US Army Infantry Divisions 1944-45 JOHNSAYENretired in August2002from30years' activeandreserveservice withtheUnitedStatesMarine Corps.Duringthattimehe servedwithartillery,armor, andmilitaryintelligence. Heispresentlyengagedas acontractciviliananalyst fortheMarineCorps.He graduatedfromtheCitadel in1974.Hehaspreviously publishedamilitary-historical magazine,The Tactical Notebook,andforOsprey haswrittenBattleOrders17: USArmyInfantryDivisions 1942-43. Battle Orders • 24 US ArlllY Infantry Divisions 1944-45 John Sayen Consultant Editor Dr Duncan Anderson • Series editors Marcus Cowperand Nikolai Bogdanovic FirstpublishedinGreatBritainin2007byOspreyPublishing, ACIPcatalogrecordforthisbookisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. MidlandHouse,WestWay,Botley,OxfordOX2OHPUnitedKingdom 443ParkAvenueSouth,NewYork,NY 10016,USA ForacatalogofallbookspublishedbyOspreyMilitaryandAviationpleasecontact: Email:[email protected] OspreyDirectUSA,c/oRandomHouseDistributionCenter,400HahnRd, Westminster,MD21157USA ©2007OspreyPublishingLtd. E-mail:[email protected] Allrightsreserved.Apartfromanyfairdealingforthepurposeofprivatestudy, OspreyDirectUK,P.O.Box140,Wellingborough,Northants,NN82FA,UK research,criticismorreview,aspermittedundertheCopyright,DesignsandPatents E-mail:[email protected] Act,1988,nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinaretrievalsystem, www.ospreypublishing.com ortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,electrical,chemical,mechanical, optical,photocopying,recordingorotherwise,withoutthepriorwrittenpermission Image credits and author's note ofthecopyrightowner.InquiriesshouldbeaddressedtothePublishers. Unlessotherwiseindicated,thephotographicimagesthatappear ISBN978 I84603 I199 inthisworkarefrom the USArmySignal Corpscollection.Inthe EditorialbylliosPublishing,Oxford,UK(www.iliospublishing.com) treediagramsand maps inthisvolume,the unitsand movements Design:Bounford.com ofnationalforces aredepicted inthefollowingcolors: IndexbyAlisonWorthington USArmyunits Olive Drab OriginatedbyUnitedGraphicsPteLtd,Singapore German units Grey TypesetinMonotypeGillSansandITCStoneSerif British/Canadian units Brown Japanese units Red 08 09 I0 II I2 II I0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 Keyto militarysymbols xxx xxx xx X III II I ••• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Army Corps Division Brigade Regiment Battalion Company/ Platoon •• • battery/troop 0 0 [Z] ~ 8 [ZS] 0 [Q] Section Squad Infantry Cavalry Artillery Antitank Antiaircraft Ammunition rn U G 0 I I IADMIN1 ICOMM 1 CHAP ICMND 1 Administration Airborne Band CombatEngineer Communications Canon Chaplain Command [!J [BJ G [E] EJ ~ D 1DEMO 1 Construction Chemical Demolition Engineer Gliderinfantry Headquarters Headquarters Heavy andService ~ ~ 0 8 EE 0 EJ liNTEL 1 Heavymachine InfantryCannon Intelligence Liaison Lightmachine Medical MilitaryPolice Maintenance gun gun OJ @] EJ G 0 [5J ~ 0 1 1 Mortar Mine Ordnance Operations Pioneer Personnel Paymaster Post Ilral I I 0 LSJ Cd G I I I/KI RADIO STAFF Quartermaster Radio Reconnaissance Signal Supply Service Staff Survey I 00 []] I I WPNS 1 7H5OMWM 110H5OMWM1 I15H5OMWM1 Keyto unitidentification Motor Telephoneand Weapons 7Smm IOSmm ISSmm ~ Unit Parent transport telegraph Howitzer Howitzer Howitzer identifier unit Wherefiguresareprovidedbelowornexttounitsymbolsinthisbook,thenumbersrefertothepersonnelstrength Commander ofeachunit.Forexample,994-10--21,060 indicatestherewere994officers,10warrantofficersand21,060enlisted men.Whereonlytwofiguresareprovided,forexample 72-1,608, theyindicatethenumberofofficersandenlisted (+)withaddedelements(-)lesselements menonly(theunithadnowarrantofficers.) Contents Introduction 4 Combat mission and preparation for war 5 Unit organization 10 The riflesquad •The infantrybattalion •The divisionartillery Thecombatengineerbattalion •Otherdivisional units Tactics 28 Infantrytactical doctrine•Weapons platoonsand companies • Infantryregimentcannon andantitankcompanies The division artillery•Combatengineers•Tanksandantitanksupport Command, control, communications, and intelligence 38 Commandand control •Communication equipment Communicationarchitecture• Intelligence Logistics 47 Infantrylogistics•Artillerylogistics• Medicaltreatmentand