The Social Engagement of Social Science Volume II The Socio-Technical Systems Perspective CONTENTS Preface Eric Trist and Hugh Murray Historical Overview: The Foundation and Development of the Tavistock Institute Eric Trist Introduction to Volume 2 Shaping a New Field Introduction Eric Trist and Ken Bamforth The Stress of Isolated Dependence: The Filling Shift in the Semi-Mechanized Longwall Three-Shift Mining Cycle Eric Trist, Gurth Higgin, Hugh Murray and Alec Pollock Alternative Work Organizations: An Exact Comparison A.K. Rice Productivity and Social Organization: An Indian Automated Weaving Shed Eric J. Miller The Ahmedabad Experiment Revisited: Work Organization in an Indian Weaving Shed, 1953-70 Fred Emery Characteristics of Socio-Technical Systems Conceptual Developments Fred Emery Designing Socio-Technical Systems for Greenfield Sites Fred Emery The Assembly Line: Its Logic and Our Future Fred Emery The Second Design Principle: Participation and the Democratization of Work Fred Emery Socio-Technical Foundations for a New Social Order? Fred Emery The Historical Validity of the Norwegian Industrial Democracy Project Paul Hill and Fred Emery Toward a New Philosophy of Management David (P.G.) Herbst Alternatives to Hierarchies David (P. G.) Herbst Designing with Minimal Critical Specifications Louis Davis The Coming Crisis for Production Management Albert Cherns Principles of Socio-Technical Design Eric Trist Socio-Technical Ideas at the End of the '70s Eric Trist QWL and the '80s References for Historical Review Associated Studies I ntroduction Gareth Morgan Organizational Choice and the New Technology Lisl Klein On the Collaboration Between Social Scientists and Engineers Eric J. Miller Technology, Territory and Time: The Internal Differentiation of Complex Production Systems Strategic Projects Introduction David (P.G.) Herbst A Learning Organization in Practice: M/S Balao Gerald Susman and Eric Trist Action Research in an American Underground Coal Mine Eric Trist and Charles Dwyer The Limits of Laissez-Faire as a Socio-Technical Change Strategy Bill Westley and Eric Trist Socio-Technical Projects in the Canadian Federal Public Service Fred Emery and Einar Thorsrud The Norskhydro Fertilizer Plant Trevor A. Williams Visual Display Technology, Worker Disablement and Work Organization Louis Davis and Stu Sullivan A New Type of Labor-Management Contract Involving the Quality of Working Life Collaborative Action Research Introduction Fred Emery Socio-Technical Unit Operations Analysis Fred Emery The Nine-Step Model Eric Trist A Socio-Technical Critique of Scientific Management Fred Emery and Merrelyn Emery The Participative Design Workshop Fred Emery Legislating for Quality of Work Life Hugh Murray Socio-Technical Action Simulations for Engaging with Engineering Designers Eric Trist Work Improvement and Organizational Democracy Calvin Pava Nonroutine Office Work Eric Trist Pava's Extension of Socio-Technical Theory to Advanced Information Technologies David Morley and Eric Trist A Brief Introduction to the Emerys' "Search Conference" Contributors THE SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE A Tavistock Anthology HISTORICAL OVERVIEW The Foundation and Development of the Tavistock Institute to 1989 by Eric Trist and Hugh Murray THE FORMATIVE GENERAL THE SEQUEL YEARS OUTCOMES Division Into Two The Founding Tradition Type C Organizations Groups Post-War Three Research The Matrix Transformation Perspectives Achieving a Working The International References Identity Network THE FORMATIVE YEARS The Founding Tradition Pre-War Antecedents After the fall of France in I94I, the Royal Air Force, by winning the Battle of Britain, prevented German invasion of the British Isles. The evacuation from the Dunkirk beaches prevented the capture of the core of the regular army, including many of the generals who were later to distinguish themselves. There was, therefore, a chance to fight again but there was no land army of any size to do so. It was thus imperative that Britain build a large land army in a hurry. Attempts to meet this need created immense problems in the utilization of human resources (problems far more severe for the army than for the other services), but no measures tried in the first few months seemed to be effective. In I94I a group of psychiatrists at the Tavistock Clinic saw that the right questions were asked in Parliament in order to secure the means to try new measures. As a result they were asked to join the Directorate of Army Psychiatry, and did so as a group. To understand how such a small group was able to be so influential, we must go back to the period immediately after World War I when there was a growing recognition that neurotic disabilities were not merely transitory phenomena related to the stress of war, but were endemic and pervasive in a modern society. In order to respond to the 'felt social need' thus arising, the Tavistock Institute of Medical Psychology (better known as the Tavistock Clinic), the parent body of the post-World War II Institute, was founded in I920 as a voluntary outpatient clinic to explore the implications for treatment and research. The founding group comprised many of the key doctors who had been concerned with neurosis in World War I. They included general physicians and neurologists, as well as psychiatrists, and one or two multiply-trained individuals who combined psychology and anthropology with medicine. The group, therefore, showed from the beginning the preparedness to be linked to the social sciences and to general medicine, as well as to psychiatry, which has characterized it ever since. Interest focussed on the then new 'dynamic psychologies' as representing the direction which offered most hope. Because of the uncertain and confused state of knowledge in these fields, tolerance of different viewpoints was part of the undertaking and the Tavistock Clinic functioned as a mediating institution, a clearing-house where the views of several contending parties could be aired. On the one hand were the adherents of Freud, Jung and Adler, who were preoccupied with establishing their own professional societies and advancing their own theories. On the other were a neurologically-oriented general psychiatry, a somatically-oriented general medicine and a surrounding society puzzled, bewildered, intrigued and frightened by the new knowledge of the unconscious and its implications for important areas of life. Since 'authoritarian' government of the medical kind in a pathfinding organization such as the Tavistock Clinic proved dysfunctional, a transition to a collegiate professional democracy took place in the early I930s, when problems arising from the Depression shook many cherished beliefs and raised new questions concerning the role of social factors in psychological illness. This organizational revolution brought to the front a younger generation of clinicians with a level of ability and a maverick quality that would otherwise have been lost.