Working with Zia Pakistan's Power Politics 1977-1988 GOlJgle Original from 01g1t1ze~ ov UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Google Ongulnl from 01g1t1zL 1,y UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Working with Zia Pakistan's Power Politics 1977-1988 s General Khalid Mahmud Arif, Nl(M), Bt ~ Karachi Oxford University Press Oxford New York Delhi 1995 Gougle 011g1nol from 01g111z •by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Yt-Q4 .t>S 3 85" 4- · A7 Oxford UniversiJy Press, Walton Street, Ox[ord OX2 6DP l) 3:i._ Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bombay 1qCJ5' Calcutta Cape 1bwn Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore 1llipei Tokyo Turonto and associated compames in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press ©Khalid Mahmud Arif 1995 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmilled, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press. This book is sold subject to the condition that ii shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser. ISBN 019 577570 8 Printed in Pakistan at The Army Press, Rawalpindi. Published by Oxford University Press 5-Bangalore Tuwn, Sharae Pc1isal P.O. Box 13033, Karachi-75350, Pakistan. Google Original from 0191t1zed by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN . "- ~f/a 1~J?~'=' :_,,:-.-,,.i. CONTENTS . Foreword IX .. Preface XVII 1. The Gathering Storm 1 2. East Pakistan Amputated 19 3. Prelude to Intervention 61 4. The Military Option 93 5. Voyage of Discovery 109 6. The Political Juggernaut 148 7. Verdict of Guilty 176 8. The Tragic End 189 9. From the Pinnacle 213 10. Interceding Links 250 11. Relations with Iran 276 12. Turmoil in Afghanistan 298 13. An Unequal Friendship 331 14. The Nuclear Ballyhoo 349 15. A Stormy Summer 385 Epilogue 410 Notes 415 Index 426 Gougle 011g1nol from 01g111z •by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Google Ongulnl from 01g1t1zL 1,y UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN ILLUSTRATIONS Between pages I I 2 and I I 3 1. The author 2. General Ziaul Haq 3. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 4. Zia receiving Bhutto 5. Bhutto reviewing parade 6. VCOAS Arif with COAS Zia 7. COS Arif with Zia and Ghulam Ishaq Khan Between pages 208 and 209 8. Bhutto at Dir 9. Bhutto's coffin being unloaded 10. Bhutto addressing a public meeting 11. Bhutto's namaz-i-janaza 12. Prime Minister Junejo with top military brass 13. Investiture ceremony 14. Presidents Zia and Carter Google Original from 0191t1zed by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN Google Ongulnl from 01g1t1zL 1,y UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN FOREWORD Scholars have long rejected Samuel Huntington's persuasive but wholly ahistorical view that the armed forces in the Third World are instruments of modernization, political stability, and economic development. Nevertheless, in Pakistan the armed forces, especially the army, are a central factor in the country's politics and thedecision making process. For much of Pakistan's history, the military has played an active role and has intervened three times to capture power. And even though it failed to institutionalize the role of the military in the formal political processes, it continues to enjoy considerable public esteem and is seen by many in Pakistan as the ultimate arbiter in the affairs of the country. In shon, an understanding of the military as a factor in Pakistan's politics is essential to a comprehension of Pakistan's post-independence history. While all Chiefs of Army Staff (COAS) in Pakistan have, in varying degrees, exercised political influence and have been seen as presi dents-in-waiting, most people perceived General Muhammad Ziaul Haq as the least likely coup-maker. His public image was that of an apolitical soldier, and if he had any political ambitions these were carefully concealed. It was perhaps his lack of charisma, his religious piety, the ostensible bluntness of a soldier, carefully cultivated an~ simplicity that seems to have so endeared him to Zulifikar Ali Bhutto that it led to his elevation as the army chief in preference to several other contenders for the job. The choice was understandable: Bhutto was ambitious and not content to be a popularly elected leader whose powers were limited by the Constitution. He wanted to monopolize power in his own hands and to reduce his political opponents to servile submission. He needed a loyal army chief who would render unquestioning loyalty to the prime minister. The choice fell on Zia because, as Bhutto confided to Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, 'he is in my pocket'. Bhutto, like most other politicians and analysts in Pakistan, greatly underestimated the shrewdness and the political acumen of Zia. Unlike Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan, Pakistan's first military ruler, Zia did not have a blueprint for capturing political power. In some ways it was thrust on him by Bhutto's misdemeanour Google Original from 0191t1zed by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN WORKING WITH ZIA and the encouragement from the leaders of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), who could not hope to oust Bhutto through the ballot and therefore viewed the military as the alternative route to power. But once in power Zia showed an uncanny ability to out manoeuvre his opponents and became Pakistan's longest serving military ruler. Zia was a master skilled tactician, and a deft survivor,~ handler of pol.itical crises. Several interrelated factors helped Zia to survive politically virtually unscathed until his death in a plane crash on 17 August 1988. It is considered flippant and perhaps unscholarly to attribute the success of a person to luck. But luck did favour Zia. Each time the man was confronted with a problem, it seems that bis stars bailed him out. The execution of Bhutto coincided with the overthrow of the Shahinshah of Iran and thereby not only removed one of Bhutto's staunchest supponers, but also greatly muted the international outcry which might otherwise have followed. In November 1979 Zia had become an international pariah, following the burning of the US embassy in Pakistan; but all his worries were wiped out when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in the following month. Zia emerged as the leader of the pro-US front-line state fighting against communism. On two other occasions, external help came to bis aid: Indira Gandhi bailed'hirn out by declaring suppon for the popular uprising in Sindh which had seriously shaken the regime; and the hijacking of a PIA plane in March 1981 by the Al-Zulfiqar group put the emerging coalition of political parties on the defensive. Zia was not just lucky; he also possessed an instinctive under standing of the political dynamics in the country. Like many other soldiers, he had contempt for politicians; however, his dislike of politicians was not a matter of military distaste for civilians but was rooted in a knowledge of the seamier aspects of their personal and public behaviour. It was the politicians who connived with him to postpone the elections because, despite their public stance, they were afraid of contesting the polls whilst Bhutto was alive. Tu them, politics was a means to 'profit and patronage' and they therefore required little persuasion to supplicate for the crumbs that fell from Zia's table. Zia was convinced that most politicians had a price; and experience confirmed his opinion that only a few were prepared to rise above their petty personal ambitions. Moreover, the hostility of the PNA leaders to Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) far outweighed the inconvenience of military rule. x Google Original from 0191t1zed by UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN