WESTERN SUGAR COOP., ET AL., Plaintiffs, v. ARCHER-DANIELS-MIDLAND CO., ET AL., Defendants. No. CV 11-3473 CBM (MANx) UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21448 February 13, 2015, Decided February 13, 2015, Filed PRIOR HISTORY: Western Sugar Coop. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158252 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 19, 2011) COUNSEL: [*1] For Western Sugar Cooperative, a Colorado cooperative, Minn-Dak Farmers Cooperative, a North Dakota Cooperative Association, The Amalgamated Sugar Company LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, The American Sugar Cane League of the USA Inc, a Louisiana Non-Profit corporation, United States Sugar Corporation, a Florida corporation, Plaintiffs: Adam R Fox, LEAD ATTORNEY, Stacie D Yee, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Los Angeles, CA; David S Elkins, LEAD ATTORNEY, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Palo Alto, CA; Eugene R Egdorf, W Mark Lanier, PRO HAC VICE, The Lanier Law Firm PC, Houston, TX; John A Burlingame, PRO HAC VICE, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Washington, DC. For Michigan Sugar Company, a Michigan corporation, Imperial Sugar Corporation, a Texas corporation, Plaintiffs: Adam R Fox, Stacie D Yee, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Los Angeles, CA; David S Elkins, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Palo Alto, CA; Eugene R Egdorf, W Mark Lanier, PRO HAC VICE, The Lanier Law Firm PC, Houston, TX; John A Burlingame, PRO HAC VICE, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Washington, DC. For C and H Sugar Company, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff: David S Elkins, LEAD ATTORNEY, Squire Pat- ton Boggs US LLP, Palo [*2] Alto, CA; Adam R Fox, Stacie D Yee, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Los Angeles, CA; Eugene R Egdorf, W Mark Lanier, PRO HAC VICE, The Lanier Law Firm PC, Houston, TX; John A Burlingame, PRO HAC VICE, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Washington, DC. For American Sugar Refining Inc, a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff: Adam R Fox, LEAD ATTORNEY, Stacie D Yee, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Los Angeles, CA; David S Elkins, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Palo Alto, CA; Eugene R Egdorf, W Mark Lanier, PRO HAC VICE, The Lanier Law Firm PC, Houston, TX; John A Burlingame, PRO HAC VICE, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Washington, DC. For The Sugar Association Inc, a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff: Adam R Fox, LEAD ATTORNEY, Stacie D Yee, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Los Angeles, CA; David S Elkins, LEAD ATTORNEY, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Palo Alto, CA; Marc E Masters, Mark T Drooks, LEAD ATTORNEYS, A Howard Matz, Bird Marella Boxer Wolpert Nessim Drooks Lincenberg & Rhow, Los Angeles, CA; Eugene R Egdorf, W Mark Lanier, PRO HAC VICE, The La- nier Law Firm PC, Houston, TX; John A Burlingame, PRO HAC VICE, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Washington, DC. For The Coca-Cola Company, Movant: Jack Baumann, Shon Morgan, LEAD [*3] ATTORNEYS, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart and Sullivan LLP, Los Angeles, CA; Christopher Tayback, Quinn Emanuel Urquhart Oliver & Sullivan LLP, Los Angeles, CA. For Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, a Delaware corporation, Cargill, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Corn Products International, Inc., a Delaware corporation, formerly known as Ingredion Incorporated, The Corn Refiners Association, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants: Bryce A Cooper, Bryna J Dahlin, Cornelius M Murphy, Dan K Webb, Ste- phen V D'Amore, PRO HAC VICE, Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL; Erin R Ranahan, Gail Jeanne Standish, Win- ston and Strawn LLP, Los Angeles, CA. For Roquette America, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendants: Bryce A Cooper, Bryna J Dahlin, Cornelius M Mur- phy, Dan K Webb, Stephen V D'Amore, PRO HAC VICE, Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL; Erin R Ranahan, Gail Jeanne Standish, Winston and Strawn LLP, Los Angeles, CA. For Tate and Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Defendant, Counter Claimant: Bryce A Cooper, Bryna J Dahlin, Cornelius M Murphy, Dan K Webb, Stephen V D'Amore, PRO HAC VICE, Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL; Erin R Ranahan, Gail Jeanne Standish, Winston and Strawn LLP, [*4] Los Angeles, CA; Joan Mack, Julia Jill Bredrup, Lennette W Lee, Michael J Proctor, Caldwell Leslie and Proctor PC, Los Angeles, CA; Edith R Mat- thai, T. John Fitzgibbons, Jr, Robie and Matthai, Los Angeles, CA. For Squire Patton Boggs (US) LLP, Objector: Edith R Matthai, T. John Fitzgibbons, Jr, Robie and Matthai, Los Ange- les, CA. For Cargill, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, a Delaware corporation, Corn Products International, Inc., a Delaware corporation, formerly known as Counter Claimants: Bryce A Cooper, Bryna J Dahlin, Cornelius M Murphy, Stephen V D'Amore, Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL; Dan K Webb, PRO HAC VICE, Winston and Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL; Erin R Ranahan, Gail Jeanne Standish, Winston and Strawn LLP, Los Angeles, CA. For The Sugar Association Inc, a Delaware corporation, Counter Defendant: Adam R Fox, LEAD ATTORNEY, Stacie D Yee, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Los Angeles, CA; David S Elkins, LEAD ATTORNEY, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Palo Alto, CA; W Mark Lanier, The Lanier Law Firm PC, Houston, TX. For Ingredion Incorporated, a Delaware corporation, formerly known as Corn Products International, Inc., Counter