Women before the qāḍī under the Abbasids Mathieu Tillier To cite this version: Mathieu Tillier. Women before the qāḍī under the Abbasids. Islamic Law and Society, 2009, 16, pp.280-301. ￿halshs-00582725￿ HAL Id: halshs-00582725 https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00582725 Submitted on 4 Apr 2011 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. 1 Women before the qāḍī under the Abbasids by Mathieu Tillier (University of Oxford) Abstract: In this article, I examine the appearance of Muslim women before the judge during the Abbasid period (132-334/750-945), both in theory and practice. The cases involving women found in law books suggest that they came freely to the court, especially for familial or marital purposes, and that the judges employed some women as court auxiliaries. However, a comparison of judicial manuals and the biographical literature shows that a woman’s appearance before the judge could create a social disturbance and that not all women were allowed to appear in court. I argue that the social distinction between those who could leave their houses – and thus come before the judge – and those who could not correlated with the social hierarchy. Based on Islamic court registers (sijillāt), several specialists in Ottoman history have analyzed the social and gender distribution of the litigants who appeared before the qāḍī, the Islamic judge. Some studies show that women represented a non-negligible percentage of the litigants – often more than ten percent.1 Unfortunately, because of the lack of documents for the first centuries of Islam, researchers cannot reach precise results.2 Judicial practices can be studied only through literary sources, like biographical dictionaries and law compendia. I wish to thank David Powers, Christopher Melchert and Karen Bauer for their comments on a previous draft of this article. 1 One of the first quantitative studies of women in Ottoman courts was undertaken by R. C. Jennings, “Women in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records – The Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri,” JESHO, 18 (1975), 53-114. See also Y. J. Seng, “Invisible Women: Residents of Early Sixteenth-Century Istanbul,” in G. R. G. Hambly, Women in the Medieval Islamic World. Power, Patronage, and Piety (London, MacMillan, 1998), 241- 68. For a review of studies on women under the Ottomans, see I. Agmon, “Women’s History and Ottoman Sharia Court Records,” Hawwa, 2 (2004), 175 ff. 2 The main exception is represented by the documents of the Geniza, which allowed S. D. Goitein to analyze the phenomenon of Jewish women appearing in the rabbinical court of Fusṭāṭ, mostly during the 11th and 12th centuries. S. D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society. The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza (Berkeley-Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1967-93), 3:332-6. 2 Nevertheless, the frequent appearance of women in the available sources suggests that the situation was not very different in early Islam. Muslim women reportedly were confined to private space, while public space was reserved for men. The qāḍī’s tribunal, usually held in the chief mosque of the city, served as public space par excellence: anyone could attend it, enter a complaint, or simply hear others’ complaints. It is necessary to investigate the sources in an effort to reconstruct the actual position of women at the qāḍī’s court. An exploration of the legal literature reveals what kinds of cases involving women were expected to be brought before the qāḍī. I rely especially on the Iraqi al-Khaṣṣāf (d. 261/874), a Ḥanafī jurist who, in the middle of the ninth century, wrote an important adab al-qāḍī manual, and on its tenth-century commentary by al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980). In fact, these two works can hardly be separated: al-Khaṣṣāf’s original text is included in al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s commentary. I will argue that, despite the absence of legal restrictions on the appearance of women before a judge, the prevailing social norm discouraged some women from appearing in court, and that gender issues must be viewed within their specific social context. 1. Legal cases involving Muslim women 1.1. Women as litigants Women appear frequently in law books about family matters. Ḥanafī jurists discuss several types of cases in which women might be involved in a lawsuit. The first category deals with personal status, that is, cases relating to marriage and divorce. A man could allege, for example, that a woman was his wife.3 As al-Khaṣṣāf explains, a woman whose husband went on a long journey and did not return may have remarried; then the first husband might come back and claim that he is her legal husband.4 Other cases come to mind: David Powers mentions the case of a woman in the fifteenth- century Maghrib who fled from her husband and remarried in a neighboring village.5 A woman also could allege that a man was her husband.6 Women were more often involved in 3 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, ed. Farḥāt Ziyāda (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1978), 138, 378, 419, 531. 