Introduction To breed an animal which is able to make promises – is that not preciselytheparadoxicaltaskwhichnaturehassetherselfwithregard tohumankind?Isitnottherealproblemof humankind? (FriedrichNietzsche,OntheGenealogyofMorality) This study explores the role of trust within the development of interna- tional political thought in the seventeenth century. It will focus on the period from the Peace of Vervins in 1598, through the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) and the various wars waged by Louis XIV up to the War of the Spanish Succession concluded with the Peace of Utrecht in 1713.1 The underlying problems of these conflicts generated a rich literature within seventeenth-century political thought. As distinct from a political 2 and diplomatic history of this period , the present study proposes a close 1 ThePeaceofVervins,concludedbetweenSpainandFranceon2May1598,wastheprimereference pointforpoliticalthinkersuntilitwassupersededbythePeaceofWestphaliaof1648.Seenotablythe anonymousseventeenth-centurytract:LesAffairesquisontaujourd’huyentrelesMaisonsdeFranceet d’Austriche(1649)andA.E.Imhof,DerFriedevonVervins1598(Aarau1966).ForEuropeanstates,the firsthalfoftheseventeenthcenturywasmarkedbySpanishand–toamuchlesserextent–Austrian HabsburgattemptstodominatetheemergingEuropeanstatesystem.Thisstrugglespilledoverinto theThirtyYearsWar.Despiteitsshortcomings,thePeaceofWestphaliacreatedgreaterstability inEurope.ThewarbetweenFranceandSpainwasonlyendedbyapeacetreatyin1659.SeeH. Duchhardt(ed.),DerPyrena¨enfriede1659:Vorgeschichte,Widerhall,Rezeptionsgeschichte(Go¨ttingen 2010)andL.Be´ly,B.HaanandS.Jettot(eds.),LaPaixdesPyr´en´ees(1659)ouletriomphedelaraison politique(Paris2015).ButthesecondhalfofthecenturysawLouisXIVattempttoappropriatethe Habsburgs’dominantroleinEurope,underminingtheWestphaliansettlement. 2 Wherenecessarythehistoricalcontextwillbereferredtoandfurtherscrutinised,butonlyinsupport ofabetterunderstandingofthetheoriesstudiedinthevolume.Foraclassicalaccountofthisperiod seeJ.Engel,“Vonderspa¨tmittelalterlichenrespublicachristianazumMa¨chte-EuropaderNeuzeit”in DieEntstehungdesneuzeitlichenEuropa.Handbuchdereuropa¨ischenGeschichtevol.3,ed.byJ.Engel (Stuttgart1971),p.1–384,W.Platzhoff,GeschichtedesEuropa¨ischenStaatensystems1559–1660(Munich, Berlin1928)andM.Immich,GeschichtedesEuropa¨ischenStaatensystems1660–1789(Munich,Berlin 1905).SeealsoJ.TerMeulen,DerGedankederInternationalenOrganisationinseinerEntwicklung 1300–1800(TheHague1917).Morerecentrelevantliteraturewillbereferredtothroughoutthisstudy. Inthelateeighteenthcentury,awarenessoftheimportanceofthehistoricalcontextasinterpretament increased.See,forinstance,J.G.Herder,“AucheinePhilosophiederGeschichtezurBildungder Menschheit”inWerkevol.I,ed.byW.Pross(Munich1984),p.589–686. 1 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of New England, on 16 Feb 2018 at 02:38:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316798515.002 2 Introduction analysisofseventeenth-centurytheorisingofinterstaterelations.Anendur- ingdiscussionoftrustcanbeidentifiedinthisperiod,makingitpossibleto useitasthestructuringprincipleforthisstudy.Whatwastheconceptual statusoftrust?Wasitseenasfoundationalintheorisinginterstaterelations? Isitpossibletodiscernaprogressivedevelopmentwithintheseventeenth- century discussion of trust? Were the relations between sovereign states inherentlyantagonistic,makingitunreasonabletotrustotherstates?What werethenecessaryconditionsfortrustbetweenstates? Thethinkersconsideredinthisstudywerelessconcernedwithdrawing diagrams of particular political situations than with drawing up general programmestoaddresstheconflictualsituationwithinEurope.Arangeof different concepts was employed by these practitioners of programmatic thought.Theyproposed–moreorlesslucidly–conditionsforfuturepeace betweenEuropeanstates.Afocusontrustenablesabetterunderstanding