DANCE OF SWORDS: U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO SAUDI ARABIA, 1942-1964 DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Bruce R. Nardulli, M.A. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2002 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Allan R. Millett, Adviser Professor Peter L. Hahn _______________________ Adviser Professor David Stebenne History Graduate Program ABSTRACT The United States and Saudi Arabia have a long and complex history of security relations. These relations evolved under conditions in which both countries understood and valued the need for cooperation, but also were aware of its limits and the dangers of too close a partnership. U.S. security dealings with Saudi Arabia are an extreme, perhaps unique, case of how security ties unfolded under conditions in which sensitivities to those ties were always a central —oftentimes dominating—consideration. This was especially true in the most delicate area of military assistance. Distinct patterns of behavior by the two countries emerged as a result, patterns that continue to this day. This dissertation examines the first twenty years of the U.S.-Saudi military assistance relationship. It seeks to identify the principal factors responsible for how and why the military assistance process evolved as it did, focusing on the objectives and constraints of both U.S. and Saudi participants. Drawing heavily on U.S. primary source materials, the research traces the history of military assistance from 1942-1964. These years are explored using six time periods. The first is from 1942 to 1945, tracing early political relations, security developments, and the initiation of military activities and assistance by the U.S. during the war years. The years 1945 to mid-1950 examine the transition from world war to cold war, and the first serious long-term plans and actions between the two countries on military assistance. The period from mid-1950 through 1953 focuses on efforts to formalize U.S.-Saudi military assistance via written agreements, and to establish a regular military advisory group inside the Kingdom. The years 1954-1956 are investigated against the backdrop of ii what was a key phase of Arab nationalism and British decline in the region, all while the U.S. continued to seek containment of Soviet influence with Saudi assistance. The period 1957-1960 focuses on the effects of key developments inside Saudi Arabia on the military assistance process; the Saudi internal power struggle between King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal. Last are the years 1961 through 1964, characterized as an era of Arab polarization and direct security threats to the Kingdom, most notably the war in the Yemen. That war brought into sharp relief the many tensions inherent in the military assistance relationship. It also was the period of greatest internal conflict between Saud and Faisal, culminating in King Saud’s removal from the throne. The work concludes with a summary of the principal findings and patterns of behavior observed over the entire period. It also addresses the historically important question (and enduring policy issue) of how to evaluate the effectiveness of the overall military assistance undertaking with Saudi Arabia. The Sword Dance or ‘Ardha’ is the national dance of Saudi Arabia. It is used here as a metaphor for the intricate moves required by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia in their military dealings, and to denote the distinct patterns of behavior that emerged. iii DEDICATION Dedicated to my wife Liliana, for her unrelenting support and who endured far more than anyone should ask. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am indebted to many people who gave of their time, knowledge, and advice throughout this endeavor. I wish to thank Professors Peter Hahn and David Stebeene for their willingness to take on this project as members of my dissertation committee. They were generous with their time and guidance in significantly improving the final product. I would also like to thank Professors Martha Garland and John Guilmartin for all of their assistance in helping me move toward final completion of my Ph D. During a much earlier phase of this effort, Drs. Williamson Murray and Charles Hermann provided freely of their time, guidance, and support for which I am most appreciative. A very special and deep dept of gratitude goes to Professor Allan Millett. In addition to being my dissertation adviser, he has been a mentor throughout my academic and professional career. His knowledge and expertise are exceeded only by his constant support and willingness to keep this research moving forward. For this I will always remain grateful. At the History Graduate School I am most thankful to Joby Abernathy for all of her assistance on the many administrative procedures associated with this effort. Beth Russell of the Mershon Center also provided critical, oftentimes short notice, communication and support throughout. At the U.S. Naval War College, I would like to thank Dr. Kenneth Watman who, along with Professor William Turcotte, provided me with the opportunity to both teach at the War College and time to write while there. Ken was also party to many long v discussions on the topic, and I benefited immensely from his sharp questioning and insights. Much of this research was conducted while at RAND. The corporation was generous in providing flexibility and assistance along the way. Several RAND colleagues were instrumental in providing all manner of support. Donna Betancourt, David Chu, Natalie Crawford, Richard Darilek, Lynn Davis, Mike Hix, David Kassing Tom McNaugher, Jim Quinlivan, and Lauri Zeman all invested in this undertaking. I only hope they know what a difference they each made and my gratitude for all they have done. I also thank Robin Davis who worked tirelessly to produce a polished final document. Finally, my greatest thanks are reserved for my parents, who made this entire journey possible. vi VITA August 14, 1956…………………………………………Born-Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 1981……………………………………………………..M.A. (First), War Studies, King’s College, University of London 1998-1999………………………………………………Visiting Professor, U.S. Naval War College, Newport Rhode Island 1986-Present…………………………………………….Member, professional research staff, RAND 1984-1985………………………………………………Member, research staff, Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, National Strategy Information Center 1982-1984………………………………………………Graduate Teaching and Research Associate, Mershon Center, The Ohio State University PUBLICATIONS 1. Bruce R. Nardulli et. al., Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999, MR- 1406-A (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND), 2002. 2. Bruce R. Nardulli, “A Future of Sustained Ground Operations,” RAND Review (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND), Summer 2002. 3. Bruce R. Nardulli and Thomas McNaugher, “Transforming the Army,” in Military Transformation (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press), 2002. vii 4. John Gordon, Bruce Nardulli, and Walter Perry, “Task Force Hawk: The Importance of Jointness,” Joint Force Quarterly (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University), Spring Issue, 2002. 5. Ian O. Lesser, Bruce R. Nardulli, and Lory A. Arghavan, “Sources of Conflict in the Greater Middle East,” in Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, RAND, MR-897-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND), 1998. 6. Bruce Nardulli et al., Future Gulf Dynamics and U.S. Security, DB-106 (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND), 1994. 7. Project Air Force Assessment of Operation Desert Shield: The Buildup of Combat Power, RAND/MR-356-AF, (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND), 1994. Authored policy section. 8. Bruce Nardulli, "European Defense and Stability in the New Era," Mershon Center, Winter 1990, The Ohio State University. 9. Bruce Nardulli, "The View From Berlin: A Conference Report," Conventional Arms Control and the Security of Europe, Westview Press, 1988 10. Bruce Nardulli, "Clausewitz and the Reorientation of Nuclear Strategy," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 5, No. 4, December 1982. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History viii Table of Contents Abstract...............................................................................................................................ii Dedication...........................................................................................................................iv Acknowledgments...............................................................................................................v Vita .................................................................................................................................vii List of Maps......................................................................................................................xii List of Tables...................................................................................................................xiii CHAPTER 1 THE DANCE OF SWORDS.......................................................................1 Introduction..............................................................................................................1 Dance of Swords: The Genesis................................................................................2 The U.S. Security Lens: Four Broad Objectives....................................................9 Constraints on U.S. Objectives..............................................................................14 The Saudi Dimensions of Security........................................................................15 Historiography.......................................................................................................21 Organization and a Note on Terminology.............................................................40 CHAPTER 2 THE DANCE BEGINS: WORLD WAR TWO AND EMERGING SECURITY TIES.....................................................................................................45 Overview................................................................................................................45 The Strategic Setting..............................................................................................47 Saudi Arabia Emerges As A U.S. Strategic Interest: Oil and Overflight..............49 Beginnings of the Military Assistance Relationship.............................................60 Observations on Early Patterns..............................................................................90 CHAPTER 3 DANCING AT A DISTANCE: POST-WAR THROUGH MID-1950....94 Strategic Setting: Cold War Onset And The Middle East.....................................94 Struggling For a Post-War Policy Toward the Kingdom......................................97 Elusive Pursuit: Dhahran, Palestine, And Military Assistance............................102 What Price Dhahran?...........................................................................................121 Bridging The Gap: Short Term Renewal And Military Survey..........................127 The Joint United States Survey Group to Saudi Arabia (JUSSGSA)..................134 After JUSSGSA: Still Playing For Time.............................................................156 Observations on Post-War Patterns.....................................................................165 CHAPTER 4 THE DANCE JOINED: MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORMALIZED, 1950-1953...............................................................................................................170 Strategic Setting: Korean War, Stirrings of Revolutionary Nationalism, and Military Assistance.....................................................................................170 Establishing Saudi Eligibility For Reimbursable Military Assistance................172 Hard Bargaining: Finding An Acceptable Quid Pro Quo For Future Access.....181 Devil In The Details: Reaching Closure on the Military Assistance Program....192 Supply and Demand: The Growing Imbalance on Security................................198 ix The Wheels Turn Slowly: Initiation of Military Assistance And Further Negotiations Over the MAAG....................................................................202 Reaching Closure on MAAG, Stalling Out on Grant Military Assistance..........215 Death of An Era, Birth of a Power Struggle........................................................217 Observations on the Early 1950s.........................................................................221 CHAPTER 5 TROUBLED MOVEMENTS: MANEUVERING IN THE FACE OF INTERNAL STRUGGLES AND RISING ARAB NATIONALISM, 1954-1956...............................................................................................................224 Strategic Setting...................................................................................................224 Early Days Under Saud: U.S. Military Assistance As A Test Of Support..........226 Royal Guard, National Guard, and Regular Armed Forces.................................234 The Road to Dhahran Renewal: Paved With Conflicting Pressures....................240 Initial Negotiations on Renewal..........................................................................264 The Suez Crisis and Dhahran..............................................................................277 Saudi Balancing Act: Supporting Nasser, Relying on the U.S............................283 Observations........................................................................................................285 CHAPTER 6 ADJUSTING TEMPO: RESPONDING TO SHIFTING PRIORITIES AND PARTNERS, 1957-1960........................................................289 Strategic Setting...................................................................................................289 The King’s Visit and Opening Positions.............................................................290 The 1380 Plan: Centerpiece of the Negotiations.................................................298 Struggling for Closure.........................................................................................305 Formal Agreement and Early Implementation....................................................311 The Building Crisis for Saud: Tensions Over Syria, Emergence of the UAR, and Palace Intrigue.................................................................320 Faisal’s Priorities and the Hiatus in Military Assistance.....................................328 Caught in the Middle: USMTM’s Growing Military Difficulties and Mounting Political Role.......................................................................335 Resistance to Faisal and His Reforms.................................................................345 Observations........................................................................................................354 CHAPTER 7 U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE CRUCIBLE: CONFLICT IN THE YEMEN...............................................................................359 Strategic Setting: Cold War With A Difference..................................................359 Early Days And Differences Under Kennedy.....................................................362 Dust-Up Over Kuwait..........................................................................................368 Next Steps on Dhahran, USMTM and Military Assistance................................372 Outbreak of the War in the Yemen......................................................................379 Washington’s Response to Early Military Developments...................................385 Fighting From Weakness: Faisal’s Response......................................................389 Measured Reassurances From Washington.........................................................393 Growing Saudi Pressure for U.S. Military Assistance........................................399 Further Escalation and New Diplomatic Efforts: The Bunker Mission..............407 Troubled Deployment: The Military and Political Complications Surrounding Operation ‘Hard Surface’......................................................415 Enduring U.S. Differences Over the Future of Hard Surface..............................429 The Johnson Administration Inherits the Yemen Headache...............................432 The U.S. Air Defense Survey..............................................................................440 x