Brooklyn Law Review Volume 77|Issue 2 Article 2 2012 Trapped in the Amber: State Common Law, Employee Rights, and Federal Enclaves Chad DeVeaux Follow this and additional works at:https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr Recommended Citation Chad DeVeaux,Trapped in the Amber: State Common Law, Employee Rights, and Federal Enclaves, 77 Brook.L.Rev.(2012). Available at:https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol77/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks. Trapped in the Amber STATE COMMON LAW, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS, AND FEDERAL ENCLAVES Chad DeVeaux† “Have you ever seen bugs trapped in amber? . . . Well, here we are . . . trapped in the amber of this moment. There is no why.”1 INTRODUCTION “The common law grows like a tree,”2 periodically sprouting new branches, shedding dead limbs. Stagnation is antithetical to this concept. “[T]he continued vitality of the common law . . . depends upon its ability to reflect contemporary community values and ethics.”3 As Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. observed, It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.4 Led by luminaries like Justice Holmes, Karl Llewellyn, and Benjamin Cardozo, the twentieth century witnessed dramatic advances in private-law jurisprudence: the virtual demise of the centuries-old doctrines of caveat emptor,5 † Associate Professor of Law, Concordia University School of Law (beginning fall 2012); Assistant Professor of Law, Western State University College of Law (fall 2009-spring 2012); LL.M, Harvard University 2008; J.D., University of Notre Dame 2001; B.A., Bowling Green State University 1997. I extend my deepest thanks to Patricia O’Connor and Scott Frey of WSU’s law library for their assistance researching this article and to the editors and staff of the Brooklyn Law Review for their hard work preparing it for publication. Any mistakes are my responsibility alone. 1 KURT VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE 76-77 (1969) (emphasis omitted). 2 Professor Lewis Sargentich invoked this metaphor during his Jurisprudence class at Harvard Law School in 2007. 3 Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (quoting Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (1960)). 4 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 5 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 580-82 (1988). 499 500 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:2 contributory negligence,6 and the tort of alienation of affections;7 the recognition of an implied warranty of habitability for residential dwellings;8 and the legislative enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).9 Yet in 2012, more than a million Americans10—probably several million11—live and work in places governed by long- discarded nineteenth-century precepts, jurisprudential purgatories where the revenants of long-dead legal doctrines stalk the living. We call these places federal enclaves—military bases, federal office buildings and residential complexes, post offices, and national parks.12 Their existence stems from the Constitution’s so-called “Enclave Clause,” Article I, Section 8, Clause 17. This provision empowers Congress to exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings . . . .13 With the surrounding state’s consent, Congress may establish a federal enclave for any “legitimate governmental 6 Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 877 (2004). 7 Rachel F. Moran, Law and Emotion, Love and Hate, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 747, 774 (2001). 8 CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 499 (6th ed. 2007). 9 Robert L. Masterson, Converting Obsolete Musical Media to Current Formats: A Copyright Infringement Defense Arising from the Right to Repair and Implied Warranty of Fitness, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 281, 298 (2009) (noting that Article 2 of the UCC has been adopted by the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and every state except Louisiana). 10 Adams v. Clinton, No. 1:98CV01665, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22848, at *13 (D.D.C. June 30, 1998). 11 See Lawrence H. Mirel, Restoration Project: Give D.C. the Vote It Once Had, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1999, at B01 (“Millions of people live in so-called federal enclaves, those territories that have been purchased by, or ceded to, the federal government for use as military bases, national parks and other federal facilities.”); Gary Thompson & Lois G. Williams, If We Can’t Vote for Them, Why Can They Tax Us?, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2000, at B02 (noting that “the millions of federal enclave residents enjoy congressional representation—by voting either in their home state or the state where the enclave is located”). 12 See Charles F. Wilkinson, Cross-Jurisdictional Conflicts: An Analysis of Legitimate State Interests on Federal and Indian Lands, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 145, 152 (1982) (discussing different types of federal enclaves). 13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. 