CentralAsianSurvey Vol.28,No.2,June2009,235–246 The view from Abkhazia of South Ossetia ablaze Paula Garb ! DepartmentofAnthropology,UniversityofCalifornia,Irvine,USA TheAbkhazianandSouthOssetianperspectivesonthefightingbetweenGeorgiansandSouth OssetiansinAugust2008couldnotbeheardabovethenoisegeneratedaroundthegeopolitical implicationsofthelargerRussian–Georgianclash.ThepopulationofAbkhaziaexperienced theviolenceinSouthOssetiaasthoughitwasoccurringontheirownterritory.Thisconfirmed theircompletelackoftrustintheGeorgiangovernment’scommitmenttopeacefulresolution of the conflicts. In addition, they were disappointed with what they regarded as the internationalcommunity’sabsenceofcriticismofGeorgia’sactionsandlackofconcernfor 9 the safety and well-being of the South Ossetians. Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia’s 0 20 andAbkhazia’sindependencehastakenthequestionofGeorgia’sterritorialintegrityoffthe st negotiationtableindefinitely.ItalsohassetbacktheformalpeaceprocesswithbothSouth u ug Ossetia and Abkhazia. An essential way forward, toward establishing trust as a necessary A foundation for progress in the political negotiations, would be for the US and other 0 1 interested countries to engage with the people of Abkhazia and SouthOssetia at alllevels, 7 :3 demonstratingcredibleandconsistentconcernforthesafetyandwellbeingofallthepeople 9 0 affectedbytheconflict. : t A Keywords:conflict;culture;Abkhazia;SouthOssetia ] s r e s u l na Introduction r e nt Georgian–Abkhazian official relations since the end of the 1992–1993 war have offered little i a common ground for a mutually acceptable resolution. Long before the August 2008 military m r fo action in South Ossetia, the Georgian–Abkhazian conflict had become intractable. In October n [i 1999,thepost-war populationofAbkhaziavotedinareferendum forindependence(Whitfield : y 2007).Untilthen,thepartiesdiscussedavarietyoffederativearrangementsaspossibletermsof B ed asettlement.Atnegotiationssincethedeclarationofindependence,Abkhazianauthoritieshave d oa refused to discuss with Georgians any settlement other than independence, while Georgia has l n w consistently sought tomaintainits territorial integrity. Since the accession topower of Eduard o D Shevardnadzein1992,theUSandotherWesterncountriesinvolvedinthepeaceprocesshave consistentlysupportedGeorgia’sterritorialbordersfromtheSovietperiod, When major fighting erupted in South Ossetia between South Ossetians and Georgians in August2008,therehadbeennoofficialtalksbetweenthetwosidesfortwoyears(International Crisis Group 2007). Similarly, the gulf between the Georgian and Abkhazian sides had been widening,resultinginfundamentallydifferentandmutuallyexclusivevisionsoffuturerelations. Fear,stereotypesandlittleunderstandingoflifeontheothersidedominatedpopulardiscoursein both communities. The August 2008 events in South Ossetia simply cemented these trends, further persuading people in Abkhazia that the Georgian government was not negotiating in good faith. The Abkhazians had predicted that the Georgian government was willing to take military action in South Ossetia and Abkhazia to get its way, and now believed that Abkhazia would be the next target. Email:[email protected] ! ISSN0263-4937print/ISSN1465-3354online #2009CentralAsianSurvey DOI:10.1080/02634930903034856 http://www.informaworld.com 236 P.Garb TheAbkhaziansdonotregardtheSouthOssetiansasethniccousinsbecauseofdifferences in history and language (Ossetian is an Iranian based Indo-European language, whereas AbkhazianbelongstotheNorth-WestCaucasianlanguagegroup).Thereisalsoaconsiderable physicaldistancebetweenthem.Yet,bothhaveasenseofaffinitythatcomesfromsimilaritiesin culture and in terms of their relationship to Georgians. Most relevant to their conflicts is that, first,theybothseethemselvesasvictimsofGeorgiannationalismandregardtheGeorgianpol- itical elite as aggressors, shown by the Georgians’ violent resistance to Abkhazian and South Ossetiandemandsforindependence.Second,theybothconsidertheirstrugglesagainsttheGeor- gians as a right of self-determination. Third, the people of both entities have chosen to take Russian citizenshipprimarily toobtainapassportthatallowsthemtotraveloutsidetheirterri- tories.TheyrefusetotakeGeorgianpassports,andtheGeorgiangovernmenthaspreventedthe issuingofUNtraveldocuments(Allin2008,Khashig2008a).Intotal,80–90%ofthepeoplein AbkhaziaandthevastmajorityinSouthOssetiahaveRussiancitizenship,whichRussiaclaims makes it duty bound toprotect its citizens bymilitary means if necessary (Allin 2008). Whatdistinguisheseachconflictfromtheotheristhat,first,theAbkhaziansareunequivocal 9 00 intheirdesireforindependencefromRussiaandGeorgia.Itisnotentirelyclearwhethermost 2 t South Ossetians want to become an independent country or to join with North Ossetia and s u ug becomepartofRussia.Second,untiltheresumptionofarmedconflictbetweenSouthOssetians A 0 and Georgians in the fall of 2004, the South Ossetians, unlike Abkhazians, travelled into 1 7 ‘Georgia proper’ and engaged extensively in trade with Georgians. This suggested to some 3 : 09 that the South Ossetians might be more willing to be part of Georgia as a natural economic t: unit. Third, South Ossetians are open to reuniting with North Ossetia, but no such sentiment A ] exists among the Abkhazians regarding their ethnic cousins, such as the Kabardians, Adyghe s ser and Abazinians in the Russian controlled North Caucasus.1 u l WhatismissingfrommostinternationalandGeorgiansourcesabouttheAugust2008eventsis a n r anyrealdiscussionaboutwhatkeepstheSouthOssetiansandAbkhaziansfromagreeingtobepart e t in ofGeorgia.Ifthisquestionisraised,theanswerusuallyfocusesonRussiaastheprimaryobstacle, ma asthoughtheAbkhaziansorSouthOssetianshavenoopinionoftheirown,oraremerepawnsof r o f the Russians (Gleason 2008). This unwillingness to consider seriously the viewpoint of the n i [ ‘pawns’,andinsistenceonpursuingapeaceprocesswithoutacommitmenttoconfidence-building : By measuresthattakeintoaccountthegrievancesoftheAbkhaziansandSouthOssetiansagainstthe d e Georgiangovernment,isasignificantreasonwhypeacenegotiationshavenotmadeprogress.This d a lo articleshowshowthefightingbetweenGeorgiansandSouthOssetiansnotonlysetbackthepeace n ow processwiththeSouthOssetians,butalsohadthesamenegativeimpactonGeorgian–Abkhazian D relations. The article highlights a perspective that has not been heard due to the global and geopoliticalimplicationsoftheRussian–GeorgianconflictinAugustandSeptember2008. My observations of the perceptions of the conflict are based on studying the Abkhazian– Georgian peace process since 1994, and on experience facilitating Abkhazian–Georgian non- governmentaldialogues.ThefocusofthisworkhasbeenontheAbkhazian–Georgianconflict, basedonthemylong-termexpertiseinAbkhazia,datingbacktothelate1970s,butnoequivalent trackrecordinSouthOssetia.2Ihavealsobeeninvolvedinnon-governmentaldialoguesinwhich South Ossetians participated. Most recently, in December 2008, I co-facilitated a dialogue betweenGeorgiansandSouthOssetiansthroughGeorgeMasonUniversity’sInstituteforConflict Analysis and Resolution with funding by the United States Agency for International Develop- ment(USAID).ThediscussionsinthisdialogueabouttheAugusteventshavemadeitpossible to identify common perceptions of these territorial conflicts andpaths to peace shared by both Abkhazians and South Ossetians. Written sources about the conflicts have also provided insights, including published articles by US, Western and Abkhazian authors who present the perspectivesoftheAbkhazianstheyhaveinterviewed. Central Asian Survey 237 ThearticleoffersadescriptionofhowthepeopleofAbkhaziaexperiencedtheconflictthat unfolded in August 2008, and an explanation of their reaction to fighting in South Ossetia as though the violence was occurring on their own territory. The article presents the ways in which Abkhazians assess the different roles that Georgia, the US, Europe and Russia played intheconflict.ItconcludeswithanexaminationoftheconsequencesoftheSouthOssetiancon- flictforAbkhaziaandimplicationsforfutureengagementofWesterncountriesandGeorgiain the peace process withAbkhazia and South Ossetia. Abkhazia experiencing South Ossetia in flames On the morning of 8 August 2008, when the news broke in Abkhazia that the previous night GeorgianforceshadshelledTskhinvali,thecapitalofSouthOssetia,manybeganpackingsuit- casesandplanningtheirdeparture.SomeofthemleftforRussiaimmediately.Tensionshadbeen buildingsincethespringinAbkhaziaovertheshootingdownofGeorgianmilitarydrones.The 9 peopleofAbkhazia,inastateofalarmforseveralmonths,wereconvincedthatGeorgianforces 0 20 wouldsoonturnintheirdirection.InalKhashig(2008a),theeditorofanAbkhaziannewspaper, t s reflecting the perspectives of Abkhazian civil society, recalled: u g u A Forthelasttwoyearsatleast,sinceGeorgiantroopsenteredtheupperreachesofAbkhazia’sKodor 0 1 gorge, the shadow of a new war has been hanging over the region like the sword of Damocles. 7 :3 Experts tried to guess who Georgia would attack first – South Ossetia or Abkhazia? In April of 9 0 thisyear[2008 – PG],onlypromptactionbyRussia,whichmovedquicklytoincreaseitspeace- t: keeping contingent in the zone of the Georgian–Abkhazian conflict, saved Abkhazia from an A ] attemptatmilitaryrevengefromGeorgia. s r se SoonafterfightingbrokeoutinSouthOssetiaon8August,theportrayalbyAbkhazianstateTV u l ofthefightingbetweenGeorgiansandSouthOssetianswasemotionalandone-sided,according a n er toNickLazaredes,aWesternTVproducerreportingfromAbkhaziainmidAugust.Thedirector t in ofAbkhazTV,GuramAkuab,toldLazaredes(2008)whathehadseeninSouthOssetiaduring a m thefightingbetweenGeorgiansandSouthOssetians.AccordingtoLazaredes,itwasanexample r o nf of the type of reporting carried out inAbkhazia. Akuab declared: i [ : Iinterviewedafamilywhohadlosttheirdaughter,asniperkilledthe14-year-oldgirl,shediedinher y B mother’sarms.Foralongtimeshewascarryingherdaughter’sbodyinherarms,suddenlyshefelt d de she had ran out of strength, so she abandoned