The Trial of the Angels in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas Summary In this article the author offers an in-depth study of the devel- opment of St. Thomas Aquinas’ thought concerning the nature of the trial and the sin of the fallen angels. He first establishes the presupposition in St. Thomas’ teachings that the angels knew by faith of the mystery of the Incarnation during their period of trial. Then the author presents the writings of Peter Lombard and Dionysius which influenced St. Thomas, and the saint’s own writings, in order to show the progress of his thought concerning the trial of the angels. This presentation makes clear the impasse to which St. Thomas arrived in the face of the mystery of evil due to the conviction that the angels had to attach their will to some real good that was really possible for them to attain as the object of their beatitude. Finally, treating the subject for the last time in De Malo, St. Thomas resolves the impasse by distinguishing between a finis ad quem and a finis a quo. In the former, the rational creature proposes a positive good as his final goal, which he must judge to be attainable. In the latter, finis a quo, the “good” which must be achieved is successful flight from something which is dreaded. In the case of the fallen spirits, the dreadful something from which they “successfully escaped into hell” was the concrete proposal of beatitude under the precise terms of the economy of salvation. While St. Thomas does not delineate the precise nature of that proposal, the author offers a solution based upon the teachings of St. Thomas, according to which, the sin of the angels was an aversion from or a rejection of the divine rule that their super- natural beatitude was to be obtained through the instrumentality of the Incarnation. Resumo Neste artigo o autor oferece um estudo aprofundado do pensa- mento de Santo Tomás referente à natureza da prova e do pecado 23 dos anjos caídos. Ele primeiro estabelece a pressuposição no en- sinamento de Santo Tomas de que os anjos conheciam o mistério da encarnação pela fé durante o seu tempo de prova. Depois o autor apresenta os escritos de Pedro Lombardo e Dionísio, que influenciaram Santo Tomás e também os próprios escritos do santo para mostrar o progresso do seu pensamento acerca da prova dos anjos. Esta apresentação manifesta o impasse a que Santo Tomás chegou perante o mistério do mal, devido à convicção de que os anjos teriam que aderir com a sua vontade a um bem real, de fato atingível por eles como objeto de sua bem-aventurança. Finalmente, tratando o assunto pela última vez no De Malo, Santo Tomas resolve o impasse distinguindo entre finis ad quem e finis a quo. No primeiro caso, a criatura racional propõe um bem positivo como meta final, julgada alcançável. No caso do finis a quo, o “bem” que se deve alcançar é uma fuga bem sucedida de algo odiado. No caso dos espíritos caídos, a coisa odiada da qual eles “escaparam com sucesso para o inferno”, foi a proposta concreta de bem-aventurança segundo as precisas exigências da economia da salvação. Enquanto S. Tomás não delineia a natureza exata desta pro- posta, o autor oferece uma solução em base aos ensinamentos do santo, segundo os quais, o pecado dos Anjos foi uma aversão ou rejeição do desígnio divino que a sua bem-aventurança sobrena- tural devia ser alcançada por meio da Encarnação. * * * I. Introduction: Setting the Stage 1. Scope and Aim Discussion in this essay shall focus directly on the major texts in which St. Thomas formally examines the trial and sin of the created spirits. Attention fixes, accordingly, on the original negative response of the reprobate spirits, not on the positive response of the holy angels. Thomas’ texts will be analyzed in chronological order. The purpose is to elucidate his doctrine both with respect to its immediate content and with regard to the development of his doctrinal thought. By the end it will become evident that the position of the juvenile Aquinas is quite 24 distinct from that enunciated towards the end of his life. Indeed, the study depicts Thomas struggling to explain the “mechanics” to the sin of the fallen spirits. Alongside his biblical reflections, his intellectual journey is punctuated by his encounters with Peter Lombard and Dionysius; he does not achieve complete equilibrium until his very late work, De Malo. The development of thought in his reflections on the angelic trial mani- fests itself already in the material presentation of the question. In the first two works (Sentence Commentary