evacuation Quartermaster,ordnance,and engineerlogisticalfunctions Combat operations 54 IstInfantryDivision (Reinforced),OmahaBeach,June6, 1944 28th InfantryDivision intheArdennes,December 16-19,1944 6thand 25th Infantrydivisionsinthe Philippines,February 1-6,1945 Lessons learned 74 Bibliography 75 Published books•Articles inperiodicals•Websites Appendix 77 Tablesoforganization •USinfantrydivisions,composition and combatrecords Index 95 Introduction This book, the second of two volumes on the US Army's 66 World War II infantry divisions,l covers their history and development from the beginning of 1944until the end ofthe war. Itwas duringthisperiod, and especiallyafter the Normandylandings, thatmostUS divisions enteredcombat. Bythe endof 1943thedefeatoftheAxispowershadbecomealmostinevitable, eventhough the toughestfighting still layahead. In combat, the infantrydivisions proved, as before, to be the most useful and versatile fighting arm. Airborne and Partofamortarplatoon equipped armoreddivisionsweredesignedforuseinonlyalimitednumberofsituations, withthe standard MI81mm mortar but infantry divisions, when appropriately reinforced, could give an excellent firing on the outskirtsofStolberg, account of themselves against any foe, in any terrain, and in any part of the Germany,September 19, 1944. world. The 19 infantry divisions that deployed to the tropical islands of the Judgingfrom the numberofempty ammunition cylindersthis platoon PacificTheaterwere as effective and useful as the 42 that fought in the plains seemsto have doneagood deal of and forests of France or the eight (of which three later went to France) that shootingalready.A licensed version servedin the mountains ofItaly. ofa French design,the M1mortar Nevertheless, the infantry divisions were heavy consumers of scarce weighed 136lb.,could becarried by manpower, rubber, gasoline, and other precious resources. three men,and couldfire its 6.87lb. high-explosive projectilesoutto 3,300yards. IThefirstvolumeisBattleOrders 17,USArmyInfantryDivisions1942-43. 4 • • Combat mission and preparation for war Thestoryofthewartimedevelopmentoftheinfantrydivisionsin the USArmy really began in March 1942, when Lieutenant General Leslie J. McNair took command ofthe newly created Army Ground Forces (AGF). The AGF owed its existence to the influence ofthe ArmyAir Corps (AAC), which had caused the WarDepartmenttoplaceallArmyunitsnotdeployedincombattheatersunder separate commands for ground (AGF), air (AAF), and service forces (ASF). The newcommandsassumedalltheresponsibilitiesofthe existingservicebranches fortraining, organization, anddoctrine. BygroupingallairunitsundertheAAF, the AACwouldbringitselfastep closerto becomingan independentservice. McNair hadbeen involvedin organizational matters since World War I. As a colonel, he hadbeenthe chiefofstaffofthe 2dInfantryDivisionwhen itfield tested the prototype triangular division in 1936-37. Based on the experience gained from these tests, in March 1938 McNair proposed that the War Department adopt a very austere division of 10,275 troops. Although the War Department largely accepted his recommendations it permitted a series of individually small but cumulatively large manpower increases, which byJune of 1941 raised the strength of an infantry division to 15,245. The organization tablesfortheApril I, 1942division(discussedindetailinBattleOrders17)added self-propelledartillery, moreandheaviertrucks, and 49 moreantitankguns, but only269 more men. McNair had taken overthe AGF onlya monthbefore this, toolateto affecttheWarDepartmentdecisionto adoptthe newtables. McNairwasoneofthefewseniorAmericanofficersin 1942whounderstood the need to economize on both manpower (despite the draft) and equipment (despiteindustrialmobilization). InWorldWarItheWarDepartmentdesigned Japanese-Americantroops of the IOOth Infantry Battalion,then servingas IstBattalion,442nd Infantry,attachedtothe 34th Infantry Division,line up on both sidesofastreetin central Livorno, Italy,July 19, 1944. 