The Project Gutenberg eBook, The Story of the Great War, Volume V (of 8), Edited by Francis J. (Francis Joseph) Reynolds, Allen L. (Allen Leon) Churchill, and Francis Trevelyan Miller This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org Title: The Story of the Great War, Volume V (of 8) Battle of Jutland Bank; Russian Offensive; Kut-El-Amara; East Africa; Verdun; The Great Somme Drive; United States and Belligerents; Summary of Two Years' War Editor: Francis J. (Francis Joseph) Reynolds, Allen L. (Allen Leon) Churchill, and Francis Trevelyan Miller Release Date: July 7, 2009 [eBook #29341] Language: English Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 ***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR, VOLUME V (OF 8)*** E-text prepared by Charlene Taylor, Christine P. Travers, and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team (http://www.pgdp.net) from page images generously made available by Internet Archive (http://www.archive.org) Note: Images of the original pages are available through Internet Archive. See http://www.archive.org/details/storyofgreatwarh05churuoft Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected. Hyphenation and accentuation have been made consistent. All other inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's spelling has been retained. Page 26: "notwithstanding he or they may believe to the contrary" has been changed to "notwithstanding what he or they may believe to the contrary". Pages 178/179: Words are missing between "cross-" and "of" in the sentence: Ten miles west of Kolki the Russians succeeded in cross- of Gruziatin, two miles north of Godomitchy, the small German garrison of which, consisting of some five hundred officers and men, fell into Russian captivity. Page 200: "during pursuit of the Russians" has been changed to "during pursuit by the Russians". Frontispiece Jutland The STORY OF THE GREAT WAR BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK · RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE · KUT-EL-AMARA EAST AFRICA · VERDUN · THE GREAT SOMME DRIVE · UNITED STATES AND BELLIGERENTS SUMMARY OF TWO YEARS' WAR Editor's logo VOLUME V P · F · COLLIER & SON · NEW YORK Copyright 1916 By P. F. Collier & Son CONTENTS PART I.—AUSTRIAN PROPAGANDA CHAPTER I. AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR IMPLICATED IN STRIKE PLOTS—HIS RECALL—RAMIFICATIONS OF GERMAN CONSPIRACIES II. THE PLOT TO DESTROY SHIPS—PACIFIC COAST CONSPIRACIES—HAMBURG-AMERICAN CASE—SCOPE OF NEW YORK INVESTIGATIONS III. VON RINTELEN'S ACTIVITIES—CONGRESSMAN INVOLVED—GERMANY'S REPUDIATIONS—DISMISSAL OF CAPTAINS BOY-ED AND VON PAPEN IV. GREAT BRITAIN'S DEFENSE OF BLOCKADE—AMERICAN METHODS IN CIVIL WAR CITED V. BRITISH BLOCKADE DENOUNCED AS ILLEGAL AND INEFFECTIVE BY THE UNITED STATES—THE AMERICAN POSITION VI. GREAT BRITAIN UNYIELDING—EFFECT OF THE BLOCKADE—THE CHICAGO MEAT PACKERS' CASE VII. SEIZURE OF SUSPECTED SHIPS—TRADING WITH THE ENEMY—THE APPAM—THE ANGLO-FRENCH LOAN— FORD PEACE EXPEDITION VIII. AMERICAN PACIFICISM—PREPAREDNESS—MUNITION SAFEGUARD PART II.—OPERATIONS ON THE SEA IX. NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS IN MANY WATERS X. MINOR ENGAGEMENTS AND LOSSES XI. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK—BEGINNING XII. SOME SECONDARY FEATURES OF THE BATTLE XIII. LOSSES AND TACTICS XIV. DEATH OF LORD KITCHENER—OTHER EVENTS OF THE SECOND YEAR PART III.—CAMPAIGN ON THE EASTERN FRONT XV. THE EASTERN FRONT AT THE APPROACH OF SPRING, 1916 XVI. THE RUSSIAN MARCH—OFFENSIVE FROM RIGA TO PINSK XVII. RESUMPTION OF AUSTRO-RUSSIAN OPERATIONS XVIII. THAW AND SPRING FLOODS 9 15 22 28 35 44 49 54 59 66 70 89 94 108 116 122 133 141 XIX. ARTILLERY DUELS XX. THE GREAT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE XXI. THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF THE BUKOWINA XXII. IN CONQUERED EAST GALICIA XXIII. THE GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE BEFORE KOVEL XXIV. PROGRESS OF THE BUKOWINIAN CONQUEST XXV. TEMPORARY LULL IN THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE XXVI. ADVANCE AGAINST LEMBERG AND KOVEL XXVII. THE GERMANS' STAND ON THE STOKHOD XXVIII. INCREASED STRENGTH OF THE RUSSIAN DRIVE PART IV.—THE BALKANS XXIX. HOLDING FAST IN SALONIKI XXX. MILITARY AND POLITICAL EVENTS IN GREECE PART V.—AUSTRO-ITALIAN CAMPAIGN XXXI. RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS ON THE ITALIAN FRONT XXXII. THE SPRING OF 1916 ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT XXXIII. THE AUSTRIAN MAY DRIVE IN THE TRENTINO XXXIV. THE RISE AND FAILURE OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN DRIVE XXXV. THE ITALIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN THE TRENTINO XXXVI. CONTINUATION OF THE ITALIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE XXXVII. MINOR OPERATIONS ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT IN TRENTINO OFFENSIVE PART VI.—RUSSO-TURKISH CAMPAIGN XXXVIII. RUSSIAN SUCCESSES AFTER ERZERUM PART VII.—CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA AND PERSIA XXXIX. RENEWED ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE KUT-EL-AMARA XL. THE SURRENDER OF KUT-EL-AMARA XLI. SPRING AND SUMMER TRENCH WAR ON THE TIGRIS XLII. RUSSIAN ADVANCE TOWARD BAGDAD XLIII. TURKISH OFFENSIVE AND RUSSIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN ARMENIA AND PERSIA PART VIII.—OPERATIONS ON THE WESTERN FRONT XLIV. RENEWAL OF THE BATTLE OF VERDUN XLV. THE STRUGGLE FOR VAUX FORT AND VILLAGE—BATTLE OF MORT HOMME XLVI. BATTLE OF HILL 304 AND DOUAUMONT—THE STRUGGLE AT FLEURY XLVII. SPRING OPERATIONS IN OTHER SECTORS XLVIII. BATTLE OF THE SOMME—ALLIED PREPARATIONS—POSITION OF THE OPPOSING FORCES XLIX. THE BRITISH ATTACK L. THE FRENCH ATTACKS NORTH AND SOUTH OF THE SOMME LI. THE BRITISH ATTACK (CONTINUED) LII. THE SECOND PHASE OF THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME PART IX.—THE WAR IN THE AIR LIII. THE VALUE OF ZEPPELINS IN LONG-DISTANCE RECONNOITERING—NAVAL AUXILIARIES LIV. AEROPLANE IMPROVEMENTS—GIANT MACHINES—TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS LV. LOSSES AND CASUALTIES IN AERIAL WARFARE—DISCREPANCIES IN OFFICIAL REPORTS—"DRIVEN DOWN" AND "DESTROYED" LVI. AERIAL COMBATS AND RAIDS PART X.