of their different uses of more explicit political and juridical concepts. Trust was not a free-standing political doctrine, but a concept employed in different political theories. ‘Trust (...) can be considered an “actor’s category”, that is, a problem about which seventeenth-century people consciously thought rather than a concept imposed on the past by later 3 historians’. Theconceptoftrustwasfluidinitsuse.Aperspectiveontrust will shed light on the various ways classical political or juridical concepts of international political thought – interest, balance of power, natural law or plans for institutionalising an international federal structure – differed in their foundational assumptions. Trust serves as an innovative interpretament to analyse the complex and often competing doctrines of interstate relations. The endeavours of the writers discussed in this study are central to understanding the theory and formation of the modern 4 state and the emerging state system. Indeed, the very term system, so 3 R.Weil,APlagueofInformers.ConspiracyandPoliticalTrustinWilliamIII’sEngland(NewHaven 2013),p.5. 4 AhistoricaloverviewisprovidedinH.Schilling,“FormungundGestaltdesinternationalenSys- temsinderwerdendenNeuzeit–PhasenundbewegendeKra¨fte”inKontinuita¨tundWandelin derStaatenordnungderNeuzeit.Beitra¨gezurGeschichtedesinternationalenSystems,ed.byP.Kru¨ger (Marburg1991),p.19–46.SeealsoH.Schilling,“KonfessionalisierungundFormierungeinesinter- nationalenSystemswa¨hrendderFru¨henNeuzeit”inDieReformationinDeutschlandundEuropa: InterpretationenundDebatten,ed.byH.Guiggisberg,G.Krodel(Heidelberg1993),p.591–613.On thefoundationsofthelegalsystem,seeH.L.A.Hart,TheConceptofLaw(Oxford1997),p.100–123. R.Aron,Peace&War.ATheoryofInternationalRelations(NewBrunswick2003),p.94–149hasan insightfuldiscussionontheinternationalsystem.TheclassicworkonthetheoryofsystemsisN. Luhmannn,SozialeSysteme.GrundrißeinerallgemeinenTheorie(FrankfurtamMain1987),p.599: ‘DerSystembegriffsteht(...)immerfu¨reinenrealenSachverhalt.Wirmeinenmit“System”also nieeinnuranalytischesSystem,einebloßegedanklicheKonstruktion,einbloßesModell’.Seealso N.Luhmannn,ZweckbegriffundSystemrationalita¨t(FrankfurtamMain1973),p.55–86. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of New England, on 16 Feb 2018 at 02:38:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316798515.002 Introduction 3 familiar to modern parlance, received its first conceptualisation at exactly 5 thismomentinthedevelopmentofinterstaterelations. ThetreatiesofMu¨nsterandOsnabru¨ck,collectivelyknownasthePeace of Westphalia, brought the Thirty Years War to an end in 1648.6 The peace settlement marked if not the end of an era of confessional wars, then at least a shift away from them and towards new structures and institutions that re–ordered international relations by means of modern state power.7 While 1648 was primarily a peace settlement for the Holy 8 Roman Empire rather than for Europe as a whole , seventeenth-century thinkerswhowroteafterthePeacerepeatedlyreferredtoWestphaliaasthe 9 pre-eminentpointofreferencefororganisinginterstaterelations. Though not the decisive watershed which introduced state sovereignty with the 10 stroke of a pen as claimed by some students of international relations , forseventeenth-centurythinkersthePeacerecognisedstatesovereigntyasa 5 SeediscussioninChapter3.3. 6 Cf.H.Duchhardt(ed.),DerWestfa¨lischeFriede.Diplomatie–politischeZa¨sur–kulturellesUmfeld– Rezeptionsgeschichte(Munich1998),M.Schro¨der(ed.),350JahreWestfa¨lischerFriede.Verfassungs- geschichte, Staatskirchenrecht, Vo¨lkerrechtsgeschichte (Berlin 1999), O. M. van Kappen and D. Wyduckel(eds.),DerWestfa¨lischeFriedeninrechts-undstaatstheoretischerPerspektive(Berlin1999), H.Duchhardt(ed.),LaPaixdeWestphalie:del’´ev´enementeurop´eenaulieueurop´eendem´emoire? (Sigmaringen1999),J.A.Caporaso(ed.),ContinuityandChangeintheWestphalianOrder(Oxford 2000). 