2012] TRAPPED IN THE AMBER 501 purpose.”14 When an enclave is created, “the jurisdiction theretofore residing in the State passes . . . to the United States.”15 State regulatory authority over the ceded property ceases and the federal authority becomes “exclusive.”16 This “grant of ‘exclusive’ legislative power to Congress . . . by its own weight, bars state regulation without specific congressional action.”17 While the land remains legally part of the state in which it sits18 and enclave citizens retain the right to vote in state elections,19 from a regulatory standpoint enclaves “are to [the surrounding state] as the territory of one of her sister states or a foreign land.”20 Enclave status extinguishes state regulatory authority, but “[t]he Constitution does not command that every vestige of the laws of the [state] must vanish.”21 In order to ensure “that no area will be left without a developed legal system,” state laws “existing at the time of the [state’s] surrender of sovereignty”22 continue in force as federal laws indefinitely until “abrogated” by Congress.23 Such preexisting state laws “lose their character as law of the state and become laws of the Union.”24 But postcession changes in state law “are not a part of the body of laws” because “[c]ongressional action is necessary to keep [the enclave’s law] current.”25 The lower federal courts have uniformly held that this principle also applies to state common-law rules in effect at the time of cession.26 14 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 542 n.11 (1976) (citing Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 528-30 (1938)). 15 Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 657 (1930). 16 United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 370 (1973). 17 Id. (quoting Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (1963)). 18 Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 626 (1953). 19 Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1970). 20 State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted). 21 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99 (1940). 22 Id. at 99. 23 Id. at 99-100. 24 Bd. of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 563-64 (E.D. Va. 1976) (quoting Stokes v. Adair, 265 F.2d 662, 665 (4th Cir. 1959)); accord Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 100. 25 Sadrakula, 309 U.S. at 99. 26 E.g., Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 170 F. App’x 496, 497-98 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that common law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower and common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress not cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Stuckstede v. NJVC LLC, No. 4:09CV0663 JCH, 2010 WL 234953, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 15, 2010) (holding that common law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Bussey v. Edison Int’l, Inc., No. CV 08-0158 AHM (RCx), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14057, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) (same); McMullen v. S. Cal. Edison, No. EDCV 08-957-VAP (PJWx), 2008 WL 4948664, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008) 502 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:2 To date, Congress has created more than five thousand federal enclaves.27 Collectively, these enclaves encompass “[r]oughly thirty percent of land in the United States”—more than 659 million acres.28 Over forty are larger than Washington, D.C.29 Congress created the vast majority of these enclaves between 1840 and 1940.30 Few have been created since the end of World War II.31 Absent congressional action, state laws effective at the moment the federal government accepted jurisdiction over these lands remain in force, frozen in time, like bugs trapped in amber. Congress has kept criminal law current by enacting the Assimilative Crimes Act (ACA), which “makes applicable on federal enclaves . . . criminal laws of the State in which the enclave is located.”32 Whenever the surrounding state alters its criminal law, the ACA incorporates the modification by (same); Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that common law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress not cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat’l Labs., 424 F. Supp. 2d 545, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); Celli v. Shoell, 995 F. Supp. 1337, 1344 (D. Utah 1998) (same); Snow v. Bechtel Constr. Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that common law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp., 425 F. Supp. 81, 88 (D. Conn. 1977) (finding that pre- cession state common law governing personal-injury torts no longer applied within federal enclave because Congress enacted statute abrogating application of pre-cession personal-injury torts and applying modern state common law to enclave-based personal-injury and wrongful-death actions), overruled on other grounds by Vasina v. Grumman Corp., 644 F.2d 112, 117-18 (2d Cir. 1981); Orlovetz v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 848 P.2d 463, 466-67 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that common law action for wrongful termination of whistleblower not cognizable on federal enclave established before state supreme court recognized cause of action); Buttery v. Robbins, 14 S.E.2d 544, 548 (Va. 1941) (citing Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929), for the proposition that state common law rules in effect at time of cession remain in force on an enclave until abrogated by Congress); Norfolk & P.B.L.R. Co. v. Parker, 147 S.E. 461, 463 (Va. 1929) (holding that state common law rules in effect at time of cession remain in force on an enclave until abrogated by Congress), superseded by statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-34 (1950), as recognized in Hudgins v. Jones, 138 S.E.2d 16, 22 (Va. 1964). 