The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis, by Karl Nordlund This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org Title: The Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis A History with Documents Author: Karl Nordlund Release Date: April 29, 2007 [eBook #21253] Language: English Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 ***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN UNION CRISIS*** E-text prepared by Louise Pryor and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) Transcriber’s note: There are many typographical and orthographical errors in the original. They are indicated like this. No corrections have been made. Storthing is sometimes spelled Storting; the use of apostrophes for possessives is inconsistent; and a number of words are inconsistently hyphenated. Neither these nor the frequent neologisms are noted explicitly. THE SWEDISH-NORWEGIAN UNION CRISIS A HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS BY K. NORDLUND PH D. UPSALA & STOCKHOLM ALMQVIST & WIKSELL LTD PRINTED BY ALMQVIST & WIKSELL LTD, UPSALA 1905 Author’s Introductory Remarks. The following work is intended to give an insight into the Swedish-Norwegian Crisis. It has been the Author’s endeavour to attain this object, partly by a condensed account of the events of the last few years, partly by a collection of suitable extracts from documents referring to this crisis. Choice in the last items has been confined to the most important ones. Touching the Consular negotiations only the discussions on the most disputed points are given. In dealing with some of the statements in Nansen’s brochure the author does not intend a exhaustive criticism of the said work, but has only tried to show, by a few instances, the treatment pure and distinct facts have been submitted to, in these days, by Norwegian agitation. The number of instances could be multiplied many times over. If the following representation has caught the tone of present feeling in Sweden, it must be excused. The Author is, however, convinced that this has not disadvantageously affected his account of the actual facts of the case. Upsala. August 1905. The Author. CONTENTS. A. History. Sid. I. Reasons for Union Crisis. Development of Sweden’s and Norway’s different reform programmes 1-8 II. Contents of the charge of 1885 in § 11 of Sweden’s Constitution. First development of Consular Question. Union Committee 1895-98 8-19 III. Consular Committee of 1902. Birth and contents of Communiqué 19-28 IV. Treaties on the identical laws 29-38 V. Norwegian accusations caused by breakdown of Consular Negatiations 38-46 VI. Development of Crisis this year until the time of the Extra-Ordinary session of Swedish Riksdag 46-64 VII. Supposed and real causes of Norwegian revolution 64-67 B. Acts. 1. Acts from Norway’s »Grundlov» 71 2. Acts from »Riksakten». (Special laws relating to Union) 72 3. Preparatory agreement, in Consular question, between Swedish and Norwegian Cabinet Councils (so called Communiqué) 73 4. Extract from Norwegian Government’s proposal referring to identical laws 75 5. Extract from Boström’s reasons for identical laws 76 6. Extract from Hagerup’s Answer 77 7. Extract from Swedish Government’s proposal regarding identical laws 78 8. Extract from Norwegian Cabinet Council’s Memorandum on account of this proposal 79 9. Extract from Swedish Cabinet’s answer 82 10. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 7th February 1905 83 11. Crown Prince-Regent’s address to Special Committee of Storthing 85 12. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 5th April 1905 86 13. Motion on Union Question in Swedish Riksdag’s Upper Chamber 87 14. Motion on Union Question in Swedish Riksdag’s Lower Chamber 88 15. Norwegian Government’s »proposal» of 17th April 1905 89 16. Report on proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 25th April 1905 92 17. Swedish Riksdag’s Statement on Union Question 93 18. Norwegian Minister’s Notice of resignation 94 19. Report on proceedings of Norwegian Cabinet Council 27th May 1905 94 20. King’s telegraphic protest against Norwegian Government’s Statement 97 21. Norwegian Ministers’ announcement to King of resignation 97 22. King’s telegraphic protest 98 23. Storthing’s President’s proposal for conclusion 7th June 1905 99 24. Storthing’s address to King Oscar 99 25. King’s telegraphic protest 101 26. Report of proceedings of Cabinet Council held on 9th June 1905 101 27. King’s letter to Storthing 10th June 1905 102 28. Storthing’s reply 106 I. Not till the present day has the Swedish-Norwegian Union Crisis presented itself in the eyes of Europe in a thoroughly acute phase. Its origin, in reality, dates as far back as the foundation of the Union itself. The original cause of the agitating union disputes has been that Sweden, from the very commencement of the Union, has internationally borne the responsibility for the same, in other words, conducted the political affairs of both Kingdoms. The inequality produced hereby, the Norwegians on their part have striven to efface. Sweden has also for a long time shown herself willing to establish full equality in the Union, at the same time that she has accommodated herself to Norway in questions of detail. As far back as 1835 it was acknowledged, on the part of [Pg 1] The object of the Union dispute. The efforts to give Norway a better position in the Union. Sweden, that Norway’s position in the Union was not in accordance with the claims of equity. Thus by a Royal Decree that year the Norwegian Minister of State at Stockholm was admitted into the Swedish so-called Ministerial Council to take part in foreign matters which concerned Norway. In 1839 the first great Union-Committee was formed, and both in this one, and two later — the last 1895-98 — Norway was offered from the Swedish side complete equality in the Union on certain conditions. Added to this Sweden has on several occasions granted partial concessions. Some have been accepted by Norway — as for instance the law passed in 1844 concerning equality in Government Symbols etc. etc. — others again were refused — as the offer in 1885 and 1891 of increased influence in the administration of Foreign affairs. If offers of equality worded in more general terms are