—THE UNITED STATES AND THE BELLIGERENTS LVII. WAR CLOUD IN CONGRESS LVIII. THE PRESIDENT UPHELD IN ARMED-MERCHANTMEN ISSUE—FINAL CRISIS WITH GERMANY 149 154 162 173 178 183 188 192 198 207 212 216 229 235 244 255 265 276 283 292 307 318 326 330 335 340 348 361 371 377 382 387 392 401 412 418 424 427 433 439 LIX. THE AMERICAN ULTIMATUM—GERMANY YIELDS TWO YEARS OF THE WAR. By Frank H. Simonds THE GERMAN PROBLEM THE BELGIAN PHASE THE FRENCH OFFENSIVE THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE THE END OF THE FIRST WESTERN CAMPAIGN THE RUSSIAN PHASE TANNENBERG AND LEMBERG WARSAW AND LODZ THE GALICIAN CAMPAIGN THE BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC RUSSIA SURVIVES THE BALKAN CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST ITALY VERDUN THE FEBRUARY ATTACK LATER PHASES GETTYSBURG THE AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE GERMANY LOSES THE OFFENSIVE THE RUSSIAN ATTACK THE BATTLE OF THE SOMME GORIZIA AS THE THIRD YEAR BEGINS THE SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR, STATEMENTS FROM THE BRITISH, FRENCH, AND GERMAN AMBASSADORS TO THE UNITED STATES LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS JUTLAND QUEEN MARY, BRITISH BATTLE CRUISER EARL KITCHENER AUSTRIAN 30.5-CENTIMETER GUN AUSTRIAN INTRENCHMENT HIGH ON A MOUNTAIN GERMAN CROWN PRINCE GIVING CROSSES FOR VALOR FRENCH AVIATION CAMP NEAR VERDUN U-C-5, GERMAN MINE-LAYING SUBMARINE MOTOR-MOUNTED FRENCH 75'S LIST OF MAPS EXPANSION OF THE WAR—DATES ON WHICH DECLARATIONS OF WAR WERE MADE (Colored Map) BATTLE OF JUTLAND BANK, THE PLATE I—DISTRIBUTION OF FORCES PLATE II—RUNNING FIGHT TO THE SOUTHWARD PLATE III—RUNNING FIGHT TO THE NORTHWARD PLATE IV—BRITISH GRAND FLEET APPROACHING FROM NORTHWEST PLATE V—BRITISH GRAND FLEET COMING INTO ACTION PLATE VI—JELLICOE AND BEATTY ACTING TOGETHER TO "CAP" GERMAN FLEET PLATE VII—JELLICOE AND BEATTY PASS AROUND THE GERMAN FLANK, "CAPPING" IT PLATE VIII—BRITISH FORCES HEADING OFF TO SOUTHWARD TO AVOID ATTACK DURING DARKNESS PLATE IX—MOVEMENT OF FORCES PLATE X—MOVEMENT OF JELLICOE'S FORCES ON MAY 31 449 461 463 466 469 472 476 476 479 480 481 484 484 487 488 488 490 491 493 494 495 496 499 499 501 503 Frontispiece OPPOSITE PAGE 78 110 158 238 350 366 446 494 PAGE Front Insert 74 77 79 81 83 85 86 88 103 105 PLATE XI—WHAT VON SCHEER SHOULD HAVE DONE EASTERN BATTLE FRONT, AUGUST, 1916 RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE FROM PINSK TO DUBNO, THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN GALICIA, THE ITALIAN FRONT, THE AUSTRIAN OFFENSIVE, MAY, 1916, DETAIL OF GORIZIA KUT-EL-AMARA RUSSIANS IN PERSIA, THE RUSSIANS IN ARMENIA, THE WESTERN BATTLE FRONT, AUGUST, 1916 FOUR ZONE MAPS (colored) VERDUN, FIRST ATTACK ON VERDUN, NORTHEAST DISTRICT IN DETAIL VERDUN, NORTHWEST DISTRICT IN DETAIL MORT HOMME SECTOR IN DETAIL VERDUN TO ST. MIHIEL VERDUN GAIN UP TO AUGUST, 1916 SECTOR WHERE GRAND OFFENSIVE WAS STARTED ENGLISH GAINS, THE FRENCH GAINS, THE TWO YEARS OF THE WAR AUGUST 18, 1914, WHEN THE BELGIAN RETREAT TO ANTWERP BEGAN AUGUST 23, 1914, AFTER THE ALLIES HAD LOST ALL THE FIRST BATTLES SEPTEMBER 6, 1914, THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE SEPTEMBER 20, 1914, THE DEADLOCK NOVEMBER 15, 1914, THE END OF THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN OCTOBER 24, 1914, THE BATTLE OF THE VISTULA OCTOBER 1, 1915, AT THE END OF THE RUSSIAN RETREAT THE CONQUEST OF SERBIA, DECEMBER, 1915 THE RUSSIAN SPRING OFFENSIVE, 1916 AUSTRO-ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS, MAY TO SEPTEMBER, 1916 EXPANSION OF THE WAR—DATES ON WHICH DECLARATIONS OF WAR WERE MADE PART I—AUSTRIAN PROPAGANDA CHAPTER I AUSTRIAN AMBASSADOR IMPLICATED IN STRIKE PLOTS—HIS RECALL—RAMIFICATIONS OF GERMAN CONSPIRACIES 106 119 157 175 241 263 272 322 333 338 343 Opposite 344 346 352 356 364 366 369 379 394 406 465 467 471 473 475 478 483 485 497 500 Public absorption in German propaganda was abating when attention became directed to it again from another quarter. An American war correspondent, James F. J. Archibald, a passenger on the liner Rotterdam from New York, who was suspected by the British authorities of being a bearer of dispatches from the German and Austrian Ambassadors at Washington, to their respective Governments, was detained and searched on the steamer's arrival at Falmouth on August 30, 1915. A number of confidential documents found among his belongings were seized and confiscated, the British officials justifying their action as coming within their rights under English municipal law. The character of the papers confirmed the British suspicions that Archibald was misusing his American passport by acting as a secret courier for countries at war with which the United States was at peace. The seized papers were later presented to the British Parliament and published. In a bulky dossier, comprising thirty-four documents found in Archibald's possession, was a letter from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Washington, Dr. Dumba, to Baron Burian, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. In this letter Dr. Dumba took "this rare and safe opportunity" of "warmly recommending" to the Austrian Foreign Office certain proposals made by the editor of a Hungarian-American organ, the "Szabadsag," for effecting strikes in plants of the Bethlehem Steel Company and others in the Middle West engaged in making munitions for the Allies. The United States Government took a serious view of the letter recommending the plan for instigating strikes in American factories. Dr. Dumba, thrown on his defense, explained to the State Department that the incriminating proposals recommended in the document did not originate from him personally, but were the fruit of orders received from Vienna. This explanation was not easily acceptable. The phraseology of Dr. Dumba far from conveyed the impression that he was submitting a report on an irregular proposal inspired by instructions of the Austrian Government. Such a defense, however, if accepted, only made the matter more serious. Instead of the American Government having to take cognizance of an offensive act by an ambassador, the Government which employed him would rather have to be called to account. Another explanation by Dr. Dumba justified his letter to Vienna on the ground that the strike proposal urged merely represented a plan for warning