When Freedom of the Press and Privacy Collide:    Reconciling Conflicts between Fundamental Democratic Values            Erin K. Coyle          A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in  partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of  Journalism & Mass Communication.          Chapel Hill  2010                            Approved by                    Ruth Walden                    Michael Hoefges                    Donald Shaw                    Anne Klinefelter                    Tom Hodson © 2010   Erin K. Coyle  ALL RIGHTS RESERVED    ii TABLE of CONTENTS            Chapter 1: When the Right to Publish and the Right to Privacy Collide    Introduction                 1­7    A. Background              7­13    B. Literature Review              13­65    C. Research Questions            65­66    D. Method and Limitations            66­77    Chapter 2: Conflicts Between Constitutional Freedoms and Common Law Privacy:     The Disclosure of Private Facts Tort    Introduction                78­83    A. Florida Star v. B.J.F. and Its Progeny        83­91    B. Elements of the Disclosure of Private Facts      91­103    C. Free Expression Values            103­111    C. Privacy Values              112­120    D. Reconciling Free Expression and Privacy Values     120­131    E. Conclusion               131­142        iii Chapter 3: Conflicts Between Constitutional Freedoms and Common Law Privacy:     The Appropriation Tort    Introduction                 143­148    A. Elements of Appropriation and Key Defenses      148­162    B. Free Expression Values             162­168    C. Privacy Values               169­178    D. Reconciling Free Expression and Privacy Values     178­183    E. Conclusion               183­190    Chapter 4: Reconciling Conflicts between the Right to Publish and the Right to Privacy    Introduction                190­184    A. Reconciling Conflicts between Free Expression and Privacy in Disclosure Cases                      184­191    B. Reconciling Conflicts between Free Expression and Privacy in Appropriation Cases                      191­196    C. Reconciling Conflicts between Free Expression and Privacy  196­204    D. Suggestions for Future Research and Conclusion     204­06                               iv ABSTRACT    After Florida Star v. B.J.F. in 1989 applied a constitutional privilege for truthful  publications of lawfully obtained information on matters of public significance, some scholars  suggested Florida Star signaled the end of the disclosure tort, and perhaps other areas of privacy  law. One legal scholar, however, warned that the Court’s creation of narrow privileges in Florida  Star and its progeny threatened “to erode both press freedom and the public’s right to know.”  Such debate clarified that privacy torts addressing emotional harms resulting from publication  directly conflict with the First Amendment right to publish.  This dissertation analyzed if and how state high courts and federal appellate courts have  reconciled free press values and privacy values when those sets of values conflicted in post­ Florida Star privacy tort cases. It examined cases involving two publication­ or publicity­based  privacy torts—disclosure of private facts and appropriation—to identify how courts have  attempted to reconcile these two sets of values considered fundamental in our democratic  society.  The analysis found that most rulings did not discuss clashes between free expression and  privacy rights because the appeals were simply based on claims that lower courts erroneously  applied the elements of the torts. And only about half of the rulings did discuss or imply at least  one democratic value undergirding free expression or privacy rights.     v If courts attempted to reconcile clashes between press freedom and privacy, they  typically sought to identify the boundary between categories of privileged disclosures and  categories of tortious disclosures and determined whether the facts at issue fell into the category  of privileged publications or into the category of invasions of privacy. In those cases, courts  typically found published information was protected under privileges for matters of public  interest associated with audience­based free expression values.   In fact, courts only ruled in favor of plaintiffs in cases involving non­media defendants  when at least one privacy value was harmed and no free expression values were promoted. This  dissertation concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court should establish a broader constitutional  privilege for publications of matters of public interest by individual communicators as well as by  the news media.       vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS      With sincere thanks, I acknowledge the many people who made this dissertation possible.  I thank my committee chair and my committee members—Dr. Ruth Walden, Dr. R. Michael  Hoefges, Dr. Donald Shaw, Professor Anne Klinefelter, and Professor Tom Hodson—for their  many thoughtful contributions to this dissertation. Each has contributed valuable insight and  expertise, enriching this dissertation and my education. And each has generously devoted  countless hours to make this study possible.    I am deeply indebted to my dissertation chair, Dr. Ruth Walden, for her support and  guidance throughout my time at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I cannot thank  her enough for all she has done for this project and for my education, especially for introducing  me to First Amendment theory, encouraging my love for the law. I am also grateful to Dr.  Michael Hoefges for advising me as I completed my coursework and comprehensive exams.     I owe many thanks to Dr. Donald Shaw for teaching me to think and write as a historian,  which has enriched my understanding of journalism and law. I want to thank him for always  believing in my abilities as a scholar. During the past several years, he has taught me how a  scholar approaches research, teaching, and service to foster collegiality and a sense of  community in our field.    I also would like to thank my family and friends for their kindness, support, and  encouragement throughout my doctoral program. I could not have completed this process  without their consistent love, support, and encouragement.     