ABUSE OF DISCRETION. See Courts of Appeals. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT. See Communications Act of 1934. AGGRAVATION EVIDENCE. See Constitutional Law, VII. ALASKA. See Federal-State Relations. ALEXANDER ARCHIPELAGO. See Federal-State Relations. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990. Title II1J]—Foreign-flag cruise ships.—Fifth Circuit’s decision holding Title III inapplicable to foreign-flag cruise ships in U. S. waters is re- versed, and case is remanded. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., p. 119. AMOUNT-IN-CONTROVERSY REQUIREMENT. See Jurisdiction, 1. ANNUAL TRUCKING FEES. See Constitutional Law, II. ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996. See Habeas Corpus, 2, 3. APPOINTED APPELLATE COUNSEL. See Constitutional Law, III, ey, 2 ARTICLE III. See Jurisdiction, 1. ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. See Constitutional Law, V, 1; VII. BATSON CLAIM. See Constitutional Law, V, 2, 3. BREACH OF CONTRACT. See Immunity from Suit. BROADBAND CABLE MODEM COMPANIES. See Communications Act of 1934. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION. See Immunity from Suit. CABLE MODEM COMPANIES. See Communications Act of 1934. CALIFORNIA. See Constitutional Law, I; V, 3. 1167 1168 INDEX CAPITAL MURDER. See Constitutional Law, VII; Habeas Cor- pus, 1. CAPITOL GROUNDS TEN COMMANDMENTS DISPLAY. See Con- stitutional Law, VI, 2. CASE OR CONTROVERSY. See Jurisdiction, 1. CERTIORARI. See Courts of Appeals. COMMERCE CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, [; II. COMMON-CARRIER REGULATION. See Communications Act of 1934. COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934. Common-carrier regulation—Coverage of broadband cable modem companies.—Federal Communications Commission’s conclusion that broadband cable modem companies are exempt from mandatory common- carrier regulation is a lawful construction of Act under Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, and Admin- istrative Procedure Act. National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services, p. 967. COMPASSIONATE USE ACT. See Constitutional Law, I. CONDEMNATION. See Constitutional Law, IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. I. Commerce Clause. California law—Medical marijwana.—Congress’ Commerce Clause power includes power to prohibit local cultivation and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes as permitted by California’s Compassionate Use Act. Gonzales v. Raich, p. 1. II. Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce. 1. Trucks engaged in interstate hauling—Pre-emption of state fee.— Title 49 U.S.C. §14504 does not pre-empt an annual $100 fee Michigan imposes on each Michigan license-plated truck operating entirely in inter- state commerce. Mid-Con Freight Systems, Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, p. 440. 2. Trucks engaged in interstate hauling—State fee.—Michigan’s flat an- nual fee on trucks engaged in intrastate commercial hauling does not vio- late dormant Commerce Clause when applied to trucks engaging in both interstate and intrastate hauling. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, p. 429. INDEX CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued. III. Due Process. 1. Appointment of appellate counsel—Indigents convicted on pleas of guilty or nolo contendere.—Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires appointment of counsel for defendants convicted on pleas who seek access to first-tier review in Michigan Court of Appeals. Halbert v. Michigan, p. 605. 2. Prisons—Inmate classification.—Procedures by which Ohio classi- fies prisoners for placement at its “Supermax” prison provide inmates with sufficient protection to comply with Fourteenth Amendment. Wilkinson v. Austin, p. 209. 3. Property interest—Restraining order enforcement.—Respondent did not, for Due Process Clause purposes, have a property interest in police enforcement of her restraining order against her husband, who had taken, and later murdered, their children. Castle Rock v. Gonzales, p. 748. IV. Eminent Domain. Public use—Condemnation of property—Development plan to revital- ize city.—Respondent city’s proposed condemnation of petitioners’ prop- erty for use under a development plan designed to revitalize city qualifies as a “public use” within meaning of Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. Kelo v. New London, p. 469. V. Equal Protection of the Laws. 1. Appointment of appellate cownsel—Indigents convicted on pleas of guilty or nolo contendere—Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires appointment of counsel for defendants convicted on pleas of guilty or nolo contendere who seek first-tier review in Michigan Court of Appeals. Halbert v. Michigan, p. 605. 2. Exclusion of jurors because of race—Peremptory strikes.—Peti- tioner is entitled to prevail on his claim that prosecutors’ peremptory strikes of potential jurors in his capital murder trial were based on race in violation of Fourteenth Amendment, and is thus entitled to federal ha- beas relief. Miller-E] v. Dretke, p. 231. 3. Exclusion of jurors because of race—Proving purposeful discrimi- nation.—California’s “more likely than not” standard is an inappropriate yardstick by which to measure sufficiency of a prima facie case of purpose- ful discrimination in jury selection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79. Johnson v. California, p. 162. VI. Establishment of Religion. 1. Ten Commandments—Courthouse display.—A determination of petitioner counties’ purpose in posting Ten Commandments on their court- house walls is a sound basis for ruling on, and may be dispositive of, Estab- lishment Clause challenges to postings; evaluation of counties’ claim of 1170 INDEX CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued. secular purpose for their displays’ final versions should take account of displays’ evolution and development. McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., p. 844. 