««A * READING* OF MARX'S 1857 INTRODUCTION TO THE GRUNDRISSE"* STUART HALL CENTRE FOR CULTURAL STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM EDGBASTON, BIRMINGHAM B15 2TT. NOV/DEC. 1973 •The text throughout is the Pelican Grundrisse. ed. 8e trans. by M. Nicolaus 1 The 1857 Introduction to the Grundrisse is one of the most pivotal of Marx's texts. It is also one of his most difficult, compressed and 'illegible' texts. In his excellent Foreword to the Pelican edition of the Grundrisse.>Nicolaus warns that, by its very nature, Marx's Notebooks are hazardous to quote, "since the context, the grammar and the very vocabulary raise doubts as to what Marx 'really' meant in a given passage" (P25). Vilar observes that the 1857 Introduction is one of those texts "from which everyone takes whatever suits him" (NLR 80). I hope to have avoided the second of these traps, and I have certainly experienced the hazard of the first. However, the Intro remains - indeed, with the growing interest in Marx's method and epistemology, occupies an increasingly central position - in the study of Marx's work. I share this sense of its significance, while differing often from, how many of Marx's explicators have read its meaning. My aim, then, is to inaugurate a 'reading' of the 1857 text: a reading which, because of the difficulties Nicolaus has drawn to our attention must necessarily take the form of an 'explication', laborious though that form is. It is, of course, not a reading tabula rasa, not a reading 'without presuppositions': thus, a 'reading' which, in Althusser's sense, is a 'guilty' one. It reflects my own problematic, inevitably. I hope.it also throws some undistorted light on Marx's. In a Letter of Jan 1*t, 1858, Marx wrote to Engels: "I am getting some nice developments. For instance, I have thrown over the whole doctrine of profit as it has existed up to now. In the method of treat­ ment the fact that, by mere accident, I have glanced through Hegel's Logic has been of great service to me - Freiligarth found some volumes of Hegel which originally belonged to Bakunin and sent them to me as a present. If there should ever be time for such work again, I should greatly like to make accessible to the ordinary human intelligence in two or three printer's sheets, what is rational in the method which Hegel discovered but at the same time enveloped in mysticism.." It was not the only time Marx made expressed .that- hope. The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy As A Whole, usually printed together with the , , « . i .. .V » , other l8Wf Manuscripts, also aimed at an exposition and critique of Hegel’s dialectic in relation to both'the PhenomenQlogyv.andl.the Logic, but was, in the final event, largely confined to the-former. As late as 1876, he wrote to Dietzgen, "When I have shaken off the burden of my economic labours, I shall write a dialectic. The correct laws of the dialectic are already included in Hegel, albeit in a mystical form. It is necessary to 6trip it of this form”. (Samtliche Schriften, vol 1. 1922. Translated in Hook, From Hegel to Marx). (Incidentally, the references to Hegel and the Dialectic are far niore; frequent, in letters and asides in Marx's mature work than recent commentators would have us believe: and they almost invariably take the form of noting the 'rational' kernal within the 'mystical shell',and the need to take, by transformation, what was valid in Hqgel while abandoning its mystical form. Marx may " have been mistaken in thinking that he could'work with-and-against Hegel in this way: but the attempts, by Althusser and others, to represent this as a casual metaphor which 'Marx did not really mean.' is extraiely- difficult to substantiate from the evidence. Cf My fuller discussion of this in the "Settling'Accounts With Althusser" paper). The hopes were not to be fulfilled, the burden of the economics never laid aside. Thus, we do not have, from the mature Marx, either the systematic delineation of the 'rational kernal', nor the method of its " transformation, nor an exposition of the results of that transformation: the Marxian dialectic. Not even a systematic, account of how the latter would differ from the former. The 1857 Introduction, and the- fgr..5ipre compressed 1859 Preface to the Critique, together with‘other scattered asides, have therefore to do duty for the unfulfilled parts of Marx's project', and the 1857 Intro in particular as representing his fullest methodological and theoretical summary-text.' Decisive,-however, as this - 3 - text is, we must not handle it as if it were something other than it is. It was written as an Introduction to the Notebooks on "The Economic Categories" which now comprise the Grundrisse. These Notebooks are, themselves, enormously comprehensive in scope, digressive and complex in structure: and quite unfinished - "rough drafts". The fact that a methodological Introduction was drafted for what were essentially working notebooks is not at all surprising, for, as well as their rich theoretical content, the Grundrisse is noteworthy for allowing us "so direct an inquiry into...his method of working" (Nicolaus, P25). Rosdolsky remarked that it "introduces us, so to speak, into Marx's economic laboratory and lays bare all the refinements, all the bypaths of his methodology". The Introduction was thus conceived as an abstract, a resume and guide, to the 'problems of method' concretely and more expansively applied in the analysis of the Notebooks themselves: material which, then, by revision, expansion and compression, modification and further labour, was transformed, first, into the Critique, and then into the successive versions of Capital. It