Theorizing the Contemporary World: Robert Brenner, Giovanni Arrighi, David Harvey Moishe Postone (to appear in Rob Albritton, Bob Jessop, Richard Westra (eds,), Political Economy of the Present and Possible Global Future(s), Anthem Press) 1 Theorizing the Contemporary World: Robert Brenner, Giovanni Arrighi, David Harvey Moishe Postone It is widely recognized that the past three decades mark a significant break with the social, political, economic, and cultural order that characterized the decades following the Second World War. Basic changes include the weakening and transformation of welfare states in the capitalist West, the collapse or fundamental metamorphosis of bureaucratic party-states in the communist East, and the undermining of developmental states in what had been called the Third World. More generally, recent decades have seen the weakening of national, state-centered economic sovereignty and the emergence and consolidation of a neo-liberal global order. Social, political, and cultural life have become increasingly global, on the one hand; on the other hand, they have become increasingly decentered and fragmented. These changes have occurred against the background of a lengthy period of stagnation and crisis: since the early 1970s, the growth of real wages has decreased dramatically, real wages have remained generally flat, profit rates have stagnated, and labor productivity rates have declined. Yet these crisis phenomena have not led to a resurgence of working class movements. On the contrary, the past decades have seen the decline of classical labor movements and the rise of new social movements, often characterized by the politics of identity, including nationalist movements, movements of 2 sexual politics, and various forms of religious “fundamentalism.” Trying to come to terms with the large-scale transformations of the past three decades, then, entails addressing not only the long-term economic downturn since the early 1970s, but also important changes in the character of social and cultural life. It is against the background of this problematic that I wish to discuss three very important works -- by Robert Brenner, Giovanni Arrighi, and David Harvey1 -- that attempt to grapple with current transformations. This paper is intended as preliminary. It does not attempt to provide a definitive critical analysis of these three authors’ works, but rather approaches specific works by these authors on a meta-theoretical level, focusing on their theoretical assumptions, in order to problematize the nature and characteristics of an adequate critical theory of capitalism today. Why a theory of capitalism – or better – a theory of capital? Let me begin with a point that Harvey and others have made in considering the period of postwar prosperity: During the period 1949-1973, Western states engineered stable economic growth and living standards similarly -- through a mix of welfare statism, Keynesian management, and control of wage relations -- although very different political parties were in power.2 One could add that in all Western states the welfare state synthesis unraveled and was rolled back in the 1970s and 1980s regardless of which party was in power. These large-scale historical developments can themselves be seen with reference to a still-larger historical pattern: the rise and decline of the state-centered organization of social and economic life, of the apparent primacy of the political over the economic. The beginnings of this period can be located roughly in the First World War and the Russian Revolution; its demise can be seen in the crisis of the 1970s and the subsequent 1 Robert Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence: A Special Report on the World Economy, 1950-98, New Left Review, no. 229, May-June, 1998; Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times, London and New York: Verso, 1994; David Harvey, The Conditions of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change, Oxford and Cambridge, Mass: Basil Blackwell, 1989. 2 See Harvey, op. cit., p. 135. 3 emergence of a neo-liberal global order. This general trajectory was global. It encompassed Western capitalist countries and the Soviet Union, as well as colonized lands and decolonized countries. When viewed with reference to this general trajectory, differences in development appear as different inflections of a common pattern rather than as fundamentally different developments. The general character of the large-scale historical pattern that structured much of the twentieth century suggests the existence of overarching structural imperatives and constraints that cannot adequately be explained in local and contingent terms. Consideration of the general historical patterns that characterize the twentieth century, then, calls into question poststructuralist understandings of history as essentially contingent. This does not, however, necessarily involve ignoring the critical insight that informs attempts to deal with history contingently -- namely, that history, understood as the unfolding of an immanent necessity, should be understood as marking a form of unfreedom. This form of unfreedom is the object of Marx’s critical theory of capitalism, which first and foremost is concerned with delineating and grounding the imperatives and constraints that are generative of the historical dynamics and structural changes of the modern world. The critique of capital does not deny the existence of historical unfreedom by focusing on contingency. Rather, it seeks to analyze that unfreedom socially and historically, uncover its basis, and point to the possibility of its overcoming. In other words, an adequate critical theory of capital seeks to elucidate the dynamic of the modern world, and does so from the immanent standpoint of its transformability. Such a critical theory of capitalism, of the historical dynamics of modernity, I would argue, can provide the best basis for a rigorous approach to the global transformations of the past three decades. It can do so, however, only to the extent that it adequately can deal with the deep social and cultural, as well as economic, changes of recent decades. All three authors I am discussing attempt to come to grips with these recent transformations within the framework of a critical theory of capitalism. In The 4 Economics of Global Turbulence, Robert Brenner marshals a great deal of evidence (data on real wages, profit rates, labor productivity rates, and growth rates) to demonstrate that the world economy has been basically stagnant for 30 years.3 Writing in the late 1990s, Brenner argues against the illusion, widespread in that period (actually, a recurrent capitalist