her child in the forest, in the wilderness and kept a lo runningwithherthreeotherchildren...Icouldneverimaginethattoday,inthe21stcentury,some- n ow body could get away with openingfire on a sleeping town. Opening fire on the people who were D asleep...Dozens,hundredsofpeoplediedatnightintheirsleep,notknowingwhathadhappened. Former residents ofAbkhaziawho hadremained inRussia after the1992–1993 warandwere visiting for the summer, left Abkhazia immediately when they heard about the military devel- opments in South Ossetia. The panic increased among residents of Abkhazia when they saw the vacationing Russian military families leave abruptly. They assumed that these families hadinformationfromtheRussianmilitaryaboutanimpendingGeorgianinvasion.Abkhazians whohadnotleftAbkhaziaduringthefirstwarwiththeGeorgianspreparedtoflee.AnAbkha- ziancolleaguetoldmethathermother,whohadinsistedonremaininginSukhumithroughout the1990swar,saidthistimeshewoulddefinitelyleave,thatshecouldnotcopeonemoretime under Georgian occupation. An official from an international organization in Sukhumi during this period in a personal email echoed information I was receiving from Abkhazian colleagues, that the population felt as though the military events in South Ossetia were actually happening in Abkhazia. One reason was the sense of shared victimhood, noted above. The events in South Ossetia and the fear of becoming the next target triggered a wartime psychological trauma experienced 238 P.Garb during all or part of the Georgia–Abkhazia war of the early 1990s. Arda Inal-Ipa (personal communication, 11 December 2008), one of Abkhazia’s few clinical psychologists and a leader of the non-governmental movement, told me that the number of patients she treated in August andSeptember 2008 was fargreater than usual – atleast oneor two a day throughout AugustandSeptember.Normallythreetofourpatientsamonthseekherconsultation.Notonly werepeoplecomingtoseeherforpost-traumaticstresssymptoms,butforothertypesofanxiety- related symptoms that were not directly related to war trauma, but could have been indirectly triggered by the fear that the events in South Ossetia had generated amongthe population. Why would the Abkhazians react so negatively to the prospect of reintegration into a Georgian state that has been portrayed in the West as a ‘beacon of liberty’ (Booth 2005), and deserving of serious consideration for membership in the European Union and NATO (Garb and Kaufmann 2007)? It is primarily because there is an enduring perception throughout the population of Abkhazia that the Georgians conducted the war of 1992–1993 with genocidal intent. Viacheslav Chirikba (2008), a non-governmental activist in Abkhazia and advisor on foreign policy to the Abkhazian government, offers an assessment of the war that represents a 9 00 consensus Ihear in Abkhazia: 2 t us Duringthewarof1992–1993,GeorgianskilledfourpercentoftheentireAbkhazianpopulationand g u destroyed the small republic’s national archives, museums, monuments of culture, and socio- A 0 economic infrastructure. The commander of the Georgian forces in Abkhazia, Colonel 1 7 G. Karkarashvili, in a televised address on the Abkhaz TV warned that he was ready to sacrifice 3 9: the lives of 100,000 Georgians in order to exterminate the entire Abkhazian nation of 93,000. 0 GeorgyKhaindrava,thecivilianadministratorofterritoriesofAbkhaziaunderGeorgianoccupation, : t A statedinaninterviewwithLeMondeDiplomatiqueinApril2003[thecorrectyearofpublicationwas s] 1993 – PG] that the Georgians were perfectly capable of destroying the genetic stock of the r se Abkhazian nation by killing 15,000 of their youths. For the small Abkhazian nation, all this was u l their “Holocaust”, the attempt of a “final solution” of the Abkhazian problem. By its genocidal a n policiesinAbkhaziain1931–1954and1992–1993,Georgialostanymoralandlegalrighttorule r te Abkhaziaandtoexploititsnaturalriches.AbkhaziawillneveragainbeapartoftheGeorgianstate. n i a Georgians and others may disagree with Abkhazian perceptions of the genocidal attempt of m r fo Georgia’s policies in 1931–1954 and 1992–1993, but this does not change the perceptions n [i held unanimously by Abkhazians and most of the non-Georgian minorities in Abkhazia. : y Chirikba (2008) connects the Abkhazian experience with Georgian forces in the early 1990s B ed to those of SouthOssetia in 2008, andasserts that: d a o l IfSaakashvili’swaronSouthOssetiahadbeensuccessfulandifhe’dwon,thereisnodoubtthatthe n ow territoryofSouthOssetiawouldhavebeencleansedofitsindigenousOssetianpopulation...and, D whatevertheRussianmotives,Russiapreventedthisfromhappening. AnimportantindicationofhowAbkhazianssawtheconnectionbetweentheir1992–1993war with Georgia and the armed conflict between South Ossetians and Georgians in August 2008, was the announcement on 14 August, the anniversary of what the Abkhazians regard as the Georgian military invasion of Abkhazia in 1992, as a day of mourning for the victims of the war in South