1 US Presence in Afghanistan and its Impact on Central Asia THESIS Submitted to the University of Kashmir for the Award of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph. D) in Political Science By Mushtaq Ahmad Bhat Under the Supervision of Dr. Tabasum Firdous (CCAS) CENTRE OF CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF KASHMIR Hazratbal, Srinagar – 190006 2014 2 University of Kashmir, Srinagar, Hazratbal 190006 NAAC Accredited Grade “A” Certificate Certified that the thesis entitled, US Presence in Afghanistan and its Impact on Central Asia, submitted by Mushtaq Ahmad Bhat is suitable for submission and worthy to award the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, subject to the approval of examiners. The scholar worked in this Centre on whole time basis for the period required under statutes. The receptivity and conduct of the scholar has remained satisfactory. Director (Prof. G. N. Khaki) Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir. 3 Contents Certificate Preface Abbrevations Chapter I Introduction 1-32 Chapter II Attacks on America- A Debate 33- 47 Chapter III US Military Presence in Afghanistan 48-88 Chapter IV Impact of US Presence on Central Asia 89-129 Chapter V Summary and Conclusion 129-141 Bibliography 142-156 Annexure I Annexure II 4 Preface The US war in Afghanistan and the controversial attack on Iraq and insurgency are examples of contemporary globalization. The US and her allies have made their presence not only in Afghanistan but different parts of the world are under siege. The US initiated military action in Afghanistan with two aims: firstly, to defeat al-Qaeda and their Taliban allies, and secondly, in concert with the Afghan people and the international community, to facilitate the creation of democratic conditions which would thwart the terrorist sanctuaries within Afghanistan. The overarching US government strategy for winning the war on terrorism and rebuilding the state of Afghanistan is predicated on six lines of operation that include: a) improving governance ; b) defeating the terrorist threat; c) improving political stability; d) enhancing economic and social development; e) implementing regional and donor strategies; and f) integrating the US government actions. The US led coalition in Afghanistan was strong with forty countries involved in so-called Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force. The US military had nearly 30,000 troops under Enduring Freedom, and about 20,000 coalition troops from 18 nations, the total was over 25,000. By the US presence in Afghanistan the security dynamics of Central Asia witnessed a great impact. It has certain important regional implications, such as; a) a huge number of people left Afghanistan and took shelter in neighbouring Central Asia; b) the huge number caused greater domestic repression in Central Asia especially in Uzbekistan; c) some Islamic militant groups retaliated from both inside and outside the region; and d) the tension increased among all the Central Asian states regarding the stability on Afghanistan. US presence in Afghanistan and its growing ties with Afghanistan also creates particular problems for China. The US military presence in Afghanistan and its immediate neighbours is seen as eroding Chinese influence in those countries. For this reason China has been more active in cultivating the all-weather bi-lateral ties with the concerned countries. In nutshell, all the neighbouring states of Afghanistan remain isolated from the aftershocks of major developments in the region since the attacks on US. It affects these states in a multidimensional way, impacting the ongoing insurgencies, fight for self-determination, efforts for revolutionizing society on their soil, struggles for autonomy, their economies, trade, foreign investment and their perceptions towards US. Now US has decided to withdraw her troops partially 5 from Afghanistan in 2015, it has become an issue of discussion for scholars throughout world whether Afghanistan will manage to continue democratic institutions established by US or she may again fall in civil war. But in November 2014 Obama has signed a Bi-Lateral Security Agreement with Afghanistan to keep her troops there for the year 2015 as well. December, 2014 Srinagar. 6 Acknowledgement This Ph.D thesis contains the result of research undertaken at the Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir. I do not find sufficient words to express my high indebtness to Almighty. My most important guide throughout all these years was Dr.Tabasum Firdous. I am very thankful to her for expert guidance. Furthermore, I would like to thank all the Directors of the Centre during the period especially Prof. G. N. Khaki, Prof. Mushtaq Ahmad Kaw, Prof. G. M. Mir, Prof. G. R. Jan, Prof. Ajaz Ahmad Banday and other faculty members for their continuous support. I am grateful to my promoters and my fellow researchers from the Centre especially from the discipline of Political Science who have given me the opportunity and freedom to determine the direction of my research, along the lines that I thought was best. I further acknowledge my thanks to the staff members of JNU (New Delhi), Delhi University, US Congress Library (New Delhi), Indian Council of World Affairs (Sapru House), (New Delhi), Indian International Centre (New Delhi), Central Secretariat Library, National