2. Ten Commandments—Display on state capitol grounds.—Fifth Cir- cuit’s decision that Establishment Clause allows display of a monument inscribed with Ten Commandments on Texas State Capitol grounds is af- firmed. Van Orden v. Perry, p. 677. VII. Right to Counsel. Effective assistance—Evaluating mitigation and aggravation evi- dence.—Even when a capital defendant and his family have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows prosecution will probably rely on as aggravation evidence at trial’s sentencing phase. Rompilla v. Beard, p. 374. COPYRIGHTS. Infringement—Distributor’s liability for third-party use.—Distributor who dispenses a device with object of promoting its use to infringe copy- right, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, going beyond mere distribution with knowledge of third-party action, is liable for resulting acts of infringement by third par- ties using device, regardless of device’s lawful uses. Metro-Goldwyn- Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., p. 913. COURTHOUSE TEN COMMANDMENTS DISPLAY. See Constitu- tional Law, VI, 1. COURTS OF APPEALS. Stay of mandate—Abuse of discretion.—Assuming that Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41 authorizes a court of appeals to stay a mandate following a denial of certiorari and that a court may stay its mandate without entering an order, Sixth Circuit’s decision to do so here was an abuse of discretion. Bell v. Thompson, p. 794. CRIMINAL LAW. See Constitutional Law, VII. CRUISE SHIPS. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. DEATH SENTENCE. See Constitutional Law, VII; Habeas Cor- pus, 1. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See Con- stitutional Law, II. DISCRIMINATION BASED ON DISABILITY. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. INDEX 1171 DISCRIMINATION BASED ON RACE. See Constitutional Law, V, 2, 3. DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION. See Constitutional Law, V, 2, 3. DISTRIBUTOR’S LIABILITY FOR THIRD-PARTY USE. See Copy- rights. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION. See Jurisdiction, 1. DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE. See Constitutional Law, II, 2. DRUGS. See Constitutional Law, I; Patent Law. DUE PROCESS. See Constitutional Law, III. EMINENT DOMAIN. See Constitutional Law, IV. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. See Constitutional Law, V. ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION. See Constitutional Law, VI. FALSE CLAIMS ACT. Retaliation action—Statute of limitations.—Because FCA’s statute of limitations, 31 U.S.C. §8731(b)(1), does not govern §3730(h) actions brought by an individual retaliated against by his employer for assisting an FCA investigation or proceeding, most closely analogous state statute of limitations applies. Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, p. 409. FEDERAL-QUESTION JURISDICTION. See Jurisdiction, 2. FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. See Courts of Appeals. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. See Habeas Corpus, 3. FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS. See also Constitutional Law, I; IJ; Jurisdiction, 2. Submerged land ownership.—Court overrules Alaska’s exceptions to Special Master’s recommendations that United States has title to pockets and enclaves of submerged lands underlying waters in Alexander Archi- pelago and title to submerged lands underlying waters of Glacier Bay. Alaska v. United States, p. 75. FEDERAL TAXES. See Jurisdiction, 2. FIFTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, IV; V, 2, 3; Full Faith and Credit Statute. FIRST AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, VI. 1172 INDEX FLAT FEES ON TRUCKING. See Constitutional Law, II. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION. See Patent Law. FOREIGN-FLAG CRUISE SHIPS. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, III; V, 1. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT STATUTE. Exceptions—Takings claim.—This Court will not create an exception to full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. §1738, in order to provide a federal forum for litigants seeking to advance Fifth Amendment takings claims. San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San Francisco, p. 323. GLACIER BAY. See Federal-State Relations. GUILTY PLEA. See Habeas Corpus, 1. HABEAS CORPUS. See also Constitutional Law, V, 2. 1. Guilty plea and sentencing decision—Prosecution’s inconsistent theory in accomplice’s case.—Sixth Circuit erred in granting respondent habeas relief on grounds that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and that it was void because State, in a later trial of re- spondent’s accomplice, pursued a theory inconsistent with one advanced in respondent’s case; but case is remanded for that court to resolve in first instance merits of inconsistency claim as it relates to respondent’s death sentence. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, p. 175. 2. Limitations period—Relation back of amended petition.—A state prisoner’s amendment to his federal habeas petition does not relate back to his timely original petition (and thereby avoid 1-year limitations period imposed by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) when amendment asserts a new ground for relief supported by facts different in time and type from those set forth in original petition. Mayle v. Felix, p. 644. 3. Motion for relief from habeas judgment—Successive habeas peti- tions.