all Austrians and Hungarians, employed in the munition factories, of the penalties they would have to pay if they ever returned to their home country, after aiding in producing weapons and missiles of destruction to be used against the Teutonic forces. This defense also lacked convincing force, as the letter indicated that the aim was so to cripple the munition factories that their output would be curtailed or stopped altogether—an object that could only be achieved by a general strike of all workers. The Administration did not take long to make up its mind that the time for disciplining foreign diplomats who exceeded the duties of their office had come. On September 8, 1915, Austria-Hungary was notified that Dr. Konstantin Theodor Dumba was no longer acceptable as that country's envoy in Washington. The American note dispatched to Ambassador Penfield at Vienna for transmission to the Austrian Foreign Minister was blunt and direct. After informing Baron Burian that Dr. Dumba had admitted improper conduct in proposing to his Government plans to instigate strikes in American manufacturing plants, the United States thus demanded his recall: "By reason of the admitted purpose and intent of Dr. Dumba to conspire to cripple legitimate industries of the people of the United States and to interrupt their legitimate trade, and by reason of the flagrant violation of diplomatic propriety in employing an American citizen, protected by an American passport, as a secret bearer of official dispatches through the lines of the enemy of Austria-Hungary, the President directs us to inform your excellency that Dr. Dumba is no longer acceptable to the Government of the United States as the Ambassador of His Imperial Majesty at Washington." Dr. Dumba was not recalled by his Government until September 22, 1915, fourteen days after the American demand. Meanwhile Dr. Dumba had cabled to Vienna, requesting that he be ordered to return on leave of absence "to report." His recall was ostensibly in response to his personal request, but the Administration objected to this resort to a device intended to cloak the fact that he was now persona non grata whose return was really involuntary, and would not recognize a recall "on leave of absence." His Government had no choice but to recall him officially in view of the imminent contingency that otherwise he would be ousted, and in that case would be denied safe conduct from capture by an allied cruiser in his passage across the ocean. His request for passports and safe conduct was, in fact, disregarded by the Administration, which informed him that the matter was one to be dealt directly with his Government, pending whose official intimation of recall nothing to facilitate his departure could be done. On the Austrian Government being notified that Dr. Dumba's departure "on leave of absence" would not be satisfactory, he was formally recalled on September 28, 1915. The seized Archibald dossier included a letter from the German military attaché, Captain Franz von Papen, to his wife, containing reference to Dr. Albert's correspondence, which left no doubt that the letters were genuine: "Unfortunately, they stole a fat portfolio from our good Albert in the elevated (a New York street railroad). The English secret service of course. Unfortunately, there were some very important things from my report among them such as buying up liquid chlorine and about the Bridgeport Projectile Company, as well as documents regarding the buying up of phenol and the acquisition of Wright's aeroplane patent. But things like that must occur. I send you Albert's reply for you to see how we protect ourselves. We composed the document to-day." The "document" evidently was Dr. Albert's explanation discounting the significance and importance of the letters. This explanation was published on August 20, 1915. The foregoing disclosures of documents covered a wide range of organized German plans for embarrassing the Allies' dealings with American interests; but they related rather more to accomplished operations and such activities as were revealed to be under way—e. g., the acquisition of munitions combined with propaganda for an embargo—were not deemed to be violative of American law. But this stage of intent to clog the Allies' facilities for obtaining sinews of war, in the face of law, speedily grew to one of achievement more or less effective according to the success with which the law interposed to spoil the plans. The autumn and winter of 1915 were marked by the exposure of a number of German plots which revealed that groups of conspirators were in league in various parts of the country, bent on wrecking munition plants, sinking ships loaded with Allies' supplies, and fomenting strikes. Isolated successes had attended their efforts, but collectively their depredations presented a serious situation. The exposed plots produced clues to secret German sources from which a number of mysterious explosions at munition plants and on ships had apparently been directed. Projected labor disturbances at munition plants were traced to a similar origin. The result was that the docket of the Federal Department of Justice became laden with a motley collection of indictments which implicated fifty or more individuals concerned in some dozen conspiracies, in which four corporations were also involved. These cases only represented a portion of the criminal infractions of neutrality laws, which had arisen since the outbreak of the war. In January, 1916, an inquiry in Congress directed the Attorney General to name all persons "arrested in connection with criminal plots affecting the neutrality of our Government." Attorney General Gregory furnished a list of seventy-one indicted persons, and the four corporations mentioned. A list of merely arrested persons would not have been informative, as it would have conveyed an incomplete and misleading impression. Such a list, Mr. Gregory told Congress, would not include persons indicted but never arrested, having become fugitives from justice; nor persons indicted but never arrested, having surrendered; but would include persons arrested and not proceeded against. Thus there were many who had eluded the net of justice by flight and some through insufficient evidence. The seventy-one persons were