title : author : publisher: isbn10 | asin : print isbn13 : ebook isbn13 : language : subject publication date : lcc : ddc : subject : cover Page iii Unsnarling the World-Knot Consciousness, Freedom, and the Mind-Body Problem David Ray Griffin UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley Los Angeles London page_iii Page iv Disclaimer: This book contains characters with diacritics. When the characters can be represented using the ISO 8859-1 character set (http://www.w3.org/TR/images/1atin1.gif), netLibrary will represent them as they appear in the original text, and most computers will be able to show the full characters correctly. In order to keep the text searchable and readable on most computers, characters with diacritics that are not part of the ISO 8859-1 list will be represented without their diacritical marks. University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press London, England Copyright © 1998 by The Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Griffin, David Ray, 1939- Unsnarling the world-knot : consciousness, freedom, and the mind- body problem / David Ray Griffin. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-520-20944-3 (alk. paper) 1. Philosophy of mind. 2. Consciousness. 3. Mind and body. 4. Free will and determinism. I. Title. BD418.3.G75 1998 128'.2dc21 97-8390 CIP Printed in the United States of America 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information SciencesPermanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984 page_iv Page v For Charles Birch, who inspired it page_v Page vii Science seems to have driven us to accept that we are all merely small parts of a world governed in full detail (even if perhaps ultimately just probabilistically) by very precise mathematical laws. Our brains themselves, which seem to control all our actions, are also ruled by these same precise laws. The picture has emerged that all this precise physical activity is, in effect, nothing more than the acting out of some vast (perhaps probabilistic) computationand, hence, our brains and our minds are to be understood solely in terms of such computations. . . . Yet it is hard to avoid an uncomfortable feeling that there must always be something missing from such a picture. ROGER PENROSE, THE EMPEROR'S NEW MIND I am confident that in our entire philosophical tradition we are making some fundamental mistake, or set of fundamental mistakes in the whole discussion of the free will problem. JOHN SEARLE, "THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM" The idea that the mind-body problem is particularly perplexing flows from our unjustified and relatively modern faith that we have an adequate grasp of the fundamental nature of matter at some crucial general level of understanding. GALEN STRAWSON, MENTAL REALITY Almost all really new ideas have a certain aspect of foolishness when they are first produced. ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD page_vii Page ix Contents Acknowledgments xi Key to Abbreviations xiii Introduction 1 1. What Is the Problem? 9 2. Paradigmatic and Wishful-and-Fearful Thinking 11 3. Confusion about Common Sense 15 4. Regulative Principles 22 5. Data 33 6. Problems of Dualism and Materialism and Their Common Root 46 7. Fully Naturalizing the Mind: The Neglected Alternative 77 8. Matter, Consciousness, and the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness 117 9. Compound Individuals and Freedom 163 10. Supervenience and Panexperientialist Physicalism 218 Notes 243 Bibliography 249 Index 259 page_ix Page xi Acknowledgments My primary intellectual debts for this book are to those authors I have cited extensively. Besides Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, these are especially Daniel Dennett, Nicholas Humphrey, William James, Jaegwon Kim, William Lycan, Geoffrey Madell, Colin McGinn, Thomas Nagel, William Seager, John Searle, Galen Strawson, and Peter Strawson. The immediate stimulus for writing this book was the conference "Consciousness in Humans, Animals, and Machines" held in October 1994 under the auspices of the Center for Process Studies in Claremont, California. I am especially indebted to Charles Birch, who proposed the conference, and Robert Valenza of Claremont McKenna College, who primarily made it possible, This book began as a "background paper" for that conference. I am also grateful to Peter Farleigh and Granville Henry who, along with Birch and Valenza, helped plan the conference and to those participants who gave helpful criticisms of the manuscript, especially (besides the aforementioned) John Cobb and Donald Griffin. The hope that the conference would enable me to improve the manuscript was also fulfilled because of presentations of some of the participants, especially William Seager on intentionality and Colin McGinn on supervenience; the latter led to the addition of chapter 10, on Jaegwon Kim's position. I am grateful to Jaegwon Kim for reading chapter 10 and for assuring me that I had not misrepresented his position, and also to Donald Sherburne and two anonymous readers for the press, all of whom made many valuable suggestions that led to improvements. Special thanks