The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research and the Antarctic Treaty David W. H. Walton ABSTRACT. The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) had its antecedents in the Special Committee on Antarctic Research of the International Geophysical Year, and thus its establishment in 1958 predates the Antarctic Treaty. As a body of the International Council for Science (ICSU, formerly the International Council of Scientific Unions) it is a nongovernmental organization, yet it has been intimately linked to the governmental dis- cussions at the Antarctic Treaty since the first Antarctic Treaty meeting in 1961. Its primary role has always been to develop and coordinate international scientific research, but it has also provided independent advice to Treaty Parties on many scientific and environmental questions, initially through national government delegations. Only in 1987 was SCAR it- self granted the status of observer and the right to attend Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) and to submit information and working papers. This paper looks at the changing relationship between SCAR and the Treaty Parties, at some of its most important science inputs to the ATCM, and at the way SCAR itself has changed. Its earliest input to governance was advice on conservation that became the Agreed Measures for the Conser- vation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora of 1964, and for the first 40 years of the Antarctic Treaty, SCAR provided major input on protected areas and protected species, as well as environmental impact and monitoring. Its proposals for seal conservation and management gave it a specific role in the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, and its Biological Investigations of Marine Antarctic Systems and Stocks (BIOMASS) programme laid the foundations for the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR). Its nonpolitical stance has allowed it to provide the only unified gazetteer for the Antarctic. The organization of SCAR remained virtually unchanged for around 30 years until the logisticians split to form the Council of Managers of National Antarctic Programs (COMNAP) in 1989. The organization was languishing, but a major review of structure and function changed that in 2000, resulting in the establishment of Open Science Conferences, major new international programmes, increased educational outreach, and a greater input to the annual Antarctic Treaty meetings, often on controver- sial subjects like marine acoustics or specially protected species. There are currently 31 full members with 4 associate members and 9 ICSU union m embers. INTRODUCTION David W. H. Walton, British Antarctic Survey, Natural Environment Research Council, High The International Geophysical Year (1956–1957) was one of the most impor- Cross, Madingley Road, Cambridge CB3 0ET, UK. Correspondence: [email protected]. tant international events in the history of twentieth century science. The original 76 • SCIENCE DIPLOMACY idea for this was apparently conceived by a small group of the arguments between Chile, Argentina, and the United physicists led by Lloyd Berkner in the United States and Kingdom over sovereignty and to ensure that the Soviets Sidney Chapman in the United Kingdom over dinner at the were not able to militarize the Antarctic and escalate the house of James van Allen in the spring of 1950 (Belanger, arms race to a new level. He used the pleas from the science 2006). The proposal was for a coordinated series of mea- community as window dressing to support his initiation of surements of many key geophysical variables using agreed secret talks in 1957 between the 12 countries toward a new protocols, especially in the polar regions. The proposers Antarctic Treaty for the continent (Berkman, this volume). enlisted the support of the National Academy of Sciences Meanwhile, the ICSU Comité Speciale de l’Année and the Royal Society as well as many of their colleagues, Géophysique Internationale (CSAGI) had already decided and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) at its fourth meeting that a more permanent international Executive Board rapidly and with enthusiasm endorsed focus for Antarctic science would be necessary and recom- the theme when it was proposed in 1951. In response to a mended to ICSU that a Special Committee on Antarctic Re- suggestion by the World Meteorological Organization that search should be formed. This was the beginning of SCAR. the polar focus was too narrow, Chapman widened it and This paper will examine the development of the rela- suggested the International Geophysical Year (IGY) rather tionship between the Antarctic Treaty Parties and SCAR, than just an International Polar Year (Belanger, 2006). using examples