concerned in violations of American neutrality in connection with the European war. The list covered several cases already recorded in this history, namely: A group of Englishmen, and another of Montenegrins, involved in so-called enlistment "plots" for obtaining recruits on American soil for the armies of their respective countries. The case of Werner Horn, indicted for attempting to destroy by an explosive the St. Croix railroad bridge between Maine and New Brunswick. A group of nine men, mainly Germans, concerned in procuring bogus passports to enable them to take passage to Europe to act as spies. Eight were convicted, the ninth man, named Von Wedell, a fugitive passport offender, was supposed to have been caught in England and shot. The Hamburg-American case, in which Dr. Karl Buenz, former German Consul General in New York, and other officials or employees of that steamship company, were convicted (subject to an appeal) of defrauding the Government in submitting false clearance papers as to the destinations of ships sent from New York to furnish supplies to German war vessels in the Atlantic. A group of four men, a woman, and a rubber agency, indicted on a similar charge, their operations being on the Pacific coast, where they facilitated the delivery of supplies to German cruisers when in the Pacific in the early stages of the war. There remain the cases which, in the concatenation of events, might logically go on record as direct sequels to the public divulging of the Albert and Archibald secret papers. These included: A conspiracy to destroy munition-carrying ships at sea and to murder the passengers and crews. Indictments in these terms were brought against a group of six men—Robert Fay, Dr. Herbert O. Kienzie, Walter L. Scholz, Paul Daeche, Max Breitung, and Engelbert Bronkhorst. A conspiracy to destroy the Welland Canal and to use American soil as a base for unlawful operations against Canada. Three men, Paul Koenig, a Hamburg-American line official, R. E. Leyendecker, and E. J. Justice, were involved in this case. A conspiracy to destroy shipping on the Pacific Coast. A German baron, Von Brincken, said to be one of the kaiser's army officers; an employee of the German consulate at San Francisco, C. C. Crowley; and a woman, Mrs. Margaret W. Cornell, were the offenders. A conspiracy to prevent the manufacture and shipment of munitions to the allied powers. A German organization, the National Labor Peace Council, was indicted on this charge, as well as a wealthy German, Franz von Rintelen, described as an intimate friend of the German Crown Prince, and several Americans known in public life. In most of these cases the name of Captain Karl Boy-Ed, the German naval attaché, or Captain Franz von Papen, the German military attaché, figured persistently. The testimony of informers confirmed the suspicion that a wide web of secret intrigue radiated from sources related to the German embassy and enfolded all the conspiracies, showing that few, if any, of the plots, contemplated or accomplished, were due solely to the individual zeal of German sympathizers.[Back to Contents] CHAPTER II THE PLOT TO DESTROY SHIPS—PACIFIC COAST CONSPIRACIES—HAMBURG-AMERICAN CASE— SCOPE OF NEW YORK INVESTIGATIONS The plot of Fay and his confederates to place bombs on ships carrying war supplies to Europe was discovered when a couple of New York detectives caught Fay and an accomplice, Scholz, experimenting with explosives in a wood near Weehawken, N. J., on October 24, 1915. Their arrests were the outcome of a police search for two Germans who secretly sought to purchase picric acid, a component of high explosives which had become scarce since the war began. Certain purchases made were traced to Fay. On the surface Fay's offense seemed merely one of harboring and using explosives without a license; but police investigations of ship explosions had proceeded on the theory that the purchases of picric acid were associated with them. Fay confirmed this surmise. He described himself as a lieutenant in the German army, who, with the sanction of the German secret information service, had come to the United States after sharing in the Battle of the Marne, to perfect certain mine devices for attachment to munition ships in order to cripple them. In a Hoboken storage warehouse was found a quantity of picric acid he had deposited there, with a number of steel mine tanks, each fitted with an attachment for hooking to the rudder of a vessel, and clockwork and wire to fire the explosive in the tanks. In rooms occupied by Fay and Scholz were dynamite and trinitrotoluol (known as T-N-T), many caps of fulminate of mercury, and Government survey maps of the eastern coast line and New York Harbor. The conspirators' equipment included a fast motor boat that could dart up and down the rivers and along the water front where ships were moored, a high-powered automobile, and four suit cases containing a number of disguises. The purpose of the enterprise was to stop shipments of arms and ammunitions to the Allies. The disabling of ships, said Fay, was the sole aim, without destruction of life. To this end he had been experimenting for several months on a waterproof mine and a detonating device that would operate by the swinging of a rudder, to which the mine would be attached, controlled by a clock timed to cause the explosion on the high seas. The German secret service, both Fay and Scholz said, had provided them with funds to pursue their object. Fay's admission to the police contained these statements: "I saw Captain Boy-Ed and Captain von Papen on my arrival in this country. Captain Boy-Ed told me that I was doing a dangerous thing. He said that political complications would result and he most assuredly could not approve of my plans. When I came to this country, however, I had letters of introduction to both those gentlemen. Both men warned me not to do anything of the kind I had in mind. Captain von Papen strictly forbade me to attach any of the mines to any of the ships leaving the harbors of the United States. But anyone who wishes to, can read between the lines. "The plan on which I worked was to place a mine on the rudder post so that when it exploded it would destroy the rudder and leave the ship helpless. There was no danger of any person being