Policy Studies Organization From the SelectedWorks of Emma R. Norman April, 2009 Violence and Deprivation: Arendt and the Pervasiveness of Superfluous Life Emma R. Norman Available at:https://works.bepress.com/emma_norman/2/ Norman MPSA 2009 33-16 Violence and Deprivation: Arendt and the Pervasiveness of Superfluous Life Emma R. Norman University of the Americas Puebla, Mexico Department of International Relations and Political Science Sta. Catarina Martir San Andres, Cholula 72710, Puebla, Mexico. [email protected] Draft Paper. Please do not quote or cite without permission. Overview: This paper teases out several strands of Arendt’s view of human superfluousness. Relating this idea to issues of stateless persons and terrorism, I argue the links between superfluousness and violence in her work are far closer than is often thought. Keywords: Arendt, superfluousness, violence, statelessness, terrorism, femicide, biopolitics Panel 33-16: Arendtian Themes Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Ill. April 2-5, 2009. 1 D Norman MPSA 2009 33-16 Violence and Deprivation: Arendt and the Pervasiveness of Superfluous Life Emma R. Norman This paper emerges from, and engages with, the current proliferation of discussions concerning Arendt’s views on sovereignty, humanity, and superfluousness. Tracing some of the different strands of her notion of human superfluousness, I look at how the exclusion and deprivation inherent in the idea of superfluousness is reflected in, and illuminated by, contemporary questions surrounding stateless persons, and several key experiences of terrorism. I argue that the strong and radical connections this notion has with Arendt´s concept of violence deserve more emphasis than it has hitherto received. For the link between superfluousness and the biopolitical ‘administration of bare lives’ undertaken increasingly by our political institutions and practices not only permits the justification of the use of violence. It can also be seen as a veiled but highly dangerous form of violence itself. And, if this is the case, it is not only stateless persons, illegal migrants and political detainees who are rendered superfluous by contemporary poietic politics, but ordinary citizens too. Totalitarian solutions may well survive the fall of totalitarian regimes in the form of strong temptations which will come up whenever it seems impossible to alleviate political, social, or economic misery in a manner worthy of man.1 It is not easy to swiftly map out Arendt’s conceptual landscape or isolate any part thereof. Arendt’s own view of her work was not a whole and coherent political theory, but a series of ‘trains of thought,’ the tracks of which sometimes intersect, but also occasionally 1Draft paper. Please do not cite without the permission of the author. Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1966), 459 [hereafter referred to as Origins]. 2 2 Norman MPSA 2009 33-16 diverge. Her many commentators have nevertheless found more intersections than Arendt perhaps envisaged, illuminating what Margaret Canovan has called “an elaborate and orderly spider’s web of concepts, held together by threads that were none the weaker for being hard to see… this means that one cannot understand one part of her thought unless one is aware of its connections with all the rest.”2 The point is a fair one and applies as much to her notion of human superfluousness as it does to many of her other political ideas. This paper explores Arendt’s notion of superfluousness in some detail by examining certain threads that connect it with other notions central to her complex web of concepts— without which superfluousness is hard indeed to comprehend. These include her dual notion of sovereignty, the way this impacts on how far human rights can be guaranteed, her singular conceptualization of violence as distinct from power, and her ambivalent attitude toward the concept of humanity. The first half of this paper discusses the way these concepts combine to delineate the idea of “human superfluousness.” It is well-known that the implications of Arendt’s argument are as clear for questions concerning stateless persons and refugees today as they were in the 1920s, 30s and 40s—if not more so. However, while she linked the starkest form of superfluousness to the “radical evil” emanating from the Nazi and Stalinist totalitarian regimes, the poignancy of this concept is not restricted to such extreme cases of violence and deprivation. The central argument of this paper is that, if the underlying emphasis Arendt placed on deprivation is read closely with her views on violence, then the concept of superfluousness 2 Canovan, Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of her Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 6. Though some are less keen to read into Arendt’s work the kind of systematism that Canovan attributes to it. See Lang’s, “Introduction,” in Hannah Arendt and International Relations: Readings Across the Lines, eds. Anthony F. Lang and John Williams (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 3 34 Norman MPSA 2009 33-16 may have a wider reach and deeper hold on contemporary political life and political communities than she intimated. In developing this argument, the second half of this paper examines where Arendt’s views on superfluousness can shed additional light on some pressing practical issues today. I explore two avenues where the concept reaches well beyond the deprivations inherent in statelessness. The first