to indicate how scientific advice has laid From its small beginnings it grew initially to involve scien- the foundations for both law and policy. tists from 46 countries, but by the time it ended scientists from 67 countries were taking part. It was, to a large part, modelled on the previous International Polar Years, and it EARLY DAYS was therefore significant that the organizers had declared that there were two scientific frontiers that should be at- The first meeting of SCAR was organized at The Hague tacked: outer space and the Antarctic. Both constituted in February 1958. The ICSU had decided that it would be major unknowns at that time, and developments in tech- attended by delegates from the 12 countries active in the nology, especially in rocketry, made the scientific prospects Antarctic as well as representatives of the five most rel- much more attractive than they had ever been before. evant scientific unions (International Union of Geodesy Twelve countries finally decided that they would and Geophysics [IUGG], the International Geographical work in the Antarctic. Several (Argentina, Australia, Union [IGU], the International Union of Biological Sciences Chile, France, and the United Kingdom) already had sta- [IUBS], the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics tions there but intended to augment their work, whereas [IUPAP], and the Union Radio Scientifique Internationale the new countries (Belgium, Japan, New Zealand, Nor- [URSI]) and one from the World Meteorological Organiza- way, South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- tion. They gathered for a three-d ay meeting that laid the lics (USSR), and the United States) all needed to establish firm foundations for what would follow over five decades. themselves there. After some arguments the sites for all the All the participating nations except New Zealand and stations were agreed and the IGY got under way. South Africa were there as well as two of the unions, all It is difficult to imagine 50 years on just how revolu- represented by scientists except Chile (whose ambassador tionary this international programme was. The aftermath attended as an observer). Only Belgium, the USSR, and of the Second World War, the expansion of Soviet military the United States brought advisors along, so it was a small activities and the spread of communism, and the militari- meeting of 18 people (Figure 1). R. Fraser and E. Herbays zation and aggressive stance of the United States threw a represented ICSU, W. Schytt IGU, A. Bruun IUBS, and pall across the world. The research turned out to be even G. Laclavère IUGG whilst N. Herlofson chaired the meet- more productive than the scientists expected, and the in- ing. The main objectives were to agree to a constitution for ternational collaboration engendered was, during the time the committee, elect officers, frame a budget, and prepare of the Cold War, a very positive and surprising result. The a scientific plan for the years after IGY. A draft constitu- scientific community soon began to lobby for a continua- tion had been prepared, apparently by Valter Schytt, based tion of the Antarctic work, citing the need to get a long-t erm on other ICSU constitutions, and circulated in advance. It return on the infrastructure investment and the value of the was commendably short at this stage! data that were being produced and pooled for all to use. Un- The sterling international work done during IGY en- known to them, President Eisenhower had already decided sured the unopposed election of Georges Laclavère from that a permanent agreement was necessary, both to stop France as president, with Keith Bullen from Australia as WALTON / SCAR AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY • 77 FIGURE 1. Participants in the first SCAR meeting, The Hague, February 1958. 1, Dr. L. M. Gould, United States; 2, Dr. Ronald Fraser, ICSU; 3, Dr. N. Herlofson, convenor; 4, Colonel E. Herbays, ICSU; 5, Professor T. Rikitake, Japan; 6, Professor Leiv Harang, Norway; 7, Dr. Valter Schytt, IGU; 8, Dr. Anton F. Bruun, IUBS; 9, Mr. J. J. Taljaard, South Africa; 10, Captain F. Bastin, Belgium; 11, Captain Luis de la Canal, Argentina; 12, Sir James Wordie, United Kingdom; 13, Professor K. E. Bullen, Australia; 14, Dr. H. Wexler, United States; 15, Ingénieur Général Georges Laclavère, IUGG; 16, Ingénieur Général André Gougenheim, France; 17, Mr. Luis Renard, Chile; 18, Dr. M. M. Somov, USSR; 19, Prof. J. van Mieghen, Belgium. From Wolff (2010). vice- president and Valter Schytt as secretary. Costs were reflection of the expertise around the table. This structure estimated at $6000 per year, so the initial contribution of working groups changed at later meetings as more sci- was set at $500 per nation with the intention to move