4 Ibid., 379. 5 D. S. Powers, “Four Cases Relating to Women and Divorce in al-Andalus and the Maghrib, 1100-1500,” in M. K. Masud et al., Dispensing Justice in Islam. Qadis and their Judgments (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2006), 402. 6 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 531. 3 divorce lawsuits. A woman who wanted to be separated from her husband might claim that he had repudiated her three times,7 or she might claim that her marriage was null and void.8 A husband could ask the judge to nullify his marriage if his wife suffered from a crippling defect like madness or severe illness (e.g. baraṣ, leprosy).9 The second category relates to material claims on a husband. Several kinds of cases can be singled out. (1) A woman might complain about the dower (mahr): although the claimant was usually the wife’s father, the judge could summon the wife to ask her about her father’s claim.10 (2) She could complain about the nafaqa or maintenance allowance provided by the husband for his wife’s daily needs. Women filed complaints against husbands who did not provide them with enough money or equipment,11 or who had to go on a journey of several months, and they asked the qāḍī to appoint a guarantor (kafīl) who would be responsible for paying their nafaqa.12 Alternatively, a woman could ask her brother or another relative to pay her nafaqa. If her husband disappeared, she could go to the qāḍī and ask him to appoint an agent (wakīl) to manage the husband’s property and pay her the nafaqa. (3) A woman could ask for material commodity, like new dresses,13 or ask for the employment of a cook.14 (4) Finally, some divorced women appeared before the judge to receive permission to take their children away from their father to another city.15 Another category is sexual intercourse. A wife might accuse her husband of engaging in illicit sexual relations with another woman (zinā).16 The jurists commonly dealt with the case in which one of the spouses could not or did not fulfill his or her sexual obligations. For example, a woman complained that her husband had sworn not to touch her and respected this oath for four mouths (īlā). In this instance, the qāḍī could impose a divorce between them.17 Sexual incapacity was also the subject of lawsuits: divorce was automatic if the wife was 7 Ibid., 138, 343, 377. 8 Ibid., 379. 9 Ibid., 344. 10 Ibid., 622, 626, 628. 11 Ibid., 646 ff. 12 Ibid., 645. 13 Ibid., 660. 14 Ibid., 650. 15 Ibid., 690. 16 Ibid., 341. 17 Ibid., 165. Cf. D. S. Powers, “Four Cases,” 395. 4 physically incapable of sexual intercourse.18 More frequently, however, jurists deal with the incapacity of men: according to Ḥanafī law, the qāḍī should pronounce the divorce immediately if a husband appears to be castrated.19 If he was sexually impotent, the qāḍī instituted a long procedure (sometimes lasting more than a year) to determine whether or not he would regain his sexual potency. If the wife proved that her husband was impotent, she was given the choice of remaining married or divorcing him.20 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ explains that sexual intercourse is a wife’s right.21 Although in theory Islamic law restricts a woman’s capacity to ask for divorce, the cases relating to sexuality suggest that some women used judicial strategies to obtain it. This hypothesis is confirmed by al-Subkī, who relates how a woman obtained a divorce after complaining that her husband’s penis was too large (shakat ilay-hi imra’a kubr ālat zawji-hā).22 An ill-treated woman might file a complaint against her husband. In Ḥanafī law, a woman cannot obtain a divorce if her husband harms her.23 However, according to al-Jaṣṣāṣ, the qāḍī must prevent her husband from abusing her.24 He can order a man to let his wife live in the house of respectable neighbors (ṣāliḥīn) who will inform the qāḍī about the husband’s behavior with his wife. If it appears that he is in fact maltreating her, the qāḍī will reprimand him or sentence him to physical punishment.25 According to Maribel Fierro, such a procedure, found also in Maghribī Mālikī law, may have originated in local Berber customs.26 The mention of this procedure in early Ḥanafī law, however, suggests that this practice originated in the east or, at least, was widespread in the Islamic empire from an early period. 18 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 643. 19 Ibid., 643. 20 Ibid., 633-34. Cf. D. S. Powers, “Four Cases,” 396; N. Hentati, “L’iʿdhār : une procédure judicaire dans le droit musulman,” ILS, 13 (2006), 400-1. 21 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 632. 22 Al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-shāfiʿiyya l-kubrā, ed. M. M. al-Ṭanāḥī and ʿA.-F. M. al-Ḥulw (Cairo: Hajr, 1413 H.), 3:452. For a different opinion, see Th. Bianquis, La famille arabe (Bruxelles: Complexe, 2005), 34. 