrast with Tunisia, complex for anyone to predict the next turn, much less Egypt, and Bahrain they couldn’t assemble in fantastic and the final outcome . Based on recent events, however, it is photogenic numbers in a single central metropolitan area, possible to consider worst case scenarios of violence or in a half-dozen major cities and a number of small towns chaos and best case scenarios for a new social contract constituted themselves as a nationalist pro-democracy pointing towards a more democratic future . movement . They chanted the North African slogans, “Irhal” and “Isqat al-Nizam,” calling for the immediate Here’s the background to this week’s news, in a nutshell . removal of the president and his whole regime . In At least since President Ali Abdallah Salih restored response to violent attacks by purported pro-regime unity by force during a short civil war in 1994, Yemen counter-demonstrators, they mockingly turned the slogan has staggered under odious burdens of rising poverty, around: “al-nizam yurid isqat al-sha’ab:” the regime wants inequality, corruption, cronyism, political de-liberalization, the downfall of the people . economic disinvestment, and ecological degradation . In power since early 1979 in North Yemen and seemingly Notwithstanding President Salih’s vague promises of an determined to rule for life, prepare his favorite son Ahmad electoral transition in 2013, demonstrations persisted, Ali Salih as his heir, and retain a monopoly of seats for spread, and expanded . Some members of parliament, his ruling General People’s Congress in an increasingly the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC), and the impotent parliament, the President derailed a functioning administration quit in solidarity with “the youth .” Even competitive multiparty electoral process . Southerners some prominent shaykhs of the president’s own Hashid living in what had been the People’s Democratic Republic tribal confederation declared their sympathies with the (PDRY) prior to 1990, having failed in the 1994 secessionist rebels . bid, have been protesting for several years against material deprivation and military repression . Discontent simmered Last Friday, March 18, in a pitch of fury or panic someone in the former North where Ali Abdallah Salih had ruled ordered snipers to open fire on demonstrators near Sana’a since 1978, too . The regime battled a localized al-Huthi University . The next day, at least fifty lay dead, and others insurgency in Sa’ada province up towards the Saudi border, mortally wounded . In disbelief, anger, and grief, a record claiming the Zaydi Shi’a rebels were inspired by Iran . Both 150,000 marched in Sana’a’s biggest day of rage so far . the “harak” (movement) in the former South and the al- Huthi rebellion considered their grievances to be separate Senior diplomats, ministers, ruling party members, and from those of the rest of the country, and the regime civil servants resigned en masse . Most striking were successfully portrayed them as isolated, illegitimate throw- defections from within the military, long the main base backs to the PDRY and the Zaydi imamate, respectively, of Salih’s support . Most ominously for Salih, Major- that threatened the unity of the republic . But across the General Ali Muhsin (al-Ahmar), a regime stalwart and top country citizens were alienated, frustrated, and miserable . commander who pitilessly prosecuted the 1994 campaign against the South and the war against the al-Huthis, The popular revolts that toppled Tunisian and Egyptian announced his support for the demonstrators . Launching dictators in early 2011 inspired Yemenis . Bypassing a partial military revolt, he ordered his tank units to the formal opposition coalition of the so-called Joint defend the demonstrators even as the Republican Guard Meeting Parties, mostly youthful demonstrators thronged under Ahmad Salih positioned itself around the massive 6 Yemen: The Final Days of Ali Abdullah Saleh? presidential compound . The reformists are wary of a wolf It might be desirable to amend the constitution, as Salih in lamb’s clothing . himself recently offered to do by way of feeble concessions, such that the country is run by a parliamentary rather than What, then, are the possible scenarios for the coming days, a presidential system . But unlike Egypt Yemen would not weeks, or months? Quite a few are circulating already, have to change the constitution before holding elections . mostly quite dire . The mutineers could clash with the Instead of quick piecemeal amendments, Yemenis could American-armed Republican Guard led by Ahmad Ali re-constitute a contemporary version of the National Salih and other forces headed by members of the Salih Dialogue of Political Forces that held mass conferences and family . An Ali Muhsin victory would amount to a military scholarly workshops nationwide in 1993 and early 1994 coup d’etat at the hands of a new dictator no less savory and eventually offered social contract and constitutional or popular than President Salih or his son . Prolonged proposals