entists became directly involved. In addition, it was agreed to a sliding scale in future years based on the number of that SCAR’s area of interest would be determined prin- overwintering staff. The establishment of the World Data cipally by scientific features. The SCAR scientists agreed Centres by ICSU had already removed one potential task on the Antarctic Convergence (Polar Front) as the general from their list of key scientific activities, but the range of northern boundary but then decided that some islands science within IGY needed to be broadened now that the lying north of this would need to be included for biologi- emphasis was not principally on geophysics. The meet- cal reasons: Ile Amsterdam, Iles Crozet, Gough Island, Iles ing set up three working groups to discuss future research de Kerguelen, Macquarie Island, Prince Edward Islands, programmes: WGI Meteorology, Oceanography, Cosmic Ile Saint- Paul, South Georgia, and Tristan da Cunha. They Physics, Biology & Physiology; WGII Geology, Glaciol- also agreed to establish the SCAR Bulletin to provide a ogy, Morphology & Cartography, and WGIII Seismology, reporting link to the global community. Gravity & Vulcanology. Given the limited information Most importantly, they stated that “the continua- on biology, this initial disciplinary listing seems still heav- tion of scientific activity in Antarctic research should be ily biased to Earth science and physics and is probably a regarded as being inspired by the interest aroused by the 78 • SCIENCE DIPLOMACY activities of IGY but was in no way an extension of the not be used for dumping nuclear waste, had established an IGY.”(SCAR, 1959). This statement was clearly a get- out international inspection procedure (which was effectively clause for politicians who wanted to draw a line under the first nuclear arms treaty), and had formally recognized their national involvement and had, at that stage, the po- that the continent should be used only for peace and sci- tential to severely limit future involvement. ence for the good of all mankind. Given the range of na- As a component body of ICSU SCAR had to adopt tional objectives, the superpower struggle for supremacy, their normal method of national representation, which was and the history of animosity between many of the partici- through a committee constituted within the national acad- pating countries, this was a remarkable achievement. emy of sciences. Since all 12 countries were already ICSU The parties had recognized at an early stage that to members, this did not cause any problem, but it did take govern the continent they would need good scientific ad- a little time for all of them to establish committees, not all vice. Although SCAR is not mentioned in the Antarctic of which have functioned effectively over the past 50 years. Treaty itself, right from the first Consultative Meeting in Although at the time this must have seemed a logical and Canberra in 1961 the importance of input from SCAR effective route for communicating with the active scien- was formally recognized. Indeed, many of the delegations tists, within a few years it became clear that this would be contained scientists associated with SCAR: e.g., for Aus- a troublesome and ineffective linkage for many countries. tralia, R. Carrick, F. J. Jacka, and P. G. Law; for France, Political wrangling was continuing over who would G. Laclavère; for New Zealand, E. I. Robertson; for Nor- continue to work in Antarctica and just how extensive that way, A. K. Corvin; for South Africa, M. P. van Rooy; for work would be. The politicians worried over the escalat- the United Kingdom, B. B. Roberts; for the USSR, M. M. ing bill for, as some saw it, scientists to have a good time at Somov; and for the United States, T. Jones. the taxpayers’ expense. The impetus seemed to be failing In the final report of the First Antarctic Treaty Con- when, at the Fifth CSAGI Meeting in Moscow in August sultative Meeting (ATCM, 1961) the first four recommen- 1958, a formal proposal from Soviet scientists to continue dations all dealt with science, and Recommendation I- IV Antarctic research galvanized both the scientists and their was specifically devoted to SCAR: politicians. It seemed that the Soviet scientists were des- perate to maintain the international links that the IGY had The Representatives agree without prejudice to the rights of fostered as well as capitalising on the international recog- Governments, to make such arrangements as they deem neces- nition gained by the launch of Sputnik 1. To assuage the sary to further the objectives of scientific co- operation set forth politicians, they needed to find a new name for the one- in the Treaty: year extension and the “Year of International Geophysical 1) That the free exchange of