illusion) that the problem of business cycles had been solved, that they had been left behind. His main concern is not only to explain the economic downturn of the early 1970s, but also why it persisted for such a long time. The fall in profitability, heralding the end of the postwar boom, began in the mid 1960s, according to Brenner and not, as many have argued, between 1969 and 1972.4 This, according to Brenner, contravenes what he calls “supply-side” theories that attribute the downturn as well as its duration to increased pressure on profits exerted by workers, inasmuch as it indicates that the downturn antedates such pressure.5 Moreover, approaches that focus on labor necessarily look at the specific situation in each country. They cannot explain the most salient characteristics of the late twentieth century downturn: that its onset and various phases were universal and simultaneous—encompassing weak economies with strong labor movements (UK) and strong economies with weak labor movements (Japan)—and that the downturn has lasted so long.6 On the basis of such considerations, Brenner argues that an explanation of the downturn and subsequent failure of economies to adjust must be on the level of the international system as a whole.7 The fall in the rate of profit was not the result of technological factors, or labor pressures, or political controls, according to Brenner, but, more fundamentally, was the result of international market competition and uneven development.8 Central to Brenner’s analysis is the general argument that capital in a particular industry cannot easily be diverted elsewhere when much of it is tied up in the form of fixed capital. Consequently, in such a situation, increased competition, resulting in lower 3 Brenner, op. cit., pp. 1-7. 4 Ibid., p. 36. 5 Ibid., pp. 8, 18. 6 Ibid., pp. 18-24. 7 Ibid., pp. 23 ff. 8 Ibid., pp. 8-11. 5 margins of profit, does not lead to the diversion of capital to other areas as predicted by mainstream economic theory, but to systemic overproduction. Hence the downturn resulting from overproduction does not result in the predicted shakeout, which then is followed by a recovery, but by a long-term fall in the rate of profit. Specifically, Brenner argues that, as a result of the devastation wrought by World War II, there was basically only one workshop in the world in the immediate postwar period – the United States. By the 1960s, however, the US began to be challenged economically by Germany and Japan. Because of the investment by American firms in fixed capital – for example in the automobile industry –- those firms continued to produce at their previous levels, even though the Germans and Japanese were expanding (automobile) production. The result was endemic, global overproduction.9 Brenner’s argument relates crises of overproduction in capitalism to the contingencies of competition. Were it not for these contingencies, firms would know how much they should be investing in fixed capital. But they do not and cannot have this knowledge; therefore they will be subject to unforeseen pressures. Because of their fixed capital investments, however, they cannot afford to cut back and invest elsewhere. Instead they are impelled to fight for market share. Consequently, profits fall. Firms try to counteract this tendency for profits to fall by squeezing labor, destroying unions, and cutting social welfare and pensions.10 Brenner’s account of boom and bust successfully addresses important features of the long downturn, especially its global character. It clearly shows that capitalism constitutes a global order – one, however, that is dysfunctional. His account is a useful corrective to mainstream economic discourse. It demonstrates the inadequacy of mainstream understandings of capital flows resulting from competition, and the illusory character of the recurrent notion that business cycles are a thing of the past. Brenner’s approach also contravenes the widespread idea that the long downturn of the late 9 Ibid., pp. 91 ff. 10 Ibid., pp. 27 ff. 6 twentieth century emerged as a result of and response to working class successes between 1968 and 1972, and provides him with the basis for a critique of the Regulation School’s account of the decline of Fordism and the emergence of a post-Fordist regime.11 In spite of Brenner’s in-depth examination of the long downturn of the late twentieth century, however, he does not adequately address other, important, dimensions of the transformations of recent decades. In that sense, his approach does not really provide an adequate account of historical change. His analysis of the long downturn with reference to international competition and systemic overproduction does illuminate important dimensions of that crisis. Nevertheless, there is no indication in Brenner’s account of a shift in the social, cultural, and political dimensions of life that could be related to the economic processes he discusses. Brenner’s focus on economy is such that there is little sense that the general historical context of the late twentieth century is in any way different from earlier periods of downturn and intercapitalist rivalry. That is, Brenner does not thematize the question of qualitative historical changes in capitalist society. Hence, when he criticizes the Regulation School, he does not provide an alternate approach to a central dimension of that theoretical approach--the concern with fundamental social and cultural changes that occur with what regulation theorists call a new mode of regulation. If a critical theory of capitalism is to adequately deal with the historical transformations of the past three decades, however, it cannot only elucidate economic developments, understood narrowly, but must be able to illuminate changes in the nature of social and cultural life within the framework of capitalism. Only then can a critical theory of capitalism claim to be a critical theory of the modern world, that is, of a historically specific objective/subjective form of social life, rather than a theory of a determinate economic organization—narrowly understood—of modern society. 11 Brenner characterizes the Regulation School as “left-wing Malthusianism,” which locates the source of the economy’s falling profitability in the declining productive dynamism of the Fordist technological paradigm. See Robert Brenner, “Reply to Critics,” in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, Vol. XIX, No. 2, 1999, p. 62. 