Archives of India and Embassy’s of US, Central Asian Republics and Afghanistan in (New Delhi). I am highly thankful to staff members of the Allama Iqbal Library of the University of Kashmir and departmental library of the Centre of Central Asian Studies, University of Kashmir. I am also thankful to the non-teaching employees of the Centre for their help and moral support. I also extend my deep sense of gratitude to the learned authors whose works I have consulted and who have been enlisted in the bibliography. I greatly acknowledge the help which I have derived from their learned works. I am also thankful to Parvaiz and Co. for technical assistance. With infinite blessings, affection, love and encouragement of my revered and dear parents, brothers and my life partner, this work has seen the light of the day. I admit the importance of their contribution and acknowledge it with profuse thanks. Mushatq Ahmad Bhat Ph. D Scholar Centre of Central Asian Studies University of Kashmir, Srinagar. 7 CHAPTER I The conflict in Afghanistan has been fanned first by the geopolitical rivalry between Russia and Great Britain that lasted for more than a century, and later, by the rivalry between the Russia and US. The US interests in Central Asia in general and Afghanistan in particular are comparatively of recent origin. US policy towards Afghanistan was basically reactive and limited to the policy of containing Russia so that it did not spread its influence beyond Afghanistan towards the oil-rich Gulf States. Throughout the 1980’s the US tried its best to organize a jihad against the communists in Afghanistan. It deliberately raised a highly militant culture among the Afghan refugees and, even went to the extent of making an international Islamic axis possible by recruiting mujahideen from all over the Muslim world. Once Russia pulled out their troops from Afghanistan, US left the scene and quietly allowed these forces to regroup under Taliban. Not only the Taliban but also al-Qaeda came into existence under the leadership of Osama bin Laden. Following the 9/11 attacks on US, Bush administration launched anti-terrorist coalition which provided opportunity to Afghanistan to thwart the Taliban threats. These incidents changed the whole security scenario of the world. Afghanistan initially supported and welcomed US military presence in fighting against terrorism but later, she showed her disillusionment against the US. The US military presence in Afghanistan had a profound impact on the security dynamics of Central Asia. It affected these states in different ways, for instance, insurgency in some Republics like Uzbekistan, or struggle for more and more autonomy to some Republics, their economies, trade, foreign investment and their perception towards US. Geo-Strategic Importance of Afghanistan 8 The case of Afghanistan, both in its historical and present context, is a complex mixture of social, political and geographical determinants which have shaped the development of Afghan society, Afghanistan has been located at the crossroad of British and Russian rivalry which resulted in Three Anglo-Afghan wars in the 19th and early 20th century.1 In a state where there would be absence of sincere leadership and solid vision, there is loss of identity and direction for that nation. Once the direction is lost, outcome is lost and when the outcome is lost, the very purpose for that nation’s existence being lost. A quick glance at Afghan history shows all these things. This is one aspect which cannot be neglected while talking on Afghanistan. Another positive aspect is partly due to difficult geopolitical conditions and the independent mood of the populations, Afghanistan managed to maintain most of its sovereignty and autonomy throughout these imperialist wars and World War II, in which she remained neutral.2 Since its inception, the great powers have always tried to disturb Afghanis due to its geographical location. Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan was one chapter of such mission. The soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan was hardly accidental, but based on quite thorough advance preparation.3 The Soviet leaders apparently had fairly reliable information on the developments in Afghanistan because of the presence of some thousands of Soviet military and technical experts in the country and because of the high level missions which were sent out to explore the prevailing situation.4 Probably after a relatively difficult process of decision-making the stakes were finally considered so high that the dilemma was resolved by resort to military means. It was no doubt expected that the operation would result in some tangible costs, but in the light of later developments, in 1 Raimo Vayrynen, Geopolitics of Afghanistan, “Journal of Peace Research,” Special Issue on Imperialism and Militarization, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1980, Sage Publications Ltd. p.93. 2 Raimo Vayrynen, Geopolitics of Afghanistan, “Journal of Peace Research,” Special Issue on Imperialism and Militarization, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1980, Sage Publications Ltd., p.94. 3 The decision to intervene was taken by the geriatric Soviet leadership, headed by the drug-dependent Leonid Brezhnev. Martin McCauley, Afghanistan and Central Asia, A Modern History, Pearson Education Limited, Britain, 2005, p.16. 