Claimant: Bryce A Cooper, Bryna [*5] J Dahlin, Cornelius M Murphy, Stephen V D'Amore, Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL; Steven Grimes, PRO HAC VICE, Winston and Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL; Erin R Ranahan, Gail Jeanne Standish, Winston and Strawn LLP, Los Angeles, CA; Joan Mack, Julia Jill Bredrup, Lennette W Lee, Michael J Proc- tor, Caldwell Leslie and Proctor PC, Los Angeles, CA. For The Sugar Association Inc, a Delaware corporation, Counter Defendant: Adam R Fox, LEAD ATTORNEY, Stacie D Yee, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Los Angeles, CA; David S Elkins, LEAD ATTORNEY, Squire Patton Boggs US LLP, Palo Alto, CA; Eugene R Egdorf, PRO HAC VICE, The Lanier Law Firm PC, Houston, TX; W Mark Lanier, The Lanier Law Firm PC, Houston, TX. For Cargill, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, a Delaware corporation, Counter Claim- ants: Bryce A Cooper, Bryna J Dahlin, Cornelius M Murphy, Stephen V D'Amore, Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL; Dan K Webb, Steven Grimes, PRO HAC VICE, Winston and Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL; Erin R Ranahan, Gail Jeanne Standish, Winston and Strawn LLP, Los Angeles, CA. JUDGES: Honorable Consuelo B. Marshall, United States District Judge. OPINION BY: Consuelo B. Marshall OPINION ORDER GRANTING INGREDION INCORPORATED'S AND [*6] TATE & LYLE INGREDIENTS AMERICAS, INC.'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS LLP Before the Court is Defendant/Counterclaimant Ingredion Incorporated's and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc.'s Motions to Disqualify Plaintiffs' counsel, Squire Patton Boggs LLP (collectively the "Motions"). (Dkt. Nos. 232, 233.) Squire Patton Boggs LLP and Plaintiff Sugar Association oppose the Motions. (Dkt. Nos. 250, 249, 252.) I. JURISDICTION This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338. II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND The underlying case arises from false advertising claims relating to the marketing of high-fructose corn syrup ("HFCS"), pitting the sugar industry against the corn-refining industry. Plaintiffs are sugar industry manufacturers, trade groups, and associations: Western Sugar Cooperative; Michigan Sugar Co.; C & H Sugar Co., Inc.; United States Sugar Corporation; American Sugar Refining, Inc.; The Amalgamated Sugar Co., LLC; Imperial Sugar Corp.; Minn-Dak Farmers Cooperative; The American Sugar Cane League U.S.A., Inc.; and The Sugar Association, Inc. ("Sugar Associ- ation") (collectively the "Sugar Plaintiffs"). (Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶¶ 12-21 (Dkt. No. 55).) [*7] Defendants are manufacturers and trade groups and associations active in the corn and HFCS industry: Archer-Daniels-Midland Company ("ADM"); Cargill, Incorporated ("Cargill"); Ingredion Inc., formerly called Corn Products International, Inc. ("Ingredion"); Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. ("Tate & Lyle"); and The Corn Refiners Association ("CRA") (collectively "Defendants").1 (Id., ¶¶ 22-27.) 1 Plaintiffs' SAC also named defendant, Roquette America, Inc. However, Plaintiffs' claim against Roquette America, Inc. was dismissed on July 31, 2012. (Dkt. No. 76.) Plaintiffs, represented by the legacy law firm of Squire Sanders & Dempsey, LLP ("Squire Sanders"), filed the in- stant lawsuit on April 22, 2011, and the SAC on November 21, 2011. (Dkt. No. 55.) The SAC asserts one cause of ac- tion for false advertising under the Lanham Act, alleging that Defendants misled consumers by use of the term "corn sugar." (SAC ¶¶ 65-75.) On September 4, 2012, Defendants ADM, Cargill, Ingredion, and Tate & Lyle each filed a counterclaim against Plaintiff the Sugar Association. (Dkt. Nos. 85-88.) Defendants' counterclaim asserts one cause of action for false adver- tising in violation of the Lanham Act, alleging [*8] that the Sugar Association misrepresented HFCS as unhealthy. (Id. ¶¶ 68-95.) A. The Patton Boggs and Squire Sanders Merger On June 1, 2014, the law firms of Patton Boggs LLP ("Patton Boggs") and Squire Sanders combined to form Squire Patton Boggs ("SPB"). SPB remains the Sugar Plaintiffs' counsel of record. Ingredion and Tate & Lyle each filed mo- tions to disqualify SPB from representing the Sugar Plaintiffs in this action because SPB is now adverse to both In- gredion and Tate & Lyle--long-standing clients of the legacy firm Patton Boggs. B. Patton Boggs' and SPB's Representation of Tate & Lyle Tate & Lyle is a global provider of food products that specializes in processing corn-based products, including HFCS. (Castelli Decl. ¶ 2.) Tate & Lyle entered into an attorney-client relationship with Patton Boggs in or about Feb- ruary 1998, as documented in a letter dated February 11, 1998, signed by Stuart Pape of Patton Boggs (the "1998 En- gagement Letter"). (Id. ¶ 3, Ex. 1.) Tate & Lyle has relied on multiple lawyers at Patton Boggs for legal advice on a wide range of matters since 1998 and through the merger in June 2014. (Castelli Decl. ¶ 4.) Patton Boggs has represented Tate & Lyle before internation- al [*9] regulatory bodies and federal agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), the United States Department of Agriculture, and the United States Customs Service. (Id.) Tate & Lyle's counsel declares that Patton Boggs' lawyers advised Tate & Lyle on matters that required a thorough understanding of its business operations, in- cluding its operations and processing of ingredients such as HFCS. (Id.) 1. Tate & Lyle Bring the Conflict to SPB's Attention In late July 2014, Tate & Lyle's counsel, Heidi Balsley, contacted SPB attorney, who was formerly a Patton Boggs attorney, Dan Waltz, inquiring whether he knew of the pending lawsuit, which he did not. (Balsley Decl. ¶ 6.) Thereaf- ter, on July 28, 2014, SPB attorneys, Stacy