concerns the way the War on Terror has displayed an enormous capacity for creating human superfluousness, not only for the detainees of Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, but at a general level. The second example is just as telling of the pervasiveness of the superfluous life. The cases of the femicides in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico over the last 16 years demonstrate how superfluousness can be generated and perpetuated not only against those who have been stripped of their citizenship status, but also against groups of ‘ordinary’ citizens within a state, too. Superfluousness and Deprivation [T]he not-so-hidden aim of totalitarianism is the deliberate attempt to make human beings qua human superfluous, to transform human beings in order to eliminate their humanity—to destroy their plurality, spontaneity, natality, and individuality.3 Most commentators on Arendt emphasize their own constellation of concepts that reveal the key position her views on superfluousness occupy in her thought. Richard Bernstein, for example, juxtaposes radical evil with the banality of evil and thoughtlessness.4 Dana Villa 3 Richard J. Bernstein, “Are Arendt’s Reflections on Evil Still Relevant?” Review of Politics, vol. 70 (2008), 69. 4 Richard J. Bernstein, “From Radical Evil to the Banality of Evil: From Superfluousness to Thoughtlessness,” in Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 137-53. See also Bernstein, “Arendt’s Reflections.” 4 5678 Norman MPSA 2009 33-16 draws close links between Arendt’s reflections on radical evil, terror and superfluousness.5 Patrick Hayden situates it vis-a-vis the concepts of the right to have rights, thoughtlessness, plurality, power and freedom.6 And Bridgit Cotter concentrates on the decline of the nation- state, sovereignty and the right to have rights.7 This paper begins along lines similar to the last approach, but takes this particular thought-train a couple of stops further by pursuing its connections with Arendt’s unique understanding of violence and her ambivalence toward the concept of humanity. Using these concepts as focal points helps to reveal several complex dimensions in the idea of superfluousness. Superfluousness, Sovereignty and the ‘Inalienable’ Rights of Man Arendt’s notion of human superfluousness is thoroughly bound to different kinds of deprivation and the modes of exclusion these produce. She introduced the concept in the context of the proliferation of stateless persons8 where redrawing the international boundaries in Europe after the First World War had deprived millions of either a home territory to be repatriated to, or a new state that would offer them naturalization. In the face of the sheer numbers of refugees at the time, the age-old right to asylum was effectively 5 Dana R. Villa, Politics, Philosophy, Terror: Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt (Princeton University Press, 1999). 6 Patrick Hayden, Political Evil in a Global Age: Hannah Arendt and International Theory (London: Routledge, 2009). See also Hayden, ‘Superfluous Humanity: An Arendtian Perspective on the Political Evil of Global Poverty,’ Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 35 (2) (2007): 279-300. 7 Bridget Cotter, “Hannah Arendt and the ‘Right’ to Have Rights,” in Hannah Arendt and International Relations: Readings Across the Lines, eds. Anthony F. Lang and John Williams (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 95-112. 8 Which, for most purposes, she equates with refugees in that they are de facto stateless. See Arendt, Origins, 281. I follow her in using the terms interchangeably here. 5 9111 Norman MPSA 2009 33-16 abandoned and the legal process of naturalization broke down internationally to the point where even naturalizations that had already been accepted were cancelled.9 Being stateless, then, did not just deprive a person of belonging to a territory, it deprived them of occupying a clear “niche in the framework of the general law.”10 The dilemma of stateless persons threw the tensions between several political and legal idea(l)s into sharp relief. First, what Arendt called ‘people’s sovereignty’ (freedom from colonial despotism embodied in the right of a people to collective self-determination) was seen to clash with ‘state sovereignty’ (“in which each state has absolute jurisdiction within its own borders and only within them”11). The enormous number of refugees meant that, if it were not trumped, people’s sovereignty was in danger of constantly threatening the established legal and political order, challenging state sovereignty in the process. In the 1920s, 1930s and beyond, the states of Europe responded by soundly re-exerting their authority over the stateless—an authority that was constrained, in Arendt’s view, only by pragmatic concerns until the rise of totalitarianism swept even those restrictions away.12 “Theoretically, in the sphere of international law, it had always been true that sovereignty is nowhere more absolute than in matters of emigration, naturalization, nationality and 9 Arendt, Origins, 285. 10 Arendt, Origins, 283, citing R. Yewdall Jermings, “Some International Aspects of the Refugee Question,” British Yearbook of International Law, 1939: 11 Cotter, “Hannah Arendt,” 97. 12 Including, to some extent, many nontotalitarian European states—particularly regarding the role of the police in dealing with stateless persons. See Arendt, Origins, 283-88. 