23 For the position of Mālikī jurists on this issue, see M. Marìn, “Disciplining Wives: A Historical Reading of Qur’ân 4:34,” Studia Islamica, 97 (2003), 31 24 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 652. 25 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 652. 26 M. Fierro, “Ill-Treated Women Seeking Divorce: the Qur’ānic two Arbiters and Judicial Practice among the Malikis in al-Andalus and North Africa,” in M. K. Masud et al., Dispensing Justice in Islam, 344. 5 Finally, women were involved in lawsuits about inheritance,27 kinship (for example if a woman claims that a foundling is her brother and asks the judge to entrust her with the child),28 or criminal matters (murder or illegal sexual intercourse).29 Al-Khaṣṣāf relates the story of a young woman who, upon reaching puberty, asked the qāḍī for permission to choose which of her divorced parents she would live with.30 On the whole, most of the cases involving women in al-Khaṣṣāf’s Adab al-qāḍī are related to family law and personal status. Al-Khaṣṣāf refers to women when their gender is essential to the substance of the case. However, he does not cite women involved in lawsuits where their gender is immaterial, as commercial litigations. Al-Khaṣṣāf’s Adab al-qāḍī, thus, reflects only women’s involvement in typically female cases, and leaves in the dark their possible participation in other types of lawsuits. 1.2. Women as auxiliaries in the qāḍī’s court The qāḍī’s court was not reserved exclusively for men. Many familial matters compelled the judge to use female auxiliaries. He needed female judicial experts to investigate women’s virginity or pregnancy, their sexual defects, and matters relating to hidden parts of the female body (like abortion, birth and suckling); this type of expertise was commonly recommended in lawsuits about female slaves, e.g., when a buyer accuses the seller of fraud.31 Such experts would determine if a young girl was physically capable of engaging in sexual relations before she got married,32 or would examine young wives who reportedly were incapable of engaging in sexual relations.33 According to al-Khaṣṣāf and al-Jaṣṣāṣ, several women might act as experts for the same case. The status of a female expert’s word and its value before the judge is striking. Usually, male Muslim experts are recognized as witnesses, and their word is considered as a testimony 27 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 398, 404. 28 Ibid., 532. 29 Ibid., 349. 30 Ibid., 690. 31 Ibid., 178, 558, 561, 562. 32 Ibid., 629. 33 Ibid., 630, 633. See R. Shaham, “Women as Expert Witnesses in Pre-Modern Islamic Courts,” in R. Shaham (ed.), Law, Custom, and Statute in the Muslim World. Studies in Honor of Aharon Layish (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2007), 49-63. Cf. D. Serrano, “Rape in Maliki Legal Doctrine and Practice (8th-15th Centuries C.E.),” Hawwa, 5 (2007), 178-9. 6 (šahāda) or information (khabar).34 According to al-Jaṣṣāṣ, however, a woman’s word cannot cancel a contract, and her statement must be treated as a claim (daʿwā). For this reason, a litigant who disagrees with her may swear that she is wrong. The judge considers him innocent and the woman’s word is rejected.35 According to some Ḥanafī jurists, however, virginity, pregnancy and menstruation can be established only by female experts, and their word must always be recognized as valid in these matters.36 Al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090) tends to recognize women’s expertise as authentic testimony. He defines a female’s report concerning the intimate parts of another female as information (khabar), similar in nature to a report going back to a single authority (al-āḥād); but it is also a testimony (shahāda), as she must be a free Muslim and use the formulary “I testify” (ashhadu) in the judicial proceeding. Moreover, her word is binding, as the qāḍī bases his judgment on it.37 In addition, the qāḍī employed women as auxiliaries when a defendant (male or female) refused to appear in court and hid at home. He had to send two trustworthy men with several women and servants (khadam): the male auxiliaries would encircle his house and prevent anyone from leaving, while the women and the servants would enter the house, drive away its female inhabitants and look for the defendant. If they found him, they compelled him to appear at the qāḍī’s court.38 Thus, women were needed to enter the private space of the house, which had to remain hidden from the eyes of any man outside the inner circle of the family.39 Women also investigated female witnesses in an effort to determine whether they were trustworthy and honorable. According to al-Khaṣṣāf, only women who are used to mixing with people in the public sphere can conduct this type of investigation.40 34 J.-P. Van Staëvel, “Savoir voir et le faire savoir : l’expertise judiciaire en matière de construction, d’après un auteur tunisois du 8e/XIVe siècle,” Annales Islamologiques, 35 (2001), 654. 35 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 558. 36 Ibid., 560. Cf. M. Fadel, “Two Women, One Man: Knowledge, Power and Gender in Medieval Sunni Legal Thought,” IJMES, 29 (1997), 195. 