killed. But by this explosion I would render the ship useless and make the shipment of munitions so difficult that the owners of ships would be intimidated and cause insurance rates to go so high that the shipment of ammunition would be seriously affected, if not stopped." The Federal officials questioned the statement that Fay's design was merely to cripple munition ships. Captain Harold C. Woodward of the Corps of Engineers, a Government specialist on explosives, held that if the amount of explosive, either trinitrotoluol, or an explosive made from chlorate of potash and benzol, required by the mine caskets found in Fay's possession, was fired against a ship's rudder, it would tear open the stern and destroy the entire ship, if not its passengers and crew, so devastating would be the explosive force. A mine of the size Fay used, three feet long and ten inches by ten inches, he said, would contain over two cubic feet: "If the mine was filled with trinitrotoluol the weight of the high explosive would be about 180 pounds. If it was filled with a mixture of chlorate of potash and benzol the weight would be probably 110 pounds. Either charge if exploded on the rudder post would blow a hole in the ship. "The amount of high explosive put into a torpedo or a submarine mine is only about 200 pounds. It must not be forgotten that water is practically noncompressible, and that even if the explosion did not take place against the ship the effect would be practically the same. Oftentimes a ship is sunk by the explosion of a torpedo or a mine several feet from the hull. "Furthermore, if the ship loaded with dynamite or high explosive, and the detonating wave of the first explosion reaches that cargo, the cargo also would explode. In high explosives the detonating wave in the percussion cap explodes the charge in much the same manner in which a chord struck on a piano will make a picture wire on the wall vibrate if both the wire and the piano string are tuned alike. "Accordingly, if a ship carrying tons of high explosive is attacked from the outside by a mine containing 100 pounds of similar explosive, the whole cargo would go up and nothing would remain of either ship or cargo." Therefore the charge made against Fay and Scholz, and four other men later arrested, Daeche, Kienzie, Bronkhorst, and Breitung, namely, conspiracy to "destroy a ship," meant that and all the consequences to the lives of those on board. Breitung was a nephew of Edward N. Breitung, the purchaser of the ship Dacia from German ownership, which was seized by the French on the suspicion that its transfer to American registry was not bona fide. The plot was viewed as the most serious yet bared. Fay and his confederates were credited with having spent some $30,000 on their experiments and preparations, and rumor credited them with having larger sums of money at their command. The press generally doubted if they could have conducted their operations without such financial support being extended them in the United States. A design therefore was seen in Fay's statement that he was financed from Germany to screen the source of this aid by transferring the higher responsibility in toto to official persons in Germany who were beyond the reach of American justice. These and other insinuations directed at the German Embassy produced a statement from that quarter repudiating all knowledge of the Fay conspiracy, and explaining that its attachés were frequently approached by "fanatics" who wanted to sink ships or destroy buildings in which munitions were made. A similar conspiracy, but embracing the destruction of railroad bridges as well as munition ships and factories, was later revealed on the Pacific Coast. Evidence on which indictments were made against the men Crowley, Von Brincken, and a woman confederate aforementioned, named Captain von Papen, the German military attaché, as the director of the plot. The accused were also said to have had the cooperation of the German Consul General at San Francisco. The indictments charged them, inter alia, with using the mails to incite arson, murder, and assassination. Among the evidence the Government unearthed was a letter referring to "P," which, the Federal officials said, meant Captain von Papen. The letter, which related to a price to be paid for the destruction of a powder plant at Pinole, Cal., explained how the price named had been referred to others "higher up." It read: "Dear Sir: Your last letter with clipping to-day, and note what you have to say. I have taken it up with them and 'B' [which the Federal officials said stood for Franz Bopp, German Consul at San Francisco] is awaiting decision of 'P' [said to stand for Captain von Papen in New York], so cannot advise you yet, and will do so as soon as I get word from you. You might size up the situation in the meantime." The indictments charged that the defendants planned to destroy munition plants at Aetna and Gary, Ind., at Ishpeming, Mich., and at other places. The Government's chief witness, named Van Koolbergen, told of being employed by Baron von Brincken, of the German Consulate at San Francisco, to make and use clockwork bombs to destroy the commerce of neutral nations. For each bomb he received $100 and a bonus for each ship damaged or destroyed. For destroying a railway trestle in Canada over which supply trains for the Allies passed, he said he received first $250, and $300 further from a representative of the German Government, the second payment being made upon his producing newspaper clippings recording the bridge's destruction. It appeared that Van Koolbergen divulged the plot to the Canadian Government. The three defendants and Van Koolbergen were later named in another indictment found by a San Francisco Federal Grand Jury, involving in all sixty persons, including the German Consul General in that city, Franz Bopp, the Vice Consul, Baron Eckhardt, H. von Schack, Maurice Hall, Consul for Turkey, and a number of men identified with shipping and commercial interests. The case was the first in which the United States Government had asked for indictments against the official representatives of any of the belligerents. The warrants charged a conspiracy to violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Law by attempting to damage plants