ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON DIPLOMATIC HISTORY The liberality of Albert Shaw, Ph. D. 1884, has made it possible for The Johns Hopkins University to provide an annual course of lectures on diplomatic history. This volume contains the lectures somewhat revised and enlarged, delivered in 1953. ALBERT SHAW LECTURES ON DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 1899. John II. I¿atané. The Diplo­ 1930. Victor Andrés Belaunde. Boli­ matic Relations of the United var and the Political Thought of States and Spanish America. 1900. the Spanish American Revolution. (Out of print.) 1938. $3.50. 1900. James Morton Callahan. The 1931. Charles Callan Tansill. The Diplomatic History of the Southern Purchase of the Danish West In­ Confederacy. 1901. (Out of print.) dies. 1932. $3.50. 1906. Jesse Siddall Reeves. Ameri­ 1932. Dexter Perkins. The Monroe can Diplomacy under Tyler and Doctrine, 1826-1867. 1933. (Out Polk. 1907. $1.75. of print.) 1907. Elbert Jay Benton. Interna­ 1933. Charles Seymour. American tional Law and Diplomacy of the Diplomacy during the World War. Spanish-American War. 1908. 1934. Second printing 1942. $3.00. $1.75. 1935. Frank H. Simonds. American 1909. Ephraim Douglass Adams. Foreign Policy in the Post-war British Interests and Activities in Years. 1935. $2.00. Texas, 1838-1846. 1910 (Out of 1936. Julius W. Pratt. Expansionists print.) 1911. Charles Oscar Paullin. Diplo­ of 1898: The Acquisition of Ha­ matic Negotiations of American waii and the Spanish Islands. 1936. (Out of print.) Naval Officers, 1778-1883. 1912. $2.25. 1937. Dexter Perkins. The Monroe 1912. Isaac J. Cox. The WTest Doctrine, 1867-1907. 1937. $3.50. Florida Controversy, 1798-1813. 1938. Arthur Preston Whitaker. The 1918. $3.00. United States and the Independ­ 1913. William R. Manning. Early ence of Latin America, 1800-1830. Diplomatic Relations between the 1941. (Out of print.) United States and Mexico. 1916. 1939. William Spence Robertson. $2.50. France and Latin-American Inde­ 1914. Frank A. Updyke. The Diplo­ pendence. 1939. $3.75. macy of the War of 1812. 1915. 1941. Thomas A. Bailey. The Policy (Out of print.) of the United States toward the 1917. Payson Jackson Treat. The Neutrals, 1917-1918. 1942. $3.50. Early Diplomatic Relations be­ 1942. Wilfrid Hardy Callcott. The tween the United States and Japan, Caribbean Policy of the United 1853-1865. 1917. $2.75. States, 1890-1920. 1943. $3.50. 1921. Percy Alvin Martin. Latin 1946. Malbone W. Graham. Ameri­ America and the War. 1925. $3.50. can Diplomacy in the International 1923. Henry Merritt Wriston. Ex­ Community. 1949. $3.25. ecutive Agents in American For­ 1950. Herbert Feis. The Diplomacy eign Relations. 1929. $5.00. of the Dollar, First Era, 1919- 1926. Samuel Flagg Bemis. Pinck­ 1932. 1950. $2.25. ney’s Treaty: A Study of Ameri­ 1951. Edward Hallett Carr. German- ca’s Advantage from Europe’s Dis­ Soviet Relations Between the Two tress, 1783-1800. 1926. Second World Wars, 1919-1939. 1951. printing 1941. $3.00. $3.00. 1927. Bruce Williams. State Secu­ rity and the League of Nations. 1953. Howard K. Beale. Theodore 1927. $2.75. Roosevelt and the Rise of America 1928. J. Fred Rippy. Rivalry of the to World Power. 1956. $6.00. United States and Great Britain 1954. Max Beloff. Foreign Policy over Latin America. 1808-1830. and the Democratic Process. 1955. 1929. (Out of print.) $3.00. THEODORE ROOSEVELT and the Rise of America to World Power The Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, 1953 THEODORE ROOSEVELT and the Rise of America to World Power by HOWARD K. BEALE Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956 © 1056, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore 18, Md. Second printing 1957 Third printing 1960 Fourth printing 1961 Distributed in Great Britain by Oxford University Press, London Printed in U. S. A. by J. H. Fürst Company, Baltimore Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 56-10255. Preface These lectures are the result of a good deal of questioning over a long period of years. For three decades the United States and other great powers have been pur­ suing policies that have not led to the better world for which men and nations have hoped. Obviously, no nation has wished to proceed to the present desperate state of inter­ national relations that threatens to destroy civilization itself; equally obviously, no one nation alone has brought the world to this state of things. Too little is known about historical causation to say what has led to this dénouement. It cannot be said with any certainty that the trend in international affairs has been inevitable or that the course of international events has been determined by forces over which man has no control. Nor yet can it be asserted, in the present state of historiography, that man by taking thought and making decisions has been fully responsible for what has happened. Yet there has been a certain inexorability about the sequence of events from World War I to the present. Decisions made by statesmen in each successive situation have been governed to a considerable extent by values already accepted and by decisions already made by predecessors under whom the direction foreign policy was to take had been established. vii Vlll PREFACE Often it has seemed that what was really needed was to change the direction, to abandon the road that led to the 1950’s and start out in an entirely different direction. My first question therefore was: How did America get started down this road and was there a time, perhaps before