added — as in 1893 and during the present year —, Nansen’s characterising Sweden’s Union policy as »90 years’ labour to procure a supremacy for Sweden», — ought to appear in its true colours2:1. The accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to acquire the supremacy have, time after time, arisen from a mixture of various matters, partly the different conceptions of the legal character of the existing Union, partly the different programmes for the reformation of the Union. Owing to the very indistinct and confused wording in the legal documents of the Act of Union the Swedish and Norwegian conceptions of the Union itself have finally become so antagonistic to each other, that the unionistic transactions have, in an excessive degree, taken the character of a continual judicial process, and the real questions have been more or less ignored2:2. Swedish Policy on its part has always maintained that Sweden’s supremacy in the Union is based on legal grounds. It has especially insisted that the administration of Foreign affairs was, from the first, placed in Sweden’s hands2:3, and this Swedish standpoint has also been acknowledged as the right one by the most eminent of Norwegian writers on State law3:1. But of late those on the Norwegian Left Side have made stronger and stronger efforts to prove, that the order existed on no legal grounds, that Norway, as a Sovereign Kingdom, had the right, for instance, to create an entire Foreign Office of its own. And under this influence the Norwegian sensitiveness has in Sweden’s defence of her conception of Union Law persisted more and more in seeing insulting »designs of supremacy». Meanwhile future prospects and reform programmes have had little to do with the Swedish conception of the legal character of the Union. The most extreme representatives of the so-called supremacy partizans — to mention one, the late professor Oscar Alin — have on different occasions maintained reform programmes, built on the principle of perfect equality within the Union, and it must be asserted that no Swedish political party in recent times has refused perfect equality to Norway3:2. That the result seems to become the rupture of the Union, and not the reorganization of the same has depended on more and more insurmountable oppositions in opinions concerning the manner and the aim for a reform. Sweden has, as a rule, preferred the entire reorganization, Norway the partial — the consequence being, for instance, the struggles in the so-called Stadtholder disputes in the sixties of the last century. Sweden has held her standpoint, especially as she has considered it to the interest of the Union to insist on creating perfect equality by concessions also from Norway, and it seemed that these demands could not gain sufficient consideration unless the reorganization was complete4:1. Sweden has furthermore insisted on negotiations and agreements, as the natural road to reform; how Norway has more and more allowed herself to take matters into her own hands, shall now be more clearly explained. Above all, however, the differences of opinion respecting the aim of the reform have become more and more pronounced. Sweden has adhered to a Union, which outworldly represents a perfect unity, and tried to create a safe and secure Union. Norway has, by degrees, in her ever increasing overwrought sensitiveness, developed her reform programme towards a purely [Pg 2] Unauthorized accusations against Sweden for endeavouring to gain the supremacy. [Pg 3] The different programmes of Sweden and Norway for reforming the Union. [Pg 4] personal union, behind which the rupture of the Union has stood as the main object in view. The connection of the Norwegian Union with the inner party struggles in Norway, has had a disastrous effect on the development of the Norwegian programme, especially since 1885. Through the Constitutional Crisis in 1884, when the Royal Powers were forced — practically if not legally — to capitulate in essentials to the orthodox parliamentarism, the Nor wegian party champions became in need of new programmes upon which to fling themselves. It was then, that the Norwegian radicals through the demand for their own Minister of State for Foreign Affairs cast a firebrand into the very midst of the Norwegian people5:1, who to that time had stood unanimous towards the claim of a mutual Foreign Minister of State for the Union. In the struggle for the political ascendency chauvinistic strongwords became more and more rife. The national sensitiveness, already considerable, became excited to the utmost under the influence of the suggestive eloquence of Björnson and other agitators. The suspiciousness disaffection towards Sweden increased. The Swedish brethren were pointed at by Björnson as the only enemy Norway had, and even in the schoolrooms and school-books their (Swedish) hereditary enemy was spoken of with curses. Simultaneously the »Norwegians of the Future» buried themselves deeper and deeper in the study of »Ancient Glorious Norway». Imagination was fed on Norwegian heroic Sagas and Viking exploits, and the ancient National Saint of Norway, Olaf the Holy, was unearthed from his long-forgotten hiding place for renewed worship5:2. This overwrought sentimental policy, of course, caused national pride and all its requisite claims, to raise a cloud over Sweden and the Union, and the essential principles in the Union Question became of less and less importance. How totally void of essential principles the recent Norwegian Union Policy has been, is most obvious in the matter of effacing the Union Symbol from the mercantile flag having for a long period of years played a dominating rôle in Norwegian party politics6:1. It became the more and more hopeless task of Sweden and the Union King to maintain the cause of the Union without support from the dominant left party in Norway. The Norwegian radical party in their blind fanaticism were scarcely capable of rational action with any feeling of real political responsibility; the friendly attitude towards Russia as their friend in need, of Björnson and other radicals, was quite sufficient proof of this. It is true, that one party — the Norwegian Right Side —, for a long time inclined to a more favourable view of the Union, has supported the