4 See The Economist, London, January 3, 1980, pp.25-26. 9 particular regarding US policy, they were probably under-estimated. US behaviour before the intervention obviously did not give reason to anticipate so tough a reaction.5 The Soviet policy in Afghanistan is based on geopolitical thinking, which appears to have a sort of renaissance in international relations in general. The Soviet Afghan border is some 12,00 km long; and south of this border an unstable and unpredictable state was about to emerge. This created considerable anxiety in Moscow, especially among the military elite. Fears that Muslim nationalism might spread to the Soviet Union were less central in this context. Soviet thinking appears to be based on an idea of ‘maximum security’; not only real but also potential threats to the security of the Soviet Union have to be removed.6 At the same time the Muslim opposition was gaining strength, partly because of the economic and military support which they received from outside the country. It is a fairly well-established fact that the Arab states and, to varying degrees, Pakistan, China, Iran and the United States, have supported Muslim rebels in Afghanistan who were also able to operate over the Afghan-Pakistan border.7 The US attitude to the Soviet role in Afghanistan was extreme in the sense that they were desirous to contain erstwhile Soviet Union. 8 The decision-makers in the United States were unhappy about the growing Soviet role in Afghanistan, but partly because of their own problems in Iran they did not want to take any drastic measures. During the summer of 1979, the policy of the Carter Administration became, partly due to factors connected with the forthcoming presidential election campaign tougher, means to utilize economic and military coercion were considered. In addition, the US response has also been based on 5 On the boycott measures undertaken by the US, see the statement by President Carter on January 4, 1980, published in ‘Survival’ vol. 3, No.1580, pp.66-68. 6 It was well-known that Hafizullah Amin, the ruler of Afghanistan at that time, was rapidly losing support, both among the people and within the army, and to maintain power he was restoring to more brutal means. Raimo Vayrynen, Geopolitics of Afghanistan, “Journal of Peace Research,” Special Issue on Imperialism and Militarization, Vol. 17, No. 2, 1980, Sage Publications Ltd., p.97. 7 In the State of the Union Address to the US Congress on January 23, 1980, President Carter stated that; an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. And such an assault will be repelled by use of any means necessary, including military force. Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, American Primacy and its Strategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997, p. 16. 8 Martin McCauley, Afghanistan and Central Asia, A Modern History, Pearson Education Limited, Britain, 2005, p. 26. 10 geopolitical approach which is visible in the declaration by the Carter administration that the Persian Gulf now belongs to the immediate US, sphere of interest.9 Geopolitics and spheres of interests are practically always detrimental to the interests of smaller powers which prefer peaceful and equitable relations with major powers.10 Same is the case with Afghanistan, which is economically very weak and has no economic importance. Its importance lies in its geopolitical location as already said. Russia may be fashioning a strategic alliance with India and Iran to keep Pakistan China out of Afghanistan. There is another reason why Moscow would like to include Islamabad. The later would like to tap into Central Asian oil and gas. Supplies would come through pipelines across Afghanistan. If Moscow can prevent these pipelines from becoming reality, Central Asian hydrocarbons will have to pass through Russia to reach the outside world. America can no longer rely on Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states for oil supplies. Within five years Russia and Central Asia can supply America with the oil it gets at present from the Gulf.11 The Soviet Union obviously wanted in Afghanistan a government which leans rather heavily to Moscow or at least understands her security concerns. It is perhaps too easy to make use of the argument that the Soviet motive is and has been to defend its interests in Afghanistan against the intrusion by other leading powers, such as Great Britain in the past.12 It is, however, difficult to believe that the motives of Soviet operations would have extended beyond Afghan borders too, for example, the shores of the Indian Ocean or the oil fields of the Persian Gulf. The Soviet military operations in Afghanistan apparently aim at giving support to the Afghan troops to clear the country of opposition elements inimical to the Babrak regime and to the Soviet Union, since these elements potentially threaten- not 9 Halliday, “Revolution in Afghanistan”, New Left Review, No.1, 1978, USA, pp.10-14. 10 Arnold Fleicher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest, New York, 1965, pp.213-215. 11 Martin McCauley, Afghanistan and Central Asia, A Modern History, Pearson Education Limited, Britain, 2005, p. xvii. 12 Gregorian Vatran, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, Politics of Reforms and Modernization, Standard Publication, New York, 1969, pp. 91-108.