IRSH47(2002),pp.65–85DOI:10.1017/S0020859002000780 #2002InternationaalInstituutvoorSocialeGeschiedenis Whose Left? Working-Class Political Allegiances in (cid:3) Post-industrial Britain Darren G. Lilleker A romanticized view of class alignment in Britain exists that has been attacked and defended equally in academic works over the last twenty years.1Historically,theLabourPartywasseenasthedefenderofworking- class interests, though critics within the party and the British socialist movement have often questioned this notion.2 Such questions have appearedmore pertinentwith thediminutionoftheworkingclassdue to thede-industrializationoftheBritish economy.In1983AndrewGamble noted that: ‘‘The greatest threat to this underlying strength of the British labour movement are the twin trends of declining manufacturing output andrisingunemployment’’.3HearguedthatitwasthefailureoftheLabour Party to arrest these trends and ‘‘translate the overwhelming objective strength[:::]intoorganizational strengthandpoliticalleadership’’4 which hadledtothedealignmentoftheworkingclassawayfromLabour. Clearly,however,theLabourPartyhasneverenjoyedthesupportofthe working class in totality and the politics of the party have, on occasions, led sections of the working class to abandon the party.5 The fact that the Britishworkingclasshashistoricallyhadaweakpartisanattachmenttothe LabourPartyhadbeenhighlightedasevidenceofdealignmentlongbefore the 1980s. Studies of partisanship decline have illustrated that working- class dealignment has been a long-standing feature of British politics. Franklin argues that this began in the mid-1960s,6 a thesis reinforced by (cid:3) The author would like to thank Janet Foxcroft, Ros Pinder, and Teresa Thorn for their invaluableandunpaidassistancewithconductingthepilotstudies,andSteveLudlamandJames Stanyerfortheirhelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraft. 1. ForanoutlineofthedebateondealignmentseeG.Evans,‘‘ClassVoting:fromPremature Obituary to Reasoned Appraisal’’, in idem (ed.), The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in ComparativeContext(Oxford,1999),pp.1–2. 2. For example see R. Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism: A Study in the Politics of Labour (London,1972). 3. A.Gamble,‘‘TheImpactoftheSDP’’,inH.Drucker(ed.),DevelopmentsinBritishPolitics (London,1983),p.299. 4. Ibid.,p.300. 5. J.E.Cronin,LabourandSocietyinBritain1918–1979(London,1984). 6. M.N. Franklin, ‘‘Is Class Still the Basis of British Politics?’’, Strathclyde Papers on GovernmentandPolitics,2(1983),pp.1–3;M.N.FranklinandA.Mughan,‘‘TheDeclineof ClassVotinginBritain:ProblemsofAnalysisandInterpretation’’,AmericanPoliticalScience Review,72(1978),pp.523–534. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859002000780 Published online by Cambridge University Press 66 Darren G. Lilleker analysesbasedontheAlford indexes ofclass votingwhichshow asteady decline after 1966, though some highlight that dealignment only became worthyofattentionduringthe1980s.7Galliehighlightedthelinkbetween dealignment and de-industrialization by discussing the decline of class in terms of the diminution of class-consciousness.8 In arguing that the traditionalsourcesofgrievance – salariesandworkingconditions – areno longer as serious to the majority of working-class employees, he hypothesized that conflict was becoming avoidable through ‘‘social integration’’inthemodernworkplace.Thisminimizedthesocialdistance between management and workforce, allowed equal participation in decision-making, and made trade-union activists irrelevant in securing benefits for the workforce.9 Gallie’s conclusion was that the British workingclass,particularlythoseinthepost-industrialeconomy,actupon personal, rather than class-conscious motivations and no longer need representation by a party whose agenda is built upon the interests of a nonexistent stereotypical social class. Such arguments allude to the inferencethat,astheworkingclassbecamemoreaffluent,partiesclaiming to represent the working class have had to adopt policies with a broader appeal.However,Goldthorpeetal.,intheirseminalstudyofthe‘‘affluent worker’’(1969),didnotproposethatsocialdivisionsalongclasslineswere