and Contra Gentiles), Thomas initially explains the very possibility of a sin on the part of the pure spirits. Then, secondly, he asks if they desired to be like God. And thirdly, he asks if that was a sin of pride. In his commentary of Dionysius’ Treatise on the Divine Names, Thomas naturally submits himself to the order and exigency of the work under con- sideration. He refrains, moreover, from his customary scholastic method of articles with objections, substantial response and rebuttals (clarifications). Nonetheless, the brief commentary on the sin of the devil is of maximum importance to the development of his subsequent thought. Dionysius had managed to speak of the sin of the reprobate spirits without a single mention of the word “pride”1. While St. Thomas accepts and follows the intuition of Dionysius: “Aversion therefore is in them the evil”2, 1 Cf. De Divinis Nominibus, IV, lect. 19, §§ 533-541 (Marietti, Romae 1950). 2 De Divinis Nominibus, IV, lect. 19, § 537. It is given as a quote from Dionysius by St. Thomas. While treating the trial of the angels in the Sentence Commentary, Thomas used the word “aversion” but a single time, and that only to indicate another form of pride, distinct from the pride he (following Lombard) attributed to the fallen spirits (cf. II Sent., dist. 5, q. 1, a. 3c). Dionysius’ statement in one English translation reads: “The evil then, in them, is a turning aside and a stepping out of things befitting themselves, and a missing of aim, and imperfection and impotence, and a weakness and departure, and falling away from the power which preserves their integrity in them” (chap. IV, section 23). Translation by C. E. Rolt, 1897 (digital publication in Christian Classics Ethereal Library). From the direct presentation of Lombard’s thought above, it is apparent that he too thought in the categories of “conversio” and “aversio”. St. Thomas even materially mentions the fact, writing: “After these things reflection leads to the inquire, what the consequences were, when they were divided by ‘aversio’ and ‘conversio’. Having already shown in what condition the angels were created, he now shows their difference form one another in terms of ‘aversio’ and ‘conversio’. He divides this in two parts; in the first he discourses on the aversion of the angels.” (II Super Sent., dist. 5, q. 1pr.). Yet, he practically sets aside this doctrine, which will later become the corner stone of his final synthesis. 25 he does not yet fully appreciate the momentousness of the proposition. Thomas was aware that Lombard had presented the divided camps of the spirits under the headings of “conversio” and “aversio”3, but no special significance was attached to this.4 Whatever influence Dionysius exercised on Lombard, apart from his conception of the angelic choirs, must have been indirect; he mentions Dionysius by name only twice.5 In the Summa Theologiae and in De Malo Thomas’ approach is quite different. Moreover, the pertinent texts in the Prima Pars indicate a period of deep and somewhat uncertain interrogation regarding the rebellion of the spirits (a fact curiously overseen by commentators). First, he departs from the pattern in the Sentence Commentary. Now he first asks whether the angels sinned by desiring equality with God. Only thereafter does he ask whether this was a sin of pride. These modifications pave the way for a significant revision of the definition of pride. The principal texts to be discussed are as follows: 6 1) Super Sententiis, lib. II, dist. 5, q. 1, aa. 1-2 (1254-1256) 2) Summa Contra Gentiles III, qq. 109-110 (1261-1264) 3) De Divinis Nominibus IV, lect. 19 (1265-1266) 4) Summa Theologiae (= STh.) I, q. 63, a. 1-3 (Prima Pars: 1266-1268) 3 “Conversio” and “aversio” are standard opposing concepts in moral theology. They play a key role in the present discussion. The English word “aversion” is a good translation for the Latin “aversio”. But the basic Latin sense of “conversio” cannot be simply rendered with our idea of religious “conversion”. “Conversio” means a turning to some good on the basis of attraction. In this essay, I will often simply use the Latin term, lest through circumlocutions the evident pairing “conversio” et “aversio” be lost from sight. 4 II Super Sent., dist. 2, q. 1pr. 5 Cf. II Sententiae, dist. 10, cap. 2, aa. 2 et 3, where he discusses the ministries and missions of the holy Angels. 