are due to my secretary, Sharon Thompson, who went far beyond the call of duty in getting this manuscript ready. My primary ongoing debt is to my wife, Ann Jaqua, who, among many other things, provides a context in which I can focus on matters such as the mind-body problem. page_xi Page xiii Key to Abbreviations AI Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas. AO Walter E Elsasser, Atom and Organism: A New Approach to Theoretical Biology. BABF Gerald M. Edelman, Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind. BH Charles Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the Philosophy of Nature. BM Keith Campbell, Body and Mind, 2d ed. BP William S. Robinson, Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and Its Causal Conditions. C William G. Lycan, Consciousness. CE Daniel E. Dennett, Consciousness Explained. CI Charles Hartshorne, "The Compound Individual." CIP William Seager, "Consciousness, Information, and Panpsychism." CM Colin McGinn, The Character of Mind. CN Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology. CR Owen Flanagan, Consciousness Reconsidered. CS Colin McGinn, "Consciousness and Space." CSPM Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method. DL Charles Hartshorne, The Darkness and the Light: A Philosopher Reflects upon His Fortunate Career and Those Who Made It Possible. EM H.D. Lewis, The Elusive Mind. EOS W.D. Hart, The Engines of the Soul. ES H.D. Lewis, The Elusive Self. FAR Peter E Strawson, Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. FOR Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason. FR John C. Eccles, Facing Reality. FU David Chalmers, "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness." page_xiii Page xiv GET J.T. Fraser, The Genesis and Evolution of Time. HBP John L. Pollock, How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon. HM Nicholas Humphrey, A History of the Mind. HS John C. Eccles, How the Self Controls Its Brain. IHM Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind, ed. Timothy Duggan. JS Ernest Lepore and Robert van Gulick, eds., John Searle and His Critics. M J.J.C. Smart, "Materialism." MAC Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness: A Contemporary Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, rev. ed. MBP John R. Searle, "The Mind-Body Problem." MBS John R. Searle, Minds, Brains and Science: The 1984 Reith Lectures. MBSC Ted Honderich, "Mind, Brain, and Self-Conscious Mind." MBWP John R. Searle, "Minds and Brains without Programs." MC William Seager, Metaphysics of Consciousness. MM Geoffrey Madell, Mind and Materialism. MMB Curt J. Ducasse, "Minds, Matter and Bodies." MMBP Michael E. Levin, Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem. MN John B. Cobb, Jr., and David Ray Griffin, eds., Mind in Nature: Essays on the Interface of Science and Philosophy. MQ Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions. MR Galen Strawson, Mental Reality. MT Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought. MW Colin Blakemore and Susan Greenfield, eds., Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and Consciousness. NYR Thomas Nagel, "The Mind Wins!" OCC Karl R. Popper, Of Clocks and Clouds. PC Colin McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution. PCH Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne: Library of Living Philosophers XX. POP William James, Principles of Psychology, vol. 1. PP Charles Hartshorne, "Physics and Psychics: The Place of Mind in Nature." PR Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology PRE John Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning. PS Sewall Wright, "Panpsychism and Science." PU William James, A Pluralistic Universe (published with Essays in Radical Empiricism), ed. Ralph Barton Perry. RM John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind. RIM Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making. SAB Karl R. Popper and John C. Eccles, The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism. SB Lynne Rudder Baker, Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism. page_xiv Page xv SM Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays. SMP Roger Sperry, Science and Moral Priority: Merging Mind, Brain, and Human Values. SMW Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World. UU David Bohm and B.J. Hiley, The Undivided Universe: An Ontological Interpretation of Quantum Theory. VN Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere. VRE William James, Varieties of Religious Experience. WJP Marcus P. Ford, William James's Philosophy: A New Perspective. page_xv Page 1 Introduction This book suggests both a formal procedure for making progress on the mind-body problem and a substantive solution to it, with special attention to consciousness and freedom. The mind-body problem, which Arthur Schopenhauer called the ''world-knot,'' has arguably been the central problem in modern philosophy since its inception in the seventeenth century. With regard to the twentieth century in particular, John Searle in The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992) has expressed his considered judgment that, "contrary to surface appearances, there