Project Gutenberg's The Thirty Years' War, by Samuel Rawson Gardiner This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org Title: The Thirty Years' War 1618-1648 Author: Samuel Rawson Gardiner Release Date: June 25, 2012 [EBook #40082] Language: English Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR *** Produced by Dianna Adair, Paul Clark and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) Transcriber's Note: Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as possible, including Anglicized spellings of the names of some places and people. Some changes have been made. They are listed at the end of the text, apart from some changes of puctuation in the Index. EPOCHS OF HISTORY EDITED BY EDWARD E. MORRIS, M.A. THE ERA OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR, 1618-1648. S. R. GARDINER. EPOCHS SELECTED. THE ERA OF THE PROTESTANT REVOLUTION. By F. SEEBOHM, AUTHOR OF 'THE OXFORD REFORMERS.'— Now ready. THE CRUSADES. By the Rev. G. W. COX, M.A.; Author of the 'History of Greece.'—Now ready. THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR, 1618-1648. By SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER.—Nearly ready. THE BEGINNING OF THE MIDDLE AGES ; CHARLES THE GREAT AND ALFRED; THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND IN ITS CONNEXION WITH THAT OF EUROPE IN THE NINTH CENTURY. BY THE VERY REV. R. W. CHURCH, M.A. Dean of St. Paul's. THE NORMAN KINGS AND THE FEUDAL SYSTEM. By the Rev. A. H. JOHNSON, M.A. [Pg i] [Pg ii] THE EARLY PLANTAGENETS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE HISTORY OF EUROPE; THE FOUNDATION AND GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. BY THE REV. WILLIAM STUBBS, M.A. &C. REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN History in the University of Oxford. EDWARD III. By the Rev. W. WARBURTON, M.A. THE HOUSES OF LANCASTER AND YORK ; WITH THE CONQUEST AND LOSS OF FRANCE. BY JAMES GAIRDNER of the Public Record Office. THE AGE OF ELIZABETH. By the Rev. M. CREIGHTON, M.A. THE STUARTS AND THE PURITAN REVOLUTION. BY J. LANGTON SANFORD, AUTHOR OF 'STUDIES AND Illustrations of the Great Rebellion.' THE FALL OF THE STUARTS; and WESTERN EUROPE from 1678 to 1697. By the Rev. EDWARD HALE, M.A. Assistant-Master at Eton. THE AGE OF ANNE. By EDWARD E. MORRIS, M.A. Editor of the Series. FREDERICK THE GREAT and the SEVEN YEARS' WAR. By F. W. LONGMAN, of Balliol College, Oxford. THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE. By JOHN MALCOLM LUDLOW. EACH 1 VOL. 16MO., CLOTH, UNIFORM. PRICE, $1.00. New York: SCRIBNER, ARMSTRONG & CO. THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR 1618-1648 BY SAMUEL RAWSON GARDINER Late Student of Christ Church Author of 'History of England from the Accession of James I. to the Disgrace of Justice Coke' and 'Prince Charles and the Spanish Marriage' NEW YORK: SCRIBNER, ARMSTRONG & CO. 1874. JAS. B. RODGERS CO., Electrotypers and Printers, 52 & 54 N. SIXTH ST., PHILADELPHIA. PREFACE. IF THE PRESENT WORK SHOULD APPEAR TO BE WRITTEN FOR MORE ADVANCED STUDENTS THAN THOSE FOR WHOM MOST IF NOT ALL THE OTHER BOOKS OF THE SERIES ARE DESIGNED, THE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT MUST BE PLEADED IN EXCUSE. THE MERE FACT THAT IT RELATES EXCLUSIVELY TO CONTINENTAL HISTORY MAKES IT UNLIKELY THAT JUNIOR PUPILS WOULD APPROACH IT IN ANY SHAPE, AND IT IS PROBABLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE THE VERY COMPLICATED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GERMAN STATES AND OTHER EUROPEAN NATIONS INTERESTING TO THOSE WHO ARE FOR THE FIRST TIME, OR ALMOST THE FIRST TIME, ATTEMPTING TO ACQUIRE HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE. EVERY HISTORY, TO BE A HISTORY, MUST HAVE A UNITY OF ITS OWN, AND HERE WE HAVE NO UNITY OF NATIONAL LIFE SUCH AS THAT WHICH IS REFLECTED IN THE INSTITUTIONS OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE, NOT EVEN THE UNITY OF A GREAT RACE OF SOVEREIGNS HANDING DOWN THE TRADITIONS OF GOVERNMENT FROM ONE GENERATION TO ANOTHER. THE UNITY OF THE SUBJECT WHICH I HAVE CHOSEN MUST BE SOUGHT IN THE GROWTH OF THE PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION AS IT IS ADOPTED OR REPELLED BY THE INSTITUTIONS UNDER WHICH GERMANY AND FRANCE, THE TWO PRINCIPAL NATIONS WITH WHICH WE ARE CONCERNED, ARE LIVING. THUS THE HISTORY OF THE PERIOD MAY BE COMPARED TO A GIGANTIC DISSOLVING VIEW. AS WE ENTER UPON IT OUR MINDS ARE FILLED WITH GERMAN MEN AND THINGS. BUT GERMANY FAILS TO FIND THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM BEFORE IT. GRADUALLY FRANCE COMES WITH INCREASING DISTINCTNESS BEFORE US. IT SUCCEEDS WHERE Germany had failed, and occupies us more and more till it fills the whole field of action. BUT THOUGH, AS I HAVE SAID, THE PRESENT WORK IS NOT INTENDED FOR YOUNG CHILDREN, NEITHER IS IT INTENDED FOR THOSE WHO REQUIRE THE RESULTS OF ORIGINAL RESEARCH. THE DATA FOR A FINAL JUDGMENT ON THE STORY ARE SCATTERED IN SO MANY REPOSITORIES [Pg iii] [Pg iv] [Pg v] [Pg vi] THAT THE GERMANS THEMSELVES HAVE NOW DISCOVERED THAT A COMPLETE INVESTIGATION INTO ONE OR OTHER OF THE SECTIONS INTO WHICH THE WAR NATURALLY FALLS, IS SUFFICIENT WORK FOR ANY MAN. THERE MUST SURELY, HOWEVER, BE MANY, AS WELL IN THE UPPER CLASSES OF SCHOOLS AS IN MORE ADVANCED LIFE, WHO WOULD BE GLAD TO KNOW AT SECOND HAND WHAT IS THE RESULT OF RECENT INQUIRY IN GERMANY INTO THE CAUSES OF THE FAILURE OF THE LAST ATTEMPT, BEFORE OUR OWN DAY, TO CONSTITUTE A UNITED GERMAN NATION. THE WRITER WHO UNDERTAKES SUCH A TASK ENCOUNTERS, WITH HIS EYES OPEN, ALL THE HAZARDS TO WHICH A SECOND-HAND NARRATIVE IS LIABLE. HIS IMPRESSIONS ARE LESS SHARP, AND ARE EXPOSED TO GREATER RISK OF ERROR THAN THOSE OF ONE WHO GOES DIRECT TO THE FOUNTAIN HEAD. HE MUST BE CONTENT TO BE THE RETAILER RATHER THAN THE MANUFACTURER OF HISTORY, KNOWING THAT each kind of work has its use. NOT THAT THE PRESENT BOOK IS A MERE COLLECTION OF OTHER MEN'S WORDS. IF I HAVE OFTEN ADOPTED WITHOUT MUCH CHANGE THE NARRATIVE OR OPINIONS OF GERMAN WRITERS, I HAVE NEVER SAID ANY THING WHICH I HAVE NOT MADE MY OWN, BY PASSING IT THROUGH MY OWN MIND. TO REPRODUCE WITH MERE PASTE AND SCISSORS PASSAGES FROM THE WRITINGS OF MEN SO OPPOSED TO ONE ANOTHER AS RANKE, GINDELY, RITTER, OPEL, HURTER, DROYSEN, GFRÖRER, KLOPP, FÖRSTER, VILLERMONT, UETTERODT, KOCH, AND OTHERS, WOULD BE TO BEWILDER, NOT TO INSTRUCT. AND