inanywaybeingeroded.Theauthorsobservedthat:‘‘inthecaseofmanual workers, a shift away from a community-oriented form of social life towardsrecognitionoftheconjugalfamilyanditsfortunesasconcernsof overridingimportance’’.10Thisindicatesthat,whilestillworking-class,the interestsofthefamilyandpersonalwealthhadbegun,asearlyasthe1960s, to inform voting behaviour. The perception that class and class-consciousness were becoming increasingly irrelevant in political terms led Tony Wright to argue that thetermclassneededtobeexchangedfor‘‘people’’.Inhishighlyplausible account of the role of the working class in British politics, he recognized that, more often than not, the working class has failed ‘‘to perform its necessaryrevolutionaryorhistoricrole’’.This,heargues,shouldnotsignal theendofsocialismbutpromptsocialiststosearchforanewconstituency consistingof‘‘thosepeopleinsearchofamorerational,secureandhuman wayoforderingsociety’’.11 Whilethisobservationisprescientintermsof thepost-1995adjustmentofBritain’s‘‘New’’Labourpartyprogramme,it is certainly not a new phenomenon. As the British working class has 7. D.Robertson,ClassandtheBritishElectorate(Oxford,1984),p.20. 8. D. Gallie, In Search of a New Working Class: Automation and Social Integration within CapitalistEnterprise(Cambridge,1978),p.295. 9. Ibid.,pp.300,308–309. 10. J.H.Goldthorpe,D.Lockwood,F.Bechhofer,andJ.Platt,TheAffluentWorkerintheClass Structure(London,1969),p.163. 11. T.Wright,Socialisms:OldandNew(London,1996),p.104. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859002000780 Published online by Cambridge University Press Political Allegiancesin Post-industrial Britain 67 historically refused to adopt the role Marxist theorists ascribed to it, it would seem that the working class has been placed on a pedestal undeservedly.WithinBritain,inthewritingsofkeytheoristsandpolitical actors,asKreigerexplains:‘‘afewcoremalemanufacturingindustrieswere allowedtostandsymbolicallyforthewholeofasegmentedandhighlysex- segregatedlaborforce’’.12 Theseindustriesbecamesymbolicbecausethey allowed‘‘anunderstandingofasharedlot’’13whichencouragedcollectivist behaviour.14 This gave an impression of unity, cohesion, and collectivity butwasactuallylimitedtocertainsectorsoftheeconomy,specificmodes of production, and centred on key trade unions. These factors are largely no longer a feature of the British political scene. The above brief discussion provides an introduction to the debate surroundingtheinfluenceofclass-consciousnessuponvotingbehaviourin anhistoricalperspective.Thisarticleseekstorevisitandquestionsomeof the assumptions of class alignment before discussing the effects of de- industrialization on the position and influence of the working class in Britainattheturnofthetwenty-firstcentury.Thestudywillbestructured in the following way. Firstly, an overview of the traditional alignment of theworkingclass;secondly,anintroductiontoBritainasapost-industrial economy, which will necessitate us rethinking various assumptions regarding the nature and composition of the working class. The third sectionofthepaperwillattempttodefinethesocioeconomicprofileofthe modern British working class and, once a broad definition of the post- industrial working class has been established, the final section can then focusuponthevotingbehaviourofthosewhocanbeclassifiedasworking- class. The main aims of this article is to examine whether class can be realisticallydescribedasafactorwhichinfluencesvotinginBritainand,if we reach a negative conclusion, develop some sense of what factors do determine voting patterns. THE WORKING CLASS IN BRITAIN: PARTISANSHIP VERSUS SELF-INTEREST Atraditional,andarguablyaratherutopian,viewofpartisanshipwouldbe that the British working class coalesced behind the Labour Party as the parliamentary force which represented their interests.15 This is highly 12. J.Kreiger,BritishPoliticsintheGlobalAge:CanSocialDemocracySurvive?(Oxford,1999), p.42. 13. A.Przeworski,CapitalismandSocialDemocracy(Cambridge,1985),p.100. 14. OnthispointseeE.O.Wright,Classes(London,1985),p.10. 15. Thiswascertainlytheviewofthekeytheoristsoftheparty,suchasSydneyWebb,Harold Laski,andG.D.H.Cole,andwassupportedbymanyontheleftofthepartywhoarguedfora more‘‘socialist’’agenda.SuchastancewouldbeexemplifiedintheworksofTonyBennand KonniZilliacus. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859002000780 Published online by Cambridge University Press 68 Darren G. Lilleker questionable.WhiletheLabourPartydidemerge‘‘fromthebowelsofthe trade union movement’’ it was hardly an easy delivery. Only just over 50 per cent of delegates voted to establish the Labour Representation Committee at the 1899 Trade Union Congress16 and it took a further ten years for the party to attract the majority of large trade unions away from the Liberal Party.17 It remained even more difficult for the Labour Partytoattractacoreelectorate.AsRalphMilibandargued:‘‘mostLabour supporters were not socialists, only anti-Conservatives. And, for those whodidnotwanttovoteConservative,therewasnoseriousalternativeto theLabourParty,justastherewasnolongeranyseriousalternativetothe Conservative Partyforthosewhowould notvoteLabour’’.18 While1945 represented the highpoint for Labour support, it also marked the watershed. Labour’s victory was underpinned by a cross-class consensus of public opinion that demanded better public services and substantial welfare reforms and believed Labour was the party to deliver; class identity arguably held little significance. Therefore we can offer the perspectiveoftheworkingclassasahighlyamorphousgroup,theinterests of which were often divided between group identity and personal economic interests. This hypothesis is substantiated by the phenomena of working-class conservatism. Surveys show that 25 per cent of the core Conservative vote19 comes from households within the lowest income bracket and, moreover, 22 per cent of Conservative Party voters count themselves as working-class. However, these are not, perhaps, those who are tradition- allyseenaspossessingaworking-classconsciousness.Asurveyconducted in1994foundthatthemajorityofthiscohortowntheirownproperty,are aspirant, oppose the closed-shop trade-union policy, have no significant view on privatization and also have strong nationalistic tendencies. They areambivalenttotheideaofthestrong‘‘nanny’’stateanddesiretheability toaccumulatewealthunhinderedbyhigh‘‘taxandspend’’governments.20 This is a significant, and arguably expanding, group whose members are currently seen as ‘‘middle Englanders’’ and who lack a strong partisan identity. The first evidence that this cohort existed was presented by Goldthorpe et al. in 1969 who argued that there was 16. A.Thorpe,AHistoryoftheBritishLabourParty(Basingstoke,1997),p.5. 17. AmajoradvancewastheaffiliationoftheMiner’sFederationofGreatBritainin1909,giving the party 88 per cent of the members of the Trade Union Congress (TUC). See Thorpe, A History,p.23. 18. Miliband,ParliamentarySocialism,p.119. 19. ThisfiguredenotesthosewhoareloyalConservativevotersratherthanworking-classvoters whomayvoteConservativeinreactiontotheLabourPartyfailingtodeliveronpromises.The majorityofsurveysandstudiesgivethefigureas25percent,thoughsomearguethattheaverage isashighas30oreven33percent. 20. P. Whiteley, P. Seyd, and J. Richardson, True Blues: The Politics of Conservative Party Membership(Oxford,1994). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859002000780 Published online by Cambridge University Press Political Allegiancesin Post-industrial Britain 69 [:::]aconsiderableshiftofworking-classsentimentawayfromLabour[:::][and] likely defectors are individuals who had looked to the advantages which a Labour Government could bring in terms of prices, full employment, social benefits and now feel cheated mainly because it is these direct personal advantagesthathavebeenwithheld.21 Twelve years prior to publication of Goldthorpe et al.’s study the Labourleadershadalsorecognizedtheneedtoappealtoabroadrangeof individualist interests. Hugh Gaitskell, Party Leader 1955–1963, told the 1957 Labour Party annual conference that a further programme of industrial nationalization had little appeal among ‘‘the so-called marginal voters, ordinary decent people who do not probably think a great deal aboutpolitics’’.Hethereforearguedthatitwouldbeagraveerrorforthe party to develop a policy based purely on ideological socialist premises, particularlyonethat:‘‘inourheartswedidnotbelievewecouldcarryout [:::] which in