WHATABOUTTEXAS?THE FORGOTTENCAUSE OFANTONIO ORENDAINANDTHE RÍOGRANDE VALLEY FARM WORKERS, 1966-1982 by TIMOTHY PAULBOWMAN Presentedtothe Faculty ofthe Graduate School of The University ofTexasatArlingtonin Partial Fulfillment ofthe Requirements forthe Degree of MASTER OFARTS INHISTORY THE UNIVERSITY OFTEXAS ATARLINGTON May 2005 CHAPTER 1 THE MAKING OF A HUELGISTA Antonio Orendain was born on May 28, 1930, in Etzatlán, Mexico.1 He was only educated through elementary school and often worked as an impoverished campesino (a Mexican farm worker). In 1950 at the age of twenty, Orendain entered California illegally. Hungry and broke, he heard that American farm owners suffered from a labor shortage following World WarII. Like many ofhiscompatriots, Orendain thought the UnitedStates was the “land of opportunity.” He crossed the border and entered San Ysidro, California, lured by rumors of farm workers making as much as $1.60 per hour –a sum which in Mexico was unheard of. To Orendain, the decision to cross the border illegally seemed logical: The worst part of it in Mexico [was] to be too close to the United States and so far away from God. If I [had] a great need in Mexico, I am pretty sure need is the mother of all inventions. And I was hungry and needy, and since I was so close to the United States, I [did not] have to invent some way in order to solve the problem. I didn’t have to break my head to solve the problem, because everybody said the United States was easy. So maybe with those ideas, like there [was] a lot of work here, is[why]Imigratedhere. Thisenterprising young mansoughta betterlife andbrighterfuture.2 The harsh realities of farm labor in the United States soon darkened his optimism. With only seasonal work available, Orendain migrated between California, Idaho, Oregon, 1 Antonio Orendain to Allen McCreight, November 14, 1978, Folder 1, Texas Farm Worker’s Union Papers, Rare Books and Manuscripts, Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas at Austin (hereafter TFWUP-UT); Antonio Orendain, interview by Charles Carr Winn, 20 July 1971, transcript, Oral HistoryProject, University LibrarySpecial Collections, Universityof Texas at Arlington (hereafter OHP-UTA). 2OrendaininterviewbyCarrWinn,OHP-UTA. 2 and Montana. He began noticing injustices growers on large farms committed against workers. For example, Orendain noticed that he and other young, healthy workers were often hired to displace older, slower workers. Since farm workers had no legal recourse, Orendain recognized this as opportunistic cruelty by the growers. He also fell victim to cruel growers who threatened to have him and other illegal workers deported unless they agreed to work for free. To avoid this, Orendain adopted Americanized Hispanic last names (such as Gómez or Hernández), claiming that people would be less likely to assume he was an illegal than when used his real name. In this manner Orendain struggled from 1950 until 1955, migrating from place to place and making about $2.35 per day. After seeing how bad conditions were for Mexican workers, he realized that the only medium capable of changing this unfair system would be a farm workers’ union. This epiphany would change hislife.3 While working in Los Angeles in 1951, Orendain met a dynamic young man who steered him toward labor organizing –César Estrada Chávez. Originally from Yuma, Arizona, Chávez came to Los Angeles to work for the Community Service Organization (CSO).4 CSO was based in East Los Angeles and its purpose was to assist Mexicans and Mexican Americans living in barrios across California. Its activities included protesting police brutality, helping people with immigration issues, and assisting the unemployed. The 3Ibid. 4 Ibid.; Jacques E. Levy, Cesar Chavez: Autobiography of La Causa (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1966), 9; Juan Gómez-Quiñónez, Mexican-American Labor, 1790-1990 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1994), 243. Levy’s book contains autobiographical passages by Chávez andotherUFWleadersonthefirst10yearsofthemovement. 