Ballin (former partner and general counsel at Squire Sanders) and Charles Talisman (former assistant general counsel at Patton Boggs) spoke with Tate & Lyle's vice president and general coun- sel, Peter Castelli, and Ms. Balsley. (Id. ¶ 7; Castelli Decl. ¶ 10.) During that call, Ms. Ballin and Mr. Talisman stated that SPB failed to identify the conflict, despite Tate & Lyle appearing as a current client in Patton Boggs' database. (Castelli Decl. ¶ 11.) They explained [*10] that a paralegal at Patton Boggs had prepared a list of clients with conflicts for considerations as part of the pre-merger conflicts diligence, and Tate & Lyle had been inexplicably omitted from the list. (Id.) During that call, they asked Tate & Lyle for a conflict waiver. (Id. ¶ 12.) They explained that, as a practical matter, a de facto ethical wall was in place because the two firms' computer systems had not been integrated and docu- ments were in different offices. (Id.) 2. Tate & Lyle Does Not Agree to Waive the Conflict During another call on August 4, 2014, Tate & Lyle's counsel, Mr. Castelli, informed Mr. Talisman and Ms. Ballin that because the instant litigation was not "ordinary commercial litigation, but rather a contentious battle between two competing industries," Tate & Lyle would not waive the conflict. (Id. ¶ 13.) Mr. Castelli requested that SPB withdraw from its representation of the Sugar Plaintiffs. (See id.) Thereafter on August 10, 2014, SPB's counsel sent a letter to Tate & Lyle's counsel, enclosing a copy of the 1998 Engagement Letter. (Castelli Decl. ¶ 16, Ex. 1.) The letter states, "the terms of Tate & Lyle's engagement of Patton Boggs. . . provided us with Tate [*11] & Lyle's advance consent that we would represent other clients on matters ad- verse to Tate & Lyle so long as those matters were unrelated to our work for Tate & Lyle." (Id.) In the letter, SPB pro- posed to carry forward the simultaneous representations of the Sugar Plaintiffs and Tate & Lyle on other matters with two distinct teams of lawyers and an ethical wall. (Id., Ex. 1.) 3. SPB Withdraws from Its Representation of Tate & Lyle On August 18, 2014, SPB sent a letter to Tate & Lyle's counsel terminating its relationship with Tate & Lyle. (Id., ¶ 22, Ex. 8.) Dan Waltz and other lawyers at SPB were actively providing services to Tate & Lyle up until SPB's termina- tion on August 18, 2014. (Castelli Decl. ¶ 23.) C. Patton Boggs' Representation of Ingredion Defendant Ingredion provides ingredients to food and beverage companies and refines corn to produce HFCS. (Levy Decl. ¶ 2.) Ingredion first retained Patton Boggs in May 2004, and Patton Boggs continued to perform work for Ingredion over the years and last performed work for Ingredion in September 2013. (Talisman Decl. ¶ 3.) Patton Boggs has provided legal services to Ingredion on at least fifty-six different occasions, and since 2004, Ingredion [*12] has paid Patton Boggs over $230,000 in legal fees. (Levy Decl. ¶ 3.) Shortly after Tate & Lyle's counsel raised the conflict, SPB sent Ingredion's counsel a letter dated July 31, 2014, advising it of the merger and that Squire Sanders had been representing the Sugar Plaintiffs and SPB would continue to do so going forward. (Id. ¶ 7, Ex. 1.) The letter stated that if Ingredion wanted to have its lawyers from Patton Boggs do any new work, it would be necessary to obtain a waiver from Ingredion due to the conflict presented by SPB's role in the present case. (Id.) Ingredion and Tate & Lyle each move to disqualify SPB from representing the Sugar Plaintiffs in this action, con- tending that the merger resulted in SPB simultaneously representing adverse clients. III. LEGAL STANDARD Motions to disqualify counsel are governed by state law. See Rodriguez v. W. Publ'g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 967 (9th Cir. 2009) ("By virtue of the district court's local rules, California law controls whether an ethical violation occurred.") The Central District applies the California State Bar Act, the California Rules of Professional Conduct, and the related judicial decisions in assessing the standards of professional conduct. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 83-3.1.2. The decision to disqualify counsel is [*13] within the trial court's discretion limited by applicable legal principles. See Trone v. Smith, 621 F.2d 994, 999 (9th Cir. 1980); People ex rel. Dept. of Corp. v. SpeeDee Oil, 20 Cal. 4th 1135, 1143, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 816, 980 P.2d 371 (1999). Because of the potential for abuse, disqualification motions are sub- ject to strict judicial scrutiny. Optyl Eyewear Fashion Int'l Corp. v. Style Cos., Ltd., 760 F.2d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 1985). A court should examine the implications of disqualification, including "a client's right to chosen counsel, an at- torney's interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client to replace disqualified counsel, and the possi- bility that tactical abuse underlies the disqualification motion." SpeeDee Oil, 20 Cal. 4th at 1145. Motions to disqualify generally arise in one of two contexts: (1) in cases of successive representation, where an at- torney seeks to represent a client with interests that are potentially adverse to a former client; and (2) in cases of simul- taneous representation, where an attorney seeks to represent in a single action multiple parties with potentially adverse interests. The primary fiduciary duty at stake in each of these contexts differs, and the applicable disqualification stand- ards vary accordingly. A. Successive Representation of Adverse Clients The rules regarding successive representation of clients with adverse interests focus on an attorney's duty of confi- dentiality.2 If an attorney undertakes [*14] to represent a client adverse to a former