Ossetia. (Khashig 2008b). Perceptions of Georgian, Western and Russianroles in the August2008 events ManyWesternobserversclaimthatRussia’sincreasinginfluenceinSouthOssetiaandAbkhazia turned the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts into Russia–Georgia disputes (Nichol 2008). Nichol (2008) wrote that ‘in a briefing on August 19 and in testimony on September 10’, Matthew Bryza, Deputy Secretary of State ‘appeared to argue that the outbreak of fighting in Georgia’s breakaway South Ossetia region on the night of August 7–8 was preplanned and provoked by Russia’ (pp. 27–28). Similarly, Georgian analysts maintain that there was not a Central Asian Survey 239 Georgia–South Ossetia war in August, rather it was a war between Russia and Georgia. Abkhazian and South Ossetian peace activists disagree stronglywiththisopinion. On22August,ArdaInal-IpaforwardedmeanemailexchangebetweenaSouthOssetianand aGeorgian,bothnon-governmentalactivistswhohadbeenengagedinpeace-buildingactivities for a decade. The two of them had been discussing the events of 7–8 August, and had diame- tricallyoppositeviewsoftheroleofRussia.Inhermessagetomeprefacingthecorrespondence, Inal-Ipawrotethattheexchange‘showshowlittleunderstandingthereisbetweenthetwosides’. In a conversation with her a few months later she lamented: ‘After all these years of dialogue Georgians still don’t really understand our grievances, still see the conflict as though it has little or nothing to do with Georgian actions’ (personalcommunication, 11 December 2008). LianaKvarchelia,aleaderofAbkhazia’sstrongestnon-governmentalorganizationandalong timeparticipantinGeorgian–Abkhaziandialogues,toldLazaredes(2008)that‘therehasbeenso much focus on Georgian–Russian relations and ... so little focus on Georgian–Abkhazian relations’.Sheaskedwhywas‘nobodyinterestedinwhywedon’tthinkit’ssafeforustolive in a Georgian state’. Another prominent Abkhazian non-governmental activist and analyst, 9 00 Tamaz Ketsba, commented: ‘By its actions in South Ossetia, Georgia showed that in reality it 2 t wantstoseetheresolutionofboththeGeorgian–OssetianandtheGeorgian–Abkhazconflicts s u ug onlybyforce’(Khashig2008b). A 0 InAbkhaziatheconvictionisthattheUnitedStatesandotherWesterncountriesgaveagreen 1 7 lighttoGeorgiatousemilitaryforceinSouthOssetia,atleastindirectly.Chirikba(2008)main- 3 : 09 tains that: : t A TheUSA,andsomeothercountries,likeIsrael,TurkeyandUkraine,bearagreatshareofrespon- s] sibility forthe current crisis. They were armingGeorgiato the teeth, knowingperfectly wellthat r se theirhugearmssuppliesandtrainingeffortscanandwillbeusedbyGeorgiaagainstthepopulation u l ofAbkhaziaandSouthOssetia–therewasnootherrationaleforGeorgiatospendsomuchefforton a n massivemilitarypreparations.Specifically,theUSAandIsrael,throughtheirmilitary,logistical,and r te advisoryassistancetoGeorgiacanberegardedasparticipantsinthisconflict. n i a According to Major General Garry Kupalba of the Abkhazian military, US weapons found in m r fo Kodori in mid-August, during their operation to expel the Georgian military from the area, n [i show that it was theintentionof the US to help Georgians win back Abkhazia militarily: : y B Kodoriwasafootholdthatwastobeusedinfuturemilitaryoperations.FromthisterritoryGeorgian d e troops were to infiltrate the rest of Abkhazia. They intended to seize Sukhumi airport...and to d a o block...theKodoriRiverhere,attheKodoribridgethussplittingAbkhaziaintotwo.(Lazaredes l wn 2008) o D Alternatively,Chirikba(2008)considerstheclaimthattheUSadministrationmayhavegivena green light to the Georgian military directly. He writes: Asonepieceofindirectevidenceforthis,IcanrefertothetalkbetweenAssistantDeputySecretary of State Matthew Bryza and the American Ambassador to Georgia John Tefft with Abkhazia’s Security Council Secretary Stanislav Lakoba and me, as presidential adviser on foreign policy, whichtookplaceintheAbkhaziancapitalSukhumon25July2008.Bryzasaidthatthesituation was very tense and that they were afraid that the ‘hot-headed boys’ in Tbilisi would do things, andthatiftherewerenoimmediatetalks,Augustwouldbehot. According to an Abkhazian respondent who heard about this conversation, Bryza was also reported to have told the Abkhazian officials that they need not worry; it would not be hot in Abkhazia. The rumour about this conversation led people to believe that in late July the Americans knew that South Ossetia would be the target of Georgian military intervention. The Abkhazians are not alone in their speculation that Georgia had reason to believe their actions in South Ossetia would not be out of line with the wishes of their friends in the US. Anatol Lieven (2008) maintains that: 240 P.Garb ItcanonlyhavebeenbeliefinUSsupportthatinspiredSaakashvilitolaunchGeorgia’sattack.If Washington had not created the impression that such support would be forthcoming in the event ofwar,therewouldhavebeennowar,andtheUnitedStateswouldhaveavoidedacrisisthatthe world economy could ill afford, including US$4.5 billion in