Why Can’t Anything Be Done? Measuring Physical Readiness of Women for Military Occupations Paper presented at the 2011 International Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society Chicago, Illinois 21-23 October 2011 Dr. William J. Gregor Professor of Social Sciences School of Advanced Military Studies US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 The opinions expressed in this paper are those of Dr. William J. Gregor and are not the views of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, or the School of Advanced Military Studies. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ 2 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 3 A HOST OF REVIEWS .................................................................................................................. 4 USE OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 1982............................................................................ 5 THE ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 1992 ................................................. 6 KASSEBAUM-BAKER AND CONGRESS 1997-1998 ............................................................ 8 THE ONLY PERFORMANCE STANDARD .............................................................................. 10 COMBAT REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................................................... 13 MEASURING PHYSICAL CAPACITY ...................................................................................... 14 ARMY ROTC APFT PERFORMANCE .................................................................................. 17 THE PERFORMANCE GAP .................................................................................................... 21 MILITARY PERFORMANCE ..................................................................................................... 28 REMEMBERING MILITARY READINESS .............................................................................. 28 BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 32 APPENDIX A: Trends in ROTC APFT Performance 1992-2000 ................................................ 35 APPENDIX B: Discussion of Impact of New 1998 APFT Standards on Cadet APFT Scores (Presented to Cadet Command June 1998).................................................................................... 37 2 INTRODUCTION “After seven years of the all-volunteer armed forces and almost as many years of debate over the role of women in the military, one might ask why anyone would seek to add a single additional syllable to this deeply emotional, frequently acrimonious discussion.” That sentence opened an article entitled “Women, Combat, and the Draft”1 published in a book entitled Defense Manpower Planning: Issues for the 1980’s. The title of the article reflected the then important legal and political argument of whether in reestablishing Selective Service Registration Congress was required to register women as well as men. However, why is the question just as apt today, some 30 years later? Why after some 30 years are the Congress, the Army, and the public still wrestling with the role of women in the military? Just as was the case in 1980, it is unlikely that any new article is going to move the front lines in this policy struggle. Nevertheless, at the risk of becoming yet another casualty in the war of words, it seems useful to revisit the questions posed in “Women, Combat and the Draft,” even if the product is only a litany of what we have failed to learn. Fortunately, a review of the government’s efforts to develop appropriate policy for the assignment of women in the armed forces is not as drab as that, though it is depressing. The story is depressing because the episodic policy reviews have focused more on the social dimensions of the force than on the functional requirements and, thus, the reviews have not advanced the Services’ understanding of how best to train and employ the force. The recently published report of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission, From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military is yet one more example of social engineering to make the force look right, but will it work right? Hence, the purpose of this article is once again to illuminate the questions that ought to have answers and to ask why can’t anything be done? 1 William J. Gregor, “Women, Combat and the Draft: Placing Details in Context,” in William J. Taylor, Jr. and Eric T. Olson, ed., Defense Manpower Planning: Issues for the 1980’s (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Press, Inc., 1981), 34. 3 A HOST OF REVIEWS When “Women, Combat, and the Draft” was written, there was little evidence upon which to base policy for the assignment of women in the armed forces. The 1977 Department of Defense background study, The Use of Women in the Military, set as its goal to avoid emotionalism and to report what information was available and where DoD could expect to be in five years.2 However, the study addressed only military manpower requirements and projections for expanding the percentage of women in the military. The issue of individual performance was not addressed. Curiously, in retrospect, the Use of Women in the Military established what have become the unchanging boundary of the policy debate. Although the study opened with the usual piety, “To put this study in context, one must remember that the overriding issue is maintaining the combat effectiveness of the armed forces.”3 It immediately stated the reasons for increasing the role of women in the military: the movement in society to provide equal economic opportunity for women and to meet the manpower needs of the all-volunteer force in the face of a declining youth population. The record now shows that the social concern for equality has dominated policy-making to such extent that the collection and evaluation of performance data, individual and collective, has been either overlooked or slighted. The policy reviews that have occurred have been occasioned largely by serious social problems in the training base and field or by flamboyant assessments of military operations. However, in no instance has performance data ever trumped the social concern for progress toward equality. That is not to say that the policy reviews did not invite testimony and collect performance data, only that the issues of performance, especially in the land forces, were discounted when decisions were made. However, in contrast to many of the previous reviews, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission 2 Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics), The Use of Women in the Military, 2nd Ed. (Washington, D.C., September 1978), 1. 