in papers the most comprehensive of which was battle could destroy the country or collapse the state . The called the Document of Pledge and Accord . That effort, former PDRY could re-declare its sovereignty . Other which failed to thwart the 1994 civil war, could be restarted regional or tribal aspirations for autonomy could come now to engage the street protesters in a genuine civic to the fore . There could be a free-for-all reminiscent of conversation about necessary reforms and help envision a Somalia, or as in Libya rebels could take some territory national path towards more democratic, just, transparent, as the old regime unleashes its fury on the population in responsible civilian governance . those areas . It’s impossible to predict the outcome of a fight to the finish, except that more blood would be shed . This is a tall order, but it is do-able . It is the best case scenario for angry yet hopeful Yemenis who have put their Any of these outcomes would turn Yemenis’ dreams of lives on the line, for the now-beleaguered pan-Arab pro- freedom into nightmares of tyranny and/or anarchy . democracy movement, and ultimately for America . Under Other Arab reformers rooting for liberalization would its counter-terrorism strategy during the past couple be disheartened . Warfare or chaos in Yemen could also of years the US spent hundreds of millions of dollars potentially threaten the stability of neighboring Saudi bolstering a corrupt military dictatorship that backtracked Arabia, embolden radical jihadists in the Peninsula, and on reforms, muzzled the press, disregarded popular thus ultimately endanger the interests of the United States . aspirations, and resorted to extra-judicial detentions and even executions . But things don’t need to turn out badly for Yemen, its neighbors, and America . What are the alternatives? Backing an economically, politically, environmentally, Best-case scenarios seem contingent on Salih following and ethically unsustainable status quo will not make Ben Ali and Mubarak’s example rather than Qaddhafi’s . Americans safer or win hearts and minds in Arabia; it If he resigns immediately, power could be transferred will put the United States on the wrong side of history to a technocratic, civilian transitional government . and could even give comfort to our worst enemies . The New parliamentary and presidential elections could be Obama administration and other Western governments organized in a matter of months . This transition would be must announce an immediate suspension of military aid easier in some ways than Egypt’s, because there are already to the Salih government and bring all possible diplomatic organized, legal political parties in Yemen (the several pressure to bear to convince President Salih that the time JMP parties and perhaps a reconstituted GPC) . Since the has come for him to relinquish power . existing multiparty electoral process has been suspended rather than irretrievably despoiled, it could be resuscitated . Sheila Carapico is professor of political science at the University of Richmond and the American University in Cairo. 7 Bloody Days in Sanaa For Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, rising economic grievances pose a graver risk to his grip on power than al Qaeda ever did. By Barak Barfi, March 18, 2011 After more than 40 people were killed on March 18 in country . But as I argued shortly after the 2009 Christmas Sanaa, Yemen, where security forces and regime loyalists Day bombing, these challenges were unlikely to bring opened fire on protesters, the bonds that hold the down the regime . Security unrest could never really cripple delicate country together are increasingly fraying . For a land that has experienced political turmoil for a thousand years, a combination of security and economic problems years . Historical instability has rendered Yemenis largely threatened the country, yet they were never able to topple inured to a level of violence that would be considered President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government . But in recent chaos in most countries . weeks, grassroots frustrations have spurred disgruntled youth to challenge a regime that is clearly willing to use Widespread societal frustrations, not regional grievances brute force to suppress their demands . And with neither or jihadism, are at the root of the current protests . In side willing to back down, they are slowly inching Yemen a country where 65 percent of the population is under toward the abyss . 