emergency Western aid to Georgia, money that could have been better spent in helping Pakistan, for example – a country that truly isvitaltoUSinterests. FormerUSAmbassadortoRussia,JackMatlock(2008),arguesthatitisprobablethatelements in the Bush administration might have encouraged Saakashvili to believe that the US would supportan effort to take SouthOssetia andAbkhazia byforce. Abkhazians and South Ossetians not only blame Western countries for stimulating the conflict, but also accuse them of not caring about their fate. A British woman with Abkhazian relatives vents onAbkhazWorld.com, writing: IhavenowordstoexpressmyfrustrationandvehementangerattheWestnotonlyforcoldheartedly turning a blindeye to Georgia’saggression and laying the blame on Russia alone, but in fact for creatingthepossibilityforGeorgiatobehavethiswayinthefirstplace.(Amza-NatiaHewitt2008) 9 0 An Abkhazian academic, OlegDamenia,puts it thisway: 0 2 st After the West did not react for several days to the Georgian artillery levelling of Tskhinval, it u ug became completely obvious to us that nobody needs either the Abkhaz or the Ossetians ... No A oneexceptRussiaisplanningtodefendus.(Khashig2008b) 0 1 37 Abkhazians are frustrated that the West does not recognize any democratic development : 09 in Abkhazia that might combat their image as a society unworthy of Western support. Non- : t governmental leader, Liana Kvarchelia (2008) expresses the sentiments of the community of A s] civil society leaders in Abkhazia. The West, Kvarchelia complains, does not recognize the r se strides Abkhazians have made toward building a democratic society. She points out that u l ‘there is a lot of frustration here that nobody really cares about our struggle to build a a n er civilized democratic state’. The Abkhazian civil society community is proud of having stood t in uptoPutin’sgovernmentandthepro-RussianelitesinAbkhaziaduringtheirpresidentialelec- a m tioninOctober2004,whenthepro-RussianpartyanditssupportersinMoscowdidnotwantto r o nf acceptthedefeatoftheirpreferredcandidate,RaulKhajimba.Abkhazia’stinycivilsocietystood i [ by the voters who wanted a new leader, Sergey Bagapsh, whowas subsequently elected. : y B NotallWesternofficialsareviewedinAbkhaziaasuncaringandunsympathetictowardsthe d de problemsfacedinAbkhazia.Abkhaziancolleaguesreportedtomethataftertheannouncement a lo of Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia, a high level European official in Abkhazia at the time n w o informally congratulated Abkhaz officials and non-governmental activists. Similarly, col- D leagues in Georgia told me that an important Western official in Tbilisi informed a group of Georgian students that it was not realistic to force a reluctant population to live in one state iftheydidnotwantto.HerecommendedthattheGeorgian governmentattractthebreakaway territories, not repel them with military action. This is not atypical of views expressed off the record by EU representatives who work in the region and travel back and forth between Tbilisi and Sukhumi hearing all sides of the conflict. It reflects some difference of opinion among European officials. Abkhazian journalist, Inal Khashig (2008a) claims that ‘now and then high-ranking European politicians did seem to realize that the optimal and least painful option for regulating the conflict would be to legalize the status quo, that is to recognize the statehood of Abkhazia’. This is one reason that Abkhazians still see the European Union as a potentially positive actorintheregion,althoughtheirexpectationsarelow.AnunnamedseniorAbkhazianofficial told Neal Ascherson (2008) about a conversation he had with EU officials visiting before the August events: Central Asian Survey 241 Isaid:wecouldplayaroleintheEU’sBlackSeaNeighbourhoodProgramme.Youcan’trecognize usatthispoint,butwhynotestablishdirectcontactsatthelevelofeducation,sport,youthpolicy,the environment?Wespokeforhours,anditseemedhopeful,butnothinghappened.BackinBrussels, theywereinflexible.AllwegotwasaproposaltosetupanEUinformationcentrehere–butonlyas abranchoftheTbilisicentreinGeorgia.WhynotaSukhumcentreansweringdirectlytoBrussels? TheEUcouldsoeasilytakeasmallsteptowardsus – forinstance,helpingustoreplaceandrestore ournationalarchives. Abkhazians, understanding the West would not stop what they considered to be Georgian aggression against South Ossetia, and fearing they would be Georgia’s next target, welcomed the appearance of 9000 Russian troops in Abkhazia on 10 August (Khashig 2008b). The arrival of the Russian forces halted plans of many residents to evacuate. People in Abkhazia regardedRussiantroopsastheguarantorofpeace,atleastforawhile.Ascherson(2008)recalled whatone woman explainedto him: Wewereallthinking:wearenext.Soyouhavetounderstandthepassionatereliefwefeltwhenthe Russians intervened. To see Russian warships appearing off Sukhum and hear Russian aircraft 9 arriving with troops – that was irresistible. Sure, we all know very well that Russia cares 0 20 nothing for small