information and views among Co- operation” became the new title, but however it was scientists participating in SCAR, and the recommenda- dressed up it was clear that if the USSR was staying, so tions concerning scientific programmes and co- operation were the Americans and many others. formulated by this body constitute a most valuable contribution to international scientific co-o peration in Antarctica, SCAR AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY 2) That since these activities of SCAR constitute the kind of activity templated in Article II of the Treaty, SCAR The State Department pushed ahead with its plan for should be encouraged to continue its advisory work a new governance system, capitalizing on the wave of sci- which has so effectively facilitated international co- entific enthusiasm. The 60 secret meetings in Washington operation in scientific investigations. eventually resulted in sufficient agreement for the coun- tries to decide that a more formal and public negotiation At that same meeting the Contracting Parties took the could take place to finalize the details of the Antarctic first steps to rectify the lack of any specific conservation Treaty (Hanessian, 1960). Meeting in Washington, D.C., measure in the Antarctic Treaty itself. Using a report pub- starting on 15 October 1959, the Contracting Parties, as lished by SCAR in 1960 (Carrick, 1960), they agreed to Rec- they styled themselves, finally signed the Antarctic Treaty ommendation I-V III, “Conservation of the Antarctic Flora on 1 December 1959. In the process of agreeing to the and Fauna,” establishing an interim measure that in 1964 Antarctic Treaty the Contracting Parties had found a way they would turn into Recommendation III-V III, “Agreed of setting to one side the sovereignty claims and disputes, Measures for the Conservation for the Antarctic Fauna and had demilitarized a continent and ensured that it could Flora.” Linked to this was Recommendation III-X asking WALTON / SCAR AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY • 79 that SCAR should continue to report on conservation mat- be sustainably harvested and that, despite the wishes of ters especially with respect to proposals for specially pro- some scientists, it was not possible to argue for a complete tected species and specially protected areas. ban on commercial sealing. At the Fourth Meeting of SCAR in October 1961 in This concern over seals finally resulted in the first of the Wellington the Biology Working Group seized on the prog- additional conventions to the Antarctic Treaty. The Con- ress toward the Agreed Measures and promptly drew up a vention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS), list of suggested protected areas, as well as recommending agreed by the Consultative Parties in 1972 in London, that the Ross seal and the fur seals should be designated specifically mandates SCAR to provide scientific advice on as specially protected species. At IV ATCM in Santiago in stock sizes and management. To involve an independent 1966, 15 new protected areas were designated, and the nongovernmental ICSU body directly in this way was cer- Ross and fur seals were formally given special protection. tainly unusual, and indeed, the signing of the instrument Interestingly, the Biology Working Group had completed was delayed until 2 June 1972 , the day after SCAR for- its 1961 report with the statement that “research in Ant- mally accepted the task. One longer-t erm commitment by arctic biology would suffer if SCAR becomes too involved SCAR as a result of CCAS was the formation and support in the political and economic aspects of conservation, as of a new Group of Specialists on Seals, part of whose role distinct from the formulation of principles and recom- was to be prepared to provide advice to CCAS if needed. mendations based upon scientific work.” Clearly, SCAR Since commercial sealing has never restarted, the conven- had already recognized the difficult balancing act it would tion has never been used, but SCAR continues to collect need to achieve if its inputs to policy were to be valued yet data annually on seal numbers killed in scientific research. its nonpolitical status was to be protected. BIOMASS AND CCAMLR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE CONSERVATION Others beside the seal biologists had also become OF ANTARCTIC SEALS alarmed at the prospect of major changes in the Southern Ocean. American biologists at the Second SCAR Biology There were other politics on the horizon that drew Symposium in 1968 (Holdgate, 1970) had noticed the way SCAR in even more closely to the Antarctic Treaty. The in which the Soviet Union was researching krill; they rec- notification by Norway that a pilot sealing expedition ognized not only how little