5 USAInfantryDivision,March I,1943 693-47-12,672 II 33-8-01 3-0-1581 7-4-215 6-0-147 37-2-430 9trucks,14jeeps 34trucks,22jeeps 13M8armoredcars 31trucks 15-passengersedan 4.50-calMGsM2 3M3A1h-tracksw/arm 30ambulances 4.50-calMGsM2,10bazookas 5bazookas,55SMGs 12112-tontruck,24jeeps 9jeeps 960mmmortars 6.50-calMGsM2 6.30-calLMGs 1·;p·1 6bazookas,22SMGs rro OrdLt Mnt 0-2-56 9-0-143 9-1-137 3-0-70 II 56carbines 52trucks(482112-ton 19trucks,7jeeps 33/4-tontrucks m • truckswith1-tontrailers 3wreckers 15jeeps III forsupplyoperations) 5bazookas 29-3-632 134-9-1,861 6jeeps,4bazookas 4.50-calMGsM2 3tractorsw/angledozers 12.50-calMGsM2 12SMGs 67trucks,16jeeps 141-6-2,941 12.50-calMGs 18.30-calHMGs 29bazookas 13SMGs I 12-1-98 27-2-429 3.50-calMGsM2 12Ml155mmhowitzers [svIc] II 2li6aibsaoznoaokiracsraft 194.500b-caazloMokGassM2 HQ& HQCo III CHAP 16trucks,4jeeps 2liaisonaircraft 63trucks,15jeeps 16-2-176 10-4-98 7-0-1102 12-0-103 Includingthree 291112-tontrucks CompanyHQand 32-0-818 1truck,7jeeps cannonplatoons w/281-tontrailers fourantitankplatoons 6105mmM3howitzers 23/4-tontrucks 143/4-tontrucks 1011/2-tontrucks 6jeeps 6jeeps w/41-tontrailers 8.50-calMGsM2 1237mmATguns 29-2-429 13/4-tontruck 10bazookas 1.50-calMGM2 12M2A1105mm 24jeeps 4.30-calLMG howitzers 4.50-calMGsM2 19.50-calMGsM2 11bazookas 40bazookas 2liaisonaircraft 62trucks Notes 21jeeps HQ&!F=I Sources:TO2-27,5-15,6-10,7-11,8-15,9-8,10-17and11-7(all HQCoL!!-J WPNS March1,1943)plustableinGreenfieldetal,TheOrganizationofGround CombatTroops(Washington,DC1947),pp274-5. 9-103 5-157 Allunitstrengthsincludeattachedmedicalandchaplains. 211/2-tontrucksw/11-tontrailer 6-186 71112-tontrucks 1ThecorrectpersonnelandequipmentstrengthsofthedivisionHQ 43/4-tontrucks,7jeeps 11112-tontruck 13/4-tontruck andHQcompanyarenotknown.Thefiguresshownareestimates 337mmATguns 360mmmortars 5jeeps basedonthebestavailabledata.Enlistedpersonnelworkingat 1.50-calMGsM2 1.50-calMGM2 681mmmortars divisionHQareincludedinthedivisionHQcompany 3.30-calLMGs 2.30-calLMGs 3.50-calMGsM2 2Anewantitankcompanywithnine57mmguns(inthreeplatoons) 8bazookas 3bazookas 8.30-calHMGs wasauthorizedinMay1943. 9BARs 7bazookas its divisions as if there would be no limit on the manpower and material available to them. Consequently it could send only 42 divisions to France beforetheArmistice, anditstillhadtostripsomeoftheseofmostoftheirmen in orderto fill out the others. For the newwar the War Departmentestimated that it would need at least 100 divisions by the end of 1943, despite the likelihood ofmuch largerdiversions ofmanpowerinto naval and air forces. Although the United States was to become the "Arsenal of Democracy" it needed time before the output of its industry could match the needs of the troops. TheUnitedStateswasalso exportinglargeamountsofequipmenttoits allies. Shortages of strategic materials, especially steel, rubber, and gasoline, placed further constraints on the equipment available. The biggest constraint ofall, however, wasthatnoUS divisionwouldbeofanyvaluetothewareffort unless it could be shipped overseas - but to do that required cargo ships, and 6 there were never enough of them. Most divisions waited years for their USAInfantryDivision,July15,1943 737-44-13,472 xx Special Troops 38-8-01 38-7-890 6-0-149 35-2-429 ... 13M8armoredcars 31trucks 3M3A1h-trackswloarm 30ambulances 12112-tontruck,23jeeps 9jeeps Special Div G 960mmmortars Troops HOCo 3.50-calMGsM2 13.30-calLMGs 2-0-72 4-0-2091 3-0-70 7-4-215 5bazookas,30SMGs 13/4-tontruck(C&R) 14trucks,16jeeps 33/4-tontrucks 36trucks,19jeeps 1jeepwltrailer 15-passengersedan 15jeeps 6.50-calMGsM2 8carbines 357mmATguns 5bazookas II 1pistol 3.50-calMGs 32SMGs • m 6bazookas 138-9-2,072 29-3-632 12M1155mmtowedhowitzers 3tractorsw/angledozers rro OrdLt n 36M2A1105mmtowedhowitzers 67trucks,16jeeps Mnt 10liaisonaircraft 12.50-calMGs 360trucks,86jeeps 18.30-calHMGs 560c-a2r-b5i6nes 5130-t0ru-1c8k3s 19tru9c-k1s-1,377jeeps 13/43--t0on-13tr4uck III 8916.560b-caazloMokGassM2 29bazookas,16SMGs (482112-tontrucks 3wreckers with1-tontrailers 5bazookas forsupplyoperations) 5.50-calMGsM2 6jeeps,5bazookas 12SMGs 139-5-2,974 13.50-calMGsM2 6105mmM3howitzers 75trucks,139jeeps 1857mmATguns CHAP 1881mm&2760mmmortars 35.50-calMGsM2 1-0-03 24.30-calHMGs 18.30-calLMGs Notes 81BARs Source:TO7(July15,1943).Allunitstrengthsincludeattachedmedicalandchaplains. 1IncludesenlistedmembersofdivisionHQ. 2 1LTC(Cdr,SpecialTroopsandHQCommandant),1CPT(AssistantHQCommandant),1MSGT(chiefclerk),1SSgt(operations),1Sgt(duty),4Pvts(1[T-5]chaplain'sassistant,2[1T-5]drivers, 1orderly). 