THE SEMINAR OF BARCELONA on Die Wege der Symptombildung Jacques-Alain Miller - with Roser Casalprim, Lucia D’Angelo, Vicente Palomera and Joan Salinas. Part One The choice of a theme V. Palomera: We are going to introduce in our Journées a new way of working consistent with the working of a Seminar. One may call it new because it was customary for our invited speaker to give a concluding lecture. In these third Journées, this is Jacques-Alain Miller. First of all, I would like to thank him for having agreed to come. Needless to say, the whole section always greatly enjoys his visits to Barcelona. I would add that he had expressed his preference for working in the way of a seminar, as opposed to a lecture. This requires some of us to accompany him, that is to say, that we be his companions in work, and that we assist him in this path. When I spoke to Jacques-Alain in La Coruna, I told him the title we had selected for our Journées - The Forms and Uses of the Symptom. He asked what theme I thought appropriate to work with the seminar. Unexpectedly, I answered why don’t we take The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms, Lecture XXIII of the Vorlesung? At this point, I would like to apologise for not specifying in the programme that the title The Paths to Formation of Symptoms is a reference to Freud’s lectures. This resulted in many of you not bringing the text. I judged - mistakenly - that the title would echo like a reflex in the ear. I would also like to recall having said to Jacques-Alain why don’t we produce something similar to what you have done twice with our colleagues in Milan? I was referring, as you all know, to the famous Marginalia of Milan published in Uno por Uno. Let’s recall that theseMarginalia were made upon two of Freud’s texts - Analysis Terminable and Interminable and Constructions in Analysis - to introduce and prepare for the last two International Congresses of the Freudian Field (How do Analyses End? in 1994 and The Power of Words in 1996). Why not try and produce a Marginalia of Barcelona if we have in mind the International Encounter of Barcelona in ’98? Here I recall the paths which led me to propose this title for a seminar on the symptom. I was convinced that Lacan somewhere had referred to Freud’s text in a precise way. Finally, I remembered where. In fact, in 1975 Lacan gave a lecture on the symptom in Geneva where he said the following: “Read a little of the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Freud’s Vorlesungen. There are two chapters on the symptom. One is called Wege der Symptombildung, the paths to the fomation of symptoms, which is chapter XXIII, then you will see that there is a chapter XVII which is called Der Sinn, The Sense of Symptoms. If there is any contribution Freud has made, this is it. It’s that symptoms have a meaning, and a meaning that can only be interpreted correctly - ‘correctly’ meaning that the subject lets some parts of it drop - as a function of his early experiences, namely in so far as he encounters what today I am going to call, through lack of being able to say anything more or anything better, sexual reality”. When I went back to these lines, I discovered something even more interesting, a disagreement between Lacan and Freud: “Freud placed a lot of emphasis on this. He thought that the term ‘auto- erotism’ needed to be accentuated, in the sense that the child initially discovers this sexual reality on his own body. I permit myself, and this doesn’t happen every day, to disagree - and to disagree in the name of Freud’s work itself.” Lacan proceeds to the case of Little Hans, about which, curiously, J.-A. Miller gave a seminar in Barcelona a year ago, published in Freudiana No. 17 under the title The Unconscious = Interpreter. J.-A. Miller referred to the role of the ‘subversive phallus’, to the strange jouissance which irrupts in the auto-erotic economy of Little Hans, an economy governed by the polymorphous sexuality which is - up to this point of irruption of jouissance - safeguarded by Little Hans’ position as ideal ego for the mother. Lacan explains the introduction of what Little Hans used to call his Wiwimacher, his ‘widdler’ - because he did not know how to call it in any other way - in his circuit. Then, in Geneva, Lacan takes Little Hans’ symptom as a counterpoint: “It is only necessary to know that in certain beings, the encounter with one’s own erection is not the least auto-erotic, it is the most ‘hetero’ that exists. However, they ask what is this? and they say so nicely that poor Little Hans only thinks about this, about this something, incarnates it in objects which are frankly external objects, as is known in this case by the horse which paws, kicks, plunges and falls to the ground. This horse that comes and goes, that has a certain way of sliding along, knocking over the cart, is exemplary for him of what he has to confront and of what he does not understand, without doubt, thanks to the fact that he has a certain kind of mother and father. His symptom is the expression, the signification, of this rejection.” As you see, Lacan refers to the phobic symptom because it exemplifies jouissance as being always ‘hetero’. On the other hand, the examples of symptoms which Freud gives in these lectures refer to hysterical and obssessive neurosis. InThe Sense of Symptoms we have two examples. The first is what we could call ‘the lady of the table cloth’, in which the symptom appears in the place of the subject’s name. The symptom is a metaphor of the subject - it is in this sense that Freud speaks of Sinn. This is precisely something which we cannot say about Little Hans, where the phobic symptom - the fear of horses - more than the subject’s