3 talented and energetic Chávez rose through the ranks of CSO, eventually becoming its national director.5 Orendain joinedCSOandbecame friends withChávez. At CSOOrendainalso met his wife Raquel, a dedicated woman who provided moral and intellectual support throughout his subsequent career as a labor organizer. They married in 1952 and both workedin the CSOfrom1953 to1962.6 Aside from Orendain’s newly formed relationships, Chávez was also developing an ideology that would later be crucial to the farm workers’ movement. As a devout Catholic, Chávez “expected the churches to minister to the poor and the needy,” arguing they should be a “pillar of support” to his organization since both pursued similar objectives.7 Also during these years Chávez began studying nonviolent protest as a form of civil disobedience. Although his mother had preached nonviolence since he was young, Chávez began studying the tactics of St. Paul and Mohandas Ghandhi.8 This would shape not only the farm workers’ movement but would also be thrust into the disputes between Chávez and Orendain thatdevelopedlaterin the 1970s. Since Orendain was a farm worker, he originally joined CSO to volunteer in the Oxnard, California anti-bracero program. The U.S. government developed the Bracero Program during World War II as a means to import cheap labor into the Southwest’s 5Levy,CesarChavez,3;Gómez-Quiñónez,Mexican-AmericanLabor,243. 6 Raquel Orendain, interview by Martha Cortera, 23 May 1976, Rare Books and Manuscripts, Benson LatinAmericanCollection,UniversityofTexasatAustin. 7Gómez-Quiñónez,Mexican-AmericanLabor,244. 8 César Chávez, “Cesar Chavez Speaks With Bob Fitch About La Causa, 1970,” interview by Bob Fitch in, Major Problems in Mexican-American History, ed. Zaragoza Vargas (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,1999),387-389;JohnC.HammerbackandRichardJ.Jensen,TheRhetoricalCareerofCesar Chavez(CollegeStation:TexasA&MUniversityPress,1998),17-18. 4 agribusiness sector.9 Chávez learned that growers in the Oxnard area were employing Mexican braceros instead of U.S. citizens, and accused them of using the program to increase their profits while perpetuating poverty among American workers. Through the CSO he pressured the Department of Labor to force the growers to hire local workers.10 This was the first time both Chávez and Orendain had aroused the antagonism of wealthy growers. After the Oxnard incident, CSO became more focused on the plight of California’s farm workers. This comes as no surprise; like Orendain, as a farm worker Chávez had experienced firsthand the injustices growers committed.11 In 1962 Orendain and Chávez lobbied California lawmakers in Sacramento for a minimum wage law and various other workplace improvements such as toilets, clean drinking water, and aid for needy children. While in the capitol building during the 1962 legislative session, one grower informed them that if the minimum wage passed he would simply move his farm to Central or South America. Orendain respondeddryly: It’s alright with me if you go and farm in Mexico or any other South American country and develop a good industry out there; but please, when the governments there take over your interests, please don’t try and send our people to fightforyourinterestsout there. Thus CSO’s efforts were strongly opposed, and Orendain began losing faith in the democratic system. Also for the first time Orendain and Chávez understood the political 9 Craig J. Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency: The Farmworker Movement in the 1960s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 133; Marion Beth Morris, “The History of the Mexican Contract LaborProgram,1942-1966” (M.A. thesis, North Texas State University, 1967), 9-10. 10 Eugene Nelson, Huelga: The First Hundred Days of the Great Delano Grape Strike (Delano: Farm WorkerPress,1966),50. 11FormoreinformationseeLevy,CesarChavez,45-93. 5 clout of the growers, learning they had successfully lobbied the California state legislature in opposition to CSO’s proposal.12 Orendain’s frustration at the organization’s inability to accomplish its objectives grew. Moreover, he was frustrated at his own limited role in CSO’s activities; as an illegal immigrant, he remained a peripheral contributor until his naturalization in 1959.13 Still, concerning farm worker assistance the group had little to be excited about. They did receive some help from the “politically active Anglo middle class,” but Orendain likened this to tokenism, claiming that politicians would use CSO “just to get elected:” In the CSO we were trying to give voting power to the Mexican Americans. We