IN FORMING MY OWN OPINIONS I HAVE HAD THE ADVANTAGE NOT MERELY OF BEING IN THE HABIT OF WRITING FROM ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS, BUT OF HAVING STUDIED AT LEAST SOME OF THE LETTERS AND STATE PAPERS OF THE TIME. I HAVE THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, BEEN ABLE, FROM MY KNOWLEDGE OF THE DESPATCHES OF SIR ROBERT ANSTRUTHER, TO NEGLECT DROYSEN'S ELABORATE ARGUMENT THAT CHRISTIAN IV. TOOK PART IN THE WAR THROUGH JEALOUSY OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS; AND TO SPEAK, IN OPPOSITION TO ONNO KLOPP, OF THE PERSISTENCE OF THE DUKES OF MECKLENBURG IN THE SUPPORT WHICH THEY gave to the King of Denmark. MORE VALUABLE THAN THE LITTLE ADDITIONAL KNOWLEDGE THUS OBTAINED IS THE INSIGHT INTO THE FEELINGS AND THOUGHTS OF THE CATHOLIC PRINCES GAINED BY A VERY SLIGHT ACQUAINTANCE WITH THEIR OWN CORRESPONDENCE. TO START BY TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHAT A MAN APPEARS TO HIMSELF, AND ONLY WHEN THAT HAS BEEN DONE, TO TRY HIM BY THE STANDARD OF THE JUDGMENT OF OTHERS, IS IN MY OPINION THE FIRST CANON OF HISTORICAL PORTRAITURE; AND IT IS ONE WHICH TILL VERY RECENT TIMES HAS BEEN MORE NEGLECTED by writers on the Thirty Years' War than by students of any other portion of history. MY TEACHERS IN GERMANY FROM WHOM I HAVE BORROWED SO FREELY, AND ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF THE SE RIES, WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGMENT IN FOOT-NOTES, WILL, I HOPE, ACCEPT THIS LITTLE BOOK, NOT AS AN ATTEMPT TO DO THAT WHICH THEY ARE SO MUCH BETTER QUALIFIED TO EXECUTE, BUT AS AN EXPRESSION OF THE SYMPATHY WHICH AN ENGLISHMAN CANNOT BUT FEEL FOR THE MISFORTUNES AS WELL AS THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF HIS KINDRED ON THE CONTINENT, AND AS AN EFFORT TO TELL SOMETHING OF THE BY- GONE FORTUNES OF THEIR RACE TO THOSE AMONGST HIS OWN COUNTRYMEN TO WHOM, FROM YOUTH OR FROM CIRCUMSTANCES OF education, German literature is a sealed book. I HAVE ONLY TO ADD THAT THE DATES ARE ACCORDING TO THE NEW STYLE. TEN DAYS MUST BE DEDUCTED TO BRING THEM IN accordance with those used at the time in England. CONTENTS. Events in English History not noticed in the text, or only referred to, are printed in Italics. CHAPTER I. CAUSES OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. SECTION I.—Political Institutions of Germany (1440-1517). PAGE National institutions of Germany defective 1 (a) As regarded the Emperor 1 (b) As regarded the great vassals 3 Attempts made to introduce order by giving a regular form to the Diet 5 These, though only partially successful, are not altogether useless 6 Constitution of the Diet 6 SECTION II.—Protestantism in Germany (1517-1570). Protestantism acceptable to the majority of the nation, but rejected by the Emperor and the Diet 8 The result is a civil war, resulting in a compromise, called the Peace of Augsburg (1555). Its terms being ambiguous on some important points, give rise to controversy 10 But as Protestantism is on the increase, the ambiguous points are, at first, construed by the Protestants in their own favour 11 The main points at issue relate to the right of Protestants to hold bishoprics, and to the right of Protestant princes to secularize church lands 12 SECTION III.—Reaction against Protestantism (1570-1596). Theological controversies are carried on with bitterness amongst the Protestants 13 [Pg vii] [Pg viii] [Pg ix] [Pg x] The Catholics, accordingly, begin to gain ground 14 And having the Emperor and Diet on their side, are able to use force as well as persuasion 14 Want of any popular representation prevents any fair settlement of the dispute 15 SECTION IV.—Three Parties and Three Leaders (1596-1612). Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinists are respectively guided by Maximilian Duke of Bavaria, John George Elector of Saxony, and Christian of Anhalt 15 Character and policy of Maximilian dangerous to the Protestants 15 The Protestants of the south more alive to the danger than the Protestants of the north 17 Spread of Calvinism, especially in the south, accounted for by the greater danger from Catholic States 17 Character and policy of Christian of Anhalt 18 1603 Accession of James I. of England 1605 Gunpowder Plot 1607 Donauwörth occupied by Maximilian 19 1608 Formation of the Protestant Union and the Catholic League 21 1609 The quarrel for the succession of Cleves does not result in open war 21 1612 John George fruitlessly attempts to mediate between the Catholics and the Calvinists 22 1613 Marriage of Frederick V., Elector Palatine, to Elizabeth, daughter of James I. of England CHAPTER II. THE BOHEMIAN REVOLUTION. SECTION I.—The House of Austria and its Subjects (1600-1618). Political and religious dissensions between the rulers and their subjects 24 1609 The Emperor Rudolph, as King of Bohemia, grants the Royal Charter to Bohemia 25 1611 He is succeeded by Matthias in spite of the intrigues of Christian of Anhalt 26 Matthias evades the charter 27 1617 Ferdinand accepted by the Bohemian Diet as King by hereditary right 28 1618 The Protestant churches on ecclesiastical lands declared illegal by the government of Matthias; one at Braunau shut up, one at Klostergrab pulled down 29 SECTION II.—The Revolution at Prague (March-May 1618). Mar. 5. Meeting of the Protestant Estates of Bohemia 29 May 23. Attack headed by Thurn upon the Regents at Prague. Martinitz and Slawata thrown out of window. Beginning of the Thirty Years' War 30 Appointment of Thirty Directors as a Revolutionary Government in Bohemia 31 SECTION III.—The War in Bohemia (May 1618-February 1619). Aug. 13. Bohemia invaded by the Emperor's general, Bucquoi. The Bohemians look abroad for help. Mansfeld brings troops to them. He besieges Pilsen, whilst Thurn makes head against Bucquoi 33 Nov. 21. Pilsen surrenders 34 Christian of Anhalt urges Frederick V., Elector Palatine, to intervene on behalf of the Bohemians, and asks the Duke of Savoy to help them 34 1619 Feb. The Duke of Savoy talks of dividing the Austrian dominions with Frederick 35 SECTION IV.—Ferdinand on his Defence (March-November 1619). Mar. 20. Death of Matthias 36 June 5. Vienna besieged by Thurn. Ferdinand threatened by a deputation from the Estates of Lower Austria 36 He is delivered by a regiment of horse, and Thurn raises the siege 37 Aug. 28. Ferdinand II. elected Emperor 38 Aug. 26. Frederick, Elector Palatine, elected King of Bohemia, Ferdinand having been previously deposed 38 Nov. 4. Frederick Crowned at Prague 39 CHAPTER III. IMPERIALIST VICTORIES IN BOHEMIA AND THE PALATINATE SECTION I.