name, a metaphor of the subject, is a metaphor of the Other and not of the subject. (Note what we have just read in Lacan: the symptom is the signification of this rejection.) The heterogeneity is, on another level, the variety of symptoms, where the symptom of Little Hans objects to the concept of auto-erotism in the formation of symptoms. Another way of introducing this ‘hetero-erotism’ would be to refer to the drive. On this point, Lacan’s thesis is that there is no genital drive, there are only partial drives. The problem for Freud was also to understand how one can maintain a sexual relation with one’s partner deriving only from the partial drives, where the phallic phase always manifests itself as a discontinuity in the development of the auto-erotic libido. Now, after this justification of the title, I will give the floor to Jacques-Alain Miller. A turntable J.-A. Miller: In this seminar, we will construct a turntable of multiple uses. A turntable which will firstly distribute and communicate every part of Freud’s work; secondly it will distribute and communicate all the constructions elaborated in the teaching of Lacan; and, thirdly, it will distribute and communicate the work of Freud and Lacan with each other. This turntable is indispensable for the orientation of our work in the Freudian Field this year about the symptom - to orient ourselves, but also to disorient ourselves a little bit. In order to be well oriented in an analytic theme it is necessary also to disorient ourselves a little; that is, not to think about the theme in a too familiar way - getting a little bit lost has all its value. Before starting, I would like to thank the invitation of José Monseny, president of the Catalonia Section, to participate in theseJournées, the third of the ESP-Catalonia. As Vicente Palomera recalled, instead of a lecture he proposed a seminar, which presupposes a common theme, a certain dialogue, a mutual verification of what is being said. The objective is to dilute a little bit the dimension of the big Other, which there is in a lecture, something that not only irritates me, but also, given that my theme this year in Paris is The Other does not Exist, is not the way I want to work. In Paris, I no longer give a course but a seminar in the company of Eric Laurent, and I would like to do something similar here. Vicente has already pointed out that the programme did not specify that we were going to work with Lecture XXIII. So, we start from the fact that almost nobody recognises in the phrase The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms the title of a lecture by Freud. This is remarkable and perhaps it will make us see that a certain return to Freud is necessary, as Lacan used to say. I would like to thank Vicente Palomera, the person in charge of the organisation of this event, for enabling me to give this seminar. As I wanted to give a seminar rather than a lecture, I would like to praise him for his Witz, in proposing a seminar ‘about’ a lecture. I would also like to celebrate the pertinence of the chosen text. He chose it on the basis of an indication of Lacan’s, which also needed to be recalled. He has told us about the mysterious way in which this punctuation had been inscribed for him. I would like to add that the effects of this seminar have started even before the seminar itself. The introductory comments made by Vicente seem to me very pertinent, as do what I have read of the first comments by Lucia. I feel that we find ourselves in a collective space with shared references and with a similar perspective on analytical problems. I will give the floor to Lucia. Presentation Lucia D’Angelo: The privilege I had of knowing that the title of J.-A. Miller’s seminar concerned Freud’s two lectures on the symptom allowed me quickly to reread them. It has to be said that the indication of these Freudian references by Lacan in the Geneva Lecture on the Symptom,provokes in the reader a certain surprise, especially when, in the course of his own lecture in Geneva, Lacan explains that he had carefully read these references for his own elucidations on the symptom. The question I asked myself was: why not examine these problems from other, later texts of Freud, in which things are not so complicated? In 1930, Freud himself states, in the preface to the Hebrew translation of these lectures, the following: “[T]hey gave a fairly accurate account of the position of the young science at that period and they contained more than their title indicated. They provided not only an introduction to psychoanalysis but covered the greater part of its subject-matter. This is naturally no longer true. Advances have in the meantime taken place in its theory and important additions have been made to it, such as the division of the personality into an ego, a super-ego and an id, a radical alteration to the theory of the instincts, and discoveries concerning the origin of conscience and the sense of guilt. These lectures have thus become to a large extent incomplete; it is in fact only now that they have become truly ‘introductory’. But in another sense, even today they have not been superseded or become obsolete. What they contain”, says Freud in 1930, “is still believed and taught, apart from a few modifications, in psychoanalytic training schools” (SE XVI: 11). As can be verified, these lectures come from an especially involved, intricate, moment in Freudian theory; neither before, nor after the well-known turning of the ’20s, but on the turn itself. Freud tries to make all the pieces of the puzzle fit, at the price of having to force more than one of the pieces. Metapsychology and the concept of narcissism had recently brought new elements to the