were working real (sic) well, but when the doctors, lawyers, and the middle class got into it, they used us just for political power and to win elections. Therefore, by 1962 we had gotten completely away from the farm workers’ problems, and so we got out of the CSO and formed the National Farm Workers’ Association. Chávez, realizing that CSO could not properly assist the farm workers, resigned first, and Orendain soon followed. Personally committed to assisting the poor farm workers, Chávez decidedtoforma farmlaborunion.14 In the summer of 1962, Chávez formed the National Farm Workers’ Association (NFWA). Chávez worked feverishly to publicize the NFWA among workers, and on September 30, they held their first meeting in Fresno with about 150 delegates. Here leadership was solidified, and many of the important players in the subsequent farm workers’ movement were elected to key leadership positions: Chávez was elected Director, Orendain Secretary-Treasurer, and Dolores Huerta and Gilberto Padilla Vice Presidents. 12OrendaininterviewbyCarrWinn,OHP-UTA. 13OrendaintoMcCreight,14November1978,Folder1,TFWUP-UT. 14OrendaininterviewbyCarrWinn,OHP-UTA. 6 Huerta and Padilla, like Orendain, were both former CSO members and later became involved in the Río Grande Valley movement. Dues were set at $3.50 per month. Thus the union wasbornandthe firsteffective effortstounionize farmworkerswereunderway.15 The significance of this first meeting cannot be overstated. Elected to positions of leadership, both Chávez and Orendain solidified their standing among union members and farm workers. By this point the two were friends, but Chávez’s respect for Orendain increased during the first year of the Delano grape strike. This later proved evident when Chávez sent Orendain to assist Eugene Nelson in the Río Grande Valley in 1966.16 Also, Orendain’s official status in the union implies a commitment to Chávez and his nonviolent philosophy. Chávez thought that only a nonviolent movement could win justice for the farm workers and most union members, including Orendain, agreed.17 Despite the fact that people noticed Orendain’s penchant for questioning authority and his “skeptical” personality,18 there is no indication Orendain criticized Chávez’s non-violence at this time. He and Chávez did have very different personalities – which Orendain’s young daughter Melanie perceptively noticed were bound to conflict in the future –but since Orendain joined the union and held a key position, he was clearly committed to the cause. Orendain thus became a committed “huelgista” (“striker,” or a participant in the farm workers’ movement). 15 Antonio Orendain interview bythe author, 11 January2005; Levy, Cesar Chavez, 174; also Orendain interviewbyCarrWinn,OHP-UTA. 16Ibid. 17 Peter Matthiessen, Sal Si Puedes: Cesar Chavez and the New American Revolution (New York: RandomHouse,1969),24-25,86. 18Ibid.,330;StanSteiner,LaRaza:TheMexicanAmericans(NewYork:HarperandRow,1969),280. 7 Wisely, the ever-patient Chávez did not force the union to act too quickly. During its first few years, the NFWA served mainly as a credit union for the workers,19 all the while spreading word of their future plans to struggle for the workers’ rights. Indeed, the workerssorely neededassistance: In California, their median annual wage was half the poverty level. Most migrant workers…worked ten-hour days for ten cents an hour. Living conditions were substandard; most…lived in barrios of large cities or in squalid conditions on farms. Growers kept shabby accommodations for field hands and local citizens wanted the migrants to work and then move on to another harvest since the community did not want to pay taxes to support additional schools and services. In California, the job accident rate was three times and infant mortality double the national average; life expectancy was under fifty, and since there were few controls then on farm pesticides and other chemicals, thousands of workers were poisoned. Furthermore, Hispanics received poor education…the average Hispanic finished eight [years of schooling] in California. Uneducated and poor, they had little hope forescaping poverty.20 Chávez wasindeedawareofthe enormity ofthe task before him. For two and a half years the NFWA slowly built up support until its first official strike in the spring of 1965. In McFarland, California, rose