3 Ibid. 4 limited its attention entirely to social concerns, even noting that military eligibility requirements present a structural barrier to service.4 Thus, the diversity commission findings are devoted totally to achieving the commission’s ideal representation of women and minorities in the military, performance requirements notwithstanding. They want the military to look right, whatever that means? USE OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 1982 A 1976 Government Accounting Office Report, “Job Opportunities for Women in the Military: Progress and Problems,” recommended that each Service develop physical standards for its jobs and standards for measuring strength, stamina, and other job requirements.5 Two years later an Army study observed, “The current lack of established performance standards, un- validated critical tasks, and the absence of a system for measuring potential against standards precludes reliable determination of the physical capabilities soldiers of either sex must possess to do their job.”6 Nevertheless, the Army did not address the matter again until 1982. Unlike the 1977 DoD background study, the 1982 Women in the Army Policy Review guided its work by two different principles. First, the review stated that the personnel policies must support fully combat readiness, and second, those policies should maximize the soldier’s contribution to the Army’s mission.7 The policy review recommended implementing a Military Enlistment Physical Strength Capacity Test (MEPSCAT) that would be used to match recruits to the physical demands of their jobs.8 The Women in the Army Policy Review reported that only 8 per cent of women were 4 Military Leadership Diversity Commission, FROM REPRESENTATION TO INCLUSION: Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century (Arlington, VA: March 15, 2011), 47. 5 Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Women in the Army Policy Review (Washington, D.C., 12 November 1982), 2. 6 Department of the Army, Evaluation of Women in the Army (Washington, D.C., March 1978), 1- 18. 7 Women in the Army Policy Review, 3. 8 Ibid., 9. 5 capable of performing jobs in the heavy work category; i.e., frequent lifting of over 50 pounds and occasionally lifting of 100 pounds.9 Nevertheless, the study observed that 42 per cent of all Army women were assigned to a heavy work MOS. In other words, many of the women in 1982 were assigned to military specialties in which they could not physically perform the required work. Implementing MEPSCAT would have aligned women with appropriate specialties but it would have excluded women from a large number of specialties. The recommendations were not implemented. Setting physical performance standards based on military job requirements interfered with the expansion of the role of women in the military, so the idea was shelved. THE ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 1992 Success in the 1991 Gulf War spawned another review of the assignment of women in the military. The collective success of the military enterprise was seen as evidence that individual performance anywhere on the battlefield had also been superior. While this conclusion is logically insupportable, that did not deter a Democrat Congress intent on using the war outcome to justify increasing social equality. The Congress repealed most of the statutory restrictions on the assignment of women in the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force in December 1991. However, the expansion of the role of women was temporarily stalled by a call to appoint a Presidential Commission to investigate changes to policy on the assignment of women in the armed forces. The Commission’s report, published November 15, 1992, finessed the intractable problem of female physical performance. The commissioners voted 12 to 0, with one abstention, to recommend that the Services retain gender-specific physical fitness tests to promote general wellness10 and they voted unanimously, 14-0, to recommend that the Services adopt gender- 9 Ibid., 2-16. 10 The Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, by GEN Robert T. Herres, Ret., Chairman (Washington, D.C., November 15, 1992), 5. 6 neutral muscular strength/endurance and cardiovascular standards for relevant specialties.11 The commissioners split on entry-level training. By a vote of 8 to 6, with one abstention, the commission supported maintaining gender-specific training. These recommendations along with others such as the recommendation to continue excluding women from combat aircraft positions reflected that commission's somewhat conservative makeup, which showed itself by a slightly greater concern for individual physical performance. All of which was no matter because the report had no impact on Service assignment and training policies. The Clinton Administration that took office in January 1993 and the new Democrat Congress easily dismissed the Presidential Commission’s recommendations and quickly set about the task of revising the definition of direct combat and the related restrictions on the assignment of women. Congress facilitated the redefinition by removing the statutory exclusion of women from combat vessels. However, the 1994 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 103-160, November 1993) did more than repeal 10 U.S.C. Section 6015.12 The authorization bill included a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to establish for any military occupational career field open to both men and women, common relevant performance standards, without differential standards or evaluation based on gender.13 For any military occupational specialty requiring muscular strength and endurance and cardiovascular capacity, the statute directed the Secretary to prescribe specific physical requirements on a gender-neutral basis. That never happened. On July 27, 1994, the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Togo West, proposed expanding the number of career fields open to women to 91.2 per cent of the career fields, 67.2 per cent of all Army positions.14 On July 29, 1994, the Secretary of Defense, Mr. William Perry, announced the opening of some 80,000 11 Ibid., 13. 12 1994 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 103-160, November 1993), section 541. 13 Ibid., section 543. 14Secretary of the Army, Mr. Togo West, Memorandum, “Increasing Opportunities for Women in the Army,” (Washington, D.C., July 27, 1994), photocopied. 