The Struggle for the Middle East The Struggle for the Middle East The Soviet Union and the Middle East 1958-68 Walter Laqueur Written under the auspices of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Georgetown University, Washington D.C. London Routledge & Kegan Paul First published 1969 by Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd Broadway House, 68-74 Carter Lane, E.C.4 Printed in Great Britain by Ebenezer Baylis <& Son Ltd, The Trinity Press, Worcester, j/fc/ London © Walter Laqueur 1969 No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except for the quotation of brief passages in criticism This book was researched and written under the first annual Distinguished Writers Award, granted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. The Center is a private, non-profit organisation that seeks to advance the understanding of international policy issues through interdisciplinary study of emerging world problems. The Center does not take a position on any policy issue, and the views expressed in works it sponsors are those of the individual author SBN 7IOO 6636 8 Contents I Introduction 1 2 Prelude: 1945-58 5 3 The Neutralization of the Northern Tier 14 4 Russia, Zionism, Israel 43 The Soviet Union and the Arab World î 63 6 Oil for the Lamps of Eastern Europe ? 118 7 Trade and Aid 137 8 The Soviet Military Presence • 145 Communism, Maoism, Arab Socialism 162 9 Conclusion 181 IO Notes *95 Bibliography 209 Documents 213 Documents page 1. O. Tuganova:Political Trends in the Arab East (1966) 213 2. Statement on the Situation in the Arab Countries by the Arab Communist Parties (May 1967) 221 3. Egypt and Communism (I). From Speeches by President Gamal Abdul Nasser in Damascus (March 1959) 229 4. Egypt and Communism (II). From Nasser’s Speech (May 29,1967) 235 5. Egypt’s Debt to the Soviet Union. From Nasser’s Speech (July 23, 1968) 237 6. Soviet Government Statement on the Situation in the Near East (May 24, 1967) 241 7. Statement on the Situation in the Middle East by the East European Communist Parties (June 1967) 243 8. A. N. Kosygin: Speech at the UN (June 19, 1967) 245 9. Decisions of the Israeli Communist Party (RAKAH) (June 1967) 256 10. Moshe Sneh: Our Position (June 1967) 258 11. CPSU: The Policy of the Soviet Union and Israeli Aggression (June 1967) 268 12. L. Brezhnev: The Middle Eastern Crisis (July 1967) 270 13. Soviet Government Statement on the Middle East (March 30, 1968) 274 14. K. Ivanov : Israel, Zionism and International Imperialism (1968) 277 viii Documents 15. ‘Baathist Crimes in Syria’ (World Marxist Review, 1964) 289 16. Khalid Bakdash: The National Liberation Movement and the Communists (1965) 292 17. Syrian Communist Party : Our Policy after February 1966 298 18. Soviet Warning to Britain, Israel and the United States (May 1966) 302 19. Khalid Bakdash: Syrian Communists Call for Arab Unity (September 3, 1967) 304 20. Iraqi Communist Party: ‘For the Defence of the Republic’ (August 1959) 316 21. Documents of the 3rd National Conference of the Iraqi Communist Party (1967) 326 22. Reza Radmanesh: The Policy of the Iranian Com­ munists (1967) 340 23. TASS: Western Interference in the Persian Gulf (March 1968) 346 24. Y. Serbin: The Navigation Regime in the Black Sea Straits (1966) 348 25. A. N. Kosygin: Speech in Ankara (December 22, 1966) 350 i Introduction The present study is devoted to a review of Soviet policy in the Middle East during the last decade and to an analysis of its future prospects. It also deals with developments inside the various Middle East countries -in so far as they may influence the outcome of the struggle for the Middle East. It is in some ways a sequel to Com­ munism and Nationalism in the Middle East (1956), and The Soviet Union and the Middle East (1959). The shortcomings of these earlier books were, and are, obvious to the author. They were written at a time when little source material was available, and when it was just beginning to be realized that the topic itself was a legitimate subject of study. The general outlines of Soviet policy in the Middle East could be only dimly recognized at the time. Since then the situation has changed radically; as far as source material is concerned, the danger now is not of drought, but of drowning, and many new problems have appeared. In the nineteen-fifties Soviet relations with Iran and Turkey were much less complex than they are today; Soviet interest in Middle East oil barely existed, and there was virtually no Soviet interest in Cyprus, Sudan, Algeria, South Arabia, and a great many other places. There was no Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and, on a different level, hardly any Soviet writings on the Middle East; but as the area assumed growing importance in Soviet policy, so has the volume of literature expanded. I was tempted at times to bring my two earlier books up to date, but refrained for a number of good reasons. They summarized the early stages (the ‘prehistory’) of the Soviet drive towards the Middle East. It was not simply a question of continuing the historical narrative and adding fresh material; the whole perspective has changed. I believe that the basic assumption of these two earlier books was correct : the Soviet drive 1 Introduction 2 towards the Middle East was gathering momentum in the fifties; given the weakness of the area as a whole and the domestic situation in the Arab world, the Soviet Union had an excellent chance greatly to strengthen its position in the Middle East and perhaps even to become the dominant power there. These assumptions were by no means generally shared fifteen or even ten years ago. Soviet pre­ occupation with Europe was taken too much for granted, while the prospects of Nasserist Pan-Arabism as an independent political force were overrated. It was difficult to foresee in the middle fifties exactly what form the radicalization in the Middle East would take in the years to come. The communist camp was still united; no rival centers had arisen to shake the monolithic bloc. We are much wiser now. During this past decade the importance of communist parties has on the whole decreased; there has been a far-reaching rapprochement between a number of Mhddle East countries and the Soviet Union, but it has largely by-passed the official communist parties in the area. Military dictators and new political groups (such as the neo-Ba’th) have been of far greater significance in this context. Even in the nineteen- fifties there were reasons to doubt the relevance of the doctrinal discussions in Soviet writings as a key to the understanding of Soviet policy in the Middle East. These books and articles were of some interest because they helped to explain shifts in policy; occasionally they reflected internal dissension. Today I feel even more sceptical about their relevance, for they shed very little light on the real mainsprings of Soviet policy. The interests of Russia as a great power have played a role in Soviet foreign policy from its earliest days, and this was, of course, inevitable. As the years passed their specific weight has steadily increased and that of Leninist ideology has steadily declined. It has declined, but not altogether disappeared. Official Soviet doctrine still survives almost in its pristine state, but the discrepancy between theory and practice is still growing, and it is now very difficult to ascertain to what extent even those making the doctrinal pronouncements believe in them. The Soviet political and military leaders are, of course, communists, and any attempt to explain their foreign-policy decisions solely on the basis of tradi­ tional power politics is ultimately futile. But what does it mean to be a leading communist in the Soviet Union today? The writings of Marx and Lenin alone are unlikely to provide a satisfactory answer. For this reason I have dealt with doctrinal disputations in this book