vii CHAPTER 1 Press freedom and privacy both serve values considered fundamental for American democratic society.1 Free expression and privacy rights even serve some of the same values, such as autonomy.2 Despite those underlying similarities, the press’s First Amendment rights occasionally conflict with privacy rights recognized by state common law and statutory torts3 that protect individuals’ privacy interests against invasions by individuals or private entities.4 The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the potential collision between the press’s right to publish information and individuals’ privacy rights in Time, Inc. v. Hill in 1967.5 In that ruling, a narrow majority of the Warren Court emphasized the importance of protecting speech and press freedom under the 1 GEORGE KATEB, THE INNER OCEAN: INDIVIDUALISM AND DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 3-4 (1992). See also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 119 (1992). Smolla wrote: Privacy, like freedom of expression, has both an individual and a collective dimension. Laws protecting privacy are the means through which the collective acknowledges rules of civility that are designed to affirm human autonomy and dignity. If conscience and consciousness are the roots of free expression, they are also the roots of privacy. 2 C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Informational Privacy, or Gossip: The Central Meaning of The First Amendment, 21 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 215, 220-21 (2004). The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized an autonomy-based constitutional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965. Thomas I. Emerson, The Right of Privacy and Freedom of The Press, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 328, 328 (1979) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). 3 For the sake of clarity, the term common law torts will be used to refer to privacy torts recognized under state common law and statutory laws throughout this dissertation. 4 Emerson, supra note 2, at 330-31. 5 385 U.S. 374, 381, 387-89 (1967). circumstances of that case.6 That was the first of six Supreme Court rulings in cases involving complaints that media defendants’ publications violated plaintiffs’ tort-based rights to privacy.7 In most cases, the Court handed down narrow, fact-specific rulings, providing limited guidance to state and federal courts tasked with reconciling future conflicts between press and privacy rights.8 Scholars have suggested the Court’s failure to create clear guidelines has a potentially chilling effect on the press’s freedom to publish. Bruce Sanford, author of a leading treatise on privacy and libel law, summarized the case law as “laden with fact- intensive cases in which results are of limited precedential value.”9 In Libel and Privacy Law, published in 1999, Sanford suggested those rulings implied that “slight alterations in material or in newsgathering” could convert “provocative, enterprising journalism” into a tortious invasion of privacy.10 Thus, he described editors as tending to be “fearful” 6 Writing for a five-member majority, Justice Brennan reasoned: “Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press.” 385 U.S. at 388. 7 The other five cases are Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Cox Broad. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g, 419 U.S. 245 (1974). 8 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530 (1989) (“The tension between the right which the First Amendment accords to a free press, on the one hand, and the protections which various statutes and common law doctrines accord to personal privacy against the publication of truthful information, on the other, is a subject we have addressed several times in recent years. . . . [A]lthough our decisions have without exception upheld the press' right to publish, we have emphasized each time that we were resolving this conflict only as it arose in a discrete factual context.”). See also Nadine Strossen, Protecting Privacy and Free Speech in Cyberspace, 89 GEO. L. J. 2103, 2104 (2000) (“[E]ach of the pertinent Supreme Court rulings concerning press versus privacy is intensely fact-specific, carefully limited to the particular circumstances, and an ad hoc weighing of the competing privacy and free speech concerns under those specific circumstances.”). 9 BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 11.1 (rev. 2d ed. Supp. 2004)(1999). 10 Id. 2 of invasion of privacy lawsuits during the twentieth century.11 Twenty-seven years earlier, Don R. Pember, an expert on mass communication law, had asserted, “[T]he newsman is affected every day, many times a day, as he prepares his record of contemporary events. Each news story, each advertisement, and each picture poses the threat of a possible lawsuit.”12 In 2004, David Anderson, a scholar of tort and First Amendment law, warned that uncertainty about the constitutional limitations on torts, in general, threatened to chill press freedom and that the lack of precision in defining restrictions on expression could cause “excessive deterrence,” dissuading the media from publishing non-tortious, as well as tortious, content.13 A 2007 publication by the Reporter’s Committee for Freedom of the Press described the right to privacy as an evolving area of law in which “many legal questions remain unsettled” in most jurisdictions and advised journalists that they need to know “how the law in their jurisdiction balances” individuals’ interests in privacy against the interests of the press and public.14 The uncertainty, of course, cuts both ways, making it difficult for individuals to know when they have legitimate privacy invasion claims against the media. Legal scholars have suggested the Supreme Court’s narrow, fact-tied rulings have favored free expression and provided little clarity on privacy rights.15 In 1992, Ken 11 Id. 12 DON R. PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT vii (1972). 13 David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 755, 761-65 (2004). Anderson also commented that the Supreme Court’s approach for identifying the constitutional limitations for privacy torts that target the content of publications “does not yet appear to be solidified.” Id. at 758. 14 A primer on Invasion of Privacy, 31 NEWS MEDIA & L. 2, 2 (Fall 2007). 15 See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1207 (1989) (“The Court in Florida Star made a choice. It decided that when the violation of 3