World War I, when decisions were made that account for the direction national policy has taken? What decisions so affected the nation’s course? Closely related was a second baffling question to which historians seldom offer an answer, namely, whether indivi­ dual men or only blind forces influence history. Leaders occupy important rôles in history as it is usually recounted, but historians often seem to assume that it is forces and not men who determine what happens. A thorough study a few years ago of what historians had written about the causes of the Civil War revealed that all the writers had told the story in terms of leaders of the day and many of them also in terms of forces, but that most of them had kept men and forces in separate compartments as if there were no inter­ action between them. Not one had come to grips with the problem as to which was more important or whether the leaders had any effect upon history at all. So, too, in recent history. Consequently, the question is still to be faced whether there was a time at which a route different from the one taken in recent foreign policy could have been chosen by the people or their leaders. / A third question that has never been satisfactorily an­ swered is why America shifted from the assumption in 1914 that war in Europe could not have serious meaning for America to her conviction three years later that she must enter that war. If events between 1914 and 1917 do not provide an entirely satisfying answer, what effect, if any, had the history of the years before 1914 upon this change of heart and America’s ultimate support of France and England against Germany? And what accounted for Theodore Roose- PREFACE IX velt's insistence earlier and more vigorously than most that we enter the war? In view of later criticisms of imperialist powers in general and American imperialism in particular and in view, too, of the strength of opposition to expansion and imperialism among Americans at the turn of the century, an answer has long been needed to a fourth question: Why did America decide in favor of rather than against expansionism and imperialism? Or did her leaders not make the decision but merely find themselves pushed into policies by forces too big for them? In so far as Roosevelt and other expansionists and imperial­ ists did determine our policy, what were their motives? Was it national pride, a sense of the white man’s burden, con­ viction about democracy, a sense of mission in the world, desire for economic gain, sheer love of power, or what, that propelled the men of 1900 into further extension of America's concern and influence to far parts of the world? This was a fifth question to which the answer could be found in part in Roosevelt. A sixth question concerned Theodore directly. While he was alive and during the years following his death, literature on Roosevelt tended to reflect the popular admiration of his contemporaries for his handling of international problems. Then the tide turned and a series of studies appeared that questioned both his wisdom and his ability as an inter­ national statesman. His importance in events in which he unquestionably participated was denied. His veracity in telling of other events and his part in them was questioned. It seemed now time to ask whether the early admiration or the later depreciation or perhaps a third more balanced view was the soundest. Finally, in several years of preparation of a biography of Theodore Roosevelt I have increasingly been preoccupied with the question as to what impact he did have upon world X PREFACE affairs. An answer to this seemed important, too, for all Americans interested in recent history. The invitation to deliver a series of lectures at The Johns Hopkins University on some phase of the foreign policy of Theodore Roosevelt offered a chance to pursue answers to some of these questions. This volume is an expansion of the Albert Shaw lectures there given. The lectures are Roose­ velt-centered. No attempt has been made to narrate the history of foreign relations during his time except where he was vitally concerned. The topics dealt with have been chosen for investigation because Roosevelt was involved in them. Important international happenings have been dis­ cussed, or little-known episodes described, or long-known stories retold in these lectures as part of an effort to view them as Roosevelt viewed them and to determine and evalu­ ate his rôle. The hope has been that new light would be thrown on the foreign relations of the period by thus viewing them through the eyes of one of the leading participants. Obviously, satisfactory answers have not been found to all the questions to which answers were sought. Some of the conclusions have had perforce to be tentative. Some of the questions may never be answered, but it is hoped that these lectures may make it possible to come nearer to finding answers, and that, in any case, they may bring new under­ standing of one of the most colorful and important actors in international affairs in recent times. Through him men may perhaps learn better to comprehend what determines history. Furthermore, new questions have arisen in the course of the study, some of them of fundamental importance to an under­ standing of American foreign policy in the later twentieth century; and it is hoped that the lectures may illuminate these new problems and may provoke others to pursue the problems further. I am under obligation to many for courtesies or assistance while these lectures were being prepared. I wish to thank for