King in his efforts to oppose the dissolving of the Union, but in the fight for the political supremacy, the power of nationalism over minds has gradually undermined its position as a pillar of the Union, and at the present period of violently agitated feeling, the party has almost entirely vanished from the »national junction.» During the process of this chauvinistic hysteria, Swedish politicians have naturally had an exceedingly delicate problem to solve. On one point opinion in Sweden has been unanimous. It has emphatically refused to accept a mere personal Union as a solution of the question. This on two grounds: one for the Union, the other for the Nation. The interests of the Union imperatively demanded outward unity, in order that the Union might be able to fulfil its purpose preserving security to the Scandinavian Peninsula in relation to Foreign powers. National interest saw in a personal union, and generally in every more radical rupture of the bonds of the Union, a risk that the influence of Sweden would thereby become unduly lessened. For if Sovereign power became the only essential bond of Union, there would be the risk of the balance of power drifting into the hands of the Storthing (especially after the events of 1884 when the Sovereign power of the King was weakened), a risk that has at the present conjuncture of affairs already made itself felt. But if Sweden has thus been unanimous in demanding a joint administration of Foreign affairs, it might be found within the range of possibilities, for the sake of peace and quietness, to grant concessions in certain matters, which in reality from an union point of view seemed both unnecessary and undesirable. They may have complain as much as they like of the Norwegian national obstinacy, of their sickly fears of any sort of »confusion»; their inability to comprehend the requirements of the Union; it remained, however, a fact, that it was necessary to take into account, and indeed, it was a duty to respect it to a certain extent, as it originated in no slight degree from feelings fed by the subordinate position Norway had always held in years gone by. [Pg 5] [Pg 6] Sweden’s later Union policy. [Pg 7] 2:1 2:2 2:3 3:1 3:2 4:1 5:1 Swedish policy had thus to face two alternatives, either firmly and inexorably to insist on the Swedish demands for the amendment of the Union, conscious that they were in the interests of the Union, and like wise the real interest of Norway; or make a compromise, be contented with a partially disorganized Union, which by its bonds outwardly at least, preserved the appearance of the Scandinavian Peninsula’s unity to Europe. The currents of the Union Policy in Sweden have swayed between these two possibilities, but if we follow it along the whole of its course, we shall see that Swedish Policy has always made a way for concessions. In the Union Committee of 1867 the Swedish members insisted on a Union Parliament as the stipulation of a joint Foreign Office; the Swedish majority in the Committe of 1898 abandoned that decision and contented itself with a joint Court of impeachment as a forum for appeal against the mutual Foreign Minister of the Union, but it insisted on maintaining the necessity of having mutual Consular representatives; during the present year, the King and the Riksdag have unanimously approved of the principles of a new arrangement with separate Consuls for Sweden and Norway. It is perhaps too soon to now judge between the lines followed by Swedish Union politicians, but in any case, it can scarcely be a matter of surprise that Swedish Policy has but slowly and gradually given up its claims. In order to preserve harmony, Sweden has been forced to do it, on account of the responsibility she once undertook on behalf of the Union, but no direct national interests have influenced the concessions and the enticing reward — harmony within the Union, the prospect of getting Norway honestly to meet her half way — has been sufficiently uncertain, in fact, the above mentioned concessions have seemed to possess a remarkable faculty for drawing forward new claims. NANSEN (ENGLISH EDITION). THE SAME AUTHOR WRITES (PAGE 62): »FINALLY IN 1903(!) THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT DECLARED OPENLY THAT THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENT WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH NORWAY’S JUST DEMANDS FOR EQUALITY IN THE UNION.» HOW SUCH A statement can be made is simply incomprehensible. HOW THE NORWEGIAN STORTHING, MADE UP AS IT IS, OF LARGE NUMBERS OF LAWYERS, HAS contributed to this, is well known to all. ON THIS ACCOUNT, IT HAS ESPECIALLY BEEN VINDICATED THAT THE ACT OF UNION PLAINLY INDICATES A JOINT FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH IS SCARCELY POSSIBLE WITHOUT A JOINT FOREIGN ADMINISTRATION; THAT THE SAME ACT OF UNION ONLY ACKNOWLEDGES THE SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER OF STATE AS THE HEAD OF THE FOREIGN ADMINISTRATION FOR THE UNION; THAT IN THE »EIDSWOLD CONSTITUTION», AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE UNION, THE PARAGRAPH REFERRING TO THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER OF STATE WAS SIMPLY IGNORED. THIS LAST INCONVENIENT FACT IS INTERPRETED BY THE MODERN NORWEGIAN THEORY OF STATE LAW AS IMPLYING, THAT THE NORWEGIAN CONSTITUTION HAS LEFT THE ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE KING PERSONALLY, WHO, IN HIS TURN ON THE GROUNDS OF THIS AUTHORITY HAS PLACED IT IN THE HANDS OF THE SWEDISH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. NANSEN (PAGE 49 AND FOLLOWING.) THE ARTFULNESS OF THIS LEGAL CONSTRUCTION BECOMES IMMEDIATELY obvious. It is exceedingly remarkable also to find that Norwegian parliamentarism can COMMIT SUCH A BLASPHEMY TOWARDS THE CONSTITUTION, THAT IT HAS confered A POSITION OF importance on the King Himself. THE NORWEGIAN RIGHT SIDE (CONSERVATIVE) HAS NOT EITHER EMPHATICALLY DISPUTED THE Swedish conception. ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE NORWEGIAN WAY OF CONFUSING THE SWEDISH legal conception AND THE SWEDISH amendment programme IN THE UNION QUESTION IS AN EXPRESSION OF NANSEN (PAGE 61). ACCORDING TO HIM »THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT AS LATE AS 1891 APPEARED, AS ALREADY MENTIONED, INCLINED TO DENY NORWAY EVERY RIGHT OF TAKING PART IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS», WHILE IN 1893 THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT OFFERED A JOINT MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOR THE UNION. THE STATE OF THE CASE WAS, THAT THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT IN 1891 OFFERED NORWAY increase OF INFLUENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BUT IN MOTIONING THIS OFFER THE SWEDISH LEGAL POINT OF VIEW WAS MAINTAINED, THAT THE ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN (DIPLOMATIC) AFFAIRS FOR THE UNION BY THE SWEDISH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS WAS FOUNDED ON LEGAL RIGHT. REFLECTIONS ARISE OF themselves. SWEDEN HAS ESPECIALLY TRIED TO ANNUL THE PARAGRAPH 25 OF NORWAY’S FUNDAMENTAL LAW WHICH LIMITS THE DUTY OF ITS UNION DEFENCE. ACCORDING TO THIS PARAGRAPH, THE YEOMANRY AND OTHER NORWEGIAN TROOPS, THAT CANNOT BE RECKONED AS BELONGING TO THE LINE, MAY NOT BE EMPLOYED OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARIES OF THE KINGDOM. THIS LAW HAS PROVED SO MUCH THE MORE pernicous, AS THE NORWEGIANS BY THEIR RECRUITING REGULATIONS HAVE ILLOYALLY WITHDRAWN FROM THE UNION-DEFENCE PART OF THEIR FIGHTING FORCES, BY OUTRAGEOUSLY ENTERING INTO THE LINE A LIMITED NUMBER ONLY OF THE ANNUAL classes of recruits. Mr HAGERUP also affirmed openly in the Storthing of 1904 that the Union question had IN QUITE TOO HIGH A DEGREE COME TO BE REGARDED BY THE NORWEGIAN PARTIES AS A workshop of weapons for elections campaigns. [Pg 8] 5:2 6:1 WE GET A GLIMPSE OF THIS ROMANCE, IN THE MIDST OF THE ULTRA MODERN »GLORIOUS» REVOLUTION. AT A LARGE MEETING AT HAMAR IT WAS DECREED, THAT THE NEW KING SHOULD BEAR A NAME AFTER ONE ON THE ANCIENT KINGS OF NORWAY. IN A FESTIVAL NUMBER OF A »VORDENS GANG» IN HONOUR OF THE REVOLUTION WE FIND PRINTED A »PSALM ON OLAF’S DAY» WRITTEN by BJÖRNSON. THAT NORWAY IN CARRYING OUT THE LAW (1899) RESPECTING THE FLAG, BROKE AN AGREEMENT with Sweden made in 1844, was of course only in conformity with everything else. II. The Consular Question is a red thread running through the history of the Union struggles during the last fourteen years— The Norwegians on their part in attempting to defend the way in which the Left Side started the Union Policy in the beginning of 1890, always allude to what happened in Sweden in 18858:1. What was it then that happened in 1885? By the amendment of the Swedish Constitution, the Prime Minister was also in the Ministerial Council (for Foreign affairs), so that the Council instead of having only two members, ever after had three, the object being to guarantee that the Cabinet Council should be more fully represented in they the in administration of Foreign affairs. Now, as previously mentioned, by a Royal Decree in 1835 the Norwegian Prime Minister at Stockholm was admitted into the Ministerial Council when foreign affairs affecting the two Kingdoms were negotiated. Thus Norway by the proposed Constitutional amendment was supposed to occupy a somewhat more unfavourable position than formerly. But Sweden immediately offers a more extended representation in the Council for Foreign affairs, which offer, however, is, for some inexplicable reason, refused by Norway on formal grounds. In the year 1891 this offer was renewed, but then the majority on the Left Side of the Storthing finds a very excellent reason for refusing the proposition, by pointing out, that the Swedish Council in motioning towards the proposed amendment in the Act of Union (not in the proposed paragraph itself) maintains the stand-point that Sweden’s leadership in the administration of Foreign affairs is founded on legal right9:1. But something else is said to have happened in 1885, which was not discovered by the Norwegian side till several years later, and which, being exposed by the Norwegian agitation in these days, offers to we Swedes the delights of novelty. Formerly foreign affairs were supposed to be administered chiefly by the Swedish King personally, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs is said to have stood in a more personal relation to the King. Foreign Affairs under such circumstances were supposed to be more impartially treated, so that even Norway’s lawful interests could receive due attention. But by the amendment of the Constitution of 1885 the Swedish Foreign Minister would be entirely subservient to Swedish Parliamentarism, which made the employment of the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the protection of Norwegian interests, still more dissatisfactory for Norway than formerly. This is pretended to have become the source of the last twenty year’s Union struggle9:2. Now the state of the case is this, the Foreign Minister’s parliamentary responsibility has not been increased by the amendment of the Constitution in 1885. Formerly he was — just as he is now — responsible, as reporter, in the first place for all resolutions in Foreign affairs. The point that was formally confirmed by law in 1885 was, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs should also prepare matters concerning foreign affairs. According to the older version of the paragraph that was altered that year (1885), the King was invested with greater rights in reference to that side of the administration of foreign affairs. Thus the amendment of the Constitution in 1885 only effected that the actual influence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sweden’s foreign policy was brought into harmony with the The Consul question. The change in the Swedish Constitution of 1885. Norway’s attitude to the same. [Pg 9] [Pg 10] formal responsibility he held in all cases for Sweden’s Foreign policy. It may be added that this constitutional amendment only confirmed the old practice, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs was formerly regularly employed to prepare matters concerning foreign affairs, and that his previous employment in the preparation of foreign affairs was naturally carried out under observation of the responsibility in which he stood for the resolutions taken, and was not inspired by any mysterious personal relations to the King. The whole of this Norwegian notion of the fatal