theory, but proved insufficient to resolve all the difficulties which Freud encountered in pursuing the work of elaboration. Strachey’s comment, in which he says that nowhere in Freud’s work can one find so many different definitions, for example, of the unconscious, as in the lectures of 1915 and 1917, is intriguing. This is a detail which Lacan himself retains in the Geneva Lecture. I believe that all these questions make the reading of these lectures all the more interesting and their incontestable theoretical and clinical richness derives from this. Let us look at the theoretical antecedents which Freud relies on at the time of writing these articles on the symptom: he has the unconscious, the psychic apparatus and a first theory of the drive - ego-drive and sexual drive. From the theory of the drive established in 1905, the operative distinction between object and sexual aim means that the Freudian schema is based entirely upon the deviations, and not upon the supposed norms, of sexuality. The pathological character of the symptom can only be revealed - and one has to maintain the expressions that Freud uses in these lectures - in the case of the exclusivity of the object and libidinal fixation. Around 1910, the great clinical contributions of Freud are produced. His famous cases had already been published, and at that time the history of the Wolf Man was already written and ready for publication. A new aetiological proposition emerges from the isolation of the new conceptual operator of infantile sexuality and the castration complex. The pathological aspects derive from sexual development, and this is also a term to retain from these lectures. The symptom then appears integrated in a combination which involves both the sexual drive and the ego-drive, and the deviation of the libido is a defence against woman’s castration. Freud reconsiders the pathological symptom in neurosis and tests the clinical distinction in the light of perversions. The conceptual triad is then: libidinal fixation, regression to auto-erotism, and narcissistic object choice in the framework of the theory of libidinal development, which allows him to establish at this point a relation with psychosis. In both neurosis and psychosis, libidinal fixation and regression to auto-erotism put him on the pathway of an important conceptual ordering which is produced from the concept of narcissism. In On Narcissism of 1914, Freud establishes the triad: auto-erotism, narcissism, object-choice; and, in the framework of libido theory: ego- libido, object-libido, and narcissistic libido. There then emerges another clinical distinction: transference neurosis and narcissistic neurosis. This is why we have to take these references from the context of the Freudian theory to try to solve the questions posed to us, given that the whole problem of the symptoms can be explained from the point of view of the libido theory and its relation to the unconscious, with the multiple meanings which the unconscious acquires here, which are preparing the way for the future structural account of the ’20s. One should bear in mind that we do not yet have Beyond the Pleasure Principle nor The Ego and the Id nor Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. What we do have, and I believe Lacan takes this very much into account, is The Interpretation of Dreams. If we compare the two lectures to which Lacan refers us, namely The Sense of Symptoms and The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms, we can see that the underlying tendency in each of them is different, starting with the type of cases presented. The first is about the two cases of obsessional symptoms in two women - clearly hysterics, I think - and the second concerns exclusively the hysterical symptom as stated several times by Freud. In The Sense of Symptoms, Freud emphasises the aspect of sense and hardly mentions the libidinal problem, while in The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms, he stresses the libidinal fixation, that is to say, the fixation to jouissance. In both articles, Freud emphasises interpretation, with an unequivocal equivalence between symptom and dream, as well as parapraxes. This seems to me an essential equivalence. The binary sense-jouissance J.-A. Miller: Despite what appears to be accidental in the choice of this text for today, we are in a fundamental place in the work of Freud and in the teaching of Lacan. Lucia has pointed out at the end, and in a single stroke, the value of the binary stressed by Lacan between Lectures XVII and XXIII of the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. In chapter XVII, which carries the title The Sense of Symptoms, sense is at stake. This seems easy to see, given that Freud himself spoke of Der Sinn der Symptome, but to see how is not so evident: it has the effect of a purloined letter. In chapter XXIII, The Paths to the Formation of Symptoms, libido is at stake - Befriedigung, satisfaction, jouissance. This is the path taken by Freud in his second cycle of lectures: it goes from sense to jouissance in the symptom. One could say that this path - as it can be read in Freud’s popular lectures, given to an audience of non-analysts - is the same path as the formation of Lacan’s teaching. The ordered, oriented, vectorised binary goes from sense to jouissance. The first thing that caught my attention while entering this room was that it has two sides. It struck me as a happy place: it invites us all the time to look from one side to the other and back again. This is exactly what Lectures XVII and XXIII tackle between them, sense andjouissance in the symptom. It functions as a basis for our lucubrations, a simple, firm and evident basis. Despite