our hearts we believed the electorate would reject’’.22 Gaitskell firmly believed that the majority of the working class were not socialists and so would reject Labour if the party offered a socialistic manifesto. This led Butler and Rose to conclude that all Labour intrinsically asked of the electorate was to adopt the view that the party ‘‘could administer the mixed economy welfare state better than the Conservatives’’.23 The firm proof that the working class would reject a socialist Labour programme was provided at the 1983 General Election, butwecanalsopointto1970,1979andtheperiod1951–1959toreinforce thepointthattheworkingclassoftendidrejectthepoliticsoftheLabour Party. In 1983 studies show that over one-third of those who were classifiedasworking-classbytheAlfordindex,34percentand36percent respectively, voted for the Conservative Party and 21 per cent indicated thatthiswasashiftintheirvotingbehaviour.Someanalystsarguethatthis was more in reaction to Labour’s leftward trajectory than evidence of a broader pattern of dealignment, and highlight 1983 as providing the necessary proof. Heath is quoted as arguing that: ‘‘in 1983 Labour fared badly in all classes alike. [But] It remained relatively stronger in the workingclassthaninthemiddleclass – inotherwordsitremainedaclass party,butin1983itwasanunsuccessfulclassparty.’’24Class,despitebeing described as irrelevant, continues to hold some significance. In 1993 Marshall found that only 6 per cent of respondents refused to assign themselves to a social class, therefore highlighting that some form of class-consciousness existed. However, his survey also discovered that 21. Goldthorpe et al., The Affluent Worker, p. 191; see also M. Abrams, ‘‘The Lost Labour Voter’’,SocialistCommentary,(February1969),pp.4–5. 22. LabourPartyAnnualConferenceReport(1957),p.155. 23. D.E.ButlerandR.Rose,TheBritishGeneralElectionof1959(London,1960),p.17. 24. G.Marshalletal.,SocialClassinModernBritain(London,1993),p.230. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859002000780 Published online by Cambridge University Press 70 Darren G. Lilleker employment sector, housing tenure, and level of benefit dependency also featured as variables which influenced voting behaviour.25 Evidence presented by more recent polls on voting behaviour suggest that traditional Labour voters are no longer loyalists at electoral polls but have become disillusioned and so voluntarily disenfranchized. This process of disillusionment with Labour was first noted by Barry Hindess in 1971. He highlighted that: [:::]thedeterminationoflocalpolicyisnowverylargelyinthehandsof[:::][the] middle-class.[:::][D]ebateisabletocentremoreroundquestionsofmeansand lessaroundthoseofends,and[:::]forlocalornationalgovernmentactiontobe judged in terms of its promise rather than its practical consequences. [:::] The apparentgrowthofconsensusis[:::]directlyrelatedtothepoliticalisolationofa fairlysubstantialsectionofthepopulation.26 Panitch reinforced these claims, highlighting that Labour had attempted ‘‘todevelopapolicyofnationalandpartyinterestwhichwillbeacceptable toabroadrangeofsectoralorganizations’’.27Theconcerniswhichsectors will be prioritized and which will be excluded in the modern British political arena. It was the middle class that New Labour specifically targeted when adopting a market-oriented approach to electoral campaigning.28 Philip Gould,senioradvisertotheLabourPartycampaignsandcommunications strategists since 1986, described these people as: ‘‘Not disadvantaged, not privileged, not quite working-class, not really middle-class – they don’t evenhaveaname.’’29 DrawingontheDemocrats’campaignintheUnited States, Gould argued the party ‘‘need[ed] to reassert their claim to represent the majority of working [people]. The working middle class needstofigureatleastascentrallyintheparty’sidentityasthetraditional blue-collar [manual labourer] imagery’’.30 This does not mean, however, thatLabourhasabandoned,orindeedlost,whatisknown as‘‘heartland’’ support. In the 2001 General Election, key constituencies showed a substantial support for Labour, despite also evidencing voter apathy by a reduced turnout. Across the Barnsley wards, the former centre of the Yorkshire mining community and a traditional stronghold of Labour supporters, Labour gained above 60 per cent of the vote. This was mirrored in almost all the industrial heartland constituencies, the Conservative vote often struggled to top 20 per cent and the only gains 25. Ibid.,pp.249–253. 