6 The dates for the works are taken from Raymundi Verardo, in: Opuscula Theologica, Vol. I, Marietti, Romae 1954, pp. x-xi. Luigi Bogliolo, Guida alla Ricerca Scientifica e allo Studio di S. Tommaso (Lateran U. Press, Rome 1967, inserted at p. 128) sets the commentary on De Divinis Nominibus as contemporaneous with Contra Gentiles II-IV. In point of fact, in Contra Gentiles, 21 of the 43 express references to Dionysius are drawn from the De Divinis Nominibus. Still, in Contra Gentiles III, only 6 of the 21 references are drawn from De Divinis Nominibus, not one of which addresses the question of the demonic rebellion. Hence, it is reasonable, at least with respect to the present topic, to follow Verardo’s chronology. 26 5) De Substantiis Separatis (1268-9)7 6) De Malo q. 16, aa. 2-4 (1268-1269) 2. Presuppositions & Unmet Expectations Before addressing particular texts, let us note certain theological or doctrinal presuppositions against which Thomas develops and articula- tes his thought. A complete work would have to include a thorough and chronological analysis of these as well. Submitting, however, to the de- limiting exigencies of this essay, suffice it to mention the most important factors. According to St. Thomas, the trial of the angels – like that of man – took place in the state of grace in the obscurity of faith.8 Proportionate to their spiritual, intuitive nature, this trial, once proposed, was decided in an instant.9 Those angels who lovingly accepted the divine plan were 7 Raymundi Verardo is evidently uncertain about the date to this work, giving a span from 1268-1273. Jacques Maritaine gives the date 1269 (in an appendix to: St. Thomas Aquinas, 1958 [digital edition from Notre Dame University, USA]) adding a year to the 1268 estimate of I.T. eschmann, in: A Catalogue of St. Thomas´ Works. Bibliographi- cal Notes, originally in: E. gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Random House, New York 1956, 381-439 (Weisheipl, 355), but actually drawn from Wikipedia. 8 “It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the movement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural being. But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural beatitude, comes from infused love, from which he could be turned away by sinning.” (STh. I, q. 63, a. 1 ad 4). That they were also created in the state of grace he holds to be the most probable position (cf. STh. I, q. 62, a. 3; I, q. 62, a. 2). 9 The “history” of the angelic trial and sin demands, at least, two instants, for the first knowledge and act of will by the created spirits could not even embrace the entire natural universe, to say nothing of the order of grace which presupposes the former (STh. I, q. 63, a. 4; De Malo q. 16, a. 4c). Moreover, the first act (operation) of a creature, deriving from the Creator, must needs have been a positive act of love (STh. I, q. 63, a. 5c). Hence, minimally, two instants were required: the first adverting and responding according to nature; and a second, taking in and responding to the supernatural. On the assumption that the angels were created in grace (Thomas’ assumption), the act of the first instant was already meritorious in all the angels, but imperfectly so. First, the good action of any creature in the state of grace is meritorious (cf. II Sententiae, dist. 40, q. 1, a. 1c; De Malo q. 2, a. 5 ad 7), but since the angels in that first moment could not advert to the supernatural order and opt for the beatific vision according to the required modality foreseen in the divine plan, that original, imperfect choice did not suffice for beatitude but had to be re-iterated in the faith’s knowledge and consent to the plan. This is the doctrine implicit in St. Thomas’ statement: “God did not distinguish between the angels before the turning away of some of them, and the turning of others to Himself, as Augustine says (De Civitate Dei XI, 15). Therefore, as all were created in grace, all 27 immediately glorified; those who rejected it were immediately and de- finitively damned. Secondly, lest the reader’s attention be distracted by certain expecta- tions, it is opportune from the outset to underscore what St. Thomas did not do! Regarding the precise object of the trial of the Angels, St. Thomas did not specify any particular mystery in the economy of salva- tion which might have precipitated the angelic trial, e.g., the Incarnation of the Son of God. Still, he did maintain, along with other theologians, that the created spirits, while yet in the state of faith and trial, did have a knowledge about the coming of Christ: All the angels had some knowledge from the very beginning respecting the mystery of God’s kingdom, which found its