* ____________________ *The staff now elected as their Director Jack Rawlings Rees, grouped around whom were Henry Dicks, Ronald Hargreaves, Tommy Wilson and Wilfred Bion, all of whom subsequently made world-wide reputations. They would have left the Tavistock had it not been for the opportunities opened up by the organizational revolution. ____________________ This younger group now began to take on a conceptual direction consonant with the emergent 'object relations approach' in psychoanalysis. The object relations approach emphasized relationships rather than instinctual drives and psychic energy. As Dicks's (I970) history (Fifty Years of the Tavistock Clinic) shows, there were great variations in the quality of the services offered by the pre-war Clinic. Among the 80 physicians who contributed six hours a week, many had little or no psychiatric training. Nevertheless, by the beginning of World War II the Tavistock had attained international standing. It had developed links with organizations in the main Commonwealth countries and the United States, and had undertaken systematic research and teaching. It had obtained peripheral academic standing in London University with six recognized teachers. The outbreak of war, however, prevented this arrangement from being implemented. WAR-TIME BREAKTHROUGHS The group who entered the Directorate of Army Psychiatry took a novel approach to the human resource problems facing the army. Rather than remain in base hospitals they went out into the field to find out from commanding officers what they saw as their most pressing problems. They would listen to their troubled military clients as an analyst would to a patient, believing that the 'real' problems would surface as trust became established, and that constructive ideas about dealing with them would emerge. The concept thence arose of 'command' psychiatry, in which a psychiatrist with a roving commission was attached to each of the five Army Commanders in Home Forces. A relationship of critical importance was formed between the Clinic's Ronald Hargreaves, as command psychiatrist, and Sir Ronald Adam, the Army Commander in Northern Command. When Adam became Adjutant General, the second highest post in the army, he was able to implement policies that Hargreaves and he had adumbrated. New military institutions had to be created to carry them out. The institution-building process entailed: Earning the right to be consulted on emergent problems for which there was no solution in traditional military rocedures, e.g., the problem of officer selection.  Making preliminary studies to identify a path of solution - the investigation of morale in Officer Cadet Training Units.  Designing a pilot model in collaboration with military personnel which embodied the required remedial measures - the Experimental War Office Selection Board.  Handing over the developed model to military control with the psychiatric and psychological staff falling back into advisory roles or where possible removing themselves entirely - the War Office Selection Boards (WOSBs) and Civil Resettlement Units (CRUs) for repatriated prisoners of war.  Disseminating the developed model, securing broad acceptance for it and training large numbers of soldiers to occupy the required roles, e.g., CRUs. To meet these large-scale tasks the range of disciplines was extended from psychiatry and clinical psychology to social psychology, sociology and anthropology. The members of these various disciplines were held together by participation in common operational tasks in an action frame of reference. To varying extents they began to learn each others' skills. The group became, to use a term that arose after the war in a project concerned with alternative forms of organization in the mining industry, a 'composite' work group. (Vol. I, 'The Assumption of Ordinariness as a Denial Mechanism') Undertaking practical tasks that sought to resolve operational crises generated insights that led toward new theory. This process was familiar to those members of the group who were practicing psychiatrists, but it was new to those coming from other disciplines. This led to a generalized concept of professionalism. The innovations introduced during the war years consisted of a series of Òinventions:"  Command psychiatry as a reconnaissance activity leading to the identification of critical problems.  Social psychiatry as a policy science permitting preventive intervention in large scale problems.  The co-creation with the military of new institutions to implement these policies.  The therapeutic community as a new mode of treatment.  