26. B.Hindess,TheDeclineofWorking-ClassPolitics(London,1971),pp.143–145. 27. L.Panitch,Working-ClassPoliticsinCrisis:EssaysonLabourandtheState(London,1986), p.57. 28. See J.Lees-Marshment,PoliticalMarketingandBritishPoliticalParties:TheParty’sJust Begun(Manchester,2001),pp.181–210. 29. P.Gould,TheUnfinishedRevolution(London,1998),p.17. 30. Ibid.,p.173. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859002000780 Published online by Cambridge University Press Political Allegiancesin Post-industrial Britain 71 in terms of percentage of votes went to the Liberal Democrats, Labour’s main opposition on the centre-left. The Labour heartland was as easily definable in the 1983 General Election, the low point for Labour voting. Those constituencies which experienced the greatest difficulties under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s neoliberal economic reforms were staunch Labour voters. These included the South Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire mining communities, Tyneside, Teeside, Liverpool, the West Midlands, Man- chester,andpartsofLondon,andcanbeclassifiedasthetraditionalcentres ofthemanufacturingandextractionindustries.BeyondtheseareasLabour struggled to hold seats that were previously regarded as ‘‘safe’’. This led many electoral analysts to argue that class dealignment was well under- way.31 However, this was not simply a case of the working class moving away from social-democratic parties; in Britain they moved away from Labour.Labour’sfailuretoarresteconomicdepression1976–1979andthe leftwarddrift1980–1983ledthepartytolosethesupportofallbutthose voters who would not under any circumstances vote Conservative. Crewe’s surveys found that the reason for this was that the majority of working-classopinion‘‘coincidedmorecloselywithConservativepolicy- stances’’.32 Crewe found a ‘‘spectacular decline in support for the collectivist trinity of public ownership, trade union power and social welfare’’.33 Therefore the working-class Conservative voting cohort increased as a result of the Labour Party’s failed economic policy and subsequentleftwardshift.Thesevoluntarilydealignedorrealignedvoters were the people who Gould would encourage the party to reorient itself towards at the 1997 General Election. However, should the realignment that occurred in 1983 be accepted as evidence of class dealignment? Saunders argued that 1983 represented a rejection of the values of the LabourPartyandevidencedtheemergenceofa‘‘cultureofconsumption’’ amongasubstantialsectionoftheworkingclass.Thisledhimtoconclude that:‘‘[w]earemovingtowardsadominantmodeofconsumptioninwhich the majority will satisfy most of its consumption requirements through private purchase’’. Here Saunders was not only discussing the family car, videorecorder, or personal stereo, but also essential welfare services. He also hypothesized that an underclass would emerge: ‘‘cast adrift on the waterlogged raft of the welfare state’’.34 This gives the impression that Saunders predicted a society of ‘‘haves and havenots’’ would emerge and 31. I.Crewe,‘‘TheLabourPartyandtheElectorate’’,inD.Kavanagh,ThePoliticsoftheLabour Party(Oxford,1982),pp.20,23.SeealsoI.Crewe,‘‘TheElectorate:PartisanDealignmentTen YearsOn’’,WestEuropeanPolitics,7(1984),pp.19–28. 32. E.Shaw,TheLabourPartySince1979:CrisisandTransformation(London,1994),p.23. 33. Crewe,‘‘TheLabourParty’’,p.37. 34. P.Saunders,SocialTheoryandtheUrbanQuestion(NewYork,1986),p.318. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859002000780 Published online by Cambridge University Press 72 Darren G. Lilleker that the majority of the former would lack any party identification. Kreiger developed this point thus: The political-electoral implications of the politics of consumption are [:::] as much behavioural as structural, the use to which they can be put in party competition depend upon the policy options that drive them, the vision of politicsthatframesthem,andthecontemporarypopularityofthepartyandthe leaderwhoenunciatethem.35 Thus, as was discussed twenty years previously in the affluent-worker thesis, politics has become contextualized within the personal circum- stances of the voter. Kreiger used the selling of council houses to emphasize his argument. The council estates, usually situated within labour-intensive industrial urban centres, were the core of Labour’s heartland support. However, with the transition from tenant to home- owner, new ‘‘anticollectivist’’ concerns became prominent. The newly empowered homeowners rejected the notion of community and class interest and embraced Thatcherite individualism. This process of gradual dealignment, due to the shifting values of working-class voters, is argued tohavestarted inthelate1960s,asconsumerism firstbecameafeature of British society, and caused an erosion of Labour’s electoral support.36 Manyarguedthatthiswasevidencedmostacutelyin1983,andclaimthat it was only when Labour rejected traditional socialist policies that the party was able to reverse the trend. Clearly a large section of the working class did reject Labour in 1983, some of whom would not return until 1997, suggesting substantial dealignment. Furthermore the use of marketing techniques, attempting toinjectthe‘‘generalwill’’intoLabourpartypolicy1995–1997througha prolonged market-research exercise, gives the impression that Labour lacked a core constituency. However, what overrides these arguments is thenotionofcompetence.Labour,post-1997,hasbeenabletocommanda largemajorityoftheelectoratewhiletheConservativesappeartohavelost a large majority of both their ‘‘heartland’’ voters and the non-aligned electorate. Labour is seen as more capable and, therefore, has currently established itself as the natural party of government. This argument is reinforced by the fact that a large percentage of the modern electorate is either apathetictoallmajorparties,oratleastdo notidentifywith either theConservativesorLabour,butvoteonthestrengthofapartiesimageof competence. Thisislinkedtoapopularizedviewthatthepartiesare‘‘too 35. J.Kreiger,‘‘Class,Consumption,andCollectivism:PerspectivesontheLabourPartyand ElectoralCompetitioninBritain’’,inF.F.Piven(ed.),LabourPartiesinPost-industrialSocieties (Cambridge,1991),pp.47–70,especiallyp.58. 36. I.Crewe,‘‘LabourForceChanges,Working-ClassDecline,andtheLabourVote:Socialand ElectoralTrendsinPostwarBritain’’,inPiven,LabourParties,pp.20–46,especiallypp.21–24. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859002000780 Published online by Cambridge University Press Political Allegiancesin Post-industrial Britain 73 similar’’, ‘‘lack a clear identity’’ and, to some, ‘‘are not ideologically driven’’.37 However, it could also be argued that the working class, due particularly to de-industrialization, has declined in numbers to such an extentthatitisnowanegligiblepoliticalforce.Thereforeallthepartiesare fighting for the support of an apolitical, middle-England cohort who are motivated purely by economic concerns and who have no ideological affinities. DE-INDUSTRIALIZATION: THE REORIENTATION OF THE BRITISH WORKER The working class is traditionally seen as the manual worker, centred within the manufacture or extraction industries. This is clearly no longer the case. As Graham and Spence highlighted, ‘‘[t]he decline of industrial manufacturing and the concurrent growth in service-sector-oriented activity have been features of change in most advanced urban economies over the last two decades’’.38 Crewe observed this process in 1991 and described the ramifications as ‘‘a smaller labour force, a smaller working class, a contraction of trade unionism, mass unemployment, and a much larger ‘peripheral’ workforce of part-time and temporary workers’’.39 Socialtrendsdatareinforcetheseclaims.In1971,54.7percentofthetotal workforce40wasclassedasmanualworkers,by1991thishadfallento37.7 per cent.41 More indicative of the level of reorientation is the fact that in 1995 only 17.6 per cent of the total workforce worked within the manufacturing industry, a figure which included those employed in specialized manufacturing such as pharmaceuticals. Additionally only 1 per cent worked in energy-supply industries, which includes