—The Attack upon Frederick (November 1619-January 1621). 1619 Maximilian of Bavaria prepares for war 39 Vienna fruitlessly attacked by Bethlen Gabor 40 Frederick finds no support in the Union 41 [Pg xi] [Pg xii] 1620 Mar. The North German Princes agree to neutrality at Mühlhausen 42 June 3. Spinola, the Spanish General, prepares to attack the Palatinate, and the Union, being frightened, signs the treaty of Ulm, by which it agrees to observe neutrality towards the League 42 June 23. Maximilian, with Tilly in command of his army, enters Austria and compels the Austrian Estates to submit, whilst Spinola reduces the Western Palatinate 42 Maximilian joins Bucquoi, and enters Bohemia 43 Sep. 28. Frederick, having failed to organize resistance, joins the Bohemian army 44 Nov. 8. Defeat of Frederick at the Battle of the White Hill, 1619 and submission of Bohemia to the Emperor 45 Jan. 22. Frederick put to the Ban of the Empire 46 SECTION II.—The War in the Upper Palatinate (January-October 1621). 1621 Jan. Frederick does not abandon hope of regaining Bohemia 47 Ap. 12. The Treaty of Mentz dissolves the Union 47 Bad character of Mansfeld's Army 48 May. Mansfeld takes the offensive 49 Aug. Recommencement of the War in the Lower Palatinate 50 Oct. Mansfeld unable to hold out in the Upper Palatinate 50 Oct. 10. Signs an engagement to disband his forces, but escapes with them to Alsace 50 SECTION III.—Frederick's Allies (October 1621-May 1622). 1621 James I. of England proposes to take Mansfeld into his pay, but he cannot agree with the House of Commons, and is therefore in want of money 50 1622 He then tries to obtain a settlement of the German disputes with the aid of Spain 51 May. A conference for the pacification of Germany held at Brussels 52 Frederick prepares for War, with the help of Mansfeld, the Margrave of Baden, and Christian of Brunswick, the latter being a Protestant Administrator of the Bishopric of Halberstadt 53 He ravages the diocese of Paderborn 55 SECTION IV.—The Fight for the Lower Palatinate (April-July 1622). Ap. 12. May 6. Frederick joins Mansfeld. Tilly defeats the Margrave of Baden at Wimpfen 57 June. Frederick, hopeful of success, refuses to consent to a treaty, and seizes the Landgrave of Darmstadt 58 But is driven by Tilly to retreat 59 June 30. Defeat of Christian of Brunswick at Höchst 59 July. Mansfeld abandons the Palatinate, and Frederick, after taking refuge at Sedan, retires to the Hague 60 CHAPTER IV. MANSFELD AND CHRISTIAN IN NORTH GERMANY. SECTION I.—Mansfeld's March into the Netherlands (July-November 1622). 1622 Tilly proceeds to reduce the fortified places in the Lower Palatinate 60 1623 Feb. 13 The Electorate transferred from Frederick to Maximilian 61 1622 Change of feeling in North Germany 61 Aug. Mansfeld and Christian establish themselves in Lorraine, and then try to cut their way through the Spanish Netherlands to join the Duke 63 Aug. 28. Battle of Fleurus. Christian loses his arm 63 Nov. Mansfeld establishes himself in East Friesland 64 SECTION II.—Christian of Brunswick in Lower Saxony (November 1622-August 1623). 1622 The Lower Saxon Circle urged by Tilly to join him against Mansfeld, and by Christian of Brunswick to join him against Tilly 64 1623 Feb. Warlike preparations of the Circle 65 Aug. 6. Christian expelled from the Circle, and defeated by Tilly at Stadtlohn 66 SECTION III.—Danger of the Lower Saxon Circle (August-December 1623). 1623 The North German Protestant Bishoprics in danger 66 [Pg xiii] [Pg xiv] Aug. Alarm in the Lower Saxon Circle 68 Dec. But nothing is done, and its troops are disbanded 68 SECTION IV.—England and France (October 1623-August 1624). Oct. Foreign Powers ready to interfere 69 Return of the Prince of Wales from Madrid 70 1624 Feb.‑May Divergence between the English House of Commons and James I. upon the mode of recovering the Palatinate 70 Position of the Huguenots in France 72 SECTION V.—Rise of Richelieu (August 1624-September 1625). Aug. Lewis XIII. makes Richelieu his chief minister. He is divided between a desire to combat Spain and a desire to reduce the Huguenots to submission 72 Richelieu's position less strong than it afterwards became. He has to make great allowances for the King's humour 74 Dec. French attack upon the Spanish garrisons in the Valtelline 75 1625 Jan.‑June Failure of Mansfeld's expedition intended by James to recover the Palatinate 76 Jan. Richelieu's plans for engaging more deeply in the war frustrated by the rising of the Huguenots of Rochelle 77 Sept. The Huguenot fleet is defeated, but Rochelle holds out 77 CHAPTER V. INTERVENTION OF THE KING OF DENMARK. SECTION I.—Christian IV. and Gustavus Adolphus (1624). Character and position of Christian IV., King of Denmark 78 Genius of Gustavus Adolphus 79 Sketch of the earlier part of his reign 80 His interest in German affairs 82 SECTION II.—English Diplomacy (August 1624-July 1625). 1624 Aug. The Kings of Denmark and Sweden asked by James I. to join him in recovering the Palatinate 84 1625 Jan. The English Government, thinking the demands of Gustavus exorbitant, forms an alliance with Christian IV. 85 June. Meeting of the first Parliament of Charles I. June Gustavus directs his forces against Poland 86 Mar. 27. Death of James I. Accession of Charles I. 86 July 18. Christian IV., at the head of the Circle of Lower Saxony, enters upon war with the army of the League commanded by Tilly 87 Aug. Dissolution of the first Parliament of Charles I. SECTION III.—Wallenstein's Armament (July 1625-February 1626). The Emperor needs more forces 87 Wallenstein offers to raise an army for him. Account of Wallenstein's early life 89 The system by which the army is to be supported is to be one of forced contributions 90 Oppressive burdens laid thereby on the country 91 Wallenstein enters the dioceses of Magdeburg and Halberstadt, and lies quietly there during the winter 92 1626 Feb. Failure of negotiations for peace 93 SECTION IV.—Defeat of Mansfeld and Christian IV. (February-August 1626). 1626 Feb. Numerical superiority on the side of the King of Denmark, but the Imperialists are superior in other respects 94 Failure of the supplies promised to Christian by Charles I. 95 Feb. Meeting of the second Parliament of Charles I.