A Brief Introduction to Transcendental Phenomenology and Conceptual Mathematics (En kort introduktion till transcendental fenomenologi och konceptuell matematik) Av: Nicholas Lawrence Handledare: Nicholas Smith Södertörns högskola | Institutionen för kultur och lärande Magisteruppsats 30 hp Filosofi | vårterminen 2017 Abstract By extending Husserl’s own historico-critical study to include the conceptual mathematics of more contemporary times – specifically category theory and its emphatic development since the second half of the 20th century – this paper claims that the delineation between mathematics and philosophy must be completely revisited. It will be contended that Husserl’s phenomenological work was very much influenced by the discoveries and limitations of the formal mathematics being developed at Göttingen during his tenure there and that, subsequently, the rôle he envisaged for his material a priori science is heavily dependent upon his conception of the definite manifold. Motivating these contentions is the idea of a mathematics which would go beyond the constraints of formal ontology and subsequently achieve coherence with the full sense of transcendental phenomenology. While this final point will be by no means proven within the confines of this paper it is hoped that the very fact of opening up for the possibility of such an idea will act as a supporting argument to the overriding thesis that the relationship between mathematics and phenomenology must be problematised. i PROLEGOMENA ......................................................................................................... 1! §1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1! §2 The task at hand .................................................................................................... 2! §3 On method ............................................................................................................ 4! §4 A terse note on language ...................................................................................... 5! I. A CRITICAL SITUATION ....................................................................................... 6! §5 The mathematisation of nature and the naturalisation of the world ..................... 6! §6 A mathematical crisis – not a crisis of mathematics ............................................ 7! §7 The question of a critique of scientific methodology ......................................... 10! II. FORMAL MATHEMATICS AND PHENOMENOLOGY ................................... 13! §8 Formal logic is formal ontology is formal mathematics .................................... 13! §9 From the theory of manifolds to the concept of the definite manifold ............... 15! §10 Beyond the unity of the manifold ..................................................................... 17! §11 Zermelo’s paradox and the division of labour .................................................. 19! §12 The absurdity of a naturalised phenomenology ................................................ 20! III. THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF LOGICAL REASON ........................................ 24! §13 The double-sidedness of sense and the world of formal analysis .................... 24! §14 The transcendental-phenomenological reduction ............................................. 25! §15 Parenthesising mathesis universalis ................................................................. 27! §16 Uncovering the soil of the objective sciences .................................................. 29! §17 The universal problem of intentionality ........................................................... 31! IV. CATEGORY THEORY AS TRANSCENDENTAL SCIENCE .......................... 33! §18 What is category theory? .................................................................................. 33! §19 Subjective and objective logic .......................................................................... 37! §20 Categorification and de-formalisation .............................................................. 39! §21 The “filling out” of formal-ontological objects ................................................ 42! §22 The theory of manifolds revisited ..................................................................... 45! EPILEGOMENA ......................................................................................................... 48! §23 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 48! BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................... 50! ii PROLEGOMENA §1 Introduction Thanks to the arduous work of Husserl and his disciples, phenomenology today finds itself as gatekeeper to a veritable goldmine of scientific results regarding concrete experience. Following on from this comes a relatively recent trend, known as the naturalisation of phenomenology, which attempts to integrate this data into modern scientific research – largely in the field of cognitive science. There is yet another trend, represented by the likes of Claire Ortiz Hill, Jairo José da Silva, and Mirja Hartimo for example, that looks to further investigate Husserlian phenomenology’s connections with the philosophy of mathematics more generally. What these trends have in common is that they both – in their own separate ways – attempt to tread the rather obscure line between