37 R. Shaham, “Women as Expert Witnesses,” 48-49. 38 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 252. See F.J. Ziadeh, “Compelling Defendant’s Appearance at Court in Islamic Law,” Islamic Law and Society, 3 (1996), 310. 39 On the private status of the house, which could not be entered legally without permission, see E. Alshech, ““Do Not Enter Houses Other Than Your Own”: the Evolution of the Notion of a Private Domestic Sphere in Early Sunnī Islamic Thought,” Islamic Law and Society, 11 (2004), 295ff. This procedure suggests that al- Khaṣṣāf still held the interventionist view of the Ḥanafī Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798) who, unlike the jurists of other madhhabs, allowed entering the house without the permission of its inhabitants. Ibid., 298. 40 Ibid., 314, 422; see also al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 314. 7 Finally, a woman might serve as trustworthy agent (amīn) to look after another woman, usually a slave, who claimed to be free, or when two litigants claimed to be her legal owner. The qāḍī entrusted the slave girl to a female agent in order to prevent her from having sexual intercourse with one of the two litigants until the resolution of the case.41 This procedure might also involve a free woman who claimed that she had been repudiated three times, in order to take her away from her husband before the qāḍī formally pronounced the divorce.42 These cases show that the judiciary needed female auxiliaries who might intervene in all situations in which there was a violation of the ḥaram – the domestic, private or female space – forbidden to any man outside the inner circle of the family. In theory, Ḥanafīs even recognized a woman’s right to be a qāḍī.43 Indeed, in the first Ḥanafī adab al-qāḍī books, women were to a large extent integrated into the court. They appeared in this literature both as plaintiffs and as judicial auxiliaries. 2. Looking for the archetypal female litigant The fact that fiqh books devote considerable attention to women appearing in court leads us to wonder whether religious models contributed to the shaping of legal theory. Few if any explicit injunctions calling on women to appear in the qāḍī’s court are found in the fiqh literature. Although the jurists do not mention any explicit model, implicit models may 41 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 377. 42 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 377. Cf. M. Fierro, “Ill-Treated Women,” 338. 43 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in al-Khaṣṣāf, Adab al-qāḍī, 354. Whereas Ḥanafīs limited women’s adjudication to non-ḥudūd cases, al-Ṭabarī allowed them to adjudicate any dispute. The Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs held that only men can serve as judges. Al-Māwardī, al-Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya (Constitutiones Politicae), ed. M. Enger (Bonn: Adolphus Marcus, 1853), 107-8; id., Adab al-qāḍī, ed. Muḥyī Hilāl al-Sarḥān (Baghdad: Maṭbaʿat al-irshād, 1971), 1:625- 8; Ibn Qudāma, al-Mughnī, ed. ʿAbd Allāh b. ʿAbd al-Muḥsin al-Turkī and ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ al-Ḥulw (Cairo: Hajr, 1986-90), 14:12-13 (I owe this reference to Christopher Melchert). Byzantine law also excluded women from serving as judges. J. Beaucamp, “Les femmes et l’espace public à Byzance : le cas des tribunaux,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 52 (1998), 132. Despite the theoretical recognition of women serving as judges in Ḥanafī law, E. Tyan found only one female judge in Islamic pre-modern history: Thaml/Thumal was appointed at the maẓālim court in 306/918-19, under al-Muqtadir. E. Tyan, Histoire de l’organisation judiciaire en pays d’Islam (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960), 162; see also Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntaẓam fī tawārīkh al-mulūk wa’l-umam, ed. Suhayl Zakkār (Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1995), 8:12; N. M. El-Cheikh, “The Qahramâna in the Abbasid Court: Position and Functions,” Studia Islamica, 97 (2003), 52-53. 8 nevertheless have shaped mentalities. We will concentrate here on two examples taken from the Qur’ān and the Sīra. First, the Qur’ān exhorts the Muslim community to resort to justice when a married couple is confronted with discord: “If you fear dissension between a married couple, send forth an arbiter from his family and an arbiter from her family. If they desire reconciliation, God will bring them together. God is All-Knowing, All-Discerning.” (Q. 4:35)44 According to Maribel Fierro, this verse “was never understood to refer to every case of marital discord, given the husband’s right to repudiate his wife that is clearly established in other Qur’ānic verses.”45 The exhortation was understood in the context of Q. 4:34, which allows the husband to take action against his wife if she disobeys him: “if after having been admonished, banished and beaten, the rebellious wife still does not obey the husband, then the two arbiters should be appointed. Presumably, it is the husband who asks for