—Impeachment of Buckingham Ap. 25. Mansfeld defeated by Wallenstein at the Bridge of Dessau 96 June. Dissolution of the second Parliament of Charles I. Aug. 27. Christian IV. defeated by Tilly at Lutter 97 Wallenstein pursues Mansfeld into Hungary 97 [Pg xv] [Pg xvi] CHAPTER VI. STRALSUND AND ROCHELLE. SECTION I.—Fresh Successes of Wallenstein (August 1626-October 1627). 1626 Divergence between the League and Wallenstein 98 Nov. Wallenstein advocates religious equality and the predominance of the army 98 1627 Jan. He persuades Ferdinand to increase his army, and is created Duke of Friedland, in spite of the growing dissatisfaction with his proceedings 100 May‑Aug. The King of Denmark hopes to resist Tilly, but Wallenstein returns from Hungary, and gains possession of Silesia 101 Sept. 20. Defeat of the Margrave of Baden at Heiligenhafen 102 Oct. Christian IV. flies to the Island of Fünen, leaving Jutland to Wallenstein 102 SECTION II.—Resistance to Wallenstein in the Empire (October 1627-February 1628). 1627 Oct. Meeting of the Electors at Mühlhausen. They complain of Wallenstein 103 1628 The commercial towns of North Germany jealous of Wallenstein 105 Feb. The Emperor declares the Dukes of Mecklenburg to have forfeited their lands and titles, and pledges the territory to Wallenstein 106 Wallenstein tries in vain to gain over the Hanse Towns 106 He attempts to establish himself on the coast of the Baltic by getting possession of the towns 108 SECTION III.—The Siege of Stralsund (August-February 1628). Feb. As Stralsund refuses to admit a garrison, it is attacked by Wallenstein's orders 108 May It is succoured by Denmark and Sweden 109 Aug. 3. The siege is raised 110 SECTION IV.—The Siege of Rochelle (1625-1628). 1625 Richelieu would have made peace with the Huguenots if he had been able 112 1626 An agreement is effected, but comes to nothing through the jealousy of Charles I. 112 1627 War between France and England, Buckingham's expedition to Rhé 113 Nov. Richelieu besieges Rochelle 114 1628 Mar Meeting of the third Parliament of Charles I. May Failure of an English fleet to succour Rochelle 115 June The Petition of Right granted Aug. Murder of the Duke of Buckingham 115 Nov. 1. Surrender of Rochelle 115 Contrast between France and Germany. Toleration granted to the Huguenots 116 CHAPTER VII. THE EDICT OF RESTITUTION. SECTION I.—Oppression of the Protestants (March 1628-May 1629). 1628 Mar. Surrender of Stade to Tilly 117 1629 Jan. Wallenstein fails to take Glückstadt 117 Mar. Dissolution of the third Parliament of Charles I. May 22. Peace of Lübeck between Christian IV. and the Emperor 118 Wallenstein invested with the Duchy of Mecklenburg 118 1628 The Protestants oppressed in the South of Germany 119 1629 Mar. 29. Issue of the Edict of Restitution 120 SECTION II.—French Intervention in Italy (1628-1630). 1628 War in Italy for the succession to the Duchy of Mantua 121 1629 Mar. Richelieu enters Italy, and compels the Spaniards to raise the siege of Casale 122 Rebellion of Rohan in the south of France 123 1629 Richelieu again enters Italy, seizes Pignerol and Saluces, and again forces the Spaniards to raise the siege of Casale 123 1630 Negotiations between France and Sweden 124 [Pg xvii] [Pg xviii] [Pg xix] SECTION III.—Wallenstein deprived of his Command (March 1629-September 1630). 1629 Wallenstein increases his forces 125 Jealousy between him and the Catholic Electors 126 1630 Assembly at Ratisbon 127 July 3. It demands that Wallenstein be deprived of his command 127 July 4. Landing of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany 128 Sept. Dismissal of Wallenstein 129 Tilly in command 130 SECTION IV.—The Swedes establish themselves on the Coast of the Baltic (July 1630-January 1631). July. Discipline in the Swedish Army 130 The Duke of Pomerania submits to him, but the Elector of Brandenburg declares himself neutral 130 1651 The treaty of Bärwalde between France and Sweden 132 SECTION V.—The Fall of Magdeburg (January-May 1631). Jan. Success of Gustavus on the Baltic coast 133 March. The Electors of Saxony hold a Protestant Assembly at Leipzig 133 Tilly attacks the Swedes, but is driven to retreat 134 Ap. 26. Treaty of Cherasco between France and the English 135 May 15. Convention between Gustavus and the Elector of Brandenburg 136 May 20. Magdeburg stormed, plundered, and burnt 136 The Emperor refuses to cancel the Edict of Restitution 137 CHAPTER VIII. THE VICTORIES OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS. SECTION I.—Alliance between the Swedes and the Saxons (June-September 1631). June 21. Gustavus compels the Elector of Brandenburg to an alliance 138 July. Gustavus at the Camp of Werben 138 Aug. Tilly summons the Elector of Saxony to submit 139 Sept. He attacks Saxony, upon which the Elector forms an alliance with Gustavus 139 Gustavus joins the Saxons 140 SECTION II.—Battle of Breitenfeld (September 1631). Sept. 17. Victory of Gustavus over Tilly at Breitenfeld 141 Wallenstein's intrigues with Gustavus 142 Wallenstein and Gustavus unlikely to agree 143 Political and military designs of Gustavus 144 He looks for a basis of operations on the Rhine 146 SECTION III.—March of Gustavus into South Germany (October 1631-May 1632). Oct. March of Gustavus to Mentz 148 1632 In spite of the objections of the French, he attacks Bavaria 149 Ap. 14. Tilly defeated and mortally wounded at the passage of the Lech 149 May 17. Gustavus enters Munich 150 SECTION IV.—Wallenstein's Restoration to command (September 1631-June 1632). Sept. Wallenstein breaks off all intercourse with Gustavus 151 Nov. Attempts to reconcile the Elector of Saxony with the Emperor 152 Dec. Is reinstated temporarily in the command of the Imperial Army 153 1632 Character of that Army 153 April Wallenstein permanently appointed Commander 155 May Offers peace to the Saxons, and drives them out of Bohemia 155 June Gustavus does not approve of the terms of peace offered by Wallenstein 156 SECTION V.—Struggle between Gustavus and Wallenstein (June-October 1632). June Gustavus and Wallenstein opposed to one another at Nüremberg 157 Efforts of Gustavus to maintain discipline 159 Sept. 4. Fails to storm Wallenstein's lines 160 Sept. 18. Gustavus leaves Nüremberg 160 Oct. Wallenstein marches into Saxony 160 SECTION VI.