completion in Christ; and most of all from the moment when they were beatified by the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never had.10 It is remarkable and a telltale sign of St. Thomas’ state of quandary that only a few articles before (STh. I, q. 57, a. 5 et ad 1) he had offered a different opinion. Moreover, in each of these texts (one placed before the treatment of the sin of the spirits and one immediately after), St. Thomas refers to and interprets an identical text in Augustine (Super Genesim ad Litteram, lib. V. cap. 19). In the earlier text (q. 57) he is only willing to speak of the natural and beatific knowledge of the angels (while ignoring completely the knowledge of faith crucial to the state of trial); there, he interpolates Augustine’s statement into a comment on the beatific knowledge of the good angels. By contrast, in STh. I, q. 64, a. 1 merited in their first instant. But some of them at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby destroying their preceding merit; and consequently they were deprived of the beatitude which they had merited.” (STh. I, q. 63, a. 5 ad 4). 10 STh. I, q. 64, a. 1 ad 4. Dom Benoist D’Azy interprets the text in this wise: “All the angels knew the Mystery of the Reign of God, ‘maxime ex quo’ their beatitude. The ‘maxime ex quo’ should not be translated ‘especially because of’ but rather ‘especially since’. Accordingly, they knew about it already beforehand.” (Le Christ et ses Anges dans l’œuvre de Saint Thomas, (in: Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique 49 (1949) Toulouse, avril-juin. p. 9 fnt. 16), (cf. also, STh. I, q. 57, a. 5c et ad 1). In STh. I, q. 57, a. 5c et ad 1) he is only willing to speak of the natural and beatific knowledge of the angels (while ignoring completely the knowledge of faith),and so interprets Augustine’s statement into a comment on the beatific knowledge of the good angels. By contrast, in STh. I, q. 64, a. 1 ad 4 he presents the Christological knowledge of the angels according to faith and to glory and to supernatural wisdom. All the spirits had the first kind of knowledge at the beginning. And he refers this again to the mentioned passage in Augustine. 28 ad 4 – as shown – he presents the Christological knowledge of the angels according to faith, glory and to supernatural wisdom. All the spirits had the first kind of faith knowledge at the beginning. In his Expositio Super Isaiam, St. Thomas – referring there again to the same text of Augustine! – is more explicit. The questions are: who is the grape-treader, and who asks his identity? First he gives the question, then the response: “I who speak”. It is well known that all the saints together understand this of Christ. The question belongs to the angels, who namely did not fully understand the mystery of the incarnation of Christ, and therefore ask, as though ignorant, according to Jerome. Opposed to his view is Augustine in his Literal Commentary on Genesis (lib. V. ch. 19). He states that the angels, from the (very) beginning of their creation knew everything that he would be doing, whether the rational seeds of things he had imprinted into them, or whether things he withheld to himself that would come to be, although they were in them, so that they could come to be. And so it can be seen that the angels knew about such mysteries.11 Reflecting on the whole position of St. Thomas, Benoist D’Azy draws a valid conclusion: Despite a certain fluctuation of expression, which is perfectly explaina- ble, St. Thomas, at the different periods of his life, always taught that the angels knew by faith the mystery of the Incarnation during their period of trial.12 11 Expositio Super Isaiam, cap. 63,1ff; line 10-24. After tossing back and forth somewhat divergent positions from the biblical gloss to Ephesians 3 and Dionysius, who understands the question to be posed by the highest angels, not by the least, St. Thomas draws, at a minimum, the conclusion: “The highest angels knew these sort of mysteries with respect to the substance of the fact, nevertheless with regards to particular circumstances they were not perfectly in the know.” The knowledge of the higher angels regarding the economy of salvation, though was shared with the lower angels as well, for this belongs to the very nature of the angelic hierarchies. While with respect to some bits of information, a postponement in communication might be argued, in the key and cornerstone of the entire economy of salvation, such a delay is scarcely conceivable. 