really has been only one major topic of discussion in the philosophy of mind for the past fifty years or so, and that is the mind-body problem" (RM, 29). As indicated by the titles of a number of recent booksfor example, Nicholas Humphrey's Consciousness Regained (1983), William Lycan's Consciousness (1987), Paul Churchland's Matter and Consciousness (1988), Alastair Hannay's Human Consciousness (1990), Colin McGinn's The Problem of Consciousness (1991), William Seager's Metaphysics of Consciousness (1991), Daniel Dennett's modestly titled Consciousness Explained (1991), and Owen Flanagan's Consciousness Reconsidered (1992)consciousness has widely come to be seen as lying at the heart of the mind-body problem. Consciousness, says McGinn, is "the hard nut of the mind-body problem" (PC, 1). Dennett says (somewhat optimistically), "Human consciousness is just about the last surviving mystery" (CE, 21). Seager, speaking of the difficulty of fitting psychology into the hierarchy of the sciences, says that "the source of the difficulty is consciousness" (MC, 18586). Humphrey, in A History of the Mind (1992), says, "The mind-body problem is the problem of explaining how states of consciousness arise in human brains" (HM, 23). John L. Pollock, in How To Build a Person (1989), has said, "The most perplexing problem for any materialist theory of the person is that of making sense of page_1 Page 2 consciousness" (HBP, 28). Thomas Nagel, whose work, especially "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" has provoked much of the current ferment, says, "Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable" (MQ, 165). In Mental Reality (1994), Galen Strawson, using "experience" synonymously with "consciousness,'' says that ''the existence of experience is the only hard part of the mind-body problem for materialists" (MR, 93). The problem of consciousness, as the central feature of the mind-body problem, is also widely seen as a problem for science (not simply for philosophy). Colin Blakemore and Susan Greenfield, editors of Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity, and Consciousness (1987), say that "the nature of consciousness may come to be seen as the central problem of research on the brain" (MW, vii). A few recent books (besides some of those already mentioned) illustrating this point are Roger Penrose's The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics (1989), Gerald M. Edelman's Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind (1992), and Israel Rosenfield's The Strange, Familiar, and Forgotten: An Anatomy of Consciousness (1992). Whereas it is now widely recognized by dualists and materialists alike that human consciousness creates a serious, perhaps intractable, mind-body problem for modern philosophy and science, the fact that human freedom is part of that problem is much less widely recognized, especially among materialists. Nevertheless, I will argue, we all inevitably presuppose that we have not only consciousness but also (a significant degree of) freedom, so that any acceptable solution to the mind-body problem must also be able to account for our freedom. I have pointed to the equal importance of this issue by including "freedom" in this book's subtitle. Indeed, I consider chapter 9, in which freedom is defended, to be the most important chapter of the book. The earlier chapters, although important in their own right, prepare the way for understanding how the kind of freedom that we all presuppose in practice can be affirmed in theory.* This book is based on the conviction that a development that has occurred in the intense and extensive current discussion provides an opportunity for a breakthrough with regard to the central metaphysical assumption that has led to the intractability of the mind-body problem, an intractability that has taken the form of a standoff between dualists and materialists. Although dualists were in the majority in the early part of the modern period and materialists have been in the ascendancy since the second half of the nineteenth century, each side has always faced insuperable difficulties. During most of this period, given the assumption that materi- *Jaegwon Kim says, "Mental causation arguably is the central issue in the metaphysics of mind" (SM, xv). (Although the affirmation of mental causation is not ipso facto an affirmation of genuine freedom, it is a necessary condition.) page_2 Page 3 alism (sometimes called physicalism) and dualism were the only serious options, dualists were content to rest the case for their position primarily on the fact that materialism confronted insoluble problems. Materialists in turn rest their case primarily on the insuperable obstacles faced by dualism. Each side, accordingly, largely ignored or at least minimized the problems in its own position. The recent development that has occurred is a much greater willingness by advocates on both sides to admit the deep problems in their own positions. On the dualist's side, Geoffrey Madell, in Mind and Materialism (1988), has been particularly frank about "the difficulties which any dualist position confronts" (MM, preface [n.p.]). While arguing that