7 SeeH.Schilling,“DerWestfa¨lischeFriedeunddasneuzeitlicheProfilEuropas”inDerWestfa¨lische Friede.Diplomatie–politischeZa¨sur–kulturellesUmfeld–Rezeptionsgeschichte,ed.byH.Duchhardt (Munich1998),p.3–32. 8 IhavealreadyarguedthisinP.Schro¨der,“TheConstitutionoftheHolyRomanEmpireafter 1648:SamuelPufendorf’sAssessmentinhisMonzambano”inHistoricalJournal42(1999),p.961– 983. 9 ItwouldbewrongtodenythevaluethePeaceofWestphaliahadforseventeenth-centurywriters suchasPufendorf,LeibnizandawholerangeofpamphleteerstowhomIwillreferfurtherinthe relevantchapters.See,asonlyoneprominentexampleoutsidethescopeofthisstudy,Rousseau’s remarkin1758,accordingtowhich‘theTreatyofWestphaliawillperhapsalwaysbethebasisofthe politicalsystem[ofEurope].Thus,publicRight,whichtheGermansstudywithsuchcare,is(...) incertainregards,thatofthewholeofEurope’.J.J.Rousseau,ThePlanforPerpetualPeace,On theGovernmentofPoland,andOtherWritingsonHistoryandPolitics,ed.byC.Kelly(Dartmouth 2005),p.35. 10 As just one of many examples, see T. L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory (Manchester1997),p.91f.:‘TheTreatyofWestphalialaidthelegalbasisforthemodernterritorial state.Uponitsfoundationwaserectedanewsystemofinternationalinteractionandanewsystem ofconceptsandtheoriesbywhichthisinteractioncouldbeunderstood.TheTreaty’srecognitionof theprincipleofexternalsovereigntyrepresentstheformalrecognitionandthelegalconsolidation ofthemoderninterstatesystem’.Today,controversyandconfusionaboutthestatusofthePeaceof Westphalialoomlarge.SeeagainstsuchpositionstheargumentsinSchro¨der,“TheConstitution oftheHolyRomanEmpireafter1648”,p.982and,withmanymorereferencestothosemisguided judgementsregardingtheissueofsovereigntyinrelationtothePeaceofWestphalia,A.Osiander, “Sovereignty,InternationalRelations,andtheWestphalianMyth”inInternationalOrganization55 (2001),p.261. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of New England, on 16 Feb 2018 at 02:38:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316798515.002 4 Introduction 11 guidingprincipleforanewinternationalsystem thatconcededstatesalone 12 tobethelegitimateactorsinthedeclaration,conductandendingofwars. Withwarandtherulesofwarbecomingexclusivelyanaffairofthesovereign 13 state,anewsystemofinternationalrelationscouldemerge. However,the result of this process was ambivalent: the opportunity for civilising and 11 ThispointisnowconvincinglymadebyD.Boucher,“ResurrectingPufendorfandCapturingthe WestphalianMoment”inReviewofInternationalStudies27(2001),p.560–562.StephenKrasner’s claimmisleadinglyattributesanuncorroboratedsignificancetothePeaceofWestphaliawhenhe asserts that it ‘was a break point with the past, but not the one understood by most students ofinternationallaw.WestphaliadidmarkthetransitionfromChristendomtoreasonofstateand balanceofpowerasthebasiccognitiveconceptualizationinformingtheactualbehaviorofEuropean rulers’.S.D.Krasner,SovereigntyOrganizedHypocrisy(Princeton1999),p.82. 12 Cf.,forinstance,O.Kimminich,“DieEntstehungdesneuzeitlichenVo¨lkerrechts”inI.Fetscherand H.Mu¨nkler(eds.),PipersHandbuchderpolitischenIdeen,Bd.3:Neuzeit:VondenKonfessionskriegen biszurAufkla¨rung(Munich1985),p.93,C.Schmitt,TheNomosoftheEarthintheInternational LawoftheJusPublicumEuropaeum,translatedbyG.L.Ulmen(NewYork2004),p.140–151,W. Janssen,“Krieg”inGeschichtlicheGrundbegriffe.HistorischesLexikonzurpolitisch-sozialenSprache inDeutschlandvol.3,ed.byO.Brunner,W.ConzeandR.Koselleck(Stuttgart1982),p.576–583, W.G.Grewe,TheEpochsofInternationalLaw(Berlin,NewYork2000),p.203–221. 