the almost negligent way in which Lacan points it out in Geneva - in a lecture which was unknown until someone brought it to me years later to be published - there is something essential of Lacan at this point. This ordered binary concentrates the central thematic of the teaching of Lacan - a central thematic which I have approached in my previous course From the Symptom to the Fantasy. The five Lacanian operations: to separate... How are sense and jouissance articulated in psychoanalysis? This is why I wanted to talk about Lacan first, because we thought - before we verified it in such an extraordinary way - that amongst us Lacan is more read than Freud... More seriously, given that we deal with Lacan’s concepts and mathemes for the strength they give, for the precision they contribute, I thought it best to tackle the Freudian problematic from Lacan. In this way I have prepared a short structural path to open here the following steps. Lacan’s point of departure, the Function and Field of Speech and Language, points out, stresses, constructs, emphasises sense in the practice of psychoanalysis, sense in the unconscious, sense in the symptom. It highlights: • that sense, if one could say so, has no sense except in language and that it is explained by the signifier, • that sense supposes the function of speech, that it is speech which gives sense, full speech, and when speech does not produce sense, ‘true’ sense, it is empty speech; but the difference between the empty and the full is given by the criterion of sense, • that the determining axis of Freudian analytic phenomena is the symbolic axis, • that the imaginary is subordinated to it, • that the real is - to use a word found in these lectures - a precondition for the insertion of the symbolic in the life of human beings and in psychical reality, and • that the real presents holes, pores, in the action of the symbol and at the same time finds itself for that reason negated by the action of the symbol. This first Lacanian elaboration results in a schema which Lacan calls L, the first letter of his name, but the basis of which is an X, opposing the symbolic and the imaginary. Sense, to be put in its place of birth, is located in the symbolic axis. Sense needs the symbol, the signifier, and furthermore needs the Other, be it as an interlocutor or as the place itself of the structure of language. In this perspective, the intention of signification, the wanting-to-say, finds this structure, A, which modifies the message that results from it. In opposition to this axis we find the imaginary couple a-a’, which comes from the mirror stage. It takes as a reference On Narcissism, a text prior to this lecture. Lacan considers that the Freudian libido circulates in the imaginary axis, in as much as it is fundamentally narcissistic. The libido is situated in narcissism. Between a and a’, there is libido, Befriedigung, what we call jouissance, in such a way that the imaginary axis is also the axis of the drive in Lacan. Lacan has entered psychoanalyis with a binarism opposing sense and jouissance. I will characterise thus the first Lacanian operation which we still practice: it is to separate, to divide, to cut. Here comes the imaginary, there the symbolic. The orientation is always from the imaginary to the symbolic, with a certain disdain for the imaginary, and, for this reason, for the drive. Throughout the first Lacanian orientation there is a devaluation of the drive, which we do not recognise when we speak of the imaginary, but it is there. Furthermore, there is the principle that it is always dangerous in practice to confuse the two of them, the symbolic and imaginary. This first Lacanian operation is a wonderful tool. Lacan takes Freud’s cases and reorders them as if by a miracle, separating the waters like a Freudian Moses. In Freud’s cases, in present day cases, in theorisation, nothing resists this. What are the paths to the formation of symptoms in this perspective? I will put it in the singular: it is essentially the symbolic path. In the inaugural text of Lacan, the symptom appears as a sense, a repressed sense. Of course, we have to take into account the signifier of this repressed sense, so I will say, rather, that the symptom appears as an enigma. It manifests itself supported by a signifier whose signified is repressed, that is to say, it has not been communicated to, or accepted by, the Other. The symptomatic is constituted by a signifier with repressed signified. The signifying material of the symptom can be taken in a part of the body, parasitized by the repressed signified, or in thought. The path to the formation of symptoms, in this perspective, follows the axis subject-Other. ... to articulate This is found in the second Lacanian operation. He takes the symbolic axis in a more complex way, with the inclusion of the effect of retroaction. I will not develop this in detail. You know Lacan’s graph. What is a graph? It is a set of pathways. Lacan’s graph, made of vectors, is the equivalent of the Freudian Wege: The graph leaves no doubt that, for Lacan, the symptom is located in s(A), as an effect of the signified of the Other. This is translated, let us say, in what Freud himself calls der Sinn der Symptom: the symptom is a special effect of the signified of the Other. Special in which way? Here, things get complicated. When one arrives at this second operation, it is not enough to divide, to cut and to separate. The second operation is to articulate sense and jouissance. Lacan realises this in a graphic form, in which he places the fantasy as touching upon the formation of the symptom. The symptom is not a normal sense, it is not an effect of the usual Sinn in the way it is connected