materialism's problems are so great that "interactionist dualism looks to be by far the only plausible framework in which the facts of our experience can be fitted" (MM, 135), he admits that "the nature of the causal connection between the mental and the physical, as the Cartesian conceives of it, is utterly mysterious" (MM, 2). He also concedes the "inexplicability" of the appearance of consciousness at some point in the course of evolution and in the development of each embryo, prior to which everything was understandable in terms of physical laws alone (MM, 140f.). He offers, accordingly, only ''a limited and qualified defense of dualism'' (MM, 9). Madell's confession of inexplicable mystery was anticipated in 1977 by fellow dualist Karl Popper. In an earlier book, Popper had seemed confident of finding a solution. "What we want," he said, "is to understand how such nonphysical things as purposes, deliberations, plans, decisions, theories, tensions, and values can play a part in bringing about physical changes in the physical world" (OCC, 15). But in the 1977 book he wrote with John Eccles, The Self and Its Brain: An Argument for Interactionism, he admitted that understanding how interaction occurred between nonphysical mind and physical brain was perhaps impossible. "Complete understanding, like complete knowledge," said Popper, "is unlikely to be achieved"(SAB, 105). Popper was not as ready as Madell now is to admit that this constitutes a serious problem for the dualistic hypothesis, but his admission is significant nonetheless. More remarkable and extensive has been the change in attitude on the part of those who reject dualism in favor of some form of physicalism or materialism.* On this side, Thomas Nagel's writings have been especially influential. While rejecting a distinct mind or soul and hence dualistic in- *Throughout most of this book I use "physicalism" and "materialism" interchangeably, in line with widespread practice (e.g., Jaegwon Kim [SM, 266n]). Accordingly, I normally refer to the position I advocate, panexperientialism, as an alternative to both dualism and physicalism. In chapter 10 as well as in a few anticipatory references, however, I point out that my kind of panexperientialism could be considered a form of physicalism. This usage implies a distinction between "materialist physicalism" and "panexperientialist physicalism." page_3 Page 4 teractionism (MQ, 182, 190, 211; VN, 29), Nagel has said that the drive to develop a physicalist account of mind has led to "extremely implausible positions" (VN, 15). Although he is not ready to conclude that physicalism must be false, he does say that "physicalism is a position we cannot understand because we do not at present have any conception of how it might be true" (MQ, 176). Colin McGinn, having been stimulated by Nagel, has created a considerable stir by going even further. While rejecting dualism and affirming physicalism more emphatically than does Nagel,* he argues that our present perplexity is terminal, that we will never be able to resolve the mystery of how consciousness could emerge from the brain (PC, 12, 7). William S. Robinson is equally emphatic. Although he thinks that a physicalistic approach can do justice to more mental phenomena than do Nagel and McGinn, he argues in Brains and People (1988) that it cannot handle sensations, such as pains. There is no imaginable story, he says, that leads from talk of neurons in the brain to "our seeing why such a collection of neurons has to be a pain.'' And this absence of understanding, Robinson adds, "is not merely a temporary limitation" (BP, 29). William Seager, although not ready to declare that physicalism will never solve the mind-body problem, says that the record thus far suggests that this may well turn out to be the case. In spite of holding that physicalism "still deserves our allegiance" (MC, 224), he says that ''the degree of difficulty in formulating an explicit version of physicalism which is not subject to immediately powerful objections is striking" (MC, 4). Reviewing the various types of physicalism (type-identity theory, functionalism, token-identity theory, psychological instrumentalism, eliminative materialism), he says, "Taken as a group they appear as an orderly retreat becoming a rout" (MC, 32). The attempt to deal with consciousness in terms of the normal explanatory method of physically resolving higher phenomena into lower elements results, Seaget says, in "a 'principled breakdown' of the explanatory scheme," adding that "it remains true, and may forever remain true, that we have no idea what-soever of how the physical states of a brain can constitute consciousness" (MC, 195). In a similar vein, Galen Strawson says that the "mysteriousness, for us, of the relation between the experiential and the physical-as-dis-cerned-by-physics is . . . a sign of how much is at present, and perhaps forever, beyond us" (MR, 50). Likewise, Jaegwon Kim's 1993 book, Supervenience and Mind, concludes with the reflection that the physicalists' attempt to save the reality of the mental seems "to be up against a dead end" (SM, 367). *Although (as I know from personal conversation) McGinn