client without obtaining informed consent, the former client may disqualify the attorney by showing a "substantial relationship" between the subjects of the prior and current representations. Flatt v. Super. Ct., 9 Cal. 4th 275, 283, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 885 P.2d 950 (1994); In re Charlisse C., 45 Cal. 4th 145, 166 n.11, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597, 194 P.3d 330 (2008). This protects the enduring duty to preserve client confidences that survives the termination of the attorney's representation. City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Cobra Solutions, Inc., 38 Cal. 4th 839, 846, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 771, 135 P.3d 20 (2006). When a substantial relationship between the representations is established, the attorney is automatically disqualified from representing the second client. Id. at 847. 2 California Rule of Professional Responsibility 3-310(E) governs successive representation of clients with adverse interests providing, "[a] member shall not, without the informed written consent of the client or former client, accept employment adverse to the client or former client where, by reason of the representation of the client or former client, the member has obtained confidential information material to the employment." In determining whether there is a "substantial relationship," a court should first analyze whether there was a direct relationship with the former client and whether the relationship touched on issues related to the present litigation. Id.; Advanced Messaging Techs., Inc. v. EasyLink, 913 F. Supp. 2d 900, 907 (C.D. Cal. 2012) [*15] (Pregerson, J.). The substantial relationship test requires evidence supporting a rational conclusion that "information material to the evalua- tion, prosecution, settlement or accomplishment of the former representation given its factual and legal issues is materi- al to the evaluation, prosecution, settlement or accomplishment of the current representation given its factual and legal issues." Khani v. Ford Motor Co., 215 Cal. App. 4th 916, 921, 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532 (2013) (citations omitted); see also Farris v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 119 Cal. App. 4th 671, 679, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 618 (2004) (evaluating whether the two representations are substantially related centers upon the factual and legal similarities of the two representations). If the former representation involved a direct relationship with the client and the matters are substantially related, the former client need not prove that the attorney possesses actual confidential information; instead, the attorney is pre- sumed to possess confidential information.3 Cobra Solutions, 38 Cal. 4th at 847. The presumption that an attorney has access to confidential information relevant to the subsequent representation and resulting disqualification extends vi- cariously to the entire firm. In re Charlisse, 45 Cal. 4th at 161; Flatt, 9 Cal. 4th at 283. 3 When the attorney's contact with the prior client was not direct, then the court examines both the attorney's relationship to the prior client and the relationship between the [*16] prior and the present representation. Co- bra Solutions, 38 Cal. 4th at 847 (citations omitted). B. Concurrent Representation of Adverse Clients Attorneys owe current clients a duty of undivided loyalty to avoid undermining public confidence in the legal pro- fession and the judicial process.4 Flatt, 9 Cal. 4th at 284; SpeeDee Oil, 20 Cal. 4th at 1146. When a law firm simulta- neously represents clients who have conflicting interests, with few exceptions, "disqualification follows automatically, regardless of whether the simultaneous representations have anything in common or present any risk that confidences obtained in one matter would be used in the other." SpeeDee Oil, 20 Cal. 4th at 1147 (citation omitted); White v. Ex- perian Info. Solutions, 993 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1166 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (Carter, J.) ("The default rule for a concurrent con- flict in California is automatic disqualification in all but a small number of cases.") This is because the "primary value at stake in cases of simultaneous or dual representation is the attorney's duty--and the client's legitimate expectations--of loyalty, rather than confidentiality." Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., 112 Cal. App. 4th 810, 822, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 442 (2003) (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). This strict per se rule recognizes that a client cannot be expected to sustain trust and confidence in his or her counsel who is also representing the client's adversary in litigation. [*17] See In re Charlisse, 45 Cal. 4th at 160. An attorney's conflict is imputed to the law firm as a whole. Advanced Mess., 913 F. Supp. 2d at 906. 4 California Rule of Professional Conduct 3-310(C) provides, "a member shall not, without informed written consent of each client, (1) Accept representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients potentially conflict; or (2) Accept or continue representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients actually conflict; or (3) Represent a client in a matter and at the same time in a sepa- rate matter accept as a client a person or entity whose interest in the first matter is adverse to the client in the first matter." IV. DISCUSSION A. SPB Is Subject to Disqualification Due to Its Concurrent Representation of Tate & Lyle and the Sugar Plain- tiffs The parties do not dispute that at the time of the merger, Tate & Lyle was a current client of SPB. SPB contends that Tate & Lyle consented to SPB's concurrent representation of the Sugar Plaintiffs by agreeing to a general advanced waiver set forth in Patton Boggs' Standard Engagement Terms enclosed in the 1998 Engagement Letter.5 (See Castelli Decl., Ex. 1.) 