13 AnglophonescholarsinparticularsummarisethesedevelopmentsunderthetermWestphalianorder. ThePeaceofWestphaliaisasymbolforaspecificsetofnewpoliticalactorsandinstitutions,as well as for the legal, political and philosophical forms in which they are to be conceived. For exampleJ.Rosenberg,TheEmpireofCivilSociety.ACritiqueoftheRealistTheoryofInternational Relations(London,NewYork1994),p.138claimedthat‘anabsolutiststates-systemwasinitialledat Westphalia’.Thisso-calledWestphalianorderthusbecameafocalpointofpolitical,historicaland philosophicalscrutinyanddebate.AnotherpertinentexampleistheviewputforwardbyMichael SheehaninTheBalanceofPower:History&Theory.Heassertedthat‘theTreatyofWestphalia (...)canbeseenasacrucialwatershedinthelongprocessbywhichthebalanceofpowerbecame thecentralguidingprincipleofEuropeaninternationalrelationsintheeighteenthandnineteenth centuries. In order to work effectively, a complex balance of power requires the existence of a functioninginternationalsysteminwhichthesovereignindependenceofstatesisthecentralgoal ofnationalpolicyandinwhichthereiscomparativemoderationinforeignpolicyobjectivesand anabsenceofideologicallybasedinterstatebitterness.ThePeaceofWestphaliacanbesaidtohave formalisedtheseconditionsinEuropeandtherebyprovidedthefoundationfortheacceptance ofbalanceofpowerlogicasadeterminantofforeignpolicybehaviour.Itbroughtanendtothe century-longChristianwarsofreligioninEurope[and]itformallyrecognisedtheconceptofstate sovereignty’.MichaelSheehan,TheBalanceofPower:History&Theory(London1996),p.37f. AlthoughthesettlementoftheWestphaliantreatieshad,toaremarkabledegree,establishedanew modusvivendiamongtheEuropeanstates,assertionssuchasSheehan’sseemtooeasilytoforgetthat theconfessionalantagonismbetweentheChristiancreedscontinuedtoinfluencetheforgingof alliancesalongconfessionallinesontheonehandand,ontheother,continuedtodisruptthesettling ofconflictsbecauseofitsdivisivepower.Giventhatthevaluesystemandthepreoccupationsofthe seventeenthcenturyaremostlyalientous,thehistorianofideasneedstoengageintheimportant taskofsituatingaccuratelythecontemporarydebatesandtheirunderlyingideastoallowforan appropriateunderstandingoftheirintellectualcurrency.Thetemptationandpitfallsofanachronistic statementsshouldberesisted.Foracriticaldiscussionandrefutationofdifferentvariantsofthese anachronistic positions, see M. Zimmer, Moderne, Staat und Internationale Politik (Wiesbaden 2008),p.37–53andOsiander,“Sovereignty,InternationalRelations,andtheWestphalianMyth”. SeealsotheverydifferentcriticismbyB.Teschke,TheMythof1648:Class,Geopoliticsandthe Making of Modern International Relations (London 2003), p. 1–4. Teschke, too, perceives these assumptionsas‘aconstitutingfoundingmythwithinInternationalRelations’. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of New England, on 16 Feb 2018 at 02:38:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316798515.002 Introduction 5 14 juridifying war equally entailed the potential for an intensification and 15 enhancementofthewareffort. Territorial states confronted one another with the claim to absolute sovereigntyandconsequentlynolongeracknowledgedanextra-territorial legalauthorityandsuperiornormativeinstitution,whetherthatofemperor or Pope. This radically departed from the theory and the practice of the priorinternationalorder.Reasonofstatedemandedcalculationofthestate’s interest, to be pursued by all available political, military and economic means.Thus,asacorrelateofreasonofstateinforeignpolicy,theconcepts ofabalanceofpowerandofapoliticsinformedbystateinterestsincreasingly dominatedinternationalpoliticalthought.Paralleltothisdevelopment,a newkindofinternationallawemergedasthelawofstates,asunderstoodby Alberico Gentili and Hugo Grotius. Together, these tendencies provided new approaches to political thought and international action in the new 16 system. Theprogrammaticseventeenth-centuryapproachestorelationsbetween Europeanstatesgeneratedthreegreatcurrentsofpoliticalthought.Firstly, theories informed by reason of state and state interest, leading to the concept of a competitive balance of power as a response to the threat of 14 Amongthewealthofliteraturesee,inparticular,Schmitt,TheNomosoftheEarthandrecently M.Koskenniemi,TheGentleCivilizerofNations.TheRiseandFallofInternationalLaw1870– 1960(Cambridge2001),M.Koskenniemi,“InternationalLawandraisond’´etat:Rethinkingthe PrehistoryofInternationalLaw”inTheRomanFoundationsoftheLawofNations:AlbericoGentili andtheJusticeofEmpire,ed.byB.KingsburyandB.Straumann(Oxford2010),p.297–339. 