27 Adams v. Clinton, No. 1:98CV01665, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22848, at *13 (D.D.C. June 30, 1998). 28 Jonathan Turley, Too Clever by Half: The Unconstitutionality of Partial Representation of the District of Columbia in Congress, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 305, 362 (2008) (emphasis added). 29 Carl Strass, Federal Enclaves—Through the Looking Glass—Darkly, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 754, 755 (1964). 30 Congress amended the United States Code in 1940 to stop the flood of enclave creation “end[ing] a period of 100 years during which the Federal Government, with relatively minor exceptions, acquired legislative jurisdiction over substantially all of its land acquisitions within the States.” Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 152 n.21 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION 49-50 (1969)). 31 Id. 32 Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 158 (1998). 2012] TRAPPED IN THE AMBER 503 reference into the federalized state law governing the enclave.33 Congress has similarly incorporated contemporary state wrongful-death,34 personal-injury,35 and workers’ compensation statutes36 into enclave law. But Congress has otherwise failed to “keep . . . current”37 the body of private law governing enclaves.38 With respect to legal areas neglected by Congress, federal enclaves have devolved into jurisprudential Jurassic Parks, “sanctuar[ies] for the obsolete restrictions of the common law.”39 One such arena is labor law. More than a million people are likely employed on federal enclaves.40 Almost every state endows employees with greater rights and remedies than federal law requires.41 Such state-enacted protections include: 33 United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 292 (1958). 34 16 U.S.C. § 457 (2006). 35 Id. 36 40 U.S.C. § 3172 (2006). 37 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940). 38 See Stephen E. Castlen & Gregory O. Block, Exclusive Federal Legislative Jurisdiction: Get Rid of It!, 154 MIL. L. REV. 113, 124 (1997) (“Congress . . . has not passed legislation for enclaves relative to contracts, sales, agency, probate, guardianship, family relations, and torts not involving death or personal injury.”). 39 Capetola v. Barclay-White Co., 48 F. Supp. 797, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1943). 40 No official statistics are available concerning the number of individuals employed on federal enclaves. I base my assertion that the number likely exceeds one million upon several facts. First, nearly thirty percent of the United States falls within the boundaries of a federal enclave. Turley, supra note 28, at 362. Second, more than a million citizens live on enclaves. Adams v. Clinton, No. 1:98CV01665, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22848, at *13 (D.D.C. June 30, 1998). Indeed, several million people likely reside on federal enclaves. Mirel, supra note 11, at B01; Thompson & Williams, supra note 11, at B02. Finally, the sheer number of decisions concerning suits by federal enclave employees suggests that the number of individuals employed in such places is very large. E.g., Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 170 F. App’x 496, 497-98 (9th Cir. 2006); Manning v. Gold Belt Falcon, LLC, 681 F. Supp. 2d 574, 576 (D.N.J. 2010); Klausner v. Lucas Film Entm’t Co., No. 09-03502 CW, 2010 WL 1038228, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010); Stuckstede v. NJVC LLC, No. 4:09CV0663 JCH, 2010 WL 234953, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 15, 2010); Rosseter v. Indus. Light & Magic, No. C 08-04545 WHA, 2009 WL 210452, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2009); McMullen v. S. Cal. Edison, No. EDCV 08-957- VAP (PJWx), 2008 WL 4948664, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008); Mersnick v. USProtect Corp., No. C-06-03993 RMW, 2007 WL 2669816, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007); Janulewicz v. Bechtel Corp., No. 06-CV-1413-H (WMC), 2007 WL 2462110, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007); Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat’l Lab., 424 F. Supp. 2d 545, 570 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Hutchinson v. Andrulis Corp., No. 5:03CV1-MCR/WCS, 2004 WL 691790, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2004); Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.P.R. 1998); George v. UXB Int’l, Inc., No. C-95-20048-JW, 1996 WL 241624, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1996); Miller v. Wackenhut Serv., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 697, 699-700 (W.D. Mo. 1992); Snow v. Bechtel Constr. Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 (C.D. Cal. 1986); Lockhart v. MVM, Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 206, 212-13 (Ct. App. 2009); Orlovetz v. Day & Zimmerman, Inc., 848 P.2d 463, 466-67 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993); Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Dirt & Aggregate, Inc., 837 P.2d 1018, 1021-22 (Wash. 1992). 41 Peter Romer-Friedman, Eliot Spitzer Meets Mother Jones: How State Attorneys General Can Enforce State Wage and Hour Laws, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 495, 503 (2006). 