influence on the Union in this constitutional amendment, is, in fact, nothing but a manufactured theory containing no real grounds whatsoever. Now it must be observed that Norway had formerly no regular parliamentary control over foreign affairs, but the Swedish offer of 1891 was just intended to give the Norwegian Storthing the right to this control, to be exercised under the same conditions as those in the Swedish Diet. But the Storthing refused (as previously mentioned) the Swedish offer; it preferred to keep the quarrel alive, and in order to do this, it was necessary to be able to refer to Swedish oppression. The Swedish offer being thus refused, the Norwegian Union politics in 1891 took a new turn. The road was already pointed out by the veteran leader of the Left Side (separatists) Johan Sverdrup; it was indicated »to take matters into our own hands». The system was founded on the Norwegian Left Side State-law theory, according to which Norway, as a Sovereign state, was entitled to its own Minister for Foreign Affairs, its own diplomatic representatives and consuls, all of which was proved with much craft by the Constitution of Norway and the Act of Union between Sweden and Norway. The right to one and all to which Norway, as a Sovereign power, was entitled, should now be realized, independently and boldly, without consulting Sweden. By Royal Decree, the Storting having granted the means, a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Norwegian Diplomatic Representatives and consuls should be appointed without delay in the Norwegian Council. Thus the lines of the future politics of Norway were fixed by the Separatists10:1. It is obvious, that the notion of the one Kingdom in a Union being able, of its own accord without consulting the other Kingdom, to alter and dissolve the bonds of Union, is theoretically inimical to the Union itself, and in fact shows enormous disloyalty to the other half of the Union. A Union policy of this sort is, of course, in spirit, completely revolutionary, and at the outset has no place within the Union. Nevertheless it has been followed under continued official protestations of fidelity to the Union — the last speech of this sort was heard a short time ago, when the well known road was fully marked out, right away to the object so long hovering in view. This is not the only piece of duplicity in Norwegian Union policy of whech Sweden has had to complain. There was a cautious beginning with »their own Consuls»; it was too venturesome a task to begin the system at once with the question of their own Minister for Foreign Affairs. On the side of Norway it has been claimed that the mercantile interests of Norway demanded a Consular Service of its own11:1. In reality, it is an indisputable fact, even acknowledged by Norwegians, that no essentially practical inconvenience has been caused by the system of having a joint Consular Service. The Circles most affected by the matter in Norway, Commercial men and ship-owners — were in opposition for a long time; not even in 1891 did the separatists venture to lay the Consular Committee’s deliberations on the subject before the mercantile authorities. One Norwegian, who was well competent to judge of the matter, acknowledged openly, when the question was first broached, that »the grounds of the proposition for a complete separation as being of benefit to the shipping, commerce, and industry of the country, are so weak, that it would be impossible for them except, through persistent agitation to gain conviction, either among the classes most interested, or amongst the masses of the people». There are principally two reasons for the proposed reform, first that Sweden and Norway have a different Tariff-System, secondly, the frequent rivalry between Swedish and Norwegian trade articles of export. The first reason is baseless, as the different Tariff-Systems are of importance chiefly for the imports, and not for the exports12:1; the second reason loses its chief point by the fact that consuls are not commercial agents, that it is not their business to promote trade for private The Norwegian radicals’ method of taking matters into their hands. [Pg 11] The real innecessity of having separate Consuls. [Pg 12] individuals, but only to give reports of the possibilities of trading with different countries. It is also worthy of mention, that in Sweden not the slightest wish has been expressed in this direction, though at present the majority of the Consuls abroad are Norwegians. And as regards the much- talked of fears, that in the administration of the Consular Service by the Foreign Office, partiality might be exercised in the interests of Sweden, the fact that for a long time past the whole of the mercantile portion of the Consuls’ duties have, on Norway’s side, been performed by one of the Norwegian Government Departements, proves how vain those fears were. Norwegian separatists, among others Michelsen himself, long ago, in a moment of rare sincerity, have acknowledged that other motives besides the practical have been at the root of the claim for reform. A Norwegian Consular Service meant, in itself, a step in the direction of the rupture of the bonds of Union, and was therefore even then an object worth striving for. But it was also openly declared, that a Norwegian Consular Service would necessarily be succeeded by a Norwegian diplomatic representation and a Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs. »Directly they have got the wedge fixed into the small end», wrote in 1892 President Hans Forssell, »they will try to persuade us that there will be no danger in letting them drive it in a bit». Above all they considered that a Norwegian Consular Service would by degrees disorganize the administration of the Foreign Office, and on the grounds of the dominating rôle interests of economy play in the Foreign politics of our day, it would by degrees expand into a regular Norwegian Foreign Office. The chief characteristic of this programme is the total absence of any motive for it from a Union point of view. Modern Norwegian Nationalism has only really thought of Sweden and Norway, but not of the Union and its claims. Whenever Sweden has ventured to advocate the cause of the Union, Norway has begun to talk of the