—Because petitioner’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion challenged only District Court’s previous ruling on Antiterrorism and Ef- fective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s statute of limitations, it is not equiva- lent to a successive habeas petition and can be ruled upon by that court without precertification by Eleventh Circuit; however, under proper Rule 60(b) standards, District Court correctly denied relief here. Gonzalez v. Crosby, p. 524. 4. Statute of limitations—Date limitations period begins to run.— Title 28 U.S.C. §2255, 4 6(3)’s 1-year limitation period begins to run on date on which this Court “initially recognized” right asserted in an appli-' INDEX 1173 HABEAS CORPUS—Continued. cant’s motion for habeas relief, not date on which that right was made retroactive. Dodd v. United States, p. 353. IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. Reclamation Reform Act of 1982—Waiver of immunity.—In enacting 43 U.S.C. §390uu, Congress did not waive United States’ sovereign immunity from a breach of contract suit brought by petitioners, who purchase water from a local water district that receives its water under a contract with United States Bureau of Reclamation. Orff v. United States, p. 596. INDIGENT DEFENDANTS. See Constitutional Law, III, 1; V, 1. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. See Constitutional Law, VII. INFRINGEMENT. See Copyrights; Patent Law. INMATE CLASSIFICATIONS. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. INTERNET. See Copyrights. INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See Constitutional Law, II. JURISDICTION. 1. Diversity action—Supplemental jurisdiction—Amount-in- controversy requirement.—Where other elements of jurisdiction are pres- ent and at least one named plaintiff in an action satisfies 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)’s amount-in-controversy requirement, § 1367 authorizes supple- mental jurisdiction over claims of other plaintiffs in same Article III case or controversy, even if those claims are for less than requisite amount. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., p. 546. 2. Removal to federal court—Federal-question jurisdiction—State quiet title action.—National interest in providing a federal forum for fed- eral tax litigation is sufficiently substantial to support exercise of federal- question jurisdiction over petitioner’s state quiet title action on removal to federal court. Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineer- ing & Mfg., p. 308. JURY SELECTION. See Constitutional Law, V, 2, 3. KENTUCKY. See Constitutional Law, VI, 1. KNOWING, VOLUNTARY, AND INTELLIGENT GUILTY PLEA. See Habeas Corpus, 1. LIABILITY FOR THIRD-PARTY INFRINGEMENT. See Copyrights. 1174 INDEX LIMITATIONS PERIODS. See False Claims Act; Habeas Corpus, 2, 4. MANDATE WITHHELD. See Courts of Appeals. MARIJUANA. See Constitutional Law, I. MEDICAL MARIJUANA. See Constitutional Law, I. MICHIGAN. See Constitutional Law, IJ; III, 1; V, 1. MITIGATION EVIDENCE. See Constitutional Law, VII. MOTIONS FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. See Habeas Corpus, 3. MURDER. See Constitutional Law, VII; Habeas Corpus, 1. OHIO. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. PATENT LAW. Infringement—Patented compound’s use in preclinical studies.—Title 35 U.S. C. §271(e)(1) exempts from patent infringement use of a patented compound in preclinical studies at least as long as there is a reasonable basis to believe that compound tested could be subject of a Food and Drug Administration submission and experiments will produce types of informa- tion relevant to an investigational new drug application or a new drug application made to FDA. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., p. 198. POLICE ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRAINING ORDERS. See Consti- tutional Law, III, 3. PRECLINICAL STUDIES. See Patent Law. PRE-EMPTION. See Constitutional Law, II, 1. PRISONERS’ RIGHTS. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. PROPERTY INTEREST FOR DUE PROCESS PURPOSES. See Con- stitutional Law, III, 3. PROPERTY RIGHTS. See Constitutional Law, IV. QUIET TITLE ACTIONS. See Jurisdiction, 2. RACE DISCRIMINATION. See Constitutional Law, V, 2, 3. RECLAMATION REFORM ACT OF 1982. See Immunity from Suit. REDEVELOPMENT. See Constitutional Law, IV. RELATION BACK OF AMENDED HABEAS PETITIONS. See Ha- beas Corpus, 2. INDEX REMOVAL. See Jurisdiction, 2. RESTRAINING ORDER ENFORCEMENT. See Constitutional Law, Ill, 3. RETALIATION ACTIONS. See False Claims Act. RIGHT TO COUNSEL. See Constitutional Law, VII. SENTENCING. See Constitutional Law, VII. SIXTH AMENDMENT. See Constitutional Law, VII. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. See Immunity from Suit. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS. See False Claims Act; Habeas Cor- pus, 2, 4. STAY OF MANDATE. See Courts of Appeals. SUBMERGED LAND OWNERSHIP. See Federal-State Relations. SUCCESSIVE HABEAS PETITIONS. See Habeas Corpus, 3. SUPERMAX PRISON. See Constitutional Law, III, 2. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION. See Jurisdiction, 1. SUPREME COURT. See also Courts of Appeals. 1. Death of CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, p. XI. 2. Appointment of CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, p. VII. 3. Term statistics, p. 1166. TAKING OF PROPERTY. See Constitutional Law, IV; Full Faith and Credit Statute. TAXES. See Jurisdiction, 2. TEN COMMANDMENTS. See Constitutional Law, VI. TEXAS. See Constitutional Law, V, 2; VI, 2. THIRD-PARTY INFRINGEMENT. See Copyrights. TRUCKING FEES. See Constitutional Law, II. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY. See Immunity from Suit. WATER PURCHASES. See Immunity from Suit. WORDS AND PHRASES. “The date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S. C. $2255, 7 6(3). Dodd v. United States, p. 353.