Cultural psychiatry for the analysis of the enemy mentality. By the end of the war a considerable number of psychiatrists and social scientists had become involved in this comprehensive set of innovative applications of concepts of social psychiatry. They saw in these approaches a significance which did not seem to be limited by the condition of war, and were determined to explore their relevance for the civilian society. Obviously, individual programs could not be transferred without considerable modification; entirely new lines of development would have to be worked out. Nevertheless, a new action-oriented philosophy of relating psychiatry and the social sciences to society had become a reality in practice. This event signified the social engagement of social science. Post-War Transformation OPERATION PHOENIX New questions now arose. Who would be the next pioneers? Who would accept the risks, which were great? Could a setting be found that could nurture the new endeavors? An answer to these questions came about in the following way. Toward the end of the war the existence of a democratic tradition in the Tavistock Clinic made possible the election by the whole staff (through a postal ballot) of an Interim Planning Committee (IPC) to consider the future of the organization. The election gave power to those who had led the work in the Army.* The IPC began meeting in ____________________ *The six elected members were J.R. Rees, who was later to found the World Federation of Mental Health; Leonard Browne, who became a prominent Alderman in the London County Council; Henry Dicks, who founded the field of cultural psychiatry; Ronald Hargreaves, who became Deputy Director of the World Health Organization; Mary Luff, who retired after the war; and Tommy Wilson, who became Chairman of the Tavistock Institute. The IPC met twice a week for two or three hours in the evenings. There were rarely any absentees. The group co-opted two people not previously at the Clinic - Jock Sutherland, a psychiatrist, who was to become Director of the post-war Clinic, and Eric Trist, a social psychologist, who was later to succeed Wilson as the Institutes Chairman. Both had played prominent parts in the war-time developments. ____________________ the autumn of I945 to work out a redefinition of the Clinic's mission in light of the experiences gained during the war. The IPC was chaired by Wilfred Bion, who used his new findings about groups to clarify issues and reduce conflicts within the planning group itself. Council approved its report by the end of that year. The IPC made a crucial decision in recognition of an impending political event - the then new Labour Government's intimation that it would in I948 create a National Health Service. The IPC resolved:  To build up the Clinic to enter the National Health Service fully equipped with the kind of staff who could be entrusted with the task of discovering the role of out-patient psychiatry, based on a dynamic approach and oriented towards the social sciences, in the as yet unknown setting of a national health service.  Separately to incorporate the Institute of Human Relations for the study of wider social problems not accepted as in the area of mental health. This readiness enabled the IPC in I945 to attract the attention of Alan Gregg, Medical Director of the Rockefeller Foundation, who was touring the various institutions that had been involved in war medicine. He was interested in finding out if there was a group committed to undertaking, under conditions of peace, the kind of social psychiatry that had developed in the army under conditions of war. So began a process that led the Rockefeller Foundation in I946 to make a grant of untied funds without which the IPCÕs post-war plan could not have been carried out. The Rockefeller grant led to the birth of the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations, constituted at first as a division of the Tavistock Clinic. With these funds it became possible to obtain for the then joint organization a nucleus of full-time senior staff who would otherwise have been scattered in universities and hospitals throughout the country and abroad. A Professional Committee (PC), with Rees in the chair, and a small Technical Executive representing the new permanent staff, chaired by Bion, came into existence in February I946. These arrangements lasted until the separate incorporation of the Institute in September I947. The situation required the transformation of a large part- time staff, appropriate for the pre-war Clinic as a voluntary out-patient hospital, into a small nucleus of full-timers, supported by others giving substantial proportions of their time, and committed to the redefined mission of the post-war organization. Decisions were taken as to who should stay, who should leave and who should be added. Criteria included willingness to participate in the redefined social mission and to undergo psychoanalysis if they had not already done so. This critical episode became known as Operation Phoenix.* ____________________ *In addition to Sutherland and Trist, a number of other outsiders who had played prominent roles in the war-time effort, were brought in at this point. John Bowlby, a child psychiatrist and analyst, was made head of what he came to call the Department for Children and Parents. (The other senior psychiatrists appointed to the Clinic were all from the wider Tavistock group.) Elliott Jaques, a young Canadian psychiatrist and psychologist, was invited to join the Institute and played a prominent role during the five years he stayed. ________________________ As regards the requirement for psychoanalysis, it was felt that object relations theory had proved its relevance during the war in the social as well as the clinical field. It represented the most advanced body of psychological knowledge then available which could provide a common foundation for those who would in various ways be continuing, in the peace, the work begun under war conditions. Training would be in the hands of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, and social applications in the hands of the Institute. This understanding equilibrated relations between the two bodies. The Society agreed to provide training analysts for acceptable candidates, whether they were going to become fulltime analysts, mix psychoanalytic practice with broader endeavors in the health field or use psychoanalytic understanding outside the health area in organizational and social projects. The Society, therefore, recognized the relevance for psychoanalysis of work in the social field, while the Institute affirmed the importance of psychoanalysis for psycho-soclal studies. In this way some I5 individuals, some in the Clinic and some in