was really known about krill would go to Antarctica in 1964 drew immediate attention but also that it did appear to be a keystone species in the to the history of sealing and its disastrous consequences Southern Ocean food web. The Soviet Union had both re- for fur seals. The Consultative Parties quickly passed Rec- search vessels and trawler fleets in the Southern Ocean and ommendation III- 11 urging that any pelagic sealing be un- was actively catching krill, having mastered the technical dertaken in such a way as not to disrupt the ecosystem problems of processing the animals prior to freezing them, nor threaten the integrity of species. They followed this as well as catching large quantities of fish. There were no at the next meeting with Interim Guidelines on the Vol- controls on any of these actions as the Antarctic Treaty untary Regulation of Antarctic Pelagic Sealing (Recom- specifically did not cover the high seas. mendation IV- 21) and urged SCAR to continue its interest These U.S. scientists persuaded the National Science (Recommendation IV- 22) in the subject. The SCAR had, Foundation to fund the first multidisciplinary oceano- indeed, been active, with the Biology Working Group first graphic cruise on board the USNS Eltanin in 1972 to producing a statement on pelagic sealing in August 1964 study the structure and function of the Ross Sea ecosystem and establishing a Subcommittee on Seals to consider the (El- Sayed, 1973). Meanwhile, at the SCAR Biology Work- problems in more detail. Returning to the subject in 1968 ing Group meeting in August 1972 in Canberra a strong the Biology Working Group had the report of the subcom- case was made for a new focus on marine resources, and a mittee to consider. This report proposed a revision of the new Subcommittee on Marine Resources was established, Antarctic Treaty’s Interim Guidelines, changing many of with S. Z. El-S ayed as its chairman. Meeting in Montreal the details and laying out details of permissible catches in in 1974, the subcommittee made rapid progress, and in Annex A and the location of sealing zones in Annex B. An 1975 the SCAR Executive Committee established it as a important element in the SCAR response was the accep- new Group of Specialists on Southern Ocean Ecosystems tance of the principle that seals were a resource that could and their Living Resources. In November of the same year 80 • SCIENCE DIPLOMACY the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research (SCOR) recommendations were filtered into the ATCMs through agreed to cosponsor the group, as did the International national delegations. Some authors (e.g., Herr, 1996) have Association for Biological Oceanography (IABO) and the included SCAR as a part of the Antarctic Treaty System, Advisory Committee on Marine Resources Research of but that suggests an equality of legal persona that has never the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. existed between governmental and nongovernmental rep- Activities increased as VIII ATCM asked SCAR to provide resentation. Of course, SCAR scientists were included a report on progress on Antarctic marine living resources. within many of the national delegations, but the organiza- The group met in 1975 in Cambridge and then again in tion itself did not initially have any formal representation. Woods Hole in August 1976, where, in a much larger con- Vidas (1996) has suggested that the changes (the admis- ference format, the proposal for cooperative studies in the sion of observers and experts as well as the Acceding Parties) Southern Ocean was developed, and Dick Laws devised were largely a response to the charge at the United Nations its new acronym, BIOMASS: Biological Investigations of that the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) was an “exclusive Marine Antarctic Systems and Stocks. club” of rich and powerful states and that their discussions The BIOMASS programme was on a much larger scale were veiled in secrecy, with the hope of defusing further crit- than anything SCAR had attempted before. It lasted over icism. Certainly, the latter charge was true, and it is difficult 10 years, with three international field seasons, involving to understand at this distance why secrecy was apparently many ships from 11 countries. Its scientific outputs were so important in the governance of an uninhabited continent. considerable (El-S ayed, 1994), but just as important was Perhaps the first and natural refuge of diplomats in any in- the way in which this research activity stimulated the tergovernmental meeting at that time was to deprive the Treaty Parties to develop a new system of governance public they represented of any useful information so that and management for the Southern Ocean. In 1977 at IX they could work untrammelled