12 Dom Benoist d’azy, loc. cit., p. 9. In a subsequent article, Les anges devant le Mystère de l-Incarnation, he repeats his conclusion: “The Angelic Doctor held that Christ was revealed to the angels during their trial as their Consummator in glory and as the Redeemer of mankind” (in: Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique 49 (1949) Toulouse, juillet-septembre, p. 141). Francesco Suarez SJ comes to basically the same conclusion: “Nevertheless I judge it to be much more probable that all the angels in the state of pilgrimage knew about the Incarnation of the Word of God by means of revelation, and so knew it by faith. This the divine Thomas STh. I. q. 64, a. 1 ad 4 “It is to be said that 29 Notwithstanding having affirmed such Christological knowledge, Tho- mas never expressly posited this as the focal point in the angelic trial. At best, inferences may be drawn in this direction from certain (supposed?) implications on his part. Strongest among these, it seems, would be his rather emphatic affirmation that every grace of all the Holy Angels – including their sanctifying grace, ergo, their light of glory – are Chris- tological graces.13 The further point in his doctrine, that their peccability could only have been detonated over some rule or standard set up by the divine will,14 practically begs the question. In his biblical commentaries, though, – whether directly in his own name, as when commenting Isaias 14:12ff,15 or Ezechiel 2816 or John 8:34ff, Ephesians 1:20, etc., or when collecting the thoughts of the Fathers in the Catena Aurea – St. Thomas disappoints such inferences by his sheer silence, “failing”, as he does, to establish the desired link. I do not deny that such a link may be reasonably drawn, … only that the “check” may not be drawn from the account of express statements by the Angelic Doctor. the mystery of God, which is complete through Christ, etc. … Where he says ‘maxime’, etc. he has declared with sufficient clarity in the prior words that he is talking about all the angels, all of whom were in the state of pilgrimage.” (De Angelis, Lugduni 1630, lib. cap. 6, p. 405 § 9). 13 St. Thomas clearly attributes the graces of the Angels to Christ, not only in terms of finality but also in terms of efficient, instrumental causality (see my essay, The Rela- tionship of the Grace of the Angels to Christ in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, in: Sapientia Crucis 4 [2003], 113-163). But even then, he does not affirm the mystery of the Incarnation to have been the formal object of their trial. There is no necessary and intrinsic cognitive link between an instrumental cause and the beneficiaries of its efficacy. An individual could evidently receive an inheritance without any prior knowledge or love of the benefactor. 14 Cf. STh. I, q. 63, a. 1c: “But every created will has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to the divine will, to which the last end is to be referred”. Again: “In another way sin comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself, but not according to proper measure or rule” (STh. I, q. 63, a. 1 ad 4). 15 In Super Isaiam, Thomas focuses his literal exegesis on the historical king of Babylon. Only in passing and without having drawn any link to Christ, does he note: “All this is exposed mystically [anagogically] of the devil.” In STh. I, q. 63, a. 5 he calls reference to the devil “metaphorical”, literally, “sub figura principis Babylonis”. 16 Thomas understands Ez 28 “mystically” (Super Isaiam, cap. 11) or “metaphorically” (“sub figura” = Prince of Babylon; “sub persona” = King of Tyre in STh. I, q. 63, a. 5c; cf. I, q. 63, a. 3sc: “ex persona diaboli”) of the devil, but literally of the King of Tyre). Nowhere is the mystery of Christ presented as a material cause of the angelic trial. See also the same position in De Substantiis Separatis, cap. 20. 30 3. Magisterial status quaestionis Finally, the Church’s Magisterium is quite succinct on the question of the trial of the created spirits and the reprobation of those who rebelled against God. The actual sin of the devil is not directly addressed until the fourth Lateran Council (1215), which declared: “The devil and other demons were created by God naturally good, but they became evil by their own doing.”17 Still, the doctrine is mentioned much earlier in many contexts; we cite merely an excerpt from Pope Leo’s Letter to Flavian, confirming the Council of Calcedon (453): It was the devil’s boast that humanity had been deceived by his trickery and so had lost the gifts God had given it; and that it had