interests of Sweden. If, at any time, the claims of the Union have been discussed in Norway, they have usually been identical with those of Norway. The interests of the Union demanded that Norway, without further parley, got what its national sensitive feeling was pleased to decree as the Sovereign Norway’s right. That is about the gist of the matter. The Norwegian policy has by degrees become blind to the fact, that the interests of the Union ought to demand a subordination of the inclination to decide arbitrarily on points touching the Union, both for the sake of Sweden and — of Norway. When therefore the King, in the interests of the Union, at first opposed both the Consular reform itself and the manner of carrying it out, they did not see the King of Norway, or the King of the Union, only the King of Sweden, the veto of the King of Norway was called the Swedish veto against the rightful claims of Norway. This dishonest doctrine has gradually poisoned the minds of the people of Norway, and it is this, that has brought about the rupture of the Union. Under strong protest from the Norwegian Right Side (Conservative), which at that time looked upon a separate Consular Service under a mutual diplomatic administration as introducing something hitherto unheard of in the annals of history, the consular question was brought to the decision by the Norwegian Left Side. By an order of the Storthing, the method was established: the Consular question was exclusively a Norwegian matter, which must be treated and decided upon by Norwegian authorities of State alone; on the other hand the winding up of the joint Consular Service would be a cause of negotiations with Sweden. In plain words, the Royal Decree must be given in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, not in a so-called Joint Cabinet consisting of both Swedish and Norwegian members, which according to the Act of Union must decide in all questions »concerning the two Kingdoms14:1.» And this one-sided right of decision was maintained in spite of the common Consular statutes — the last in 1886 — having been confirmed by a Joint Cabinet, and in spite of the fact that these statutes prescribed the settlement of Consular Affairs in that Council alone. Added to this, the relations of the future Norwegian Consular Service to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs and diplomatic representatives had also to be arranged. This matter might certainly be considered, to belong to the negotiations relating to the winding up of the joint Consular Service. But if Norway resolved that a separate Consular Service should be established within a given time, it would be Norway’s prerogative to dictate the conditions of winding it up; Norway might without further ceremony withdraw a portion of its Foreign affairs from the joint Foreign administration. The real object of raising the consular question. [Pg 13] Want of Union motives for Consular reform. Misinterpretation of the King’s opposition. [Pg 14] The raising of the Consular question in 1891. [Pg 15] Through its leader, Emil Stang, the Norwegian Conservatives supported the Union King’s view that the matter was as yet too imperfectly developed, and that it must be decided on in a joint Cabinet. But in 1892 the Storthing resolved, with a majority of 14 votes, on the establishment of a Norwegian Consular Service. The King was prepared to refuse the sanction to this, in a Norwegian Cabinet Council, and then and there began the conflict between King and Council, as witnessed by the events of later times. The character of this conflict may be mentioned already here, as Norway, in fact, was even then, in 1892, on the eve of the revolution, which has now broken out. When the Constitution of Norway was framed in 1814, the Continent was but little acquainted with the pure parliamentarism, with a ruling Council and a powerless King. The Constitution is instead based on the theory of the division of the state power into three organs, and this is plainly stated in the division of the Constitution. The King’s veto over legal questions is only suspensive, but he is not represented as the helpless tool of Storthing and Council. The Cabinet Council is certainly responsible to the Storthing, but only for its own advice, not for the King’s Decrees. The King is legally bound to listen to the opinions of his ministers, but the right of making Decrees according to his own judgment, is expressly reserved to him. Nor does the Constitution of Norway recognize the law of refusing countersignature, which is found for instance in the Swedish Constitution. In 1814 the Storthing explicitly refused a proposition to give the Cabinet Council this right, declaring that the King ought not to be deprived of all his privileges. All the King’s Decrees must be countersigned by one of the Prime Ministers, but this countersignature implies only the responsibility for the agreement of the records with the resolutions taken. The greatest Norwegian writers on State Law, have acknowledged that this is Norwegian National Law15:1. Furthermore the Constitution originally did not recognize something else remarkable for modern parliamentarism: the Ministers were not even allowed to attend the debates of the Storthing. Then came the Crisis of 1884, when the Norwegian Radicals with the Court of impeachment a weapon, forced the King to capitulate, forced him to summon a Radical Ministry, and to sanction an amendment of the Constitution, by which the Ministery were allowed to attend the debates in the Storthing. By this means, the modern parliamentarism, with all its claims, elbowed its way into Norwegian State life. But the old prescriptions as to the responsibility of the Cabinet Council, were retained, and they must naturally be interpreted as of old. The new parliamentary interpretation of these prescriptions of responsibility, especially the right of refusing countersignature, was opposed by the King, who adhered to the old only possible forms. Even in 1892 the Radical Cabinet Steen did not venture to carry the Consular question to an extreme. They were contented to play with fire. Before the King found an opportunity to give his definite answer to the consular question, the Cabinet retired. The Ministerial strike recently set on the