by public opinion. ATCM the parties agreed to establish a new convention Criticism eventually had some effect. The Consul- for the sustainable management of marine living resources tative Parties responded to increasing public concern in and thus was born the Convention for the Conservation 1983 by first allowing Non-C onsultative Parties to attend of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), which the meetings, then admitting as Consultative Parties India, was signed on 20 May 1980 and came into force on 7 April Brazil, China, and Uruguay (undermining the argument 1982. The SCAR scientists were closely involved in advis- at the United Nations that only developed states could ing on the scientific basis for the convention, which was achieve the highest status), and finally inviting both ob- established on a new principle: maximum sustainable yield servers and experts to attend the meetings, thus meeting without disturbing the existing ecological relationships be- the criticisms from the international environmental lobby. tween species. Equally important was the acceptance by So, finally, at XIV ATCM in 1987 in Rio de Janeiro, the politicians of the scientific argument that the CCAMLR SCAR and CCAMLR were both formally invited to take boundary should not be that of the Antarctic Treaty but their place as observers and were requested to provide re- a relevant biological one: the Antarctic Polar Front (Ant- ports of their activities to the plenary. Since then, SCAR’s arctic Convergence). As Nigel Bonner has said (Bonner, input to the Antarctic Treaty meetings has steadily increased, 1987:145), “CCAMLR is a philosophical scientist’s con- not only in terms of providing information and working pa- vention. It is certainly not a convention for fisheries man- pers but also in the institution of a SCAR science lecture to agers,” yet it has been made to work and its principles have the plenary, the first of which was given by Claude Lorius since been adopted for other regional fisheries. (then president of SCAR) at XV ATCM in Paris. The SCAR was granted the status of observer at the CCAMLR Scientific Committee once it was established, but since so many SCAR scientists were already involved in na- CONSERVATION INITIATIVES tional delegations, it initially rarely took up the role. Later, it appointed a marine scientist as the official SCAR repre- Having had a major hand in establishing CCAMLR, sentative to ensure that requests to SCAR could be formally SCAR was already moving on. The Biology Working Group targeted and to allow for an independent report to the Biol- Subcommittee on Conservation was chaired by Nigel Bon- ogy Working Group at the following SCAR meeting. ner, a seal biologist, then head of Life Sciences Division These early exchanges set the model for the rela- at the British Antarctic Survey. Bonner had watched with tionship between SCAR and the Antarctic Treaty for interest the development of a World Conservation Strategy the first 25 years where SCAR’s ideas, suggestions, and by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature WALTON / SCAR AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY • 81 (IUCN, 1980) with assistance from the United Nations En- upward. Interest in Antarctic minerals was first expressed vironment Program (UNEP) and the World Wildlife Fund at VI ATCM in Tokyo in 1970, in an attempt to interest (WWF). The IUCN had observed continuing and accelerat- Contracting Parties in developing a minerals regime ahead ing degradation of habitats globally, widespread pollution, of the need for one (Joyner, 1996). This proved to be ex- and damage from the development of infrastructure, a lack cellent timing as the actions of the Organization of Petro- of adequate conservation legislation, and governments leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 in restricting whose priorities were short-t erm and economic rather than the world supply of hydrocarbons and causing a quadru- long-t erm and strategic. Published in 1980 (IUCN, 1980), pling of the price jerked governments into considering all the objective of the strategy was to integrate conservation sorts of new possibilities for future hydrocarbon develop- and development in a global framework within which na- ment. In addition, in 1971–1972 drilling by the Glomar tional and regional strategies could be developed. Section Challenger in the Ross Sea had discovered traces of meth- 18 was devoted to the Global Commons and drew particu- ane but no oil, fuelling media speculation that there could lar attention to the need to manage the Southern Ocean be extensive oil reserves in Antarctica. The VII ATCM in living resources sustainably. In 1982 IUCN proposed that Wellington began the discussions ostensibly as part of a a joint