phenomenology and mathematics. In this paper it will be argued that there is perhaps a third way to investigate this perimeter, one which may be viewed as a heretical chimera of the first two, and which ultimately amounts to the radicalisation of phenomenology by way of contemporary mathematics. What is required then is a historico-critical investigation that will attempt to come to terms with phenomenology’s telos by taking a closer look at its relationship with mathematics. This contention is announced here as part of a series of introductory remarks but it is also worth mentioning that the thesis itself claims to be no more than a prolegomenon for future investigations. In the spirit of the tradition of transcendental philosophy, this paper will take as its modest aim the raising of phenomenological problems that will in turn require further investigation. The conclusion of this thesis will, if all succeeds as planned, point to the possibility of a transcendentalisation of a specific special science – category theory – and to an associated mathematisation of phenomenology. This would mean, more specifically, the imbuing of category theory with transcendental sense by employing it to investigate problems of intentional constitution and, as a result, opening up certain phenomenological regions to mathematics. It is hoped that by awakening these possibilities the paper’s overriding thesis, that the delineation between mathematics and philosophy must be considered anew, will be significantly reinforced. This is by no means an uncomplicated matter and this study’s conclusions will no doubt leave the reader with more questions than answers. One such question would undoubtedly 1 be: if a transcendental mathematics is truly possible, and category theory is such an obvious fit for such a science, why is there no existing literature on the topic? Gilbert T. Null and Roger A. Simons investigate the extension of set-theoretical based mathematics to transcendental problems of course, and Sebastjan Vörös sensibly highlights that a phenomenologisation of the natural sciences would need to be undertaken if a naturalisation of phenomenology were to be taken seriously, but in neither case is there a turn to conceptual mathematics for a solution.1 On the other side of the coin there is undoubtedly academic interest in the benefits of category- theoretical methods in the modelling of consciousness, exemplified by the work of Z. Arzi-Gonczarowski and D. Lehmann, but this – unsurprisingly – shows no concern for questions relating to transcendental subjectivity.2 So why has no one put two and two together (so to speak)? On this it is only possible to speculate, but perhaps the answer to this question will in fact go some way towards supporting this paper’s thesis. Operating with pregiven notions of the disparate natures of mathematics and transcendental phenomenology, the possibility of a combination of the two seems to have been obscured from view. It is hoped that, by turning to a historico-critical approach, while it will admittedly not be possible to confirm the idea of a transcendental mathematics, the need to revisit the division of labour between mathematics and phenomenology will remain unequivocal. §2 The task at hand The task to be undertaken is not one of saving the objective sciences from a transcendental epochē – that instead falls upon those advocating for the naturalisation of phenomenology. There is no hope harboured in this paper of sparing formal mathematics the parenthesizing to which it is due. The task is not to explicate Husserl’s latent importance to the philosophy of mathematics. The aim is rather to suggest that there may be a mathematics that, as non-naive, distinguishes itself from 1 Gilbert T. Null and Roger A. Simons, “Manifolds, Concepts and Moment Abstracta,” in Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, ed. Barry Smith (München: Philosophia Verlag, 1982); Sebastjan Vörös, “The Uroboros of Consciousness: Between the Naturalisation of Phenomenology and the Phenomenologisation of Nature,” Constructivist Foundations 10, no. 1 (2014): 96– 104. 2 Z. Arzi-Gonczarowski and D. Lehmann, “From Environments to Representations— a Mathematical Theory of Artificial Perceptions,” Artificial Intelligence 102, no. 2 (July 1, 1998): 187–247. 2 formal mathematics and, subsequently, earns itself the title of transcendental science. It is a mathematics immune to the reduction which piques the interest, and the possibility of such a mathematics that motivates this paper’s thesis. As the study is to be a historico-critical one, the aim will be to shed light on the true sense of Husserlian phenomenology through the contemporary developments of mathematics. The task then becomes one of explicating the implicit importance of mathematics to phenomenology and this comes of course with an associated risk of absurdity. Admittedly, being attempted here is nothing more that the exploration of a possible kinship between transcendental phenomenology and mathematics (in the guise of category theory). It could easily be misconstrued then that the task is one of applying formal mathematics to philosophy or of turning phenomenology into a positive science. It will hopefully be possible to show that this is not the case. It is also perhaps necessary to emphasise that any talk of the mathematisation of phenomenology does not mean