political stage, was even then in the perspective. But the King having vainly tried to form a Conservative Ministry and matters becoming serious, a retreat was sounded, the Storthing itself taking the initiative, this time, strange to say, receiving the hint from Mr Michelsen. The requests of the Ministers to resign were withdrawn, and the Consular Question was postponed to a future date. The Norwegian masses were not as yet sufficiently impregnated with the gospel of the dissolution of the Union — and Norway was not yet armed for defence. The following year the same tale began afresh. The Storthing resolved on having a separate Consular Service, the Ministers sent in their requests to resign, to avoid, as they declared, rousing a constitutional dispute on the countersignature question which might bring about consequences »that scarcely any other political question had aroused in our present constitution». This time the Conservatives stepped into the breach on behalf of the King and the Union. For two years The Cabinet Stang opposed a furious Storthing, while the King was powerless to form a parliamentary Radical Ministry on reasonable terms. This conflict naturally produced intense excitement, and the Radicals, of course, saw in the King’s opposition, Sweden’s and the King’s of Sweden, not the King’s of the United Kingdoms fighting a battle against the destruction of the Union. It is in this way that the Consular Question became magnified into a question of National honour. The blow given to their honour by the disloyalty of the Radicals to the Union was entirely ignored. The Consular question became by degrees, the chief National question of the »The King and the Ministry» according to the Norwegian Constitution. [Pg 16] The development of the Consular question. [Pg 17] 9:1 9:2 10:1 8:1 11:1 country. In the Spring of 1895 the situation in Norway was such that a complete standstill was threatened, and all sorts of extravagant plans were mooted on the Norwegian Radical Side. It was then that in limited Swedish Conservatives circles a plan was said to exist for making Norway come to an agreeable settlement of the Union question, by main force. This is a matter impossible to decide. These reports spread like wildfire, and had the effect of oil upon fire. And now at last Norway begins to think of her defence which of late years she has neglected. The Norwegians meanwhile gave in as Norway was not ready. The Storthing in Norway also consented to what Sweden had all along endeavoured to obtain, viz. a general settlement. The Union Committee 1895-1898 effected a couple of year’s truce; any real results were not to be expected. The Norwegian Radicals had other plans than a reasonable settlement of the Union question; its representatives in the Committee were bound by their party programme, and insisted on having their own Minister for Foreign affairs. On the other side, the two representatives of the Swedish Conservatives maintained the demand for a Union Parliament which the Norwegians in the previous Union Committee had refused. The Swedish and Norwegian majorities were very nearly balanced. They were united in the opinion that the Union necessarily demanded a joint Minister for Foreign affairs, but differed in everything else on several points. For instance, the Norwegian majority, characteristically would not agree to limit the possibility for Norway (on the grounds of paragraph 25 in the Constitution) of withdrawing of her own accord, a greater or smaller portion of Norwegian troops from the defending forces of the Union18:1. In the Consular question there were also differences. The Swedish members were unanimous in insisting on a joint Consular Service for both Kingdoms. The Norwegian majority preferred, from all points of view, a joint Consular Service to a separate one for each Kingdom, and strongly emphasized the point that in all circumstances the consuls ought to be personally and immediately under the control of the Minister for Foreign affairs, as the limits in the sphere of operations between the Consuls and the Diplomatic Officials became more and more indefined. But with evident respect to the opposing Norwegian opinions, it tried to regulate the Consular Service, by joint terminable laws, nevertheless, so worded, that not till the lapse of 15 years, the Kingdom that so desired, might have the right to dissolve the joint Consular Service18:2. The Union Committee having failed, the Norwegian Radicals prepared for another attack on the old lines. By passing the Flag Bill, they prepared to renew negotiations on the Consular Question, while, at the same time, they were busily engaged in strengthening their defence and raising on the boundaries rumoured fortresses against Sweden. The Under Secretary of State, Dr. Sigurd Ibsen, instituted an inquiry as to the feasibility of having a separate Consular Service in conjunction with the existing Foreign administration. It was on this point that the Minister for Foreign affairs, for the time being, Mr. Lagerheim, made a proposal, the consequences of which brought about the present crisis. Compare NANSEN (page 48 and following). THE NORWEGIANS, AS AFORESAID, HAVE GENERALLY LOOKED UPON SWEDEN’S MAINTAINING ITS CONCEPTION OF THE UNION LAW AS SOMETHING VERY CRIMINAL; THIS HAS BEEN NORWAY’S right alone. COMPARE NANSEN (PAGE 54). »THE CHANGE IN THE SWEDISH CONSTITUTION IN 1885 HAS therefore become the principal cause of the last twenty years’ strife in the union.» ON THE NORWEGIAN SIDE, IT HAS BEEN SAID, THAT SWEDEN IN 1885 ADOPTED THE SAME METHOD, WHEN, BY CHANGING THE SWEDISH CONSTITUTION BY THEMSELVES, THEY REORGANIZED THE COUNCIL FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IT MUST, HOWEVER, BE OBSERVED, THAT, IN THIS, SWEDEN IS SUPPORTED BY ITS OWN RIGHT, AS ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE FOREMOST NORWEGIAN WRITERS ON STATE LAW AND NORWEGIAN CONSERVATIVES, TO UNDERTAKE THE management of foreign policy. This legal stand-point had been adopted in 1835, when A RESOLUTION WAS PASSED IN THE Swedish CABINET TO ADMIT THE NORWEGIAN MINISTER OF STATE TO THE Ministeral COUNCIL. THE NORWEGIAN CLAIM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE REVISION OF THE SWEDISH CONSTITUTION IS, HOWEVER, UNWARRANTABLE, AS