manufacturing munitions for the Allies, thus interfering with legitimate commerce, and with setting on foot military expeditions against a friendly nation in connection with plans to destroy Canadian railway tunnels. The vice consul, Von Schack, was also indicted with twenty-six of the defendants on charges of conspiring to defraud the United States by sending supplies to German warships in the earlier stages of the war, the supplies having been sent from New York to the German Consulate in San Francisco. The charges related to the outfitting of five vessels. One of the latter, the Sacramento, now interned in a Chilean port, cleared from San Francisco, and when out to sea, the Government ascertained, was taken in command by the wireless operator, who was really a German naval reserve officer. Off the western coast of South America the Sacramento was supposed to have got into wireless communication with German cruisers then operating in the Pacific. There she joined the squadron under a show of compulsion, as though held up and captured. In this guise the war vessels seemingly convoyed the Sacramento to an island in the Pacific, where her cargo of food, coal, and munitions were transferred to her supposed captors. The Sacramento then proceeded to a Chilean port where her commanding officer reported that he had been captured by German warships and deprived of his cargo. The Chilean authorities doubted the story and ordered the vessel to be interned. Far more extensive were unlawful operations in this direction conducted by officials of the Hamburg-American line, as revealed at their trial in New York City in November, 1915. The indictments charged fraud against the United States by false clearances and manifests for vessels chartered to provision, from American ports, German cruisers engaged in commerce destroying. The prosecution proceeded on the belief that the Hamburg-American activities were merely part of a general plan devised by German and Austrian diplomatic and consular officers to use American ports, directly and indirectly, as war bases for supplies. The testimony in the case involved Captain Boy-Ed, the German naval attaché, who was named as having directed the distribution of a fund of at least $750,000 for purposes described as "riding roughshod over the laws of the United States." The defense freely admitted chartering ships to supply German cruisers at sea, and in fact named a list of twelve vessels, so outfitted, showing the amount spent for coal, provisions, and charter expenses to have been over $1,400,000; but of this outlay only $20,000 worth of supplies reached the German vessels. The connection of Captain Boy- Ed with the case suggested the defense that the implicated officials consulted with him as the only representative in the United States of the German navy, and were really acting on direct orders from the German Government, and not under the direction of the naval attaché. Military necessity was also a feasible ground for pleading justification in concealing the fact that the ships cleared to deliver their cargoes to German war vessels instead of to the ports named in their papers. These ports were professed to be their ultimate destinations if the vessels failed to meet the German cruisers. Had any other course been pursued, the primary destinations would have become publicly known and British and other hostile warships patrolling the seas would have been on their guard. The defendants were convicted, but the case remained open on appeal. About the same time the criminal features of the Teutonic propaganda engaged the lengthy attention of a Federal Grand Jury sitting in New York City. A mass of evidence had been accumulated by Government agents in New York, Washington, and other cities. Part of this testimony related to the Dumba and Von Papen letters found in the Archibald dossier. Another part concerned certain revelations a former Austrian consul at San Francisco, Dr. Joseph Goricar, made to the Department of Justice. This informant charged that the German and Austrian Governments had spent between $30,000,000 and $40,000,000 in developing an elaborate spy system in the United States with the aim of destroying munition plants, obtaining plans of American fortifications, Government secrets, and passports for Germans desiring to return to Germany. These operations, he said, were conducted with the knowledge of Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador. Captains Boy- Ed and Von Papen were also named as actively associated with the conspiracy, as well as Dr. von Nuber, the Austrian Consul General in New York, who, he said, directed the espionage system and kept card indices of spies in his office. The investigation involved, therefore, diplomatic agents, who were exempt from prosecution; a number of consuls and other men in the employ of the Teutonic governments while presumably connected with trustworthy firms; and notable German-Americans, some holding public office. Contributions to the fund for furthering the conspiracy, in addition to the substantial sums believed to be supplied by the German and Austrian Governments, were said to have come freely from many Germans, citizens and otherwise, resident in the United States. The project, put succinctly, was "to buy up or blow up the munition plants." The buying up, as previously shown, having proved to be impracticable, an alternative plan presented itself to "tie up" the factories by strikes. This was Dr. Dumba's miscarried scheme, which aimed at bribing labor leaders to induce workmen, in return for substantial strike pay, to quit work in the factories. Allied to this design was the movement to forbid citizens of Germany and Austria-Hungary from working in plants supplying munitions to their enemies. Such employment, they were told, was treasonable. The men were offered high wages at other occupations if they would abandon their munition work. Teutonic charity bazaars held throughout the country and agencies formed to help Teutons out of employment were regarded merely as means to influence men to leave the munition plants and thus hamper the export of war supplies. Funds were traced to show how money traveled through various channels from the fountainhead to men working on behalf of the Teutonic cause. Various firms received sums of money, to be paid to men ostensibly in the employ of the concerns, but who in reality were German agents working under cover. Evidence collected revealed these various facts of the Teutonic conspiracy. But the unfolding of such details before the Grand Jury was incidental to the search for the men who originated the scheme, acted as almoners or treasurers, or supervised, as executives, the horde of German and Austrian agents intriguing on the lower slopes under their instructions.