was not, therefore, intended to stand wholly in its own right. The examples it treats 'on the run* are often drawn from, and can be found in a much developed form,.in the Notebooks themselves. Indeed, one of the most illuminating uses of the Intro is to turn from the brief methodological resumes, to the substantive passages to which they refer, and to see how the method informs the actual working-through of a particular point in the demonstration. But it remains what it says - an 'Introduction'. Moreover, the tentative character of the text was signified by Marx's decision in the end not to publish it. The Intro was, as we know, replaced by the terser Preface: and some of the central propositions of the Intro are modified, or at least suspended, by the time they reached the Preface. Thus, "A general intro­ duction which I had drafted is omitted, since on further consideration, it seems to me confusing to anticipate results which have still to be substantiated, and the reader who really wishes to follow me will have to advance from the particular to the general" - an injunction which, superficially, at least, appears to reverse the proposition offered in the Intro, to advance from the general to the concrete (though, as we shall see, it is one of the temptations open to a reading of the Intro which is not sensitive to the Hegelian heritage of Marx's thought, to confuse the 'particular* with the 'concrete'). Still, an immediate contrast of the Intro with the Preface (where a classical conciseness is everywhere in play, quite different from the linguistic playful­ ness and conceit of the Intro) will remind us that, despite its brilliant demonstrations and its dense argumentation, the 1857 Intro remains, even with respect to Marx's method, provisional. I In both the opening and closing sections of the main text of the Intro (I omit, for the moment, Marx's very sketchy notes at the end), Marx's reprise of his method proceeds via a critique of the methods of political economy. The first section deals with Production. The object of the inquiry is "material production". Smith and Ricardo begin with "the individual and isolated hunter or fisherman". Marx, however, begins with 'socially determinate' individuals, and hence "socially determined individual production". This marks the beginning of a lightning critique of the ideological presuppositions of Political Economy. The C18 theorists, up to and including Rousseau, find a general point of. departure in 'the individual' - projected as an ideal, true for all time. Smith and Ricardo take over this ideological projection and found their theories upon it. Yet 'the individual' cannot be the point of departure, but-only the result. Rousseau's 'natural man' appears as a stripping away of the entanglements and complexities of modern life, the rediscovery of the natural, universal human-individual core beneath. Actually, the whole development of 'civil society' is subsumed in this aesthetic conceit. It is not until labour has been freed of the dependent and restricted forms of feudal - 5 - society, and subject to the enormous revolution it undergoes under early capitalism, that the modern concept of 'the individual' could appear at all. A whole historical and a whole ideological development, then, is already presupposed in - but hidden within - the notion of the Natural Individual and of universal 'human nature'. This is an absolutely characteristic movement of thought in the Intro. It takes up the 'given' points of departure in Political Economy. It shows by a critique that these are not, in fact, starting points but points of arrival. In them, a whole historical development is already 'summed up'. In short (to anticipate): what appears as the most concrete, common-sense, simple, constituent starting-points for a theory of Political Economy, turn out, on inspection, to be the sum of many, prior, determinations. Production outside society is an absurdity: as absured as the notion of language without individuals living and talking together. It takes, then, a gigantic social development to produce 'the isolated individual' producer as a concept: only a highly elaborated form of developed social connectedness can appear - take the 'phenomenal form' - of men pursuing their egoistic interests as 'indifferent', isolated, individuals in a 'free' market organized by an 'invisible hand'. (To be strictly accurate, Mam argues that the "all sided dependence" appears as a mutual indifference: however, since the relation must continue to be mediated, it is - by the medium of money, which thus comes not only to be a 'universal' mediator of equivalent exchanges, but as that which regulates the relations between individuals from the outside - "as something alien to them, autonomous, as a thing". In this way, the "social connection between persons is transformed into a social relation between things". Note that Marx does not say men become things, but that the relation of men/men in exchange is expressed in the form thing/thing; this displacement of form enables a relation of mutual interdependence to 6 assume the form, appear, as a spontaneously organized relation of mutual indifference). "The reciprocal and all-sided dependence of in­ dividuals who are indifferent to one another forms their social connection. The social bond is expressed in exchange value” (Grund P156-7). This concept - that the capitalist mode of production depends on social connection assuming the 'ideological' form of an individual dis-connection - is one of the great, substantive themes of the Grundrisse as a whole. But its working-out also has consequences for the problems of method. For the displacement of real relations