would reject physicalism or materialism under one definition, according to which it holds that consciousness is identical with the brain in such a way as also to be a spatial entity or property, he does, like Nagel, accept a two-aspect version of physicalism. page_4 Page 5 For good measure we can throw in a similar conclusion by an advocate of epiphenomenalism, which, being halfway between dualism and materialism, can be considered an aberrant version of one or the other. Keith Campbell, the second edition of whose Body and Mind appeared in 1984, at one time had accepted materialism. But he came to reject it after deciding that phenomenal properties, such as the feeling of pain, could not be properties material objects could have (BM, 1059). His "new epiphenomenalism" says that we do have a spiritual mind, which is produced by the body, but that it does not act back on the body (which allows a physicalist, deterministic account of human behavior, the need for which is a regulative principle for Campbell [BM, 125]). Recognizing that his position shares an "embarrassing" question with dualism, namely, how a "spiritual mind"our awareness with its phenomenal propertiescan be "caused by changes in sense organs and brain," be says: ''How this is done we do not know. . . . I suspect that we will never know how the trick is worked. This part of the Mind-Body problem seems insoluble. This aspect of humanity seems destined to remain forever beyond our understanding'' (BM, 131). This new situationthe recognition by leading advocates on all sides of unresolved and probably unresolvable problems within their own positionsprovides an opportunity for a conceptual breakthrough insofar as it has led to the realization that a satisfactory solution will have to move beyond assumptions of long standing. Nagel has again led the way. "The world is a strange place," he says, "and nothing but radical speculation gives us the hope of coming up with any candidates for truth" (VN, 10). Suggesting the direction that this radical speculation should take, he says that "any correct theory of the relation between mind and body would radically transform our overall conception of the world and would require a new understanding of the phenomena now thought of as physical" (VN, 8). Strawson* agrees. Saying that "the enormity of the mind-body problem" requires a "radical response," he predicts that a solution, if possible at all, will involve a "revolution" in our conception of the nature of the physical (MR, 99, 92). McGinn locates the intractability of the mind-body problem in "our inadequate conception of the nature of the brain and consciousness" (PC, 2n). Although doubting that we are up to the kind of radical reconception that would be needed, he does agree that "something pretty remarkable" would be necessary to find a constructive solution to the mindbrain relation (PC, 2, 86, 104). John Searle has been particularly caustic in his treatment of the materialist tradition, saying that the "most striking feature of . . . mainstream phi- *Because I discuss both Galen Strawson and Peter Strawson, referring simply to "Strawson" could be confusing. However, my discussion of Peter Strawson is limited to section V of chapter 9. All references to "Strawson" before that are to Galen Strawson. page_5 Page 6 losophy of mind of the past fifty years" is how much of it "seems obviously false" (RM, 3). It also, Searle suggests, reflects a neurotic-like pattern of behavior: A philosopher advances a materialist theory of the mind. . . . He then encounters difficulties. . . . [C]riticisms of the materialist theory usually take a more or less technical form, but in fact, underlying the technical objections is a much deeper objection. . . : The theory in question has left out . . . some essential feature of the mind, such as consciousness or 'qualia' or semantic content. . . . And this leads to ever more frenzied efforts to stick with the materialist thesis and try to defeat the arguments put forward by those who insist on preserving the facts. After some years of desperate maneuvers to account for the difficulties, some new development is put forward that allegedly solves the difficulties, but then we find that it encounters . . . the same old difficulties. (RM, 30) "After half a century of this recurring pattern in debates about materialism," Searle adds, "one might suppose that the materialists and the dualists would think there is something wrong with the terms of the debate. But so far this induction seems not to have occurred to either side" (RM, 49). Searle believes that the basic problem is that materialism has accepted the vocabulary and categories of Cartesian dualism, according to which if something is ''physical" it cannot also be ''mental," and if something is "mental" it cannot also be "physical" (RM, 14, 26, 54). A constructive solution will require a reconception in which this "conceptual dualism" (RM, 26) is rejected. Although I do not believe, for reasons I will give later, that Searle's own way of rethinking the relation between physicality and mentality provides the basis for a satisfactory solution, I do believe that his formal recommendations