5 The 1998 Engagement Letter was countersigned by Executive [*18] Vice President and General Counsel of Tate & Lyle's corporate predecessor, Patrick Mohan, and the letter referenced the Standard Terms of En- gagement that were in effect at that time. (Mohan Decl., ¶ 1, 3.) 1. Waiver Principles When evaluating whether a law firm may concurrently represent two clients, even on unrelated matters, it is pre- sumed that the duty of loyalty has been breached and counsel is automatically disqualified, unless full reasonable dis- closure is made and both clients knowingly agree in writing to waive the conflict. See Visa U.S.A., Inc. v. First Data Corp., 241 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (Hamilton, J.) (citation omitted); Concat LP v. Unilever, PLC, 350 F. Supp. 2d 796, 819 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (Illston, J.) (citation omitted). Because the waiver must be informed, a second waiver may be required if the original waiver insufficiently dis- closed the nature of a subsequent conflict. Concat, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 820. But an advanced waiver of potential conflicts need not specify the exact nature of the future conflict. Visa, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1105. California law does not require that every possible consequence of a conflict be disclosed for consent to be valid; the inquiry is "whether the waiver was fully informed." Id. Whether full disclosure was made and the client made an informed waiver is a fact-specific inquiry that considers the following factors: (1) the breadth [*19] of the waiver; (2) the temporal scope of the waiver (whether it waived a current conflict or whether it was intended to waive all conflicts in the future); (3) the quality of the conflicts discussion between the attorney and the client; (4) the specificity of the waiver; (5) the nature of the actual conflict (whether the attorney sought to represent both sides in the same dispute or in unrelated disputes); (6) the sophistication of the client; and (7) the interests of justice. Id. at 1106 (citations omitted). 2. Tate & Lyle Did Not Make an Informed Waiver of SPB's Concurrent Representation The prospective waiver in the Standard Engagement Terms provides in relevant part: "It is possible that some of our current or future clients will have disputes with you during the time we are representing you. We therefore also ask each of our clients to agree that we may continue to represent or may undertake in the future to represent existing or new clients in any matter that is not substantially related to our work for you, even if the interest of such clients in those unrelated matters are directly ad- verse to yours . . . ." (Castelli Decl., Ex. 1.) The breadth and temporal scope of Patton Boggs' advanced [*20] waiver is open-ended. It purports to waive con- flicts in any matter not substantially related indefinitely. The waiver also lacks specificity. It does not identify a poten- tially adverse client, the types of potential conflicts, or the nature of the representative matters. SPB argues that like in Visa, the Court should enforce the advanced waiver, finding Ingredion's "level of experience with legal services" crucial in determining that Ingredion gave informed consent. See Visa, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1109-10 (finding the client gave informed consent, reasoning, in part, that the client was a Fortune 500 company; it had its own legal department; it routinely hired national law firms to handle its more complex legal matters, and accordingly, it was "expected to understand the full extent of what it waived. . . ."). SPB contends that Tate & Lyle's own highly experi- enced counsel signed the 1998 Engagement Letter on behalf of Tate & Lyle, and it is undisputed that Tate & Lyle is a sophisticated client. (Opp'n at 13:16-14:16.) SPB further contends that other jurisdictions and the ABA Model Rules and opinions recognize that the most important factors in evaluating informed consent are the involvement of inde- pendent counsel; the [*21] sophistication of the client; and the exclusion of conflicts in substantially related matters. (Opp'n at 10:1-19.) Tate & Lyle's former Executive Vice President and General Counsel who signed the 1998 Engagement Letter, Pat- rick Mohan, declares, "I am certain that no one from Patton Boggs discussed the advanced waiver with me at the time that I executed the 1998 Engagement Letter. . .[i]f they had and I had understood that it was meant to waive actual fu- ture conflicts without further disclosure and consent by Tate & Lyle, I never would have signed the agreement." (Mohan Decl. ¶ 5.) Mr. Mohan further declares, "I did not understand or intend Tate & Lyle to be agreeing to waive future con- flicts that would include having Patton Boggs adverse to Tate & Lyle in litigation while it was still actively representing Tate & Lyle on other matters without a further, specific disclosure and request for a waiver from Tate & Lyle." (Id. ¶ 4.) Moreover, the Model Rules are merely persuasive authority, and in any event, they embrace a consideration of all of the Visa factors--not just a select few. See, e.g., ABA Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.7 cmt. 22 (2011). Further- more, in Visa, the court upheld the [*22] prospective waiver that identified the adverse client by name, it disclosed as fully as possible the nature of any potential conflict that could arise between the parties, and it specifically contemplated the firm's representation of Visa against First Data in litigation matters. See Visa, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1107; see