arbitration because, for whatever reason, he has no desire to divorce his rebellious wife.”46 However, jurists also understood this rule as “a mechanism for a wife to seek a judicial divorce on the ground of harm.” 47 Q. 4:35 was revealed in an Arabian context where there were no state institutions such as the office of qāḍī. The Qur’ān mentions two ḥakams or arbiters chosen by the litigants, who determine whether they should stay married or divorce.48 This understanding of Q. 4:35 is reported by al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923). At the end of the 3rd/9th century, however, the sulṭān or his delegate was probably the main supervisor of the procedure: the litigants had to complain before him, and he had to choose the two ḥakams if he lacked a clear understanding of the situation of the spouses. Here, the ḥakams act as agents (wakīls) who negotiate an agreement between the litigants.49 If the spouses refuse to invest them with the power of decision, they intervene as experts or witnesses before the sulṭān to determine which of the spouses is at fault.50 As Fierro has shown, when this procedure was enforced in practice, it was usually the 44 Translation by Tarif Khalidi, The Qur’an (London: Penguin Classics), 2008, 67. 45 M. Fierro, “Ill-Treated Women,” 325. 46 Ibid., 325. The commentators explain that the “rebellion” of the wife may be caused by the conduct of her husband, or by too small a nafaqa. See references infra. 47 Ibid., 326. 48 See Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778?), Tafsīr al-Thawrī (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1403 H.), 94-95. 49 This corresponds to the Ḥanafī doctrine, which considers the ḥakamān to be mere agents of the spouses. Therefore, their decision is not binding. According to the Mālikīs, however, the arbiters are entitled to impose a divorce. Fierro, “Ill-Treated Women,” 329, 331. 50 Al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr (Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1404 H.), 5:70-71, 75-76. Cf. Muqātil b. Sulaymān, Tafsīr Muqātil b. Sulaymān, ed. A. Farīd (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya), 2003, 1:228. 9 qāḍī who appointed the two ḥakams:51 this suggests that the litigants had already brought suit before the qāḍī. Whatever the modes of application of this procedure may have been in time and space, the Qur’ān itself was regarded as encouraging both men and women to seek justice. The commentators explain that other verses are related to a judicial context. According to al-Ṭabarī, Q. 58:1ff. were revealed when an Anṣārī woman (named Khawla or Khuwayla)52 came to the Prophet and asked him about her marital situation after her husband told her that “her back was like his mother’s back” (a case of ẓihār). In one narrative, al-Ṭabarī compares the situation to that of a trial in which the Prophet was supposed to act as a judge and to deliver a judgment (fa-yaqḍī fiyya wa-fīka amra-hu).53 In addition to this Anṣārī woman, the example of some early Muslim women may have encouraged women to appear in court. It is well known that Arab women held an important political and religious position in early Islam, especially when they belonged to noble families.54 Of the many women who played an important role in early Islamic politics, three of them may have influenced women’s position in the legal sphere. (1) Khadīja, Muḥammad’s first wife, is remembered as an independent woman who managed her business affairs by herself. Although her model does not seem to have influenced women’s legal status in Islam, her independence may have encouraged women to undertake judicial actions before the qāḍī, especially in case of business litigations. (2) ʿA/’isha, the youngest of Muḥammad’s wives, is an ambiguous character: she appears simultaneously as the archetypal child-wife “that God offered to the pious mature man”55 and as the woman who opposed ʿUthmān and revolted against ʿAlī, the fourth caliph. During the first years of her marriage to the Prophet, she was accused of illegal sexual intercourse (the so-called “lie case”, ifk).56 Strictly speaking, this was not a judicial case, as there was no 51 M. Fierro, “Ill-Treated Women,” 330. 52 On the disagreements about her nasab, see al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr, 28:1. Cf. Muqātil b. Sulaymān, Tafsīr, 3:329. 53 Al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr, 28:5. Earlier tafsīrs, however, do not treat the mujādila as a plaintiff in a trial, but rather as a woman seeking the opinion of the Prophet. See Muqātil b. Sulaymān, Tafsīr, 3:329. 54 See for example N. Abbott, “Women and the State in Early Islam,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 1 (1942), 106-126. 55 Th. Bianquis, La famille arabe médiévale, 86. 56 See Ibn Hishām, al-Sīra l-nabawiyya, Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 2001, 674 ff; EI2, s.v. ʿA/’isha bint Abī Bakr (W. M. Watt); D. A. Spellberg, Politics, Gender, and the Islamic Past. The Legacy of ʿA’isha bint Abi Bakr (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 61 ff.