504 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:2 (cid:129) the right to higher minimum wages than those guaranteed by federal law,42 (cid:129) the right to receive overtime under circumstances not required by federal law,43 (cid:129) the right to receive benefits for dependents and domestic partners not provided by federal law,44 (cid:129) greater rights to medical leave to care for ailing family members than those provided by federal law,45 (cid:129) protections against discrimination not provided by federal law,46 (cid:129) more stringent workplace safety standards than federal law requires,47 and (cid:129) common law causes of action against employers for the termination of at-will employees for reasons or under circumstances that violate public policy,48 including the termination of whistleblowers.49 Because nineteenth- and early twentieth-century precepts govern most aspects of enclave private law, civilians employed on federal enclaves typically enjoy none of these rights.50 Modern state private law should not necessarily extend to government employees or military personnel acting in their official capacities within an enclave. Such extension of state law might “frustrate specific [federal] objectives” for the enclave.51 But no compelling reason exists to deny civilians—and government and military officials acting in their private capacities—the application of modern private law. Today, private corporations unaffiliated with the military derive millions of dollars in revenue from transactions conducted within federal enclaves.52 A teenager employed at a fast-food restaurant within an enclave ought to be entitled to the same wage-and-hour and workplace-safety laws as an employee who works just outside the boundaries of the enclave. Under the current law, he is not. An army servicewoman who purchases a bicycle for her child from an enclave retailer ought to enjoy the 42 See infra note 294 and accompanying text. 43 See infra note 299 and accompanying text. 44 See infra note 296 and accompanying text. 45 See infra note 295 and accompanying text. 46 See infra note 300 and accompanying text. 47 See infra note 302 and accompanying text. 48 See infra note 313 and accompanying text. 49 See infra note 320 and accompanying text. 50 See infra notes 303-25 and accompanying text. 51 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979). 52 See infra Parts V & VI. 2012] TRAPPED IN THE AMBER 505 implied warranties imposed by the UCC. Because most enclaves predate the adoption of the UCC, such sales are virtually always governed by the outmoded doctrine of caveat emptor.53 I am personally acquainted with the eccentricities of federal-enclave law. As a young attorney, I represented a pro bono client facing eviction from a residential apartment in the Presidio of San Francisco, a federal enclave administered by the National Parks Service.54 I removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction because the law governing his suit was California’s 1872 unlawful-detainer statute, which lived on as “‘federalized’ state law.”55 The Presidio is a bustling commercial center in the heart of San Francisco. Millions of dollars of commercial transactions take place on the Presidio each year.56 Yet nineteenth-century private law governs most conduct there. As then-Congressman James Buchanan observed in 1823, federal enclaves represent a “palpable defect in our system” because “a great variety of actions, to which a high degree of moral guilt is attached, and which are punished . . . at the common law . . . by every State . . . may be committed with impunity [within enclaves].”57 So it is with the Presidio today.58 The premise that when jurisdiction is transferred from one government to another existing laws remain in force until abrogated by the new sovereign is derived from international 53 Most federal enclaves were established between 1840 and 1940. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 152 n.21. Most states enacted the Uniform Commercial Code during the 1960s. See Harry J. Haynsworth, The Unified Business Organizations Code: The Next Generation, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 83, 101 (2004). 54 See Swords to Plowshares v. Kemp, 423 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 55 Id. at 1037. As “federalized” law, the “assimilated state [unlawful detainer] law [wa]s distinctly federal in nature,” thus “its application establishe[d] the basis for federal question jurisdiction.” Id. at 1038. My client resided in federal housing. Id. at 1038 n.7. I removed the case to federal court because I planned to challenge his eviction on due- process grounds and I preferred to make this argument before a federal forum. This strategy proved successful. See Swords to Plowshares v. Kemp, No. C05-01661MJJ, 2005 WL 3882063, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2005). While my client resided in federally subsidized housing, notably, the majority of housing units on the Presidio are not subsidized and operate for profit. Dan Levy, A Green Belt in the Black: Presidio as National Park Achieves Self-Sustaining Goal 8 Years Early, S.F. CHRON., June 19, 2005, at A-1. 56 Levy, supra note 55, at A-1. 57 Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 160 (1998) (quoting 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 930 (1823)). 58 The state of the law in the Presidio is reminiscent of the phenomenon astronomers refer to as a singularity—the center of a black hole where the past and present collide rendering invalid the ordinary laws of physics. Marcus Chown, Dark Matter Rockets and Black Hole Starships, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 28, 2009, at 34, 36-37. 