also Za- dor Corp. v. Kwan, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1285, 1302, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 754 (1995) (upholding an advanced waiver in which the prospective, adverse client was specifically named). The advanced waiver here did not identify potential adverse clients or the nature of any potential conflicts covered by the waiver. It is difficult to imagine that in 1998, Patton Boggs contemplated potential conflicts that could surface 16 years later and disclosed them to Tate & Lyle, and that Tate & Lyle--as sophisticated as it is--fully appreciated the risks and made an informed waiver. The Court finds that the advanced waiver did not amount to a full and reasonable disclosure of the potential con- flict; accordingly, Tate & Lyle did not knowingly waive the conflict.6 Visa, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1106-07. A second more specific waiver was required because the advanced waiver did not sufficiently disclose the nature of the conflict and the material risks of SPB's ongoing representation of Tate & Lyle and the adverse Sugar Plaintiffs. [*23] See Concat, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 820-21. 6 Because Patton Boggs' advanced waiver does not constitute "informed consent," the Court does not address the parties' alternative arguments regarding whether the terms of the waiver apply, e.g., whether the waiver is inapplicable because Patton Boggs/SPB has obtained sensitive, proprietary or other confidential information of Tate & Lyle or whether the former and current representations are substantially related. 3. SPB's Withdrawal Did Not Cure the Conflict On August 18, 2014, after SPB concurrently represented Tate & Lyle and the Sugar Plaintiffs for more than two and a half months, SPB terminated its relationship with Tate & Lyle after it would not agree to waive the conflict. (See Castelli Decl. ¶ 22, Ex. 8.) The "hot potato rule" bars an attorney and law firm from curing the dual representation of clients by expediently severing the relationship with the pre-existing client. See Flatt, 9 Cal. 4th at 288. Accordingly, the automatic disquali- fication rule applicable to concurrent representations cannot be avoided by unilaterally converting a present client into a former client. Id. SPB argues that the "hot potato doctrine" does not apply and it was permitted to withdraw: (1) pursuant to the terms of the [*24] 1998 Engagement Letter; (2) because the withdrawal could be accomplished without material adverse effect and was permitted under the District of Columbia and California Rules of Professional Responsibility; and (3) because it is not a situation in which SPB dropped a client "like a hot potato" to take on a new client. (Opp'n at 15:20-19:26.) The 1998 Engagement Letter provides, "[i]f either you or we conclude that our representation should or must be terminated, we will do our best to protect your interests in providing a smooth transition to new counsel." (Castelli Decl., Ex. 1.) That provision does not authorize SPB to cure a conflict of interest by its withdrawal. Moreover, at the time of SPB's withdrawal, it was representing Tate & Lyle in a project involving a 90-day response deadline. (Proctor Decl. ¶ 6.) Tate & Lyle's counsel declares that the company is now forced to find new counsel to replace its counsel of sixteen years and bring that new counsel up to speed. (Castelli Decl. ¶ 23; Balsley Decl. ¶ 11.) Additionally, the "hot potato rule" applies regardless of the attorney's reasons for terminating the relationship.7 See Flatt, 9 Cal. 4th at 289. The "hot potato rule" does not distinguish circumstances [*25] in which counsel drops a client to represent a new client, from the circumstances present here. Rather, the doctrine is grounded in an attorney's undi- vided duty of loyalty, which was unquestionably breached by SPB simultaneously representing adverse clients. See id. at 284. 7 SPB cites the District of Columbia and California Rules of Professional Conduct, but California law applies to the Motions to Disqualify in this case. See In re Cnty. of Los Angeles, 223 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Because we apply state law in determining matters of disqualification, we must follow the reasoned view of the state supreme court when it has spoken on the issue"). In sum, SPB concurrently represented Tate & Lyle in regulatory matters and the adverse Sugar Plaintiffs in this ac- tion. Tate & Lyle did not consent to the concurrent representation, and SPB's withdrawal from its representation of Tate & Lyle did not cure the conflict or convert Tate & Lyle into a former client for purposes of disqualification. SPB is therefore subject to disqualification from the present action. B. SPB is Subject to Disqualification Due to its Prior Representation of Ingredion in Matters Substantially Re- lated to the Present Action 1. Ingredion was a Former Client of SPB Ingredion first retained [*26] Patton Boggs in May 2004, and Patton Boggs has continued to perform work for In- gredion over the years and last performed work for Ingredion in September 2013. (Talisman Decl. ¶ 3.) Ingredion contends that it was an existing client at the time of the merger because during the firm's decade-long representation, Ingredion reached out to Patton Boggs on an as-needed basis, but time gaps never resulted in a termina- tion of the attorney-client relationship.8 (Levy Decl. ¶ 5.) Ingredion contends that it was treated as an existing client and was not asked to enter into a new fee agreement when it approached Patton Boggs in February 2009, May 2013, or on other occasions following time gaps. (Id.) All work was billed to Ingredion's existing account with Patton Boggs. (Id.) 8 For example, there were gaps of activity between July 2008 and February 2009, as well as between June 2012 