to suggest that all transcendental problems are to fall within the region of conceptual mathematics, that is to say that it is not being proposed that there is no room left for transcendental psychology in the investigation of subjectivity. Rather, in problematising the division of labour between phenomenology and mathematics, the task is to show that there are perhaps some areas, such as the critique of logical reason, which would be best delegated to a phenomenological mathematics and that by working in concert with transcendental psychology, mathematics may be able to help phenomenology realise its full sense. After, in chapter I, assessing the critical situation in which Husserl found himself, a critique of the relationship between formal mathematics and phenomenology will be carried out in chapter II. This will include an attempted elucidation of the definitive rôle that Husserl’s concept of the definite manifold plays in defining the domain of transcendental phenomenology. Chapter III will then be devoted to addressing, and problematising, the critique of logical reason as outlined by Husserl, with the aim of opening up for the possibility of mathematics after the phenomenological- transcendental attitude has been invoked and the objective sciences have been parenthesized by an all-embracing transcendental epochē. With the possibility of a transcendental mathematics hopefully now being promoted somewhat – or at the very least not being ruled out – there will be, in chapter IV, a focus on establishing the possibility of category theory as a candidate for the new branch of transcendental 3 science which this paper proposes. All this is carried out in the hope of establishing that the division between mathematics and phenomenology must be re-thought. §3 On method Upon completion of Husserl’s The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (henceforth Crisis) the reader is left standing at a crossroads of sorts: even if they find themselves utterly convinced by the conclusions of the text, and consequently also of its methodology, they are forced to choose which of these two will be taken as premise for any future philosophical inquiries. But how can this be? Surely with a set of rigorous scientific results at hand it is guaranteed that any subsequent reiteration of the method in question will of necessity yield the same outcome, otherwise the hypotheses would be falsified and it would be necessary to start again from scratch. The reason for this rather unique situation is that the method employed by Husserl is not a historical one, but rather a “teleological-historical” or “historico-critical” one.3 When the sciences are studied in this fashion it is realised that without any understanding of their beginnings no understanding can be reached as concerns their inherent meaning. At the same time, by returning directly to their origin there will be no understanding of the way in which their sense reveals itself throughout the development of the science in question. So, in order to reveal their teleological sense, a method must be employed that allows for the moving back and forth throughout history in a “zigzag pattern”.4 Now, obviously, any study carried out in this manner cannot extend beyond its contemporary situation in terms of the historical data it has at its command. That is to say that Husserl could only start and end with the sciences of his time. However, anyone alive today stands at a point in history and, more specifically, armed with a manifold of pregiven mathematics that were of essential necessity inaccessible to Husserl. So in other words the opportunity of understanding Husserl in a way that he could never have understood himself presents itself.5 This 3 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 3; Edmund Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), §100. 4 Husserl, Crisis, 58. 5 Ibid., 73. 4 means that if Husserl’s historico-critical methodology is inherited then the results of his study must be subsumed into any more contemporary investigation: past philosophers cannot be taken at their word and no one can be allowed – not even Husserl himself – to escape this rule of thumb.6 The method will involve performing a critique upon Husserl’s phenomenology – in all its glorious failings and shortcomings – while at the same time being an attempt to reveal its full sense. What, in Crisis, Husserl does to Kant, Hume, Galileo etc. an attempt will be made here to do to Husserl himself. It could be argued that this choice of method conveniently alleviates any responsibilities felt by a more traditional historical investigation. Formulated in a perhaps slightly more crass fashion: it permits the picking and choosing of historical data. This could be rebutted by saying that, while this may very well be true, the method also comes with the burden of ascribing sense to what otherwise might have been disregarded as nonsense or absurdity. This is not something that is necessarily required of the historian. With this in mind it is hoped that the investigation will go someway towards justifying the methodological choices made but – at the same time – the fruitfulness belonging to any future critique of the historico-critical method employed are appreciated. §4 A terse note on language The German term “Mannigfaltigkeit”, depending on the text and the translator, has been rendered as either “multiplicity” or “manifold”. In this text the choice has been made to follow the lead of David Carr, Dallas Willard and J.N. Findlay in preferring to use the term “manifold”. “Unsinn” will be rendered as “nonsense” or, where clarification is needed, “senseless” while “Widersinn” will be rendered as “absurd” or in some cases, in the interest of emphasis, “countersense”. When appearing in adjectival form “categorial” will be related to “category” in the sense employed by Husserlian phenomenology. 