[Back to Contents] CHAPTER III VON RINTELEN'S ACTIVITIES—CONGRESSMAN INVOLVED—GERMANY'S REPUDIATIONS— DISMISSAL OF CAPTAINS BOY-ED AND VON PAPEN In this quest the mysterious movements and connections of one German agent broadly streaked the entire investigation. This person was Von Rintelen, supposed to be Dr. Dumba's closest lieutenant ere that envoy's presence on American soil was dispensed with by President Wilson. Von Rintelen's activities belonged to the earlier period of the war, before the extensive ramifications of the criminal phases of the German propaganda were known. At present he was an enforced absentee from the scenes of his exploits, being either immured by the British in the Tower of London, or in a German concentration camp as a spy. This inglorious interruption to the rôle he appeared to play while in the United States as a peripatetic Midas, setting plots in train by means of an overflowing purse, was due to an attempt to return to Germany on the liner Noordam in July, 1915. The British intercepted him at Falmouth, and promptly made him a prisoner of war after examining his papers. Whatever was Von Rintelen's real mission in the United States in the winter of 1914-15, he was credited with being a personal emissary and friend of the kaiser, bearing letters of credit estimated to vary between $50,000,000 and $100,000,000. The figure probably was exaggerated in view of the acknowledged inability of the German interests in the United States to command anything like the lesser sum named to acquire all they wanted—control of the munition plants. His initial efforts appeared to have been directed to a wide advertising campaign to sway American sentiment against the export of arms shipments. His energies, like those of others, having been fruitless in this field, he was said to have directed his attention to placing large orders under cover for munitions with the object of depleting the source of such supplies for the Allies, and aimed to control some of the plants by purchasing their stocks. The investigation in these channels thus contributed to confirm the New York "World's" charges against German officialdom, based on its exposé of the Albert documents. Mexican troubles, according to persistent rumor, inspired Von Rintelen to use his ample funds to draw the United States into conflict with its southern neighbor as a means of diverting munition supplies from the Allies for American use. He and other German agents were suspected of being in league with General Huerta with a view to promoting a new revolution in Mexico. The New York Grand Jury's investigations of Von Rintelen's activities became directed to his endeavors to "buy strikes." The outcome was the indictment of officials of a German organization known under the misleading name of the National Labor Peace Council. The persons accused were Von Rintelen himself, though a prisoner in England; Frank Buchanan, a member of Congress; H. Robert Fowler, a former representative; Jacob C. Taylor, president of the organization; David Lamar, who previously had gained notoriety for impersonating a congressman in order to obtain money and known as the "Wolf of Wall Street," and two others, named Martin and Schulties, active in the Labor Peace Council and connected with a body called the Antitrust League. They were charged with having, in an attempt to effect an embargo (which would be in the interest of Germany) on the shipment of war supplies, conspired to restrain foreign trade by instigating strikes, intimidating employees, bribing and distributing money among officers of labor organizations. Von Rintelen was said to have supplied funds to Lamar wherewith the Labor Peace Council was enabled to pursue these objects. One sum named was $300,000, received by Lamar from Von Rintelen for the organization of this body; of that sum Lamar was said to have paid $170,000 to men connected with the council. The Labor Peace Council was organized in the summer of 1915, and met first in Washington, when resolutions were passed embracing proposals for international peace, but were viewed as really disguising a propaganda on behalf of German interests. The Government sought to show that the organization was financed by German agents and that its crusade was part and parcel of pro-German movements whose ramifications throughout the country had caused national concern. Von Rintelen's manifold activities as chronicled acquired a tinge of romance and not a little of fiction, but the revelations concerning him were deemed sufficiently serious by Germany to produce a repudiation of him by the German embassy on direct instructions from Berlin, i. e.: "The German Government entirely disavows Franz Rintelen, and especially wished to say that it issued no instructions of any kind which could have led him to violate American laws." It is essential to the record to chronicle that American sentiment did not accept German official disclaimers very seriously. They were too prolific, and were viewed as apologetic expedients to keep the relations between the two governments as smooth as possible in the face of conditions which were daily imperiling those relations. Germany appeared in the position of a Frankenstein who had created a hydra-headed monster of conspiracy and intrigue that had stampeded beyond control, and washed her hands of its depredations. The situation, however, was only susceptible to this view by an inner interpretation of the official disclaimers. In letter, but not in spirit, Germany disowned her own offspring by repudiating the deeds of plotters in terms which deftly avoided revealing any ground for the suspicion—belied by events—that those deeds had an official inception. Germany, in denying that the plotters were Government "agents," suggested that these men pursued their