and May 2013. (See Levy Decl. ¶ 5.) An engagement letter dated December 14, 2005 (the "2005 Engagement Letter") from Patton Boggs' attorney, Stu- art Pape, enclosed Patton Boggs' Standard Terms of Engagement. The Standard Terms of Engagement provides, "[i]t is our policy that the attorney-client relationship will terminate upon [*27] our completion of any service that you have retained us to perform." (Talisman Decl., Ex. 2.) Patton Boggs completed services for Ingredion in September 2013, eight months prior to the merger in June 2014, and under the terms of the 2005 Engagement Letter, its attorney-client relationship with Ingredion ended. Ingredion contends that it was not rendered a former client by the statements in Patton Boggs' Standard Terms of Engagement because (1) it did not expressly agree to those terms; and (2) the 2005 Engagement Letter that accompa- nied the Standard Terms of Engagement shows that Ingredion retained Patton Boggs not for a discrete issue or litiga- tion, but to provide ongoing representation in connection with FDA regulation of Ingredion's products. (See Proctor Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. 10.) Ingredion was not required to take any action to show its assent to the Standard Terms of Engagement. The 2005 Engagement Letter from Mr. Pape provides, "[t]his letter supplements and modifies the enclosed terms of engagement. . . [i]f you agree with these terms and conditions, including those set forth in the [Standard Terms of Engagement], no further action is required. . . ." (Id.) The 2005 Engagement Letter also provides [*28] that Patton Boggs was retained to "represent [Ingredion] in con- nection with FDA regulation of the Company's Products." (Id., Ex. 10.) It does not specify that Patton Boggs' represen- tation is ongoing, continuing or open-ended. The Standard Terms of Engagement provides that the attorney-client rela- tionship would end upon completion of Patton Boggs' services and states that should Ingredion continue to retain Patton Boggs, the attorney-client relationship would be re-established at that time. (Id.) Once Patton Boggs completed its rep- resentation of Ingredion in September 2013, the attorney-client relationship terminated. See, e.g., Banning Ranch Con- servancy v. Super. Ct., 193 Cal. App. 4th 903, 913-14, 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 348 (2011). Accordingly, Ingredion was a former client of Patton Boggs at the time of the June 2014 merger.9 Whether SPB can represent the Sugar Plaintiffs in this action after previously representing Ingredion depends on whether SPB can do so while maintaining its duty of confidentiality it owes to Ingredion. That, in turn, depends on whether the former and cur- rent matters are "substantially related." 9 In any event, whether Ingredion was a current or former client is a moot issue because as set forth infra, the Court finds that the former and current matters are "substantially [*29] related." SPB is thus presumed to have confidential information, thereby subjecting it to automatic disqualification. See Flatt, 9 Cal. 4th at 283; Cobra Solutions, 38 Cal. 4th at 847. In addition, the Court need not address whether Ingredion consented to waive the conflict by the advanced waiver provision in Patton Boggs' Standard Terms of Engagement because the ad- vanced waiver by its terms did not waive conflicts in matters that are substantially related. (Opp'n at 9:7.) 2. The Prior and Current Representations are "Substantially Related" a. Patton Boggs' Prior Work for Ingredion vs. Its Work in the Present Action Patton Boggs' attorneys advised Ingredion regarding permissible, common or unusual names for HFCS. (Levy Decl. ¶ 10.) Evidence filed in camera shows lawyers billed time in 2006 for researching regulations on advertising products with HFCS; reviewing FDA and Department of Agriculture rules and regulations on HFCS, and discussing research and common or unusual names for HFCS with each other and Ingredion. (Levy Decl. ¶ 10; In Camera Proctor Decl, Exs. 3, 5.) Patton Boggs' attorneys also advised Ingredion regarding FDA statements and enforcement actions following a let- ter issued from the FDA dated July 3, 2008, signed by Geraldine June [*30] (the "Geraldine June Letter"). (Levy Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. 4.) The Geraldine June Letter describes aspects of manufacturing HFCS and whether a resulting product could be considered "natural." (Id. ¶ 10.) Ingredion received advice from Patton Boggs regarding interpretation of the Gerald- ine June Letter, including advice concerning a key aspect of the HFCS manufacturing process and how that might affect whether the resulting HFCS product could be described as "natural." (Id. ¶ 11.) Patton Boggs' lawyers billed time in 2009 for researching and discussing FDA statements and natural claims internally and with Ingredion. (In Camera Proctor Decl, Ex. 5.) Ingredion contends that in the Geraldine June Letter, the FDA concluded that HFCS qualifies as "natural." (Id.; Mot. at 7:20-22.) Counsel for Ingredion declares that it and other Defendants are relying on the Geraldine June Letter in this action in support of their position that it is not a misrepresentation to claim that HFCS is "natural." (Id.) SPB represents Plaintiffs in this lawsuit against Defendants, alleging that they engaged in false advertising of HFCS. Plaintiffs allege that this lawsuit is a response to an educational campaign initiated [*31] by Defendant CRA in 2008 that sought to educate the public about HFCS and to address the Sugar Plaintiffs' purported vilification and myths about HFCS with facts and scientific studies. (See SAC ¶ 46; Ingredion's Am. Ans., Counterclaims (Dkt. No. 91) at ¶ 46.) Sugar Plaintiffs allege that Defendant CRA's campaign constitutes false advertising under the Lanham Act, identi- fying two categories