meeting be held with SCAR to bring conservation- concern that mineral extraction would have serious im- ists together with Antarctic scientists. Following this, at pacts on the environment. At their next meeting in Oslo the 16th IUCN General Assembly in 1984 Antarctica was in 1975 their Recommendation VIII- 14 invited SCAR to designated as a region in which IUCN should actively pro- make an assessment of the possible environmental impacts mote the protection, management, and conservation of the of mineral exploration and exploitation. environment and natural resources. The SCAR was immediately apprehensive about this, The IUCN formally approached SCAR, and Bon- and at XIV SCAR in Mendoza there was very spirited ner was designated to work with their convenor (Martin discussion about what should be done to provide a reply. Angel) on developing such a regional conservation strat- Some biologists were concerned that any response by egy for the Antarctic, covering both the land and the sur- SCAR would be seen as supporting mineral exploitation rounding ocean. With support from both sides the joint whilst others from the geological sciences saw this as an IUCN/SCAR Symposium on Requirements for Antarctic opportunity to lay out what little was really known about Conservation was held in Bonn in April 1985. Out of this economic mineral resources and correct many widely pub- was developed the Strategy for Antarctic Conservation licized misunderstandings. In the end, SCAR established (IUCN, 1991). For whatever reason, IUCN and SCAR the Group of Specialists on Environmental Impact Assess- failed to send the strategy to the ATCM, which at that ment of Mineral Resource Exploration and Exploitation point, was rather absorbed in agreeing the Protocol on in the Antarctic (EAMREA), chaired by Jim Zumberge, Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, and the a geologist, but containing a wide range of both geolo- valuable lessons that could have been utilized were lost. gists and biologists. Parts of their report submitted to IX Indeed, the strategy was not written in a user- friendly ATCM proved politically unacceptable (especially to the fashion, and its published format was not well designed. USSR), and the Antarctic Treaty then established its own Despite all the effort put into drafting and agreeing it, the Intergovernmental Group of Experts which produced a strategy failed to make any substantive mark on Antarctic parallel report (Bonner, 1993b). environmental governance. The Antarctic Treaty soon saw that such a contentious subject would need lengthy negotiations away from public view and these could not be contained within the normal FINDING A CONCENSUS ON MINERALS ATCM agenda. A series of Special Consultative Meetings was begun under the chairmanship of Chris Beeby from The Antarctic Treaty is silent on all forms of re- New Zealand, leading in 1988 to a consensus in the form source, not only because the extent and value of Antarctic of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral resources were unknown in the 1950s but also because Resource Activities (CRAMRA). During the course of these achieving agreement on these, even as abstract aspirations, negotiations SCAR was again asked for advice, producing would have been too difficult for the Washington talks. a new report “Antarctic Environmental Implications of Although marine living resources (first as seals and then as Possible Mineral Exploration and Exploitation” in 1986. fish and krill) were the initial resources legislated for, the All this effort appeared to be in vain because although question of mineral resources was already floating steadily all parties signed CRAMRA, the refusal first by Australia 82 • SCIENCE DIPLOMACY and then by France and New Zealand to ratify it effec- how government employees (the managers) could realisti- tively consigned it to limbo. Yet the new environmental cally make themselves subservient to a nongovernmental thinking that went into the safeguards in CRAMRA was body (SCAR Executive Committee). He began to talk up to find an unexpected outlet in a more general instrument the need for change in San Diego in 1986 and reinforced for environmental protection. this at a special meeting in Boulder in 1987. In all this he found a willing supporter in Jim Bleasel, the director of the Australian Antarctic Division and the chairman of THE FORMATION OF THE COUNCIL the Working Group on Logistics. Together they persuaded OF MANAGERS OF NATIONAL the managers that their rightful place was in their own ANTARCTIC PROGRAMS autonomous organisation. Discussions continued through into the next SCAR meeting in Hobart, where on 15 Sep- The SCAR Working Group on Logistics had been one tember 1988 the Council of Managers of National Ant- of the first