NORWAY, IN THE INDISPUTABLY UNIONISTIC STADTHOLDER QUESTION IN 1860 MAINTAINED THAT SWEDEN WAS NOT WARRANTED IN interfering when revisions or changes were made in the Norwegian Constitution. Compare NANSEN (page 68 and following). The position in 1895. The Union Committee 1895-1908. [Pg 18] Norway prepares again to the Consular Question. [Pg 19] 12:1 14:1 18:1 18:2 15:1 IT IS A SINGULAR COINCIDENCE, THAT NORWAY IN THESE DAYS, WHEN IT HAS BROUGHT THE CONSULAR QUESTION TO A CLIMAX, HAS BEGUN TO CARRY OUT A GENERAL RISE IN THE FISCAL rates; the mercantile interests of »the land of Free Trade» Norway evidently do not lie so very deep after all. THE QUESTION AS TO WHEN A MATTER SHALL BE DISCUSSED IN A JOINT CABINET OR NOT, HAS NOT BEEN THE SMALLEST OF THE STUMBLING BLOCKS IN THE THORNY PATH OF THE UNION NEGOTIATIONS. IN NORWAY, TO QUOTE MR HAGERUP, THERE HAS BEEN QUITE A »SICKLY» FEAR OF HAVING MATTERS SETTLED THERE. ON THE NORWEGIAN LEFT SIDE THEY HAVE DEFENDED THE OPINION, THAT ONLY THOSE MATTERS WHICH, BEING EXPRESSLY MENTIONED IN THE ACT OF UNION, AS BEING DISTINCTIVELY UNION-MATTERS OUGHT TO BE BROUGHT THERE. IN SWEDEN IT HAS BEEN HELD, THAT THE ACT OF UNION HAS NO POWER TO GIVE AN EXHAUSTIVE ACCOUNT AS TO WHAT MATTERS BELONG TO THE UNION AND WHICH DO NOT. WHETHER IT CAN BE CONSIDERED A MATTER WHICH CONCERNS BOTH THE KINGDOMS DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON THE EXACT NATURE OF the matter itself. This latter conception has been adopted of old. Compare No. I §§ 5, 15, 30, 31. THE SWEDISH MAJORITY HAD CONTEMPLATED A PROVISION IN THE ACT OF UNION, wherevy IT BECAME INCUMBENT FOR BOTH KINGDOMS TO PLACE A FIXED MINIMUM OF FIGHTING FORCES TO the disposition of the Union. NANSEN SAYS (PAGE 71) »DIVISIONS AROSE PARTLY OVER THE RESISTANCE FROM THE SWEDISH SIDE TO THE UNANIMOUS DEMAND OF THE NORWEGIAN DELEGATES FOR A SEPARATE CONSULAR Service.» This is, as plainly apparent, an extremely modified version of the truth. III. His Excellency Mr. Lagerheim’s proposal implied an attempt to settle the Consular Question itself, by retaining the existing Foreign Administration and dissolving the joint Consular Service. By doing this, he plainly foresaw that the Consular Question would inevitably be raised afresh on the part of Norway. It was necessary therefore to lead the work of reform in the quiet paths of Union negotiations, in order to prevent the old attempts on Norway’s side »to take matters into her own hands», to the detriment of the harmony in the Union. If results in that way could be gained, negotiative operations might win more confidence from distrustful Norwegian politicians. The Swedish government seems also to have taken into account the contingency that, by making this offer, they would get Norway to meet them half way, and agree sooner or later to a definite solution of the Union conflict, by a reorganisation, on the grounds of having a joint Minister for Foreign affairs. In one respect, it was undeniably a good opportunity for such an attempt. The violent Russianizing of Finland, and the undefined plots it concealed, could not fail to open the eyes of many in Norway. Even Norwegian Radicals were obliged to acknowledge that the integrity of the Kingdoms of Scandinavia formed a necessary guarantee for their freedom and independence19:1. It was certainly on that account that their courage was not so fully shared by all, when the Norwegian Radicals prepared to renew their old efforts to break the Union. An honourable compromise with Sweden, on that occasion, would probably have been acceptable. But Mr Lagerheim’s experiment had, on all hands, almost insurmountable difficulties through which to pilot its way. In Sweden it had always been feared that separate Consuls for Norway without the reorganization of the Foreign administration, would act as a wedge to rupture the Union, especially as leading Norwegian politicians took no pains to hide their ulterior motives. Therefore, the Swedish Diet in 1893 expressed a decided wish that the Consular question should not be discussed except in connection with the question of Foreign administration, and from this decision the Swedish Diet has not since deviated in any way. In order, therefore, that there might be some prospect of the Swedish government gaining the approval of the Swedish Diet, of the result of the negotiations, it was necessary that it contained His Excellency Mr. Lagerheim’s Proposal. [Pg 20] The difficulties attending the satisfactory settlement of the Consular Question. safe guarantees that the Consular reform would not react to the advantage of a Union programme to which Sweden could never agree: i. e. a purely personal Union. But on the other hand, it was expected that the efforts to get these guarantees fixed on a firm basis would meet with opposition from the Norwegian side. The old Norwegian traditions of the Radical party were as deeply rooted as ever in the political life of Norway. It was hard for the Norwegian Radicals to lose sight of the original political aims in carrying out the reform of the Consular service. D:r Ibsen’s aforesaid inquiry plainly hinted that Norwegian opposition would be raised against the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs having direct control over the Norwegian Consuls, a stipulation that was absolutely necessary both from a Swedish and a Union point of view. And Norwegian policy had generally with its sickly distrust and susceptibility an instinctive disinclination to bind Norway to anything referring to the burning question of the day. »As to one’s rights, no one negotiates». This has become well nigh the axiom for Norwegian politics. And Norway now considers she has a right to one and all of her demands. — In a joint Cabinet Council held on January 21et 1902, it was resolved to convene a Union Consular Committee consisting of two Swedish and two Norwegian authorities,21:1 who were to institute an examination as to how far a new arrangement with separate Consuls for each of the United Kingdoms would practically work under the administration of the present joint diplomatic representatives. The Committee accepted its task in a purely administrative spirit. It declared distinctly that it considered it was not compulsory for them to give an opinion as to the sui...