—The Battle of Lützen (October-November 1632). [Pg xx] [Pg xxi] Oct. Gustavus follows Wallenstein into Saxony 161 Nov. 16. Battle of Lützen 162 Death of Gustavus 163 Victory of the Swedes 164 Irreparable loss by the death of Gustavus to the Protestants 164 CHAPTER IX. THE DEATH OF WALLENSTEIN AND THE TREATY OF PRAGUE. SECTION I.—French Influence in Germany (November 1632-April 1633). 1633 Differences between Bernhard and Oxenstjerna 166 Ap. 23. The League of Heilbronn signed 167 Firm establishment of Richelieu's authority in France 168 Richelieu's interposition in German affairs 169 SECTION II.—Wallenstein's Attempt to dictate Peace (April-December 1633). 1633 Wallenstein's peace negotiations with the Swedes and Saxons 170 Oct. He drives the Saxons out of Silesia 172 Nov. Ratisbon taken by Bernhard 173 Spanish opposition to a peace which would leave Spain exposed to French attacks 173 Dec. Wallenstein thinks of making peace, whether the Emperor consents or not 175 SECTION III.—Resistance to Wallenstein's Plans (January-February 1634). 1634 Jan. Oñate, the Spanish Ambassador, persuades the Emperor that Wallenstein is a traitor 175 Ferdinand determines to displace Wallenstein 176 Feb. 19. Wallenstein engages the Colonels to support him 177 SECTION IV.—Assassination of Wallenstein (February 1634). Feb. 18. Wallenstein declared a traitor 179 Feb. 21. The garrison of Prague declares against him 179 Feb. 24. Wallenstein at Eger 179 Feb. 25. He is assassinated 181 Comparison between Gustavus and Wallenstein 181 SECTION V.—Imperialist Victories and the Treaty of Prague (February 1634-May 1635). 1634 Feb. The King of Hungary reorganizes the imperial army 181 Sept. 6. In conjunction with the Cardinal-Infant, he defeats Bernhard at Nördlingen 183 Consequent necessity of an increased French intervention 184 1635 Peace of Prague 184 May 30. It is not universally accepted 185 Miserable condition of Germany. Notes of an English traveller 187 CHAPTER X. THE PREPONDERANCE OF FRANCE. SECTION I.—Open Intervention of France (May 1635). 1635 Protestantism not out of danger 189 May. Close alliance of some of the Princes with France 190 Importance of the possession of Alsace and Lorraine 191 May 19. France declares war against Spain 192 SECTION II.—Spanish Successes (May 1635-December 1637). 1635 Failure of the French attack on the Spanish Netherlands 192 1636 Spanish invasion of France 193 Oct. 4. Baner's victory at Wittstock 194 1637 Feb. 15. Death of Ferdinand II. Accession of Ferdinand III. 194 Imperialist success in Germany 195 SECTION III.—The Struggle for Alsace (January 1638-July 1639). 1638 Bernhard's victories in the Breisgau and Alsace 195 July 8. Death of Bernhard 196 [Pg xxii] [Pg xxiii] SECTION IV.—French Successes (July 1639-Dec. 1642). French maritime successes 197 1639 Spanish fleet taking refuge in the Downs 198 It is destroyed by the Dutch 198 1640 Insurrection of Catalonia 199 Nov. Independence of Portugal 200 1641 Defeat of the Imperialists at Wolfenbüttel 201 1642 Defeat of the Imperialists at Kempten 201 Aug. Charles I. sets up his standard. Beginning of the English Civil War Dec. 4. Death of Richelieu 201 SECTION V.—Aims and Character of Richelieu (December 1642-May 1643). Richelieu's domestic policy 201 Contrast between France and England 202 Richelieu's foreign policy 203 Moderation of his aims 204 1643 May 14. Death of Lewis XIII 205 SECTION VI.—More French Victories (May 1643—August 1645). 1643 Rule of Cardinal Mazarin 205 May 19. Enghien defeats the Spaniards at Rocroy 206 The French kept in check in Germany 207 1644 Enghien and Turenne. Battle of Freiburg 208 July Battle of Marston Moor 1645 Aug. 3. Second Battle of Nördlingen 208 Mar. 6. Swedish victory at Jankow 209 CHAPTER XI. THE END OF THE WAR. SECTION I.—Turenne's Strategy (June 1645-October 1648). 1645 Negotiations for peace begun 209 June. Battle of Naseby Aims of the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria 210 1646 Turenne outmanœuvres the Imperialists 212 1647 May‑Sept. Truce between the French and the Bavarians 213 1648 May 17. Defeat of the Bavarians at Zusmarshausen 213 SECTION II.—The Treaty of Westphalia (Oct. 1648). 1648 Terms of the peace 213 Oct. 24. How far was toleration effected by it 214 General desire for peace 217 SECTION III.—Condition of Germany. Debasing effects of the war 217 Decrease of the population 218 Moral and intellectual decadence 218 Disintegration of Germany 220 Protestantism saved, and with it the future culture of Germany 220 SECTION IV.—Continuance of the War between France and Spain (1648-1660). 1648 Recognition of the independence of the Dutch Republic 221 1649 Execution of Charles I. The Fronde 222 Continuance of the war with Spain 223 Alliance between France and Cromwell 223 1660 Treaty of Pyrenees 224 [Pg xxiv] [Pg xxv] § 1. Want of national institutions in Germany. § 2. The Emperor. § 3. The German kingship. § 4. Its connexion with the Empire. § 5. Some confusion unavoidable. § 6. The great vassals. French greatness based on Tolerance 225 Intolerance of Lewis XIV. and downfall of the French monarchy 226 THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. CHAPTER I. CAUSES OF THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR. SECTION I.—Political Institutions of Germany. IT WAS THE MISFORTUNE OF GERMANY IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES THAT, WITH MOST OF THE CONDITIONS REQUISITE FOR THE FORMATION OF NATIONAL UNITY, SHE HAD NO REALLY NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. THERE WAS AN EMPEROR, WHO LOOKED SOMETHING LIKE AN ENGLISH KING, AND A DIET, OR GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHICH LOOKED SOMETHING LIKE AN ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, BUT THE RESEMBLANCE WAS FAR GREATER IN appearance than in reality. THE EMPEROR WAS CHOSEN BY THREE ECCLESIASTICAL ELECTORS, THE ARCHBISHOPS OF MENTZ, TREVES AND COLOGNE, AND FOUR LAY ELECTORS, THE ELECTOR PALATINE, THE ELECTORS OF SAXONY AND BRANDENBURG, AND THE KING OF BOHEMIA. IN THEORY HE WAS THE SUCCESSOR OF THE ROMAN EMPERORS JULIUS AND CONSTANTINE, THE RULER OF THE WORLD, OR OF SO MUCH OF IT AT LEAST AS HE COULD BRING UNDER HIS SWAY. MORE PARTICULARLY, HE WAS THE SUCCESSOR OF CHARLES THE GREAT AND OTTO THE GREAT, THE LAY HEAD OF WESTERN CHRISTENDOM. THE EMPEROR SIGISMUND, ON HIS DEATH-BED, HAD DIRECTED THAT HIS BODY SHOULD LIE IN STATE FOR SOME DAYS, THAT MEN MIGHT SEE 'THAT THE LORD OF ALL THE WORLD WAS DEAD.' 