506 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:2 law.59 The principle “assures that no area however small will be left without a developed legal system for private rights.”60 But these assimilated laws are not meant to live on into perpetuity. They are intended to serve only as a jurisprudential backstop to prevent anarchy during the transition period.61 Upon accepting jurisdiction, the new sovereign assumes the responsibility to actually govern the territory.62 In common-law countries, the new sovereign’s courts likewise assume the responsibility to promulgate common-law rules for the territory.63 I posit that enclave common law should not remain forever frozen in time at the moment of cession. While state court common-lawmaking jurisdiction is extinguished, the responsibility to maintain enclave private law should pass from the state to the federal courts and become a matter of federal common law. Congress and the federal courts share the blame for the nonsensical state of enclave law. Both have wholly abdicated their respective responsibilities. Congress has failed to enact private-law legislation for enclaves. More critically, the federal courts have refused to assume responsibility for enclave common-law development. This article argues that as federal instrumentalities, enclaves should be subject to federal common law. Moreover, federal courts should use their discretion to borrow64 the common law of the surrounding state, so long as doing so does not “frustrate specific [federal] objectives” for the particular enclave.65 Because many aspects of state labor law, like wage- and-hour provisions, cannot be enacted through the common- lawmaking process, Congress should enact a statute, similar to the ACA, making state labor laws applicable to civilians employed within federal enclaves. 59 See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828) (holding that Spanish private law governed Florida territory until abrogated by Congress). 60 James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940) (citing Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 542 (1885)). 61 See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Donoho, 356 P.2d 267, 271 (Colo. 1960) (asserting that adoption of preexisting state laws was intended to temporarily “fill the vacuum which would otherwise exist” in enclave private law). 62 See United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246, 253-54 (1819) (ruling that acquisition of possession and control of territory endows the sovereign with exclusive prerogative to govern that territory). 63 See Cornelius J. Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265-66 (1963) (arguing that courts historically assume responsibility for private-law development subject to sporadic legislative involvement). 64 California ex rel. State Lands Comm’n v. United States, 457 U.S. 273, 283 (1982); accord United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979). 65 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728. 2012] TRAPPED IN THE AMBER 507 Part I of this article explores the origin and development of the federal-enclave doctrine from its genesis, as a rule of international law adopted by the Marshall Court in 1828,66 to the Court’s most recent reaffirmation of the principle in 1973.67 Part II addresses Congress’s authority to assimilate contemporary state law, making such law applicable within federal enclaves. In particular, this part examines federal statutes making modern state criminal codes, workers’ compensation laws, and wrongful-death acts applicable in federal enclaves. Part III discusses limitations upon the authority ceded by the states to the federal government. This part examines the right of states to reserve limited legislative authority as a condition of cession. In addition, this part addresses the Supreme Court’s somewhat paradoxical assertion that an enclave is “to [the surrounding state] as the territory of one of her sister states or a foreign land,”68 yet nonetheless “d[oes] not cease to be a part of [the surrounding state].”69 This part also addresses the right of enclave residents to vote in state elections. Part IV addresses the inapplicability of modern state choice-of-law rules in litigation arising on federal enclaves. Today, most states employ interest-balancing tests when deciding which jurisdiction’s law to apply in litigation involving contact with multiple states.70 Because the law applicable to federal enclaves is viewed as federal law—notwithstanding its origin as state law—the Supremacy Clause bars courts from balancing the enclave’s interests against those of surrounding states.71 The Supremacy Clause dictates that the enclave’s federalized state law must be applied when the pertinent events giving rise to a suit occur on a federal enclave even if the surrounding state possesses materially greater interests in the litigation’s outcome. Part V explores some of the federal-enclave doctrine’s perverse effects. Because the doctrine freezes in time existing state private law—both statutory and common law—long-dead canons such as the tort of alienation of affections and the doctrine of caveat emptor live on in most enclaves as 66 See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828). 67 United States v. State Tax Comm’n, 412 U.S. 363, 378 (1973) (reaffirming doctrine of exclusive federal jurisdiction over enclaves). 68 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 69 Howard v. Comm’rs of Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 626 (1953). 70 See infra Part IV. 71 See infra Part IV.