grafters working for a company called Mount Arbor were promised $9 dollars per thousand roses grafted but were actually receiving only $6-7.50. When the union set up pickets, the company called the police and used strikebreakers from Mexico to break the picket lines. Despite the union’s loss, Chávez later recalled that this event “gave us a good indication of whatto expect in other strikes, how labor contractors and police would be used against us.”21 19Melanie Orendain interviewbythe author, 18 January2005;OrendaininterviewbyCarr Winn, OHP- UTA. 20TerryH. Anderson, The Movementand the Sixties: Protestin America From Greensboro to Wounded Knee(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1995),301. 21Levy,CesarChavez,179-180. 8 With this first experience behind them, Orendain was thrilled the union was finally acting. They remained dormant until the fall, when on September 8 a Filipino farm workers’ union, the Agricultural Workers’ Organizing Committee (AWOC), went on strike against grape growers in the Delano area where the NFWA was headquartered.22 Chávez was again reluctant to get involved, but the head of AWOC, Larry Itliong, implored him to do so. Some of the strikers had threatened to beat up strikebreakers, and Itliong knew that Chávez’s pacifism and magnetic appeal could prevent this violence.23 Chávez was thus finagledintoparticipating,andthusthe famousDelanogrape strike began. The strike garnered immediate reaction from local Catholic and Protestant clergy. The California Migrant Ministry, led by the reverend Christ Hartmire, gave emphatic support to the union. Two local Roman Catholic priests, Keith Kenney and Arnold Meagher, echoed Chávez’s religious ideology, justifying church support by saying, “where the poor are, Christ should be.” A Time article that covered the role of the church in the new strike presented the demonstrators as, “the poor calling out to heaven.” Typical strikers were cited, such as “Manuel Rivera, 52 and father of seven, [who] works ten hours a day for $1.25 an hour to feed his family, [and] says the ‘vineyard owners make an animal out of me, they might as well put a leash on me.’”24 Chávez’s dream of the church assisting hisstruggle tohelp suchimpoverishedworkerswasbecoming reality. Orendain’s stance on church involvement with union activities was less enthusiastic. Being non-religious, it was well known that Orendain had a very cynical 22Ibid.,182. 23FlorenceM.White,CesarChavez:ManofCourage(Champaign:GerrardPublishingCompany,1973), 59. 24 “Grapes of Wrath,” Time,10December1965,96. 9 outlook towards the church and that he “strongly opposed any use of religion in union activities.”25 Chávez’s devout beliefs would later publicly come between him and Orendain. Nevertheless, atthistime theirrelationship remainedin goodstanding. By the end of 1965 the strike became stronger. The union claimed over five thousand members, and various religious, student, and civil-rights groups were supporting their effort. Also, Walter Reuther, head of the United Auto Workers (UAW), pledged five thousanddollarsa month until the strike waswon. Despite thisbacking, NFWA effortsdid not halt Delano’s massive grape harvest. Thus, the union turned to a new tactic –a nationwide boycott. Blacklisted were the largest grape growers from the Delano area: Schenley Industries, DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation, andeighty-three smallervineyards.26The boycott remained an important tactic through the duration of the farm workers’ movement. Orendain spent the latter weeks of 1965 traveling with Chávez throughout California to the union leader’s various speaking engagements, encouraging support for the boycott.27 The union also began sending delegates to many of the major metropolitan areas across the country, and for that purpose in January 1966 Chávez and Orendain went to Chicago. Tracking the effectiveness of this trip is difficult, although it is known they had at least minimal success: in an amusing incident, a group of sympathetic Chicago housewives stripped a local supermarket of DiGiorgio canned goods and barricaded the aisles on 25 Levy, Cesar Chavez, 277; Richard Griswold del Castillo and Richard A. García, Cesar Chavez: A TriumphofSpirit(Norman:UniversityofOklahomaPress,1995),85. 26Newsweek,27December1965,57-58,84. 27OrendaininterviewbyCarrWinn,OHP-UTA. 10