7 additional positions in all the Services to women. No effort was made to address the question of individual suitability and physical performance standards. KASSEBAUM-BAKER AND CONGRESS 1997-1998 The next opportunity to review the issue of physical performance standards was occasioned by neither a military success nor a growing shortage of military manpower. Rather it was the result of investigations into incidents of sexual assault at Aberdeen Proving Ground and other training bases. On June 27, 1997, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen announced the appointment of the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues. Chaired by former Senator Nancy Kassebaum-Baker, the advisory committee was to assess the current training programs of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps and to determine how best to train the gender-integrated, all-volunteer force. In December that year, much to Mr. Cohen’s surprise and that of the Services, the Kassebaum-Baker commission recommended separating men and women in basic training and providing gender-specific training.15 The Congress responded quickly and created its own commission to investigate initial entry training, the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues. Therefore, what initially was an investigation into sexual misconduct expanded to address the manner in which military recruits were trained. Although it was not a formal element of the commission’s charter, the political purpose of the commission was to provide a way to avoid implementing the Kassebaum-Baker committee recommendations on gender-integrated training while endorsing the Services response to that committee's other recommendations. Most of the commission’s recommendations were unanimous and endorsed the status quo. Only on the issue of gender-integration during Initial 15 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENDER-INTEGRATED TRAINING AND RELATED ISSUES TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (Washington, D.C.: December 16, 1997). 8 Entry Training, IET, did the commissioner’s split. Five commissioners, Dr. Charles Moskos, LtGen William M. Keys, Ret., Mr. Thomas Moore, and the Chairman, Anita Blair, did not concur on the recommendation to permit the Services to continue conducting basic training in accordance with current policy.16 Dr. Moskos abstained because he thought the wording of the recommendation implied there were no serious problems with IET. He noted that the trainers’ comments indicated that there was something seriously flawed in gender-integrated training. In contrast, commissioners Blair, Moore, and Keys wrote, “that, not only is there evidence of serious problems in gender-integrated training, but there is also substantial evidence that gender-separate training produces superior results.”17 They, however, felt frustrated in their efforts to obtain the data needed to assess the cause. They noted that during the work of the commission the Services indicated that their decisions on gender-integrated training were final and that they were not willing to change. Similarly, the Services were willing to provide information supporting their positions but less forthcoming with information adverse to their positions. These commissioners noted too that the Services provided only a few extremely limited comparative studies and most of the studies were of sociological or psychological issues.18 In summarizing their findings concerning gender-integrated training, they observed that the evidence needed to judge gender- integrated training was to a large extent missing. So much so, they found it necessary to task the Services to: Assess, with respect to each service, the degree to which different standards have been established, or if not established are in fact being implemented, for males and females in basic training for matters such as physical fitness, physical performance (such as confidence and obstacle courses), military skills (such as marksmanship and hand-grenade qualifications), and nonphysical tasks required of individuals and, to the degree that differing standards are in fact being implemented, assess the effect of the use of those differing standards. 16 Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues Final Report (Washington, DC, 1999), xlii. 17 Ibid., 191. 18 Ibid., 195 9 Despite the Services’ position that the standards during IET were the same for men and women the commissioners were convinced that the trainers were informally making accommodations to ensure the training results met Service expectations.19 In effect, the dissenting commissioners were asking the Services to define the physical performance standards for occupational specialties open to men and women. Thirty-three years after The Use of Women in the Military, despite numerous commissions and federal statutory requirements, the military still has no body of objective evidence to demonstrate the effectiveness of their training programs. There are no objective measures to assess the impact of training in a gender-integrated versus a gender- separated environment or to assess whether women are prepared to serve in heavy physical occupations, much less the combat arms. THE ONLY PERFORMANCE STANDARD What physical performance evidence was available, the Services in general and the Army in particular have sought mightily to disparage. That data, of course, is the data collected on physical fitness tests. The Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues made fitness tests a particular point in its findings, recommending the Services take steps to educate service members about the meaning of “physical fitness,” and how it differs from job performance standards. The Commission observed that there was widespread misunderstanding about the purposes of the Services’ physical fitness test. The tests are, in the words of the Commission, designed to measure physical health and well-being.20 That may be the correct clinical interpretation of Service physical fitness testing, but it is certainly not how the tests are used and it is not consistent with the prodigious amount of Army research devoted to it. The 19 “It is obvious to any observer of basic training that there are differences in physical performance between men and women. De facto differences in performance (whether or not meeting standards) create the appearance of unequal, or unequally applied, standards. This suggests that standards or testing may be manipulated to permit lower-performing recruits to pass.” Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues Final Report, 198-199. 20 Ibid., xxxiv. 10