15 Cf.E.Krippendorff,StaatundKrieg.DiehistorischeLogikpolitischerUnvernunft(Frankfurtam Main1985),p.277–282.SeealsoJohannesBurkhardt’sthesisthatbellicosityensuednotbecause of the existence of early modern states, ‘but rather from the state’s imperfections, failings and shortcomings’. J. Burkhardt, “Wars of States or Wars of State-Formation?” in War, the State andInternationalLawinSeventeenth-CenturyEurope,ed.byO.AsbachandP.Schro¨der(Farnham 2010),p.34.Forfurtherdiscussion,seealsoJ.Burkhardt“DerDreißigja¨hrigeKriegalsfru¨hmoderner Staatsbildungskrieg”inGeschichteinWissenschaftundUnterricht45(1994),p.487–499,J.Burkhardt, “Die Friedlosigkeit der Fru¨hen Neuzeit. Grundlegung einer Theorie der Bellizita¨t Europas” in Zeitschriftfu¨rHistorischeForschung24(1997),p.509–574andcriticallyB.Teschke,“Revisitingthe ‘War-Makes-States’Thesis:War,TaxationandSocialPropertyRelationsinEarlyModernEurope” inWar,theStateandInternationalLawinSeventeenth-CenturyEurope,ed.byO.AsbachandP. Schro¨der(Farnham2010),p.35–59. 16 Cf.R.Axtmann,“TheStateoftheState:TheModeloftheModernNationStateanditsCon- temporaryTransformation”inInternationalPoliticalScienceReview25(2004),p.264–281.Ofthe vastliteratureonthetheoryandpracticeofpoliticalandlegaloperationsinthemodernstatesys- tem,see,forexample,H.Duchhardt,GleichgewichtderKra¨fte,Convenance,Europa¨ischesKonzert. FriedenskongresseundFriedensschlu¨ssevomZeitalterLudwigsXIV.biszumWienerKongreß(Darm- stadt1976),Grewe,TheEpochsofInternationalLaw,A.Strohmeyer,TheoriederInteraktion.Das europa¨ischeGleichgewichtderKra¨fteinderfru¨henNeuzeit(Wien,Ko¨ln,Weimar1994),Sheehan, TheBalanceofPower;L.Be´ly(ed.),L’Europedestrait´esdeWestphalie.Espritdeladiplomatieet diplomatiedel’esprit(Paris2000),A.Blin,1648–LaPaixdeWestphalieoulanaissancedel’Europe moderne(Paris2006). Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of New England, on 16 Feb 2018 at 02:38:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316798515.002 6 Introduction universal monarchy. Secondly, juridical and philosophical theories which applied natural law to interstate relations and proposed a jus publicum Europaeum as a reliable juridical framework. And thirdly, projects which aimed for perpetual peace on the basis of federal structures for organis- ing the state system. To distinguish between these different approaches, we need to contextualise them both in comparison with rival positions andinrelationtoconcretepoliticalcontroversiesandtheprevailinginter- ested parties. But all three approaches confronted the central problem: 17 the sovereignty of the state. This is why those who deemed it necessary to implement institutions above the sovereign state so as to enforce an internationalorderlikenedthesphereofinterstaterelationstothestateof nature. Politicaladvisers,ontheotherhand,frequentlyunderstoodtheconcepts for organising interstate relations in a less sophisticated way as either the struggleforuniversalmonarchyorthevariousfacetsofabalanceofpower. TheDukeofSullyarguedforcefullyagainsttheHabsburgclaimtouniversal monarchy. The alternative he offered was to be seen in a balance of the European powers, which he perceived as being formed around the two antagonistic blocs of the Habsburgs and their allies on the one side, and 18 theFrenchcrownanditsalliesontheother. Theconceptofuniversalmonarchycanbeseenprimarilyasarhetorical device in those theories which advocated a balance of power as the only 19 reliablealternativetowhattheysawasanundesirablehegemony. Writing at the dawn of the eighteenth century in the context of the War of the Spanish Succession, Charles D’Avenant displayed how perceptions of the threatofuniversalmonarchyhadshiftedduringthepreviouscentury:‘’Tisa 17 Thatisnottosaythattheseargumentswereanti-statist.Onthecontrary,thestatewasseenasa crucialpartofanysolutiontotheinherentantagonisticrelationsbetweenstates. 