6 111 Norman MPSA 2009 33-16 expulsion.”13 This led Arendt to muse on the probable correlation between how far a regime had been ‘infected’ with totalitarianism and how often it exercised its sovereign right to denationalize. At this point a second tension emerges to add to the picture of how successive layers of exclusion and deprivation transform into the condition of being rendered superfluous. Depriving stateless persons of legal membership in a state after WWI did not merely dispossess them of their physical homes, and lead to the loss of a sense of belonging to a rooted homeland, or of the cultural world they had carved for themselves there. It also ruled out the possibility of them ever finding another home or territory of their own.14 Arendt saw this as the most primary deprivation of all: the loss of a place in this world, a loss that renders opinions insignificant and actions ineffective.15 In becoming stateless, persons are additionally robbed of the only entity that could guarantee a set of minimum rights, rendering them extremely vulnerable to any kind of abuse and deprivation, since they have no legal status either in their own countries or abroad. Arendt’s complaint was with the claims to the so-called universal and inalienable qualities of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, and for the same reasons, later the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These rights had been classified as ‘inalienable’ since they were meant 13 Arendt, Origins, 278. 14 Arendt, Origins, 294 15 Arendt, Origins, 296. 7 1111 Norman MPSA 2009 33-16 to be independent of all governments; but it turned out that the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back upon their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them… The stateless people were… convinced… that loss of national rights was identical with loss of human rights.16 This part of her logic leads to the argument that the victory of state sovereignty over people’s sovereignty can transform multiple experiences of loss into rendering persons superfluous and disposable. The state has the last word on who and what kinds of persons have legal status and will be protected, and whose human rights will be suspended or negated. Unable to send refugees back to their now nonexistent homelands and unwilling to assimilate or naturalize them into their own sovereign nations, the idea of internment camps for large groups of stateless persons became (and still is17) the “routine solution”18 along with a temptation to resort to excessive policing and arbitrary rule.19 Here is where the implications of ‘losing one’s place in the world’ truly start to emerge. The plight of the stateless “is not that they are not equal before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed, but that nobody wants even to oppress them… only if they remain perfectly “superfluous,” if nobody can be found to “claim” 16 Arendt, Origins, 291-2. 17 From 2001-2008 the Australian government shipped asylum seekers to offshore camps on Nauru island (see Cotter, “Hannah Arendt,” 106) and Manus Island, Papua New Guinea. Both were shut in 2008, but the Christmas Island detention center remains open to deal with Australia’s policy of mandatory detention for unauthorized aliens. Administrative detention of refugees and asylum seekers is widespread in Europe and the U.S. in restrictive detention centers and sometimes in prisons. 18 Arendt, Origins, 279. 19 Arendt, Origins, 287-8. 8 22222 Norman MPSA 2009 33-16 them, may their lives be in danger.”20 They are, in short, deprived of the most fundamental right of all: “the right to have rights.”21 Successive layers of deprivation coalesce finally into total exclusion from the international “family of nations,” first juridically, then morally and ultimately through the destruction of individuality,22 which obliterates the spontaneity and natality that form the human capacity for beginning something anew and uncaused. Superfluousness thus goes beyond experiencing loneliness and uprootedness.23 It is the experience of being totally cut loose from reality; of being isolated physically, socially and psychologically from the common human world of men. Many commentators identify Arendt’s idea of superfluousness with the telos of the totalitarian project, the essence of which was terror and the aim of which was to render human beings into something other than human, mere “specimens of the human animal”24 through the horrors of the death camps. This radical, ‘end-stage’ of superfluousness refers to the point where once-human individuals were turned into unremembered, replaceable, 20 Arendt, Origins, 295-6. 21 Arendt, Origins, 296. This has been the specific focus of increasing academic attention of late. See Cotter, “Hannah Arendt,” 2004; Stefan Heuser, “Is There a Right to Have Rights? The case of the Right of Asylum,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice vol. 11, no. 1 (February 2008): 3-13; James D. Ingram, “What is a ‘Right to Have Rights’?: Three Images of the Politics of Human Rights,” American Political Science Review vol. 102, no. 4 (November 2008): 401-416; Richard Bellamy, “The ‘Right to have Rights’: Citizenship Practice and the Political Constitution of the European Union,” One Europe or Several? Working Papers 25, One-Europe Programme (2001). 22 See Arendt, Origins, 447-55. 23 See Arendt, Origins, 474-9. Uprootedness can be a precursor to superfluousness, but is not equivalent to it (475). 24Arendt, Origins, 455, 464. See also Villa, Philosophy, Terror, Politics, 6, passim. 9