3 11LT(chaplain). 4 1MAJ(medica!),1CPT/1LT(dental),1TSgt(medical),1Sgt(medical),13Pvts(7[1T-3,1T-4,3T-5]surgicaltechs[including3aidmenfortheReconTroopand1fortheSignalCompany], 1[T-5]dentaltech,2[1T-5]medicaltechs,1basic). shipping. Therefore, McNair reasoned that an infantry division had to use as few menand strategicmaterials as possible andminimize the numberofcubic feetitcouldfitinto.InthelightoftheseconsiderationsMcNairfoundtheApril 1942infantrydivision inexcusablyextravagant. McNair concluded that the only long-term solution was to rewrite the infantry division organization tables to make them as "lean" as possible. To do this, he established the AGF Reduction Board. The "no-men," as the Table I:Infantrydivision members of the board came to be called, reviewed and modified all ground officerrankabbreviations force tables oforganization to achieve reductions of 15 percent in personnel (1942-43) and 20 percent in motor vehicles, but without cutting combat effectiveness. Rank Abbr. McNair personally participated in the work of the board and became the Majorgeneral MG biggest "no-man" of all, often saying "no" to his own "no-men." The "no Brigadiergeneral BG men" slashedthe proportionoforderliesto officers, gave as manylighttruck drivers as possible additional duties such as working in the kitchens, and Colonel COL eliminated "luxury" items. Company headquarters lost their tents and were Lieutenantcolonel LTC allowed only one portable typewriter each. No chairs, safes, or tables were Major MAJ allowed in any headquarters belowdivision level. The "no-men" assigned all personnel and equipment to specific vehicles and permitted no "reserves." Captain CPT They also increased the use of trailers since these considerably extended Firstlieutenant ILT the payload of the available trucks. Though leaving all "offensive" weapons Second lieutenant 2LT in place, they slashed anything whose main function was to increase Warrantofficer WO self-sufficiencyin security or supply. 7 In particular, McNair tried to discourage what he called "empire building" or the tendency of every arm and service to augment itself as if it had to win the war alone. An example was the persistent demands by many division commanders for their own tank, tank destroyer, antiaircraft, reconnaissance, and militarypolicebattalions so theycouldhandle everycontingency, not just the ones most likely to occur. There was also the tendency, deeply rooted in American society, to encumber the military with comforts, conveniences, gadgets,technicians, "experts,"specialservices,andcomplexcommand-control systems. Naturally, once these additions got started, they multiplied exponentially. Forexample, ifonewantedtoincreasethenumberofdentistsin a division one would also have to increase the number of dental technicians. Dentists and technicians had to be fed and required more cooks. Cooks, dentists, and technicians needed. trucks and their drivers and mechanics. Cooks, dentists, technicians, drivers, and mechanics needed medical care and that meant doctors, nurses, and medical technicians. The cooks, dentists, technicians, drivers, mechanics, doctors, nurses, and so forth needed clothing andthatmeantmorequartermasters- andofcoursetheyallneededdentalcare, which again increasedthe requirementfor dentists. McNairwas determined to nip such expansionin thebud. The "no-men" uniformly observed certain principles. First, for local air defense they replaced all Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs) outside the rifle squads with smaller numbers of much more effective M2 .50-caliber machine guns. Second, theyreplacedabout40percentoftheantitankgunsinadivision with large numbers-of the new 2.36in. antitank rocket launcher Ml or "bazooka."Neitherthebazookasnormostofthe .50-calibermachinegunshad Infantrymen crossa blown-up assigned gunners. Company commanders were expected to train a sufficient bridgeoverthe Marneat Mareuil numberoftheirmento operatetheseweaponsas an additionalduty. Third, in sur-AyonAugust30, 1944.German troops dynamited the bridge before addition to cutting the number of motor vehicles the "no-men" replaced abandoningthetown. heaviervehicleswithlighterones. Intheinfantryregimentstheyused 11/z-ton 8