18 Wewillsee,however,thatabalanceofpowerwasconceptualisedindifferentandmorecomplex waysthanthosesuggestedbySully.Ithasbeenclaimedthat‘thechiefattractivepowerofthis balance-of-powerdoctrine,thenasnow,wasitsapparentinescapability,theabsenceofapractical alternative’.P.W.Schroeder,TheTransformationofEuropeanPolitics1763–1848(Oxford1994), p.10. 19 OneexceptionisCampanella’swritingindefenceofSpanishuniversalmonarchy,sincethistext providesanilluminatingcontrasttothebulkofthewritingsstudiedhere.Theclassicalstudyonthe conceptofuniversalmonarchyisstillF.Bosbach,MonarchiaUniversalis.EinpolitischerLeitbegriff derFru¨henNeuzeit(Go¨ttingen1988).SeealsoA.Strohmeyer,“IdeasofPeaceinEarlyModern ModelsofInternationalOrder:UniversalMonarchyandBalanceofPowerinComparison”inJ. Du¨lfferandR.Frank(eds.),Peace,WarandGenderfromAntiquitytothePresent.Cross-cultural Perspectives(Essen2009),p.65–80andM.vanGelderen,“UniversalMonarchy,theRightsofWar andPeaceandtheBalanceofPower:Europe’sQuestforCivilOrder”inReflectionsonEurope: DefiningaPoliticalOrderinTimeandSpace,ed.byH.-A˚.PerssonandB.Stra˚th(Brussels2007), p.49–71. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of New England, on 16 Feb 2018 at 02:38:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316798515.002 Introduction 7 melancholyConsiderationthatwecannolongersaytheHouseofAustria, the two Branches of which preserved the balance of Power, and weighed in the Scale against France: We must now say the House of Bourbon. WithwhatMischiefsdoesnottheConjunctionofsuchmightyKingdoms threatentheWorld?IftheFrenchhaveitnotintheirWill,isitnotintheir Powertooppressthewhole,especiallyifbothSceptersfallintooneHand? Inshort(...)theyseemthePeoplemostlikelytoinvadetheLibertiesof 20 Europe’. This historical shift is remarkable and D’Avenant’s views were sharedbyotherobservers. Alongsidethepoliticaltheoriesofbalanceofpoweroruniversalmonar- chy,andthejuridicalwritingsofnaturallaw,athirdgenrecanbeidentified: 21 schemesforpeace. Oneshouldnotdismisstooquicklytheeffortsofearly modern thinkers to formulate alternatives to the balance of power. They were aware of the dilemmas inherent in the attempts to conceptualise an organising principle for interstate relations. Plans for peace between sovereign states were often disregarded as naive. In order to establish an international assembly with the requisite rights and powers, a real trans- formation of power had to occur, but privileged sovereigns are reluctant to give up rights. Immanuel Kant would make this point: ‘it will be said, states will never submit to coercive laws of this kind; and a proposal for a universal state of nations to whose power all individual states should voluntarilyaccommodatethemselvessoastoobeyitslaws–howevergood it may sound in the theory of an Abbe´ St Pierre – still does not hold in 22 practice’. With state sovereignty in place to guarantee internal security, sovereignsresistedendangeringthedomesticstatusquo.Seeninthislight, anyprogrammetoorganisetheEuropeanstatesystemonthebasisofsome kindoffederalstructuredirectlyconfrontedtheexclusivityofabsolutestate sovereignty. In this complex set of circumstances, what was the political role of trust?Thepositivenotionoftrustandtrustworthinessimmediatelyfound its negative counterweight in fraud and untrustworthiness. However, it 20 C.D’Avenant,AnEssayuponUniversalMonarchy.WrittenintheYear1701(London1756),p.59f. 21 AnexcellentoverviewisnowavailableinthestudybyB.Arcidiacono,Cinqtypesdepaix.Une histoiredesplansdepacificationperp´etuelle(Paris2011). 