extraction, and3.9percentintheconstructionsector.Thismeansthatthetraditional working class industries employed an average of only 22 per cent of the workforce.42 So where do the British people work in the post-industrial economy? Twenty-four per cent work in the distribution, and hotels and 37. Commentsmadebythoseinterviewedwhorespondedthattheydidnotintendtovote,or hadnotvoted,in2001.SeeTheGuardian(8June2001)andTheDailyTelegraph(8June2001). Theseresponseswerealsorecordedbylocalnewspaperjournalists:see,forexample,Leicester Mercury(5June2001),p.10;ibid.,(6June2001),pp.4–5.Whilethoseinterviewedobviously cannotreflectarepresentativesampleofallnonvoters,theyareindicativeoftheopinionsheldof themajorpartiesatthattime. 38. D. Graham and N. Spence, ‘‘Contemporary Deindustrialisation and Tertiarisation in the LondonEconomy’’,UrbanStudies,32(1995),p.885. 39. Crewe,‘‘LabourForceChanges’’,p.25. 40. Thisincludesfull-timeandpart-timeworkers,maleandfemaleproductiveunitsandcovers everyindustry. 41. Censusrecords,SocialTrendsDataset:ST30A2;PercentageofManualWorkers1911–1991. 42. Figures use data for 1995, 1996, and 1997, See Office for National Statistics, Annual EmploymentSurveyRevised:EmploymentAnalysis1995–1997,DatasetAES95–97. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859002000780 Published online by Cambridge University Press 74 Darren G. Lilleker restaurants categories, within which are included the retail and wholesale trade and the majority of leisure-related services: hotel, restaurant, and licensed bar staff particularly. Eighteen per cent work within the finance sector (43 per cent of this cohort are classed as skilled), though the remaining 57 per cent come under the category of other business-related activities. This category mainly includes clerical staff attached to the financeindustry,inparticularcall-centreworkers,thesectorreferredtoby Third-WayintellectualCharlesLeadbeateras:‘‘thefactoriesofthemodern service economy’’.43 The other large category is public administration, employing 25 per cent of the workforce:the majority ofthese employees areskilledineducativeorsocial-workskills,but22percentareclassified as routine administrative staff. ThesedramaticchangesinthestructureoftheBritisheconomyoccurred between 1970 and 1980, and had serious political repercussions. The overall levels of employment had dropped steadily from 1966 due to a contractionin manufacturing,theservice industrywas able tooffer some relief to the employed but became the employer for a greater number of women than men.44 The decline of manual industry caused a general uneaseamongemployeesintheheavyindustries – fuelextractionandsteel manufacture – particularly as working conditions and real-wage levels begantodecline.Inmanyindustriesantagonismbetweenmanagementand workerswascharacterizedasabattleovershopfloorcontrol.Theworking classessoughtguaranteesovertenureandwageincreasesabovethelevelof inflation,butunderpinnedthesewithdemandsforworkplacedemocracy. Those manual workers who felt their personal circumstances were most under threat equally recognized that the Labour party was both ill- equippedandill-preparedtoarrestsocialchangeinfavouroftheworking class. Thus the increase of militancy, in the workplace and within the Labour party, was an attempt to gain true working-class power. Those workers who felt that they could adapt to a service economy rejected the politics of the Left and embraced the individualism of Conservative politics. These members of the working class, and their descendants, are themodernera’sfloating,ornonaligned,voters.Theirpoliticalallegiances are no longer defined by their employment and though, as we shall see, they face an even more uncertain future as a member of the fragmented working class in an unstable service economy they are, as Cronin observed: ‘‘more self-confident and assertive, less inclined to accept the dismally low standards of the past and quite intolerant towards the pretensions and authority of employers, trade union officials and the state’’.45 43. C.Leadbeater,LivingonThinAir(London,2000),p.61. 44. Cronin,LabourandSociety,p.195. 45. Ibid.,p.208. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020859002000780 Published online by Cambridge University Press