'WE HAVE CHOSEN YOUR GRACE,' SAID THE ELECTORS TO FREDERICK III., 'AS HEAD, PROTECTOR, AND GOVERNOR OF ALL CHRISTENDOM.' YET IT WOULD BE HARD TO FIND A SINGLE FRAGMENT OF REALITY corresponding to the magnificence of the claim. AS FAR, HOWEVER, AS THE PERIOD NOW UNDER REVIEW IS CONCERNED, THOUGH THE NAME OF EMPEROR WAS RETAINED, IT IS UNNECESSARY TO TROUBLE OURSELVES WITH THE RIGHTS, REAL OR imaginary, connected with the imperial dignity. Charles the Great, before the imperial crown WAS CONFERRED ON HIM, RULED AS KING, BY NATIONAL ASSENT OR BY CONQUEST, OVER A GREAT PART OF WESTERN EUROPE. WHEN HIS DOMINIONS WERE DIVIDED AMONGST HIS SUCCESSORS, THE RULE OF THOSE SUCCESSORS IN GERMANY OR ELSEWHERE HAD NO NECESSARY CONNEXION WITH THE IMPERIAL CROWN. HENRY THE FOWLER, ONE OF THE GREATEST OF THE KINGS OF THE GERMANS, WAS NEVER AN EMPEROR AT ALL, AND THOUGH, AFTER THE REIGN OF HIS SON OTTO THE GREAT, THE GERMAN KINGS CLAIMED FROM THE POPE THE IMPERIAL CROWN AS THEIR RIGHT, THEY NEVER FAILED ALSO TO RECEIVE A SPECIAL GERMAN CROWN AT AACHEN ( Aix-la-Chapelle) or at Frankfort as the symbol of their headship over German lands and German men. WHEN, THEREFORE, THE WRITERS OF THE 16TH OR 17TH CENTURIES SPEAK OF THE RIGHTS OF THE EMPEROR IN GERMANY, THEY REALLY MEAN TO SPEAK OF THE RIGHTS OF THE EMPEROR IN HIS CAPACITY OF GERMAN KING, JUST AS, WHEN THEY SPEAK OF THE EMPIRE, THEY MEAN WHAT WE CALL GERMANY, TOGETHER WITH CERTAIN SURROUNDING DISTRICTS, SUCH AS SWITZERLAND, THE NETHERLANDS, LORRAINE, AND EASTERN BURGUNDY OR FRANCHE COMTÉ, WHICH ARE NOT NOW, IF ALSACE AND THE NEWLY-CONQUERED PART OF LORRAINE BE EXCEPTED, INCLUDED UNDER THAT NAME. IN THE SAME WAY THE MERE FRAGMENTS OF FEUDAL SUPREMACY, AND THE PAYMENT OF FEUDAL DUES WHICH THE EMPERORS CLAIMED IN ITALY, BELONGED TO THEM, NOT AS EMPERORS, BUT SIMPLY AS ITALIAN KINGS, AND AS WEARERS OF THE IRON crown of Lombardy, which, as the legends told, was formed of nails taken from the Saviour's cross. NOT THAT IT WOULD BE WISE, EVEN IF IT WERE POSSIBLE, TO DO OTHERWISE THAN TO FOLLOW THE PRACTICE OF CONTEMPORARIES. THE STRANGE FORM, EMPEROR OF GERMANY, BY WHICH, AT A LATER PERIOD, MEN UNFAMILIAR WITH GERMANY HISTORY STROVE TO RECONCILE THE OLD CLAIMS WITH SOMETHING LIKE THE ACTUAL FACT, HAD NOT BEEN YET INVENTED. AND, AFTER ALL, THE CONFUSIONS OF HISTORY, THE USE OF WORDS AND TITLES WHEN THEIR MEANING IS CHANGED, ARE SO MANY TOKENS TO REMIND US OF THE UNITY OF SUCCESSIVE GENERATIONS, AND OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ANY ONE OF THEM BUILDING ANEW WITHOUT REGARDING THE FOUNDATIONS OF THEIR FATHERS. ALL THAT IS NEEDED IS TO REMEMBER THAT THE EMPEROR OF LATER TIMES IS A PERSONAGE WHOSE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS CAN BE PROFITABLY COMPARED WITH THOSE OF HENRY VIII. OF ENGLAND OR LEWIS XIV. OF FRANCE, NOT WITH JULIUS OR CONSTANTINE WHOSE SUCCESSOR HE PROFESSED himself to be. 'TAKE AWAY THE RIGHTS OF THE EMPEROR,' SAID A LAW BOOK OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY, IN LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD HAVE STARTLED AN OLD ROMAN LEGISLATOR, 'AND WHO CAN SAY, "THIS HOUSE IS MINE, THIS VILLAGE BELONGS TO ME?"' BUT THE PRINCES AND BISHOPS, THE COUNTS AND CITIES, WHO WERE GLAD ENOUGH TO PLEAD ON THEIR OWN BEHALF THAT THEIR LANDS WERE HELD DIRECTLY FROM THE HEAD OF THE EMPIRE, TOOK CARE TO ALLOW HIM SCARCELY ANY REAL AUTHORITY. THIS KINGLY DIGNITY WHICH PASSED UNDER THE NAME OF THE EMPIRE WAS INDEED VERY WEAK. IT HAD NEVER OUTGROWN THE NEEDS OF THE MIDDLE AGES, AND WAS STILL ESSENTIALLY A FEUDAL KINGSHIP. FROM [Pg xxvi] [Pg 1] [Pg 2] [Pg 3] [Pg 4] § 7. Their independence. § 8. Prospect of order. § 9. Attempts to introduce order. § 10. The Diet, or general assemblies of the Empire. § 11. The princes care little for the Diet. § 12. Some sort of order established. § 13. The three Houses of the Diet. § 14. The cities too weak. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH IT WOULD TAKE TOO MUCH SPACE TO NOTICE HERE, IT HAD FAILED IN PLACING ITSELF AT THE HEAD OF A NATIONAL organization, and in becoming the guardian of the rights of the tillers of the soil and the burghers of the towns, who found no place in the ranks of the feudal chivalry. THE IMMEDIATE VASSALS OF THE EMPIRE, IN FACT, WERE ALMOST INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNS, LIKE THE DUKES OF NORMANDY IN THE FRANCE OF THE TENTH CENTURY, OR THE DUKES OF BURGUNDY IN THE FRANCE OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY. THEY QUARRELLED AND MADE WAR WITH ONE ANOTHER LIKE THE KINGS OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE. THEIR OWN VASSALS, THEIR OWN PEASANTS, THEIR OWN TOWNS COULD ONLY REACH THE EMPEROR through them, if anybody thought it worth while to reach him at all. THE PROSPECT OF REVIVING THE GERMAN KINGSHIP WHICH WAS VEILED UNDER THE AUGUST TITLE OF EMPEROR SEEMED FAR DISTANT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY. BUT WHILST THE EMPIRE, IN ITS OLD SENSE, WITH ITS CLAIMS TO UNIVERSAL DOMINION, WAS A DREAM, THIS GERMAN KINGSHIP NEEDED BUT WISDOM IN THE OCCUPANT OF THE THRONE TO SEIZE THE NATIONAL FEELING, WHICH WAS CERTAIN SOONER OR LATER TO CALL OUT FOR A NATIONAL RULER, IN ORDER TO CLOTHE ITSELF IN ALL THE AUTHORITY WHICH WAS NEEDED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE UNITY AND THE SAFETY OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE. THAT, WHEN THE TIME CAME, THE MAN TO GRASP THE OPPORTUNITY WAS NOT THERE, WAS THE chief amongst the causes of that unhappy tragedy of disunion which culminated in the Thirty Years' War. IN THE MIDDLE OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY AN EFFORT WAS MADE TO INTRODUCE A SYSTEM OF REGULAR ASSEMBLIES, UNDER THE NAME OF A DIET, IN ORDER TO STEM THE TIDE OF ANARCHY. BUT IT NEVER ENTERED INTO THE MIND OF THE WISEST STATESMAN LIVING TO SUMMON ANY GENERAL REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE. IN THE OLD FEUDAL ASSEMBLIES NO ONE HAD TAKEN PART WHO WAS NOT AN IMMEDIATE VASSAL OF THE EMPIRE, AND the Diet professed to be only a more regular organization of the old feudal assemblies. FROM THE DIET, THEREFORE, ALL SUBJECTS OF THE TERRITORIAL PRINCES WERE RIGOROUSLY EXCLUDED. WHATEVER THEIR WISHES OR OPINIONS