U.S. A rmy C oUnterinSUrgenCy And C ontingenCy o d perAtionS oCtrine 1942–1976 by Andrew J. Birtle CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 2006 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Birtle, A. J. (Andrew James) U.S. Army counterinsurgency and contingency operations doctrine, 1942–1976 / by Andrew J. Birtle. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Counterinsurgency—United States—History—20th century. 2. United States. Army. I. Title. U241.B52 2006 355.4’25—dc22 2006020046 CMH Pub 70–98–1 First Printing F oreword In recent years the U.S. Army has been heavily engaged in per- forming counterinsurgency and nation-building missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. These undertakings, together with recent operations in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans, have kindled a strong interest in the Army’s past experiences in combating irregulars and restoring order overseas. In response, the Center has commissioned its historians to take a close look at the evolution of counterinsurgency and related doctrine in the U.S. Army. This volume, covering 1942 to 1976, is the second volume representing that effort. During the third quarter of the twentieth century, powerful politi- cal and socioeconomic forces created instability in many countries. Watching international communism exploiting such situations, the United States mobilized its resources to fight Communist subversion as part of a post–World War II global “Cold War.” While recognizing the underlying problems that made societies vulnerable to Communist exploitation, the U.S. Army played a central role in executing all aspects of this policy. It furnished counterguerrilla training, advice, and assistance to foreign armies and police forces. It occupied conquered or unstable countries, organized governments, and supplied men, money, and materiel to help allied nations redress the socioeconomic and polit- ical conditions that American policy makers believed fostered unrest. And when necessary, it fought Communist insurgents, guerrillas, and even regular forces employed in irregular roles. The Cold War is over and the threat posed by communism much diminished. However, the conditions that can fuel civil unrest and insurrection are still with us and will probably always be features of human affairs. Soldiers, diplomats, politicians, and analysts will thus benefit from learning about how the U.S. Army has historically approached such problems and the successes and failures that those ventures have met. Although every historical event is unique, many of the issues and challenges involved in such actions are as relevant today as they were in the past. By examining evolving Army doctrine, train- ing, and field operations, this work provides an in-depth look at how our institution performed its counterinsurgency and nation-building responsibilities during a previous era of global instability, experiences iii that might well shed some needed light on the work that must be done today and tomorrow. Washington, D.C. JEFFREY J. CLARKE 15 September 2006 Chief of Military History iv t A he Uthor Andrew J. Birtle received a B.A. degree in history from Saint Lawrence University in 1979 and M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in military history from Ohio State University in 1981 and 1985, respectively. He worked for the U.S. Air Force as a historian for approximately three years before joining the U.S. Army Center of Military History in 1987. He has written several articles, pamphlets, and monographs; a book on the rearmament of West Germany; and U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941, the companion volume to this study. He is currently working on a volume concerning U.S. Army activities in Vietnam between 1961 and 1965. v p reFACe Stability operations, nation building, and counterinsurgency: these are all phrases that are very much in the news today as the United States and its allies attempt to bring peace and order to troubled places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. None of these terms are new. They all originated over forty years ago, when the United States wrestled with an earlier era of global instability. Although the causes of foreign unrest, the nature of the threat, and the circumstances under which the United States has attempted to address those challenges are different today than they were several decades ago, many of the fundamental issues associated with such phenomena remain the same. Indeed, readers of this study and its predecessor volume, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941, will find many points of similarity in how the U.S. Army has dealt with counterinsurgency, constabulary, and limited contingency situations in the past. The reasons for these similarities and the principles that form the core of American doctrine are described in the book. The volume also examines the nature of coun- terinsurgency and nation-building missions, the institutional obstacles inherent in dealing effectively with such operations, and the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. doctrine, including the problems that can occur when that doctrine morphs into dogma. Readers should remember, however, that while many threads of continuity exist there are also developments that have no parallel. Continuity and change are the twin muses of histo- ry. No two situations are identical, and the fact that something happened in one instance does not mean it will occur in another. This is particularly true with regard to the subject matter of this book, as a plethora of politi- cal, socioeconomic, cultural, environmental, and military factors give each counterinsurgency, nation-building, and contingency operation a unique hue. The vagaries of these types of operations encumber both the historian and the doctrine writer. Consequently, writers and readers alike should always bear in mind that history, like military doctrine, is not an exact science, nor does it have determinative or predictive powers. It is an interpretive art that explains the past, helps us understand the present, and provides insights that may assist us in wrestling with the inevitable challenges of the future. Hopefully this volume accomplishes all three goals. vii Many people, far too many to name, assisted in the production of this volume. I would like to extend a general word of appreciation to the staffs of the National Archives and Records Administration, the Library of Congress, the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), the U.S. Army Military History Institute (MHI), and the Pentagon, Infantry School, and Command and General Staff College libraries. Individuals worthy of special mention are Wilbert Mahoney of the National Archives; Richard J. Sommers, David Keough, and Pamela Cheney at MHI; and at CMH, Graham Cosmas, Mary Gillett, James Knight, and Geraldine Harcarik. I would also like to recognize the members of the Center’s Publishing Division who transformed the manuscript into a book: Keith Tidman, Beth MacKenzie, S. L. Dowdy, and Teresa Jameson. Contractor Anne Venzon created the index. I am especially grateful to Diane Sedore Arms, whose expert editing greatly improved the quality of the work. Thanks also go to the scholars who reviewed all or portions of the manuscript and made many helpful suggestions: Stephen Bowman, Jeffrey Clarke, Robert Doughty, Paul Herbert, Joel Meyerson, Allan Millett, Richard Stewart, and Lawrence Yates. Finally, I would like to thank my parents and my wife, without whose support this work would not have been possible. Though many people contributed to this volume, the author alone is responsible for all interpretations and conclusions, as well as for any errors that may appear. Washington, D.C. ANDREW J. BIRTLE 15 September 2006 viii