operations with the recognition that they alone undertook all the risks, and that if unmasked it was their patriotic duty not to betray "the cause," which might mean their country, the German Government, or the German officials who directed them. Not all the exposed culprits had been equal to this self-abnegating strain on their patriotism; some, like Fay, were at first talkative in their admissions that their pursuits were officially countenanced, another recounted defense of Werner Horn, who attempted to destroy a bridge connecting Canada and the United States, even went so far as to contend that the offense was military—an act of war—and therefore not criminal, on the plea that Horn was acting as a German army officer. In other cases incriminating evidence made needless the assumption of an attitude by culprits of screening by silence the complicity of superiors. Yet despite almost daily revelations linking the names of important German officials, diplomatic and consular, with exposed plots, a further repudiation came from Berlin in December, 1915, when the New York Grand Jury's investigation was at high tide. This further disavowal read: "The German Government, naturally, has never knowingly accepted the support of any person, group of persons, society or organization seeking to promote the cause of Germany in the United States by illegal acts, by counsels of violence, by contravention of law, or by any means whatever that could offend the American people in the pride of their own authority.... I can only say, and do most emphatically declare to Germans abroad, to German-American citizens of the United States, to the American people all alike, that whoever is guilty of conduct tending to associate the German cause with lawlessness of thought, suggestion or deed against life, property, and order in the United States is, in fact, an enemy of that very cause and a source of embarrassment to the German Government, notwithstanding what he or they may believe to the contrary." The stimulus for this politic disavowal, and one must be sought, since German statements always had a genesis in antecedent events—was not apparently due to continued plot exposures, which were too frequent, but could reasonably be traced to a ringing address President Wilson had previously made to Congress on December 7, 1915. The President, amid the prolonged applause of both Houses, meeting in joint session, denounced the unpatriotism of many Americans of foreign descent. He warned Congress that the gravest threats against the nation's peace and safety came from within, not from without. Without naming German-Americans, he declared that many "had poured the poison of disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life," and called for the prompt exercise of the processes of law to purge the country "of the corrupt distempers brought on by these citizens." "I am urging you," he said in solemn tones, "to do nothing less than save the honor and self-respect of the nation. Such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and anarchy must be crushed out." Three days before this denunciation, the Administration had demanded from Germany the recall of Captains Boy-Ed and Von Papen, respectively the military aid and naval attaché of the German embassy. Unlike the procedure followed in requesting Dr. Dumba's recall, no reasons were given. None according to historic usage were necessary, and if reasons were given, they could not be questioned. It was sufficient that a diplomatic officer was non persona grata by the fact that his withdrawal was demanded. Germany, through her embassy, showed some obduracy in acting upon a request for these officials' recall without citing the cause of complaint. There was an anxiety that neither should be recalled with the imputation resting upon them that they were concerned, say, in the so-called Huerta-Mexican plot—if one really existed—or with the conspiracies to destroy munition plants and munition ships, or, in Captain Boy-Ed's case, in the Hamburg-American line's chartered ships for provisioning of German cruisers, sailing with false manifests and clearance papers. An informal note from Secretary Lansing to Count von Bernstorff so far acceded to the request for a bill of particulars, though not customary, that the German embassy professed to be satisfied. Secretary Lansing stated that Captains Boy-Ed and Von Papen had rendered themselves unacceptable by "their activities in connection with naval and military affairs." This was intended to mean that such activities here indicated had brought the two officials in contact with private individuals in the United States who had been involved in violation of the law. The incidents and circumstances of this contact were of such a cumulative character that the two attachés could no longer be deemed as acceptable to the American Government. Here was an undoubted implication of complicity by association with wrongdoers, but not in deed. The unofficial statement of the cause of complaint satisfied the embassy in that it seemed to relieve the two officers from the imputation of themselves having violated American laws. The record stood, however, that the United States had officially refused to give any reasons for demanding their recall. Germany officially recalled them on December 10, 1915, and before the year was out they quitted American soil under safe conducts granted by the British Government. Captain von Papen, however, was not permitted to escape the clutches of the British on the ocean passage. While respecting his person, they seized his papers. These, duly published, made his complicity in the German plots more pronounced than ever. His check counterfoils showed a payment of $500 to "Mr. de Caserta, Ottawa." De Caserta was described in British records as "a dangerous German spy, who takes great risks, has lots of ability, and wants lots of money." He was supposed to have been involved in conspiracies in Canada to destroy bridges, armories, and munition factories. He had offered his services to the British Government, but they were rejected. Later he was reported to have been shot or hanged in London as a spy. Another check payment by Captain von Papen was to Werner Horn for $700. Horn, as before recorded, was the German who attempted to blow up a...