via their ideological representations requires, for its critique, - its unmasking - a method which reveals the 'essential relations' behind the necessary but mystifying inversions assumed by their "surface forms". This method - which, as we shall see later, Marx identifies as the core of what is scientific in his dialectic - forms the core methodological procedure, not only of this text and of the Notebooks, but of Capital itself. What's more, this 'methodological' procedure becomes, once more in its turn, a theoretical discovery of the utmost importance: the theoretical discovery which in its expanded form (there are several provisional attempts to formulate it in the Grund) constitutes the pivotal section, early in Capital I. on "'The Fetishism Of Commodities" and is in fact the basis of what we can only call-the mature theory of ideology embedded in Capital.itself. . (The crucial references here are Geras, "Marx & The Critique of Political Economy", in Blackburn: John Mepham, "The Theory of Ideology In Capital", Radical Philosophy. Cf. also my paper, "Structure And Forms: Marx's Mature Theory Of Ideology") (Early•examples of the theme of connection/indifference and of the application of the phenomenal form/real relation distinction in method are: Grundrisse, the "Chapter on Money", PI56-165, end the "Chapter on Capital", esp. P2hl-7). The Introduction, then, opens with this methodological argument: the critique of certain .'normal' types of logical abstraction. The argument - 7 - is basic to any discussion of Marx’s method. 'Political Economy' operates as a theory through its categories. How are these categories formed? The normal method is to try to isolate and analyse a category in terms of those elements which remain 'common' to its empirical-historical referent through all epochs and all types of social formation. This attempt to identify, by means of the logic ‘ of abstraction, as the core of a concept or category, those parts of it which remain common and stable through history is really a type of 'essentialism'. This search for the stable essence is precisely what marks out 'vulgar' Political Economy as, fundamentally, an ideology, an apologetics, founded on the cart-horse of 'common-sense'. But, in its more sophisticated forms (that is, in the forms of theorizing which, for Marx, represented the most advanced modes of thought in bourgeois society), the search for 'essences' is not absent, even though arrived at in more sophisticated ways. Hegel, the .summit of classical German philosophy, developed a mode of thought which was the very opposite of static: his grasp of movement and of contradiction is what raised him above all other forms of logical theorizing available to him, in Marx's eyes. Yet, because the movement of the dialectic was cast, for Hegel, in an idealist form, his thought retained the notion of the 'essential core' which survived all the motions of mind. It was the perpetuation of this 'essential core' within the concept which, Marx believed, constituted the secret guarantee within Hegel's dialectic of the ultimate harmoniousness of existing social relations (e.g. The Prussian State): a point of arrival, in Hegel, which never ceased both to alarm and confuse his 'left' disciples. Similarly, despite its significant theoretical advances, Political Economy, too, speaks of 'bourgeois' production and of private property as if these were the secret 'core' or 'essence' of the concepts 'production' and 'property': as if these latest forms exhausted the historical content of the categories. In this way, Political Economy too presented the capitalist mode of production, - 8 - not as a historical structure and creation, the work of men under certain conditions, and thus subject to the movement of historical forces, but as the natural and inevitable state of things, economically. In this way, bourgeois thought helped to •naturalize1 (i.e. to pass off a historical structure as a natural product) the form of society which gave rise to it. At this level, classical Political Economy (despite its enormous scientific advances over its 'vulgar* forms) retained an ideological presupposition at its 'scientific' heart. In criticizing this mode of theorizing, in terms of the reduction of specific historical relations to their lowest-common, trans-historical essence, Marx begins to distinguish the method of historical materialism from the modes of theorizing from which, at another level, his own thought made its first, decisive departure. The argument here - still in a fairly . X simple form - fleetingly anticipates the alternative which he develops more fully in the subsequent pages. There is no ’production-in-general’ (just as there is no ideology-in-general): only distinct forms of production, - specific to time and conditions. (One of those distinct forms is - rather confusingly - 'general production’: i.e. production based on a specific kind of labour, labour which is not specific to a particular branch of production, but which has been 'generalized': 'abstract labour'. But we shall come to that in a moment). Since any mode of production depends upon 'determinate conditions' ("socially determined individual production": Grund. P83)» there can be no guarantee, outside history, outside its specific, concrete conditions, that those conditions will always be fulfilled, or remain constant through time. Except in the most common-sense way, there is no scientific sense in which the concept 'production', referring to the capitalist mode, and entailing as one of its required conditions, 'free labour', can be said to have an immediate identity' (i.e. to be 'essentially the same as') production in, say, slave,