countries and was acting only in its own interest. But at that moment we were t so grateful. s u g u A 0 1 37 Consequences of the South Ossetian conflict from the Abkhazian perspective : 9 0 DespitetheanxietyoverthewarinSouthOssetiaandintheKodoriGorgeinAbkhazia,Abkha- : At zians believe they have made important territorial and political gains. First, Abkhazians have ] s acquired territory and security. Russia sent its forces to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, not only r e us defending the Abkhazians against a Georgian attack, but also enabling Abkhazians to reunite al Abkhazia. The security provided by Russian forces gave Abkhazians the opportunity to expel n r e Georgian forces from the Upper Kodori Gorge. The Tbilisi government had renamed it Upper t n i Abkhazia after winning control of this area two years earlier from a Georgian illegal militia. a rm The Abkhazians also gained a strip of land along the Abkhazianside of the Inguri River, land o f n that had earlier belonged to the Georgians (Smyr 2008). In a piece filed by Elizabeth Owens i [ : (2008), she reported Sergei Dzhonua, the Abkhazian government’s representative in the y B Upper Kodori, as saying that not only did the Abkhazians win territory from the Georgians, d e d butalsoastockpileofweaponsthatwouldlast,inhisview,forthreetofouryears.Thisinfor- a o nl mationcannotbeverified,buttheAbkhaziansregarditastrue.OwensquotesDzhonua,saying w Do with a smile: ‘The Abkhaz army didn’t have American weapons before. And now we’ve got Americanmachineguns,Americanautomaticrifles,allofthatweaponrythattheUStransferred hasbeenleftthere.’Owenswentontosay:‘DzhonuascoffedatTbilisi’sassertionsthatGeor- gianforcesstationedintheUpperKodoriGorgehadbeenactinginalaw-enforcementcapacity, ratherthanasregularsoldiers.’‘Police’,hetoldher‘don’tneedbunkers,grenadelaunchers[and] howitzerbatteries.DoyourpoliceinAmericaneedthis?Everythingthatwasneededtostarta war, it was all there’ (Owens 2008). Second, Russia recognized Abkhazia’s independence. Immediate security was vital, but RussiandiplomaticrecognitionofAbkhaziawasahighlysymbolicvictory.Russia’srecognition cameasasurprisetomostAbkhazians.Lazaredes(2008),whowasinAbkhaziawhenthenews of recognition was announced, wrote: When Russian president Dmitry Medvedev formally recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states on August 26, itcaught the republiccompletely by surprise. After 15 years of suspense, no one, not even senior officials, believed Russia would actually take this step. Just after three in the morning, asMedvedev finishedannouncing the news in a televised address, the firstsalvoesofautomaticgunfirebegantosoundoverAbkhaziaasthecelebrationsbegan. 242 P.Garb Smyr (2008)described the spontaneous jubilation: Inundertenminutes,thestreetsoftheAbkhazcapitalSukhumwerefullofpeople.Carsbearingthe nationalflagofAbkhaziazoomedalongthestreetshootingtheirhorns,thesoundminglingwithgun- shots and shouts of delight. It seemed as though the entire population had come out to mark the occasion.PresidentSergeiBagapshandtherestoftheAbkhazleadershipcameouttojointhecel- ebrationsonSukhum’scentralsquare,infrontoftheoldparliamentbuilding,stillinruinsfromthe 1992–1993war. ThefactthatnoothercountrybutNicaragua,asofthiswriting,hasfollowedRussiainrecogniz- ing Abkhazia andSouth Ossetia, fuels accusations by theAbkhazians andOssetians of double standards in the West. They ask why, if the US and many other Western countries recognized Kosovo’sindependenceinFebruary2008,theycouldnotdothesameforAbkhaziainSeptember 2008.Abkhazianscontinuallyask:‘WhyaretheSouthOssetiansandAbkhazians,whoaretrying toescapefromtheGeorgianbullyandwhoalreadyhaveviablestatehoodsformorethan15years, deniedthesamerighttorecognitionaswasallowedforKosovoAlbanians’(Chirikba2008).They donotaccepttheargumentthatKosovoisacompletelydifferentcase,thatincontrasttoAbkhazia 9 0 it was ready for independence. Abkhazians claim they are even more deserving of independent 0 2 t status than Kosovo, a position articulated by Sergei Shamba (2008), de facto foreign minister s gu ofAbkhazia: u A 10 We can now discern a direct analogy between Kosovo and Abkhazia, even though Abkhazia has 7 much greater legal, historical, and moral reasons for having its independence recognized than 3 : 9 Kosovo does ... We live on our native land. We ourselves obtained our independence without 0 : anyforeignmilitaryaid,incontrasttoKosovo.TheAbkhaziansourselvesdroveouttheGeorgian t A aggressorsfromourterritory.IncontrasttoKosovowehavedevelopedallstructuresofstateand ] rs governmentauthority,developedcivilsociety,amultipartypoliticalsystem,anindependentmass e s media, and non-governmental funds and organizations. During the last twenty years we have had u l presidentialandparliamentaryelections. a n r e Third,Abkhaziansperceiveamajorpoliticalgain,becauseasaresultofRussia’srecognitionof t n i thesedisputedterritories,theissueofGeorgia’sterritorialintegrityisfinally,practicallyspeaking, a rm offthenegotiationtable.TerritorialintegritywasnotmentionedinUNResolution1866passedin o f n mid-February2009,extendingtheUnitedNationsObserverMissioninGeorgia(UNOMIG)for i [ : another four months. Russia’s delegation maintains that this omission was a clear victory for y B the Abkhazians. Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s ambassador tothe UNcommented that: ‘The funda- d e d mental thing is there is no reference to territorial integrity of Georgia in this resolution and it a o nl wouldnothavebeenpossibletohaveitadoptedhadtherebeensuchareference’(Corso2009). w Do ThealreadydifficultnegotiationshavebecomeevenmorecomplicatedbecausetheRussians and Abkhazians are putting forward new demands about format and use of terms now that Abkhaziahasanewdefacto,ifnotdejure,status.Forexample,commentingonthepossibility oftalksinGenevawithGeorgianofficials,AbkhazianPresident,SergeiBagapsh,declared‘We neverparticipatedastheGeorgiansideatanymeeting,evenbeingnon-recognized.3Andnow,it is even more unreal’ (Regnum News Agency 2008). This does not mean that the Abkhazian leadership will refuse to participate in talks. On the contrary, in an official statement posted on 16 February, Sergey Shamba called for renewing weekly meetings with Georgian govern- ment envoys in Gali, a predominantly ethnic Georgian region of Abkhazia. Shamba proposed that representatives from the UN, Russia and European Union participate. Shamba also made it clear that Abkhazia wants inclusion in such meetings as a full member, otherwise they will not participate atall (Corso 2009). Fourth, independence, in the Abkhazian view, has created new opportunities for the return of Georgian refugees, neighbourly relations with Georgia, and the return of the Abkhazian diaspora. Abkhazian non-governmental activists who meet regularly for dialogue with their Central Asian Survey 243 counterparts in Georgia argue that Georgia stands to benefit from recognition of Abkhazia. Chirikba’s (2008) maintains that the Georgians should be happy to be rid of the problem of Abkhazia: By recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia surgically cut off the major problem for Georgia – the territorial one. Paradoxically as it might seem, this will bring the long-awaited stability to the region. Free of its disputed territories, which it was never able to re-conquer and control, Georgia can concentrate on its own internal problems, of which it has quite enough. Besides, Georgia still has areas compactly populated by ethnically and linguistically diverse minorities – Megrelians, Svans, Azeris and Armenians. The lessons of Abkhazia and South OssetiashouldteachanygovernmentinTbilisithattheproblemofminoritiesrepresentsacrucial politicalissueforsuchamulti-ethniccountryasGeorgia. Amza-Natia Hewitt (2008), commenting about the future of an independent Abkhazia recog- nized by Georgia, has asserted that Georgians returning to an independent Abkhazia could live in peace: ‘In all honesty, these people [those living in Abkhazia—PG] could even live togetherwiththeGeorgiansastheyoncedid,butonlywiththeassuranceofnomoreGeorgian 9 initiated fighting.’ The return of the Abkhazian diaspora is also predicted, as restrictions on 0 0 2 entering Abkhazia are now lifted from the Russian side. According to Neal Ascherson (2008), t us an Abkhazian junior minister he spoke to in the fall of 2008, speculated that ‘direct links g u A with Turkey could persuade thousands of Turkish Abkhazians to return to the land of their 0 1 fathers and repopulate the empty countryside’. Cemre Jade, an ethnic Adyghe-Abkhazian 7 :3 who has lived most of her life in Turkey, but currently works as a sociologist in Abkhazia, 9 0 echoes this view. She claims that in the two years she has been living in Abkhazia, others : t A like her who have immigrated to Abkhazia from the diaspora have doubled from around 200 ] rs to 400. She wrote: ‘More and more are coming since recognition. Now people feel safer in e s u Abkhazia’ (Jade 2009). However,the numbers remain very small. l na Fifth,AbkhaziacanactasabufferzonebetweenRussiaandGeorgia.Theroleofabufferzone r te is an appealing one to Abkhazians. Abkhazian President Sergei Bagapsh has said: ‘We would n i rather become a buffer zone and keep intact our nation, our ethnicity, our language, our a m or culture,ouridentity,justlikeanyothercountryinthisworld.’Bagapshinsistsinthisinterview f in thatAbkhaziaisnotgoingtohaveanyassociatedstatuswithRussia.‘Thisisoutofthequestion’, [ : hesaid,‘Russiahasnoclaimsorintentiontotakeawayanything’(CaucasusKnot2008).Atthe y B d same time, Abkhazians acknowledge theperils of being abuffer zone, sandwichedas theyare e ad between a hostile Russia and Georgia. When Neal Ascherson (2008) was in Abkhazia in the o l n fall of 2008, he noted that Abkhazia’s leaders were worried about Georgia’s future and about w o D sharingaborderwithadisintegratingGeorgia.AbkhazianswereconcernedthatGeorgiamight fall apart due to increasing conflicts with minorities and future actions against Georgia by Russia.Ascherson(2008)writesthat:‘Inspiteoftherecentpast,they[Abkhazians – PG]still long for a close relationship with a stable, pacific, prosperous Georgia: two small Caucasian neighbourslinkedbyacommoninterestinEurope,Turkeyandthewiderworld.’ The question of Russian patronage AbkhaziansrecognizetheperilsofsharingaborderwithRussia.Whileexpressinggratitudefor Russian recognition of Abkhazian independence and the assurance of tangible guarantees of security, they also talk about the downsides of Russia’s support. Even when armed conflict was under way in South Ossetia and later in Georgia proper, while watching Russian tanks roll down Abkhazia’s coastal highway, people confided that they had mixed feelings seeing so much Russian military hardware in their land. They have voiced concern about Abkhazia’s agreement to allow Russian bases to remain in Abkhazia for 99 years, fearing complete 244 P.Garb occupation and eventually an inability to tear themselves loose from Russia’s grip. Speaking anonymously to me, colleagues have commented that 99 years is a very long time; that much can change in such a period. Citing an example of such dramatic change, one of them pointed out that it was 99 years ago that the Russian government considered the Abkhazians, who had emigrated to Turkey in the 1800s – in many cases under Tsarist pressure – as disloyal and therefore would not allow them toreturn to Abkhazia. TheconcernsaboutRussianinterestsinAbkhaziaarenotlimitedtothemilitaryandpolitical realms, but also include the economic one. Russian leaders have tried to get the Abkhazian governmenttoreplacekeygovernmentfigureswiththosemoresympathetictoRussianbusiness interests. Russians, with their enormous resources, can easily control the Abkhazian economy (Smyr 2008). An example of this simmering distrust was reported in the Georgia Times (2009), and has circulated throughout Abkhazia. In December 2008, Russia and Georgia signed a memorandum about reallocating electricity from the Inguri Power Plant that is on the Abkhazian side of the ceasefire line between Abkhazia and Georgia. Throughout the Soviet and post-Soviet period the plant has been jointly operated by the Abkhazians and 9 00 Georgians; the dam is on the Georgian side and the plant is on the Abkhazian side. This new 2 t reallocation of electricity is not between the two neighbours, but between Russia and s u ug Georgia.Georgiahasbeenco-operatingwiththeRussiancompanyInterRAOUESingenerat- A 0 ing electricity in Georgia. According to Abkhazian sources, the Russian company struck this 1 7 deal without consulting the Abkhazians, further increasing people’s fears that the Russians 3 : 09 have already decided that Abkhazia’s resources de facto belong to Russia. : t A ] s er Implications and conclusions s u l Whatnow?Inthenearfuture,lookingatthesituationfromtheoutsideitappearsunlikelythat a n r more military ventures will be repeated. All of Georgia’s attempts at military solutions in e t in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have ended in failure. They have taken Georgia further away ma from its goals. Further isolation of the breakaway territories will not help repair relations. r o f Georgia’sunwillingnesstoallowAbkhaziansandSouthOssetianstotravelwithUNdocuments, n i [ and refusal to encourage anysignificant Western engagement in the breakawayterritories, has : By isolated these numerically small nationalities from the global community and pushed them d e increasinglycloserto Russia. d a lo Themostconstructive approach byGeorgia andits Western supporterswould betorecog- n ow nizethatmilitaryaction,togetherwitheconomicandpoliticalisolation,havelefttheAbkhazian D andSouthOssetianhealthcareandeducationsystems,andtheireconomiesinshambles.Thishas onlymade people more resentful toward Georgia and its Western supporters. A fruitful policy would be for Georgia, the US and the West to engage with Abkhazians and South Ossetians at all levels, demonstrating credible and consistent concern for the safety and well-being of all the people affected by the conflict. Now, more than ever before, it is necessary to restore trustsothatpoliticalnegotiations,whichfurtheraresolutionoftheconflicts,canbeproductive. Abkhazians are fairly certain that Russia does not want an independent Abkhazia that is recognized by anyother country.Russia, they say, is happy that therest of the world does not followitinrecognizingAbkhazia.ThisgivesRussiaexclusiverightstoAbkhaziabydefault.It also prevents Georgia from having any influence over Abkhazia. What harm would it do to at leastconsideranddiscusstheprosandconsofGeorgiarecognizingAbkhazia?PerhapsGeorgian recognition would be the best way to counteract this influence. Even pro-Russian Abkhazians supportthisideaasaneffectivewaytopreventAbkhazia’scompleteoccupationbyRussia. If Abkhazia’s isolation continues, the people fear that eventually Russia will buy up and occupy Abkhazia like the former colony it once was. Abkhazians want to be a neutral buffer