MIGHT BE, THEY HAD NEITHER PART NOR LOT IN THE COUNSELS OF THE NATION. THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE DIET ANSWERING TO THOSE REPRESENTATIVES OF ENGLISH COUNTIES, MEN NOT GREAT ENOUGH TO ASSUME THE STATE OF INDEPENDENT PRINCES, NOR SMALL ENOUGH TO BE CONTENT SIMPLY TO REGISTER WITHOUT QUESTION THE DECREES OF THOSE IN AUTHORITY WHO WITH US DID MORE THAN ANY OTHER CLASS TO CEMENT TOWN AND COUNTRY, KING AND PEOPLE TOGETHER. NOR DID EVEN THE LESS POWERFUL OF THE IMMEDIATE VASSALS TAKE PART IN THE MEETINGS. LIKE THE LESSER BARONS OF THE EARLY PLANTAGENET REIGNS, THEY SLIPPED OUT OF A POSITION TO WHICH THEY SEEMED TO HAVE A RIGHT BY THE FACT THAT THEY HELD THEIR FEW SQUARE MILES OF LAND AS DIRECTLY FROM THE EMPEROR AS THE DUKES OF Bavaria or the Electors of Saxony held the goodly principalities over which they ruled. SUCH A BODY WAS MORE LIKE A CONGRESS OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNS THAN an English Parliament. Each member came in his own right. He might or might not speak the SENTIMENTS OF HIS SUBJECTS, AND, EVEN IF HE DID, HE NATURALLY PREFERRED DECIDING PRETTY MUCH AS HE PLEASED AT HOME TO ALLOWING THE QUESTION TO BE DEBATED BY AN ASSEMBLY OF HIS EQUALS. AN ELECTOR OF SAXONY, A LANDGRAVE OF HESSE, OR AN ARCHDUKE OF AUSTRIA KNEW THAT TAXES WERE LEVIED, ARMIES TRAINED, TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL wants provided for at his own court at Dresden, at Cassel, or at Vienna, and he had no wish that it should be otherwise. NOR WAS IT EASY, EVEN WHEN A PRINCE HAD MADE HIMSELF SO OBNOXIOUS AS TO CALL DOWN UPON HIMSELF THE CONDEMNATION OF HIS FELLOWS, TO SUBJECT HIM TO PUNISHMENT. HE MIGHT, INDEED, BE PUT TO THE BAN OF THE EMPIRE, A KIND OF SECULAR EXCOMMUNICATION. BUT IF HE WERE POWERFUL HIMSELF, AND HAD POWERFUL FRIENDS, IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO PUT IT IN EXECUTION. IT would be necessary to levy war against him, and that war might not be successful. STILL, AT THE END OF THE FIFTEENTH AND THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURIES SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE. AN IMPERIAL COURT ( Reichskammergericht) CAME INTO EXISTENCE, MAINLY NOMINATED BY THE PRINCES OF THE EMPIRE, AND AUTHORIZED TO PRONOUNCE JUDGMENT UPON CASES ARISING BETWEEN THE RULERS OF THE VARIOUS TERRITORIES. IN ORDER TO SECURE THE BETTER EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCES OF THIS COURT, GERMANY WAS DIVIDED INTO CIRCLES, IN EACH OF WHICH THE PRINCES AND CITIES WHO WERE ENTITLED TO A VOICE IN THE DIET OF THE Empire were authorized to meet together and to levy troops for the maintenance of order. THESE PRINCES, LAY AND ECCLESIASTICAL, TOGETHER WITH THE CITIES HOLDING IMMEDIATELY FROM THE EMPIRE, WERE CALLED THE ESTATES OF THE EMPIRE. WHEN THEY MET IN THE GENERAL DIET THEY VOTED IN THREE HOUSES. THE FIRST HOUSE WAS COMPOSED OF THE SEVEN ELECTORS, THOUGH IT WAS ONLY AT AN IMPERIAL ELECTION THAT THE NUMBER WAS COMPLETE. AT ALL ORDINARY MEETINGS FOR LEGISLATION, OR FOR THE DISPATCH OF busiNESS, THE KING OF BOHEMIA WAS EXCLUDED, AND SIX ELECTORS ONLY APPEARED. THE NEXT HOUSE WAS THE HOUSE OF PRINCES, COMPRISING ALL THOSE PERSONS, LAY OR ECCLESIASTICAL, WHO HAD THE RIGHT OF SITTING IN THE DIET. LASTLY, CAME THE FREE IMPERIAL CITIES, THE ONLY POPULAR ELEMENT IN THE DIET. BUT THEY WERE TREATED AS DECIDEDLY INFERIOR TO THE OTHER TWO HOUSES. WHEN THE ELECTORS AND THE PRINCES HAD AGREED UPON A PROPOSITION, THEN AND NOT TILL THEN IT WAS SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE OF Cities. THE SPECIAL RISK ATTENDING SUCH A CONSTITUTION WAS THAT IT PROVIDED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE WANTS OF THE PRINCES AND ELECTORS. IN THE DIET, IN THE CIRCLES, AND IN THE IMPERIAL COURT, THE PRINCES AND ELECTORS EXERCISED A PREPONDERATING, IF NOT QUITE AN EXCLUSIVE INFLUENCE. IN ORDINARY TIMES THERE MIGHT BE NO DANGER. BUT IF EXTRAORDINARY TIMES AROSE, IF ANY GREAT MOVEMENT SWEPT OVER THE SURFACE OF THE NATION, IT MIGHT VERY WELL BE THAT THE NATION WOULD BE ON ONE SIDE AND THE PRINCES AND THE ELECTORS ON THE OTHER. AND IF THIS WERE THE CASE THERE WOULD BE GREAT DIFFICULTY IN BRINGING THE NATION INTO HARMONY WITH ITS INSTITUTIONS. IN [Pg 5] [Pg 6] [Pg 7] § 1. The German people in favor of Protestantism; the Diet opposed to it. § 2. Most of the lay princes adopt it. § 3. The Emperor Charles V. 1552. § 4. The Convention of Passau. 1555 § 5. The peace of Augsburg. § 6. Its terms. § 7. Might the princes seize more lands? ENGLAND THE SOVEREIGN COULD ALTER A HOSTILE MAJORITY IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS BY A FRESH CREATION OF PEERS, AND THE CONSTITUENCIES COULD ALTER A HOSTILE MAJORITY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS BY A FRESH ELECTION. IN GERMANY THERE WAS NO HOUSE OF COMMONS, AND AN EMPEROR WHO SHOULD TRY TO CREATE FRESH PRINCES OUT OF THE IMMEDIATE VASSALS WHO WERE TOO WEAK TO BE SUMMONED TO THE DIET WOULD ONLY RENDER HIMSELF RIDICULOUS BY AN ATTEMPT TO PLACE IN CHECK THE REAL possessors of power by the help of those who had the mere appearance of it. SECTION II.—Protestantism in Germany. When, in the sixteenth century, Protestantism sudDENLY RAISED ITS HEAD, THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EMPIRE WERE TRIED TO THE UTTERMOST. FOR THE MASS OF THE NATION DECLARED ITSELF IN FAVOUR OF CHANGE, AND THE DIET WAS SO COMPOSED AS TO BE HOSTILE TO CHANGE, AS SOON AS IT APPEARED THAT IT WAS LIKELY TO TAKE THE DIRECTION OF LUTHERANISM. IN THE ELECTORAL HOUSE, INDEED, THE VOTES OF THE THREE ECCLESIASTICAL ELECTORS WERE MET BY THE VOTES OF THE THREE LAY ELECTORS. BUT IN THE HOUSE OF PRINCES THERE WERE THIRTY-EIGHT ECCLESIASTICAL DIGNITARIES AND BUT EIGHTEEN LAYMEN. IT WAS A BODY, IN SHORT, LIKE THE ENGLISH HOUSE OF LORDS BEFORE THE REFORMATION, AND THERE WAS NO HENRY VIII. TO BRING IT INTO HARMONY WITH THE DIRECTION WHICH LAY SOCIETY WAS TAKING, BY SOME ACT EQUIVALENT TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MONASTERIES, AND THE CONSEQUENT EXCLUSION OF THE MITRED ABBOTS FROM THEIR SEATS IN PARLIAMENT. TO PASS MEASURES FAVOURABLE TO PROTESTANTISM THROUGH SUCH A HOUSE WAS simply impossible. Yet it can hardly be doubted that a really national Parliament would have adopted Lutheranism, more OR LESS MODIFIED, AS THE RELIGION OF THE NATION. BEFORE PROTESTANTISM WAS FIFTY YEARS