formed after SCAR was established. It never sat arctic Programs (COMNAP) was formed. To try to find a easily alongside the other purely scientific working groups, face- saving formula, the new organization was described but it did have the advantage of ensuring that science and as being “federated” to SCAR, but in reality, the managers logistics periodically met together and talked. In its early had broken free completely, appointing David Drewry as days it was tasked with responding to several Antarctic the first chairman and Al Fowler as executive secretary in Treaty requests on communications, transport, and even a new independent secretariat (Fowler, 2000). data management. As SCAR membership increased, the Appearing at the next ATCM in Bonn in their own diversity of appointments of national programme man- right, COMNAP made a major impression on the Con- agers increased, with some from science backgrounds, tracting Parties as a well organized and professional body others from technical and engineering backgrounds, and and immediately began to undertake studies at the re- some, from South American countries in particular, man- quest of the Consultative Parties. This impression was, of agers from diplomatic or military backgrounds. The de- course, helped by the extensive resources under the con- gree of autonomy that each had varied widely and, with trol of the managers, who could easily divert both staff it, the degree of political control, as well as the extent and thousands of dollars into exercises they thought po- of resources that each controlled. Organizing the work- litically important. This was in sharp contrast to SCAR ing group proved a continuing problem, yet SCAR felt whose report, presented by Dick Laws as President, had strongly that having the managers within the SCAR um- suggested that SCAR had problems funding the work nec- brella was the most effective way to keep communications essary to meet the constant stream of requests from the going and integrate the science and logistics for efficiency. Antarctic Treaty. In particular, he said, “If the ATCPs do When Edward Todd was Director of the Office of Polar not give reasonable weight to the views of SCAR and if Programs (OPP), he apparently developed some strong SCAR is unable to attract the relatively substantial (but views on SCAR, believing that SCAR was interfering in the absolutely small) extra funds required it may be obliged to way that the United States made its decisions about science concentrate on primary science and withdraw from giving programs and logistics. In 1983 he wrote, with respect to advice on applied or management problems. The ATCPs the Logistics Working Group, “some SCAR participants have not responded to SCAR requests for extra funding to forget that commitments to SCAR are not governmental enable it to carry out the applied science function. To help commitments by most SCAR participants who have no SCAR make a decision it asks the ATCPs to make clear such charter; this confusion has led SCAR to assume man- their intentions” (ATCM, 1992:232). He went on to lay agement direction of research activities to which govern- out what should be the relevant responsibilities of Treaty ments are not committed, and to unwarranted criticism Parties, SCAR, and COMNAP and cautioned against the of governments that have declined the presumed commit- Consultative Parties taking advice from environmental ment of resources necessary to implement them” (Fowler, pressure groups. This sort of straight talking was not to 2000:32). This streak of irritability persisted in the United the liking of some Consultative Parties, who questioned States, and the appointment of Peter Wilkness as Direc- the role of SCAR and, by inference, its temerity in telling tor of the National Science Foundation Office of Polar governments what should be done. Although many Con- Programs exacerbated it further. Wilkness saw the work- sultative Parties came to the rescue of SCAR, no funding ing group as an ineffective anachronism and questioned was forthcoming, and by breaking the implicit rules that WALTON / SCAR AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY • 83 govern discussions at Antarctic Treaty meetings, this re- • environmental aspects of waste disposal port made the role of SCAR at ATCMs harder to achieve • protected areas in the Antarctic immediately afterward. • additional protective measures. Thus, SCAR was well prepared for engaging with the THE PROTOCOL REVOLUTION CEP when it finally came into being and provided a wide range of assistance, including workshops organized on The sudden demise of CRAMRA and the rapid nego- protected areas, subantarctic island management, and en- tiation of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the vironmental