of false and/or misleading representations: the first category is Defendants' use of the term "corn sugar," and the second category is Defendants' statements that HFCS is a "natural" product. (SAC ¶¶ 68, 69.) Defendants, including Ingredion, defend that the term "corn sugar" accurately depicts HFCS and that the FDA has confirmed methods of producing HFCS that qualifies as "natural." (See Mot. (Dkt. No. 24) at 7:8-22, 5:12-15.) Ingredi- on's defense relies, in part, on the Geraldine June Letter. (See id.; Levy Decl., ¶ 11.) The Geraldine June Letter has been explored in multiple depositions, it is expected to be discussed in motions for summary judgment, and it will likely be addressed at trial. (See Levy Decl. ¶ 11; Proctor Decl. ¶ 8.) b. Legal and Factual Similarities The evaluation of whether the two [*32] representations are substantially related centers upon the factual and legal similarities of the representations. See Farris, 119 Cal. App. 4th at 679 (citations omitted). SPB contends that none of the four billing entries from August 2006 relating to HFCS, concern the use of the word "sugar" or any other term at issue in this litigation. (Opp'n at 16:2-10.) SPB further argues that there was no question related to whether the word "sugar" could be used for HFCS in labeling, or any question regarding the relative benefits of sugar versus HFCS, and the inquiry did not relate to advertising. (Id.) SPB contends that the Geraldine June Letter is only at issue in this litigation regarding whether Defendants can rely on it as an FDA endorsement of marketing HFCS as "natural." (Id. at 16:20-22.) SPB further contends that work per- formed in August 2009, was performed by attorneys Paul Rubin, who left Patton Boggs in August 2012 (two years be- fore the merger) and Smitha Stansbury, who left SPB in July 2014 (almost two months after the merger). (Id. at 16:16.) A "substantial relationship" does not necessarily mean an exact match between the facts and issues involved in the two representations. See Farris, 119 Cal. App. 4th at 688; see also Trone, 621 F.2d at 1000 (explaining that the [*33] substantial relationship test does not require that the issues in the two representations be identical); see also Flatt, 9 Cal. 4th 275, 283, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 885 P.2d 950; Jessen v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 111 Cal. App. 4th 698, 712-13, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 877 (2003). The work Patton Boggs performed for Ingredion in 2006 and 2009 relates to the propriety of characterizing HFCS as "natural" under FDA policy--advice that is germane to issues concerning marketing and adver- tising HFCS as natural and whether such claims could be false or misleading. Accordingly, the similarities of the legal and factual issues of Patton Boggs' prior representation of Ingredion put Patton Boggs, now SPB, in a position where confidential information material to its current representation of the Sugar Plaintiffs was likely imparted to counsel. See Cobra Solutions, 38 Cal. 4th at 847. Moreover, the fact that former Patton Boggs attorneys Smitha Stansbury and Paul Rubin are no longer at SPB does not change the outcome, particularly since Ms. Stansbury left SPB after the merger. See, e.g., Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 809 F. Supp. 1383, 1390-91 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (Orrick, J.). Ingredion has established that there is a "substantial relationship" between the prior and current representations, and the attorneys at Patton Boggs, now SPB, are presumed to possess confidential information. SPB is thus subject to auto- matic disqualification from this action.10 See Farris, 119 Cal. App. 4th at 679; Cobra Solutions, 38 Cal. 4th at 847. 10 The presumption [*34] that an attorney has access to confidential matters relevant to a subsequent repre- sentation extends the attorney's disqualification vicariously to the attorney's entire firm. See In re Charlisse, 45 Cal. 4th at 161; Flatt, 9 Cal. 4th at 283. 3. SPB's Evidence Does Not Overcome the Presumption SPB provides declarations from attorneys that have worked on the instant lawsuit on behalf of the Sugar Plaintiffs. These attorneys declare that they have never received any information from any lawyer who was with Patton Boggs about either Ingredion or Tate & Lyle, and they have not performed work on any matter for Tate & Lyle after the mer- ger. (See gen. SPB's Omnibus Compendium of Declarations (Dkt. No. 262).) SPB's counsel declares that the only law- yers who remain at SPB who have worked on Ingredion matters after 2010 are Stuart Pape, Carey Nuttall, and Ann Spiggle. (Talisman Decl., Ex. 39 at ¶ 6.) These lawyers declare that they have never provided any information to any lawyer who was at Squire Sanders about Ingredion, and after the firms merged, they did not work on any matter for the Sugar Plaintiffs.11 (See Nuttall Decl., Ex. 28; Pape Decl., Ex. 29; Spiggle Decl, Ex. 38.) 11 Similarly, attorneys who worked on matters for Tate & Lyle declare that they [*35] have had no contact with any lawyer formerly with Squire Sanders about the Sugar case; shall have no such contact in the future; have not had any discussion about Tate & Lyle with any lawyer formerly employed at Squire Sanders; and have never provided any information to any lawyer formerly with Squire Sanders about Tate & Lyle. (See, e.g., Mudrick Decl., Ex. 27; Randle Decl., Ex. 31; Samolis Decl., Ex. 32; Schutzer Decl., Ex. 34.) Shortly after the merger in July 2014, Stuart Pape--the Patton Boggs attorney who signed the engagement letters for both Ingredion and Tate & Lyle--consulted with the Sugar Plaintiffs' expert witness, David Kessler, and the former Squire Sanders attorney, John Burlingame, who is co-lead attorney for the Sugar Plaintiffs in this action. (See Pape