OLD, IN SPITE OF ALL DIFFICULTIES, NINETY per cent. of the population of Germany were Protestant. IN DEFAULT OF NATIONAL ACTION IN FAVOR OF PROTESTANTISM, IT WAS ADOPTED AND SUPPORTED BY MOST OF THE LAY PRINCES AND ELECTORS. A NEW PRINCIPLE OF DISINTEGRATION WAS THUS INTRODUCED INTO GERMANY, AS THESE PRINCES WERE FORCED TO ACT IN OPPOSITION TO THE VIEWS ADOPTED BY the Diet. IF THE DIET WAS UNLIKELY TO PLAY THE PART OF AN ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, NEITHER WAS THE EMPEROR LIKELY TO PLAY THE PART OF HENRY VIII. FOR THE INTERESTS OF GERMANY, CHARLES V., WHO HAD BEEN ELECTED IN 1519, WAS WEAK WHERE HE OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN STRONG, AND STRONG WHERE HE ought to have been weak. As Emperor, he was nothing. As feudal sovereign and national ruler, he was very little. But he was also a prince of the Empire, and as such he ruled over the Austrian duchies and Tyrol. Further than this, he was one OF THE MOST POWERFUL SOVEREIGNS OF EUROPE. HE WAS KING OF SPAIN, AND OF THE INDIES WITH ALL THEIR MINES. IN ITALY, HE DISPOSED OF NAPLES AND THE MILANESE. SICILY AND SARDINIA WERE HIS, AND, UNDER VARIOUS TITLES, HE RULED OVER THE FRAGMENTS OF THE OLD BURGUNDIAN INHERITANCE, FRANCHE COMTÉ, AND THE SEVENTEEN PROVINCES OF THE NETHERLANDS. SUCH A MAN WOULD INFLUENCE THE PROGRESS OF AFFAIRS IN GERMANY WITH A WEIGHT OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO HIS POSITION IN THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION. AND UNHAPPILY, WITH THE POWER OF A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN, HE BROUGHT THE MIND OF A FOREIGNER. HIS MOTHER'S SPANISH BLOOD BEAT IN HIS VEINS, AND HE HAD THE INSTINCTIVE AVERSION OF A SPANIARD TO ANYTHING WHICH SAVOURED OF OPPOSITION TO THE DOCTRINES OF THE CHURCH. 'THAT MAN,' HE SAID, WHEN HE CAUGHT SIGHT OF LUTHER FOR THE FIRST TIME, 'SHALL NEVER MAKE ME A heretic.' OF THIS ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE MINORITY OF THE PRINCES BACKED BY THE MAJORITY OF THE NATION, AND THE MAJORITY OF THE PRINCES BACKED BY AN EMPEROR WHO WAS ALSO A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN, CIVIL WAR WAS THE NATURAL RESULT. IN THE END, THE TRIUMPH OF THE PROTESTANTS WAS SO FAR SECURED THAT THEY FORCED THEIR OPPONENTS IN 1552 TO YIELD TO THE CONVENTION OF PASSAU, by which it was arranged that a Diet should be held as soon as possible for a general pacification. THAT DIET, WHICH WAS ASSEMBLED AT AUGSBURG IN 1555, MET UNDER REMARKABLY FAVOURABLE CIRCUMSTANCES. CHARLES V., BAFFLED AND DISAPPOINTED, HAD RETIRED FROM THE SCENE, AND HAD LEFT BEHIND HIM, AS HIS REPRESENTATIVE, HIS MORE CONCILIATORY BROTHER FERDINAND, WHO WAS ALREADY KING OF HUNGARY AND BOHEMIA, AND WAS HIS DESTINED SUCCESSOR IN THE GERMAN POSSESSIONS OF THE HOUSE OF AUSTRIA. BOTH HE AND THE LEADING MEN ON EITHER SIDE WERE ANXIOUS FOR PEACE, AND WERE JEALOUS OF THE INFLUENCE WHICH PHILIP, THE SON OF CHARLES V., AND HIS SUCCESSOR IN SPAIN, ITALY, AND THE NETHERLANDS, MIGHT gain from a continuance of the war. THERE WAS LITTLE DIFFICULTY IN ARRANGING THAT THE PROTESTANT PRINCES, WHO, BEFORE THE DATE OF THE CONVENTION OF PASSAU, HAD SEIZED ECCLESIASTICAL PROPERTY WITHIN THEIR OWN TERRITORIES, EITHER FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES OR FOR THE SUPPORT OF PROTESTANT WORSHIP, SHOULD NO LONGER BE SUBJECT TO THE LAW OR AUTHORITY OF THE CATHOLIC CLERGY. THE REAL DIFFICULTY AROSE IN PROVIDING FOR THE FUTURE. WITH PROTESTANTISM AS A GROWING RELIGION, THE PRINCES MIGHT BE INCLINED TO PROCEED FURTHER WITH THE SECULARIZING OF THE CHURCH PROPERTY STILL LEFT UNTOUCHED WITHIN THEIR OWN TERRITORIES; AND BESIDES THIS, IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT EVEN BISHOPS OR ABBOTS themselves, being princes of the Empire, might be inclined to abandon their religion, and to adopt Protestantism. THE FIRST OF THESE DIFFICULTIES WAS LEFT BY THE TREATY IN SOME OBSCURITY; BUT, FROM THE STRESS LAID ON THE ABANDONMENT BY THE CATHOLICS OF THE LANDS SECULARIZED BEFORE THE CONVENTION OF PASSAU, IT WOULD SEEM THAT THEY MIGHT FAIRLY URGE THAT THEY HAD NEVER ABANDONED THEIR CLAIMS to lands which at that date had not been secularized. THE SECOND DIFFICULTY LED TO LONG DISCUSSIONS. THE PROTESTANTS WISHED THAT ANY BISHOP OR ABBOT WHO PLEASED MIGHT BE [Pg 8] [Pg 9] [Pg 10] [Pg 11] § 8. Might the ecclesiastics turn Protestants? § 9. Dangers of the future. § 10. Fresh encroachments upon Church lands. § 11. The Ecclesiastical Reservation. § 12. The northern bishoprics Protestant. § 13. Good and bad side of the arrangement. § 1. Theological disputes among Protestants. § 2. The Catholics make progress. ALLOWED TO TURN PROTESTANT, AND MIGHT THEN ESTABLISH PROTESTANTISM AS THE RELIGION OF HIS SUBJECTS. THE CATHOLICS INSISTED THAT ANY BISHOP OR ABBOT WHO CHANGED HIS RELIGION SHOULD BE COMPELLED TO VACATE HIS POST, AND THIS VIEW OF THE CASE PREVAILED, UNDER THE NAME OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL RESERVATION. IT WAS FURTHER AGREED THAT THE PEACE SHOULD APPLY TO THE Lutheran Church alone, no other confession having been as yet adopted by any of the princes. SUCH A PEACE, ACCEPTABLE AS IT WAS AT THE TIME, WAS PREGNANT WITH FUTURE EVIL. OWING ITS ORIGIN TO A DIET IN WHICH EVERYTHING WAS ARRANGED BY THE PRINCES AND ELECTORS, IT SETTLED ALL QUESTIONS AS IF NOBODY BUT PRINCES AND ELECTORS HAD ANY INTEREST IN THE MATTER. AND, BESIDES THIS, THERE WAS A MOST UNSTATESMANLIKE WANT OF PROVISION FOR FUTURE CHANGE. THE YEAR 1552 WAS TO GIVE THE LINE BY WHICH THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS OF GERMANY WERE TO BE MEASURED FOR ALL TIME. THERE WAS NOTHING ELASTIC ABOUT SUCH LEGISLATION. IT DID NOT, ON THE ONE HAND, ADOPT THE RELIGION OF THE VAST MAJORITY AS THE ESTABLISHED RELIGION OF THE EMPIRE. IT DID NOT, ON THE OTHER HAND, ADOPT THE PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY. IN THINKING OF THEMSELVES AND THEIR RIGHTS, THE PRINCES HAD forgotten the German people. THE BARRIERS SET UP AGAINST PROTESTANTISM WERE SO PLAINLY ARTIFICIAL THAT THEY SOON GAVE WAY. THE PRINCES CLAIMED THE RIGHT OF CONTINUING TO SECULARIZE CHURCH LANDS WITHIN THEIR TERRITORIES AS INSEPARABLE FROM THEIR GENERAL RIGHT OF PROVIDING FOR THE RELIGION OF THEIR SUBJECTS. AT ALL EVENTS THEY HAD MIGHT ON THEIR SIDE. ABOUT A HUNDRED MONASTERIES ARE SAID TO HAVE FALLEN VICTIMS IN THE PALATI...