6 Ibid. 5 I. A CRITICAL SITUATION In the opening pages of Crisis Husserl laments at the state in which he finds the sciences of his day. At that point in history science was of course booming in terms of its results so it is important to note that the crisis Husserl is interested in concerns not the productivity of the sciences but rather the questionability of their “genuine scientific character”.7 In this first chapter an attempt will be made to carry out an assessment of the nature of the crisis of which Husserl speaks. §5 The mathematisation of nature and the naturalisation of the world For Husserl the nomological sciences, that is to say the exact sciences driven by the marvel of modern mathematics, are to be both admired and admonished. It is undeniable that the formulae of positive science present civilisation with the quite remarkable ability of making systematically ordered predictions but it is important to be wary of the transformation of meaning which has at the same time, as part of the ongoing development of science and the production of its realm of objectivity, inevitably taken place. Euclid is responsible, in Husserl’s view, for laying forth the ideal of exactness which would in the modern period consume the sciences. This he achieved with his axiomatisation of geometry which, at the same time as it set about structuring the theme of geometry under a finite collection of homogenous laws, led “almost automatically…to the emptying of its meaning”.8 While bringing to light a whole range of universal tasks and instigating the idea of a “systematically coherent deductive theory” Euclid allowed geometry to transgress beyond its traditional focus on the practical tasks of everyday life.9 What was once a science of the very practical requirements of praxes, such as surveying, had – thanks to a collection of seemingly innocuous axioms – been transformed into a science of infinite tasks. It was then only a matter of time until, just like Euclidean geometry succeeded in idealising spatio- temporal shapes, Galileo succeeded in transforming the totality of nature into a mathematical manifold. From this point in history onwards the sciences were able to treat nature as a totality determined by the exact laws of causality and, in this way, were able to make valuable predictions with an ever-increasing degree of precision. 7 Ibid., 3. 8 Ibid., 44. 9 Ibid., 21ff. 6 But while nature can indeed be interpreted as a mathematical hypothesis, one with a track record of astonishing levels of success of course, it would be absurd to believe that the world – as “a world of knowledge, a world of consciousness, a world with human beings” – could also be understood as a complete system of laws which the positive sciences are able to explain by way of their infinite task of deduction.10 That is to say that, despite the fact that they are most definitely deserving of the utmost respect and admiration, the nomological sciences cannot be allowed to extend their region beyond the methodological framework to which they are essentially bound. The crisis experienced by Husserl then is not the mathematisation of nature but rather, more specifically, the naturalisation of the world. So Galileo’s nature, which has as its “mathematical index” the idealised shapes of Euclidean geometry, is an objectification of the concrete world of immediate experience and as such should not be confused with the very world which it aims to idealise.11 This however is the very crisis which modern science has undergone as it erroneously takes the model for the modelled and, as a result, loses touch with the world it set out to explain. §6 A mathematical crisis – not a crisis of mathematics In his elucidation of the role of mathematics in this crisis of science Jairo José da Silva believes that, while it is true that Husserl stood in awe of the achievements of modern mathematics, he at the same time feared for them “degenerating” into mere technique.12 But slightly opposed to this it is perhaps more important to emphasise that what Husserl is recounting, while it may be a crisis brought about by mathematics, is not a crisis of mathematics itself. For Husserl, the fact that material mathematics has through the course of history transformed into formal mathematics, and that subsequently the theory of manifolds has become a technique devoid meaning, is both legitimate and necessary.13 What Husserl is truly concerned about is not the state of mathematics but rather the “decapitation” of philosophy that the success of the nomological sciences has given rise to.14 It is objectivism (as opposed 10 Ibid., 265. 11 Ibid., 37. 12 Jairo da Silva, “Mathematics and the Crisis of Science,” in The Road Not Taken: On Husserl’s Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics (London: College Publications, 2013), 347. 13 Husserl, Crisis, 47. 14 Ibid., 9. 7