with the fantasy. At this point one does not know whether Lacan is Freudian or Freud Lacanian. In Lecture XXIII, this appears as an open book. Furthermore, the fantasy, ($◊a), is the result of a long circuit which is a libidinal circuit, in which the drive appears as a signifying chain, and desire as signified of this signifying chain. Lacan also invents a quilting point (point de capiton) of the drive with desire. He also locates the connection between jouissance and castration. In sum, the circuit of the drive is articulated with the semantic circuit. ... to deduce, to produce and to knot There is a third Lacanian operation after separation and articulation: deduction. The schema of alienation and separation is the new representation of the symbolic axis subject- Other, which is the reason why these two circles are called the subject and the Other. It results in the deduction of jouissance from sense. It shows that jouissance under the form of (a) necessarily complements the effect of sense. First there is signifier and sense, this is what Lacan calls alienation; in a second moment, there is a plus- de-jouir, this is what Lacan calls separation. The fourth operation is the production. The production of a plus-de-jouir from the signifying apparatus is demonstrable in this system. The fifth operation is to knot. It gives the foundation of the whole perspective. In this zone, not so articulated, not so differentiated as the others, the equation, the identification, of sense and jouissance is at stake. It is what Lacan calls the enjoyed sense. However, sometimes this means to oppose radically sense and jouissance. This is a zone where Lacan has begun to question as such the relation between sense and jouissance, trying out many versions of it. This is the path of Lacan’s teaching. Let’s return to Freud. An anecdote of the Introductory Lectures Mr. Whitehead, collaborator with Bertrand Russell in the creation of the first effective symbolism of mathematical logic, a philosopher in the full exercise of his profession, used to say - it is a phrase which enchants me - that all philosophy was nothing more than commentary on the work of Plato. He reduced all philosophy to this. Under this inspiration, I would say that all Lacan’s teaching is a commentary on Freud’s Lectures XVII and XXIII. There is a little exaggeration in this but, who knows, no more than in Whitehead’s phrase. You may think this is to give too much honour to these lectures, given to a lay audience of non- analysts, lectures presented to a relatively ‘naïve’ public, as Freud remarks, a public of good will, but not an erudite public like the two parts of this one here today. It is a work of exposition, it is not a work of investigation. These lectures have something of smoothness, of continuity. One should not forget the conditions in which they were delivered by Freud, during the First World War, when he was, one has to say, quite nationalistic. This would be forgotten later when he writes to Arnold Zweig saying that one does not have to identify too much with German culture, and one of them goes to Jerusalem, the other to London as an immigrant. There is little indication of the moment in these lectures, but there is a funny anecdote. To make a scansion, I will read it, it is the only indication in these lectures of that time. It concerns the way in which the Oedipus complex was received by the German troops in the First World War. “Listen to this episode which occurred in the course of the present war. One of the stout disciples of psychoanalysis was stationed as a medical officer” - it must surely be Abraham - “on the German front somewhere in Poland. He attracted his colleagues’ attention by the fact that he occasionally exercised an unexpected influence on a patient. When he was questioned, he acknowledged that he was employing the methods of psychoanalysis and declared his readiness to convey his knowledge to his colleagues. Every evening thereafter the medical officers of the corps, his colleagues and his superiors, came together in order to learn the secret doctrines of analysis. All went well for a while; but when he spoke to his audience about the Oedipus Complex, one of his superiors rose, declared he did not believe it, that it was a vile act on the part of the lecturer to speak of such things to them, honest men who were fighting for their country, and fathers of a family, and that he forbade the continuance of the lectures. That was the end of the matter. The analyst got himself transferred to another part of the front. It seems to me a bad thing, however, if a German victory requires that science shall be ‘organised’ in this way, and German science will not respond well to the organisation of such a kind” (SE XVI: 300). In a certain way, Freud already prefers psychoanalysis to a German triumph, if the German triumph would not need to talk about Oedipus. This is to illustrate the atmosphere of these lectures. This could lead us to underestimate these lectures, but we won’t! I have reflected upon this and have concluded that the simplification to which Freud obliges himself - a simplification is also necessary in a seminar, in the acceleration of a theoretical exposition - finally shows the fundamentals and lineaments of his theory, its framework. Not only is there an obligation of condensation, but also an obligation of continuity, and Freud, in giving ten or fifteen lectures in a series, makes appear as a problem the articulation between the themes, a problem which does not appear at the time at which they are elaborated thoroughly but separately. The simplification has its own advantage: it must articulate themes that are otherwise investigated in a dispersed way.