22 I.Kant,“OntheCommonSaying:ThatMightbeCorrectinTheory,butitisofnoUseinPractice” inTheCambridgeEditionoftheWorksofImmanuelKant.PracticalPhilosophy,ed.byM.J.Gregor (Cambridge1996),p.309.However,thisdoesnotmeanthatKantadvocatedthebalanceofpower. Onthecontrary,heclaimedthat‘anenduringuniversalpeacebymeansoftheso-calledbalanceof powerinEuropeisamerefantasy,likeSwift’shousethatthebuilderhadconstructedinsuchperfect accordwithallthelawsofequilibriumthatitcollapsedassoonasasparrowalighteduponit’. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of New England, on 16 Feb 2018 at 02:38:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316798515.002 8 Introduction 23 is fear – crucial in Hobbes’s political theory but also of considerable 24 relevance in early modern international thought – that should be seen as the prime conceptual counter to trust. Given their mutual fear, trust remainedprecariousbetweenEuropeanstates,evenasasystemofinterstate relationsemerged. Looking at trust as a principle underpinning the seventeenth-century discourses of interstate relations shows that references to trust – or to 25 26 fides , good faith, Vertrauen and confiance – were deployed as a tool in political conflicts. The claim to faithfulness for one’s own side was as much a part of the strategic deployment of trust as the denial of the trustworthiness of an adversary. There are thus two very different levels tobeassessedregardingtheconceptualisationoftrust.Thefirstisamore abstract concept of trust as a fundamental and philosophical value that might provide a basis for organising relations between states. The second is a more cynical strategic use in the polemics that accompanied various interstate conflicts. An almost universal starting point for seventeenth- centurypoliticalthinkerswasMachiavelli.Hepointed,likenobodyelse,to theelusivenessoftrustwhenthecircumstancesofpoliticschanged:‘Rulers (...)haveoftenfoundthatmenwhomtheyhadregardedwithsuspicion in the early stages of their rule prove more reliable and useful than those whom they had trusted at first. (...) But it is very difficult to generalise 23 SeeChapter3.2.OneofthekeyreferencesisT.Hobbes,OntheCitizen,ed.byR.Tuck(Cambridge 1997),p.37. 24 See, for example, A. Oschmann, “Der metus justus in der deutschen Kriegsrechtslehre des 17. Jahrhunderts”inAngstundPolitikindereuropa¨ischenGeschichte,ed.byF.Bosbach(Dettelbach 2000),p.101–131. 25 Fides in the Roman sense has a twofold meaning. Cicero argued that ‘the keeping of faith is fundamentaltojustice’.Cicero,OnDuties,ed.byM.T.GriffinandE.M.Atkins(Cambridge 1991), (I-23),p.10.However,inadditiontotheCiceronianconnotation,fidesalsoboreavery differentmeaninginRomanthought,ascoercionandpowerwerenecessarycomponents.The stronger, victorious Romans would absorb the vanquished into their fides and it would be the Romanswhodictatedthetermsofinclusion.Grotiusdrawsattentiontothisdifferentusage.H. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed. by R. Tuck (Indianapolis 2006), p. 1587: ‘We often meetinRomanHistorieswiththeseExpressions,Tradereseinfidem,Toyieldthemselvestothe Faith,Tradereinfidem&clementiam,ToyieldtotheFaithandClemency.(...)Butitmustbe understood,thatbytheseWordsismeantanabsoluteSurrender:AndthattheWordFidesinthese PlacessignifiesnothingbuttheProbityoftheConqueror,towhichtheConqueredyieldshimself’. HobbessharedGrotius’sperceptionoftheRomanfides.T.Hobbes,Leviathan,ed.byR.Tuck (Cambridge1992),p.485.SeethediscussioninR.Heinze,“Fides”inR.Heinze,VomGeistdes Ro¨mertums(Darmstadt1960),p.59–81,D.No¨rr,DieFidesimro¨mischenVo¨lkerrecht(Heidelberg 1991)andM.Hartmann,DiePraxisdesVertrauens(Berlin2011),p.375–405. 26 Notethattrustfiguresquiteprominentlyasakeyconceptnotonlyindifferentlearnedacademic workssuchasthosebyGentili,Grotiusandothers,butalsoinpamphlets,polemicsandpeace treatiesthemselves.ApartfromtheRomannotionoffides,allthesetermsareunproblematicand interchangeable. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of New England, on 16 Feb 2018 at 02:38:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316798515.002 Introduction 9 27 about this, since men and circumstances vary’. Following Machiavelli, we can conceptualise trust: the moment an actor trusts another, he or sheembracesahypothesisthatseemssecureenoughtopredicttheother’s action.Trustthuscorrespondswiththeassumptionoffuturebehaviouron the part of others. Though always prone to exploitation, trust is a crucial 28 componentofpoliticalconduct. Trust has attracted the attention of modern scholars. In the field of sociology,NiklasLuhmann’sstudyVertrauen.EinMechanismusderReduk- tionsozialerKomplexita¨tisanearlyandimportantcontribution.Luhmann analyses ‘trust as a form of security’ and is in this respect relevant to the 29 present study. Political philosophers have also taken up the theme of 30 trust. John Dunn is eminent among the scholars who have worked on 31 trust within the field of the history of political thought. Peter Johnson’s Frames of Deceit addresses ‘trust as a conditional disposition’ within the politicalcommunityofastate,thoughnotwithinthefieldofinternational 32 relations. Trust also plays a considerable role within the scholarship of (political) economy, although it is rarely related to the specific concerns 27 N.Machiavelli,ThePrince,ed.byQ.SkinnerandR.Price(Cambridge2008),p.74. 28 Cf.G.Simmel,Soziologie.Untersuchungenu¨berdieFormenderVergesellschaftung(Berlin1908), p.263:‘Vertrauen,alsHypotheseku¨nftigenVerhaltens,diesichergenugist,umpraktischesHandeln daraufzugru¨nden,istalsHypotheseeinmittlererZustandzwischenWissenundNichtwissenum denMenschen’. 29 N.Luhmann,Vertrauen.EinMechanismusderReduktionsozialerKomplexita¨t(Stuttgart1973),p.12. SeealsoP.Sztompka,Trust:ASociologicalTheory(Cambridge1999). 30 See,inparticular,A.Boyer,Chosepromise.E´tudessurlapromessea`partirdeHobbesetdequelques autres(Paris2014)andHartmann,DiePraxis. 31 SeeJ.Dunn,ThePoliticalThoughtofJohnLocke(Cambridge1969),esp.p.120–187,J.Dunn, “TrustinthePoliticsofJohnLocke”inJ.Dunn,RethinkingModernPoliticalTheory(Cambridge 1985),p.34–54,J.Dunn,“TrustandPoliticalAgency”inTrust:MakingandBreakingCooperative Relations,ed.byD.Gambetta(Oxford1988),p.73–93.SeealsoH.W.Blom,“Patriots,Contracts andOtherPatternsof Trust inaPolyarchicSociety: TheDutch17th Century”in‘Patria’ und ‘Patrioten’vordemPatriotismus:Pflichten,Rechte,GlaubenunddieRekonfigurierungeuropa¨ischer Gemeinwesenim17.Jahrhundert,ed.byR.v.Friedeburg(Wiesbaden2005),p.193–213.Hobbes scholarshavealsonoticedtheimportanceoftrustinHobbes’spoliticalphilosophy,thoughnotin relationtointernationalpoliticalthought.See,inparticular,D.Gauthier,TheLogicofLeviathan: TheMoralandPoliticalTheoryofThomasHobbes(Oxford1969),J.Hampton,HobbesandtheSocial ContractTradition(Cambridge1986)andD.Baumgold,“‘Trust’inHobbes’sPoliticalThought” inPoliticalTheory41(2013),p.838–855. 32 P.Johnson,FramesofDeceit.AStudyoftheLossandRecoveryofPublicandPrivateTrust(Cambridge 1993),p.19.Amongtheotherstudiesontrustwithinmoralandpoliticaltheory,seethecollection ofessaysinD.Gambetta(ed.),Trust:MakingandBreakingCooperativeRelations(Oxford1988),A. B.Seligman,TheProblemofTrust(Princeton2000),M.Hollis,TrustwithinReason(Cambridge 1998),E.Uslaner,TheMoralFoundationsofTrust(Cambridge2002),C.Tilly,TrustandRule (Cambridge2005)andM.Kohn,Trust.Self-InterestandtheCommonGood(Oxford2008).Afairly descriptivehistoricalaccount,thoughregrettablynotdealingwiththeseventeenthcentury,isnow foundinU.Frevert,Vertrauensfragen.EineObsessionderModerne(Munich2013). Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of New England, on 16 Feb 2018 at 02:38:48, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316798515.002