WHAT’S THE POINT OF KNOWLEDGE? A Function-First Epistemology MICHAEL HANNON What’s the Point of Knowledge? What’s the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology MICHAEL HANNON OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS UNIVERSITY PRESS Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Hannon, Michael (Michael J.), author. Title: What’s the point of knowledge? : a function-first epistemology / Michael Hannon. Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2019] I Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018032483 (print) ILCCN 2018051505 (ebook) I ISBN 9780190914752 (online content) I ISBN 9780190914738 (updf) I ISBN 9780190914745 (epub) I ISBN 9780190914721 (cloth: alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Knowledge, Theory of. Classification: LCC BD161 (ebook) I LCC BD161 .H36 2019 (print) I DDC 121—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018032483 CONTENTS Preface vii Introduction 1 CHAPTER 1 Methodologies in Epistemology 11 CHAPTER 2 The Point of Knowledge 35 CHAPTER 3 The Value of Fallible Knowledge 56 CHAPTER 4 Impure Knowledge 81 CHAPTER 5 Pluralism about Knowledge 103 CHAPTER 6 Epistemic Diversity 139 CHAPTER? Epistemic Pragmatism 157 CHAPTER 8 Skepticism and the Point of Knowledge 189 CHAPTER 9 What’s the Point of Understanding? 222 Bibliography 257 Index 271 PREFACE Why do humans use words like “knowing,” “understanding,” and “ra­ tional”? Put more broadly, what is the point of epistemic evalua­ tion? This book attempts to answer this question. I began working on this topic in 2009 at the University of Cambridge, where my doctoral thesis explored the ways in which speaking of “knowing” facilitates human cooperation, survival, and flourishing. Drawing on the work of Edward Craig, I hypothesized that humans think and talk about knowledge primarily to identify reliable sources of information to members of their community. I claimed (and still claim) that identifying reliable informants is essential for pooling, sharing, and retrieving useful information. This idea might appear simple, but I believe it has wide-reaching implications. In subsequent years, I have continued investigating the nature, purpose, and value of knowledge, building on my previous work while pushing deeper to extend it in new directions. The result is this book. In a book about our epistemic dependence on others, I must thank the many people to whom I am indebted for their comments, criticisms, and encouragement while working on this project. Two of the most influen­ tial people are Hallvard Lillehammer (my PhD supervisor) and Stephen Grimm (my postdoc supervisor). Together their incisive comments have shaped many ideas in this book. I cannot imagine a better pair of mentors and I owe each of them an immeasurable debt. I am also grateful to Krista Lawlor for agreeing—on very short notice—to supervise part of this proj­ ect while I was a visiting postdoc at Stanford University in the spring of 2017. Others who deserve thanks are Byron Alvares, Manuel Alves, Nathan Ballantyne, James Beebe, Jessica Brown, Chris Cowie, Edward Craig, Tim Crane, Keith DeRose, Sinan Dogramaci, Kate Elgin, Sam Elgin, Georgi Gardiner, Mikkel Gerken, John Greco, David Henderson, Nick Hughes, Mark Kaplan, Klemens Kappel, Chris Kelp, Martin Kusch, Jess Kwong, Tania Lombrozo, Helen Marsh, Robin McKenna, Joshua Mozersky, Gareth Nellis, Corey Nishio, Huw Price, Duncan Pritchard, Kevin Roberts, Patrick Rysiew, Anand Shan, Barry Smith, Ernest Sosa, and Nick Treanor. I am especially thankful to Kate Elgin and Robin McKenna for reading and providing comments on a full draft of this manuscript. My family, too, is owed more than deep thanks. Their influence on my work is less obvious but no less real. I also want to apologize to anyone I forgot to mention by name and say thank you for your help. This book is the result of many years of thinking about the social role of knowledge, and I am sure I have learned things from more people than I can now remember. Audiences at the following events have also provided helpful feed­ back at various stages of writing: the Bled Epistemology Conference (2017), Queen’s University Colloquium Series (2017), University of Vienna (2017), Varieties of Understanding Seminar (2016), Concepts and Cognition Lab at UC Berkeley (2016), APA Pacific Division Meeting (2015), Buffalo Experimental Philosophy Conference (2015), Helsinki Epistemology Workshop (2015), Central States Philosophical Association (2015), APA Eastern Division Meeting (2014), NYC Philosophy of Language Workshop (2013), Midsummer Philosophy Workshop (2013), European Epistemology Network Meeting (2012), and the Cambridge Faculty of Philosophy (2010-2013). I have drawn, with kind permission, on previously published work. Parts of chapter 2 are taken from “The Practical Origins of Epistemic Contextualism,” Erkenntnis (2014) 78 (4): 899-919. Chapter 3 draws on my paper “Fallibilism and the Value of Knowledge,” Synthese (2014) 191 (6): 1119-1146. Chapter 4 is based on “A Solution to Knowledge’s Threshold Problem,” Philosophical Studies (2017) 174 (3): 607-629. Parts of chapter 5 are taken from “The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions,” Philosophy Compass (2015) 10 (12): 856-866. Chapter 6 is a substantially revised and expanded version of “The Universal Core of Knowledge,” Synthese (2015) 192 (3): 769-786.1 want to thank the relevant editors and publishers for letting me use this material. I am also grateful to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for providing me with a doctoral fellowship that viii | Preface