been stripped of the endowment of immortality and so was subject to the harsh sentence of death. He also boasted that, sunk as he was in evil, he himself derived some consolation from having a partner in crime; and that God had been forced by the principle of justice to alter His verdict on humanity, which He had created in such an honorable state. All this called for the realization of a secret plan18 whereby the unalterable God, whose will is indistinguishable from His goodness, might bring the original realization of His kindness towards us to completion by means of a more hidden mystery, and whereby humanity, which had been led into a state of sin by the craftiness of the devil, might be prevented from perishing contrary to the purpose of God.19 Similarly, the Catechism of the Catholic Church deals briefly with the trial of the angels and the sin of the fallen spirits: 391 Behind the disobedient choice of our first parents lurks a seductive voice, opposed to God, which makes them fall into death out of envy [Cf. Gen 3:1-5; Wis 2:24]. Scripture and the Church’s Tradition see in this being a fallen angel, called “Satan” or the “devil” [cf. Jn 8:44; Rev 12:9]. The Church teaches that Satan was at first a good angel, made by God: “The 17 DS 800: “The devil and the other demons were indeed created naturally good by God, but they became evil by their own doing.” Cited in the CCC n. 391 as well. See also Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua, saec. V, (DS 325). 18 The “secret” in the plan could regard, yes, the Mystery of the Incarnation, … but it could also be predicated of the mystery of the Cross alone. 19 Pope leo I., Letter to Flavian, Bishop of Constantinople, about Eutyches, in: Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, edited by Norman P. Tanner SJ, Sheed & Ward, Georgetown University Press 1990, Vol. I. p. 79. The text, as given, is a translation from the more authoritative Greek of the original Latin Letter, since the Greek text was read to the Council Fathers at Chalcedon, and some of those formulations found their way into the decrees of the Council. 31 devil and the other demons were indeed created naturally good by God, but they became evil by their own doing” [IV Lateran Council]. 392 Scripture speaks of a sin of these angels [cf. 2 Pt 2:4]. This “fall” consists in the free choice of these created spirits, who radically and irre- vocably rejected God and his reign. We find a reflection of that rebellion in the tempter’s words to our first parents: “You will be like God” [Gen 3:5]. The devil “has sinned from the beginning”; he is “a liar and the father of lies” [1 Jn 3:8; Jn 8:44].20 The net result, thus far, simply establishes the fact that the evil spirits, as free personal agents, knowingly and willingly chose (caused) their own evil state by radically and irrevocably rejecting God and His Kingdom. Act I. Commentary on Lombard’s Sentences Scene 1. Letting Peter Lombard speak for himself First let us consider what Peter Lombard taught. Lombard addresses the question of the trial of creatures in book II of the Sentences. He comes to the question of the actual choice of the spirits in their trial in the 5th distinction of the second book of Sentences. Prior to this, though, he had discussed the creation of the angels and indicated the parameters of the trial in the economy of the divine plan. Created in a state of goodness, there was a slight delay before the trial and fall.21 Their goodness, accor- ding to Lombard, was a mere natural state of innocence.22 Access to the supernatural order of grace and glory was to be gained only in and through a trial. Those who responded well were to be confirmed simultaneously in grace and glory; those who responded badly would be reduced to a state of abject reprobation: All the angels were created good, and in the very beginning of creation they came forth in goodness, that is, without vice. They were also just, that 20 CCC 391-392. The biblical references and footnote have been inserted directly into the text. 21 II Sententiae, dist. 3, cap. 4, n. 5. 22 “So the spiritual and angelic nature was formed at its foundation according to habit of nature, and yet that form, which it was afterwards to accept through love of and conversion to its Creator, it did not have, but it was formless without it.” (II Sententiae, dist. 2, cap. 5). He takes his cue from Augustine’s statement that creation began in an unformed state, this being Lombard’s interpretation of De Genesi ad litt., lib. I, c. 1, n. 2 (PL 34, 247; CSEL 28-1, 4). 32