7 Relatedly (and this is crucially important) a critical theory of capitalism must be capable of elucidating qualitative, interrelated changes in social objectivity and subjectivity if it is to address large-scale cultural changes and social movements. Only then can it be, at least potentially, a theory of capitalism’s possible overcoming. The question in this regard is not whether Brenner, or any other theorist, explicitly deals with such issues, but whether their approach is intrinsically capable of elucidating historical transformations of politics, culture, and society. Whatever its strengths, Brenner’s approach does not deal adequately with the historical development and structure of capitalism as a form of social life. Changes in culture and subjectivity seem to be outside of its purview. These limitations of Brenner’s approach are related to his basic understanding of capitalism. The issue here is not simply one of analytic range – whether a critical account of capitalism should focus on economic processes alone, rather than also addressing other dimensions of social life. Rather, it is whether the basic categories of that account can intrinsically relate different dimensions of life as interrelated aspects of a determinate form of social life. Brenner’s analytic point of departure is a traditional Marxist emphasis on the unplanned, uncoordinated and competitive nature of capitalist production.12 That is, at the core of his analysis of the long downturn are the notions of uneven development and competition. These notions are centrally defining of capitalism in Brenner’s approach, and implicitly point to rational planning as the most salient characteristic of the post-capitalist world. The focus of such a critique of capitalism, in other words, is essentially the mode of distribution. Issues of the form of production, of work, and, more fundamentally, of social mediation are outside of its framework. Notions such as competition and uneven development, along with categories central to Brenner’s analysis, such as profit, fixed and circulating capital, however, are categories of economy; that is, they are categories of the surface that do not adequately grasp the fundamental nature and historical dynamic of capitalism as a historically specific form of social life. 12 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, op. cit., p. 8. 8 In this essay I can only touch upon the theoretical significance of the distinction between surface and deep structure (as marking the distinction between critical political economy and the critique of political economy), and why it would make sense to revisit the category of value. At this point I simply wish to note that to characterize a notion such as that of uneven development as one of the surface does not mean that it is illusory, but signifies, rather, that it does not grasp what is most essential to capitalism. Characterizing notions such as competition and uneven development and categories such as profit as surface phenomena, expresses a position that regards categories such as commodity, value, and capital as those of deep structure. Brenner, however, rejects the latter categories, characterizing approaches based on them as “Fundamentalist Marxism.”13 Differences regarding value theory frequently express different understandings of the categories. For example, value usually has been interpreted essentially as an economic category, a category of distribution that grounds prices, demonstrates exploitation (the category of surplus value), and explains the crisis- ridden character of capitalism (as a result of the growing organic composition of capital). The significance of value, so understood, often has been called into question on the basis of arguments that claim prices, exploitation, and crises can be explained without reference to such a category. I would argue for another understanding of Marx’s category of value. It is not simply a refinement of that category as it was developed by Smith and Ricardo. Rather, it is a category that purports to grasp determinate abstract forms of social mediation, social wealth, and temporality that structure production, distribution, consumption and, more generally, social life in capitalist society. The temporal dimension of the categories of deep structure grounds the dynamic of capitalism; it helps explain, in historically specific terms, the existence of a historical dynamic that characterizes capitalism. Those categories, then, seek to grasp the general contours of that dynamic while indicating that an immanent historical dynamic does not characterize human histories and societies per 13 Ibid., p. 11. 9 se. Moreover, the categories of value and capital are not merely economic and are not even categories of social objectivity alone – but are categories that are at once social and cultural. Finally, the dynamic grounded in value is such that value becomes less and less adequate to the reality it generates. That is, the dynamic gives rise to the objective and subjective conditions of possibility of a social order beyond capitalism.14 (I shall begin to further elaborate these contentions when I later discuss the notion of the falling rate of profit, as understood by Brenner and Arrighi.) Far from being categories of economic and social life in general, the underlying categories of the critique of political economy purport to grasp the essential core of a historically determinate form of social life – capitalism – in ways that indicate its historically specific and possibly transient character. The abolition of what the categories purportedly grasp would entail the abolition of capitalism. Engaging this fundamental problematic fully requires interrogating the nature of temporality in capitalism, an issue that I cannot elaborate extensively in this essay. I would, nevertheless, like to pursue these considerations further with reference to Giovanni Arrighi’s The Long Twentieth Century. Arrighi is among those theorists who conceptualize the period since 1973 as one of qualitative change, which he characterizes in terms of the “financialization” of capital as its predominant feature.15 Arguing against positions like Hilferding’s, that the increased importance of finance capital marks an entirely new stage of capitalist development, Arrighi maintains that the primacy of financialization is a recurrent phenomenon, a phase of larger cycles of capitalist development that began in late medieval and early modern Europe.16 Arrighi’s study of the crisis of the late twentieth century is embedded in a much larger framework – an analysis of “the structures and processes of the capitalist world system as a whole at different stages of its development.”17 The latter, in turn, is deeply 14 For an extensive elaboration of these arguments, see Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 15 Arrighi, op. cit., p. xi. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid., p. xi. 10