25, Yemenis are understandably more interested in finding employment and weeding out corruption than in In a society where violence is a preferred form of eliminating al Qaeda operatives in remote tribal regions . diplomacy, it should come as no surprise that Saleh New cadres of college graduates have protested outside unleashed his security forces on peaceful demonstrators . government offices in Ibb demanding jobs . Workers have In the past, tribesmen in regions hostile to the regime crippled the port in Hudaydah, calling for the resignation killed soldiers who sought water from their wells, while of superiors who grew rich at the public’s expense . clans seeking concessions from the government kidnapped foreign ambassadors to express their frustrations . In The Yemeni people’s resolve has shaken the regime, and it Yemen, politics is a blood sport . is beginning to reveal its cracks . Senior provincial officials have quit their posts . Almost two dozen parliamentarians Having witnessed the fall of three presidents -- two of have resigned from the ruling General People’s Congress whom were assassinated -- in the four years before he took party . State electric workers have gone on strike in Taiz . power, Saleh has long been prepared for threats to his rule . Even the military has not been spared . In the northern To solidify his power, he created a military that is loyal to province of Saada, where a rebellion has flared for the him rather than the state . Following the model of his long- past seven years, soldiers mutinied against their senior time ally, former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Saleh commander . The regime is hemorrhaging defections . chose a senior staff based on family ties rather than merit . Almost all top military positions are held either by his kin But more worrisome for Saleh than these desertions is the or by members of his extended Sanhan tribe . They have as ripple effect the unrest is causing among his chief backers much to lose as Saleh does if he is deposed . -- the tribes . For the first time in Saleh’s 32-year rule, most of the tribes in the two largest confederations oppose the For years, many Yemen observers argued that the president . And even among the clans that have remained dilemmas the country faced -- a secession movement loyal, such as Bayt Lahum and Banu Suraym, his support is in the south, a sectarian rebellion in the north, and a far from secure . Saleh has been able to win over the chiefs flourishing al Qaeda affiliate -- threatened to implode the with lavish financial promises and government posts, 8 Yemen: The Final Days of Ali Abdullah Saleh? but the average tribesmen, who rarely benefit from this Moreover, the Egyptian paradigm of “take the square and patronage, have turned against him . cripple the country until the president resigns” is ill-suited to a country like Yemen . Egypt is a hydraulic civilization The unrest has spread to Yemen’s financial sector as where approximately a quarter of the population lives well . Foreigners are unable to withdraw hard currency in the capital along the Nile River . So when a million from their bank accounts, and money-changers are protesters poured into downtown Cairo, they paralyzed refusing to sell U .S . dollars . Seeking to avert an economic the country . But in Yemen there are too many squares in crisis, Yemen asked its wealthy neighbors from the Gulf too many towns and villages to capture . Fewer than 10 Cooperation Council last week for $6 billion in aid . But percent of Yemen’s 25 million people live in Sanaa . Almost having earmarked $10 billion to shore up member nations 70 percent of the population lives in rural regions spread Bahrain and Oman rocked by political unrest, the council out across a vast area . may be reluctant to provide more funds to a country it often views as a poor stepsister . And though protesters have staged large demonstrations in cities such as Aden and Taiz, they have made less headway Despite their accomplishments, Yemeni protesters have a in the president’s tribal strongholds of Amran, Dhamar, long way to go before they can replicate the success of the and Khawlan . Holding these provinces is crucial to Saleh’s demonstrators in Cairo’s Tahrir Square . In Egypt, President survival hopes . Hosni Mubarak was a pharaoh -- he could ignore the opposition because he never had to consider their views . Throughout his three decades in power, Saleh has So when protests shook the pillars of his regime, he did not successfully placated both friends and adversaries with his know the very people who could throw him a lifeline . But in well-oiled patronage machine . But today’s protests are led Yemen, Saleh is little more than a tribal chieftain who has by a young generation that refuses to be bought off . Having historically relied on shifting coalitions to prop up his rule . rejected the government’s lavish financial promises, the demonstrators are not likely to flinch in the face of force More primus inter pares than despot, Saleh has always either . And in a country where conflicts are often decided by been deft at maneuvering between factions and parties . In force, more blood may spill before the standoff is resolved . fact, a number of opposition leaders currently jockeying to speak for the protesters sat in a unity government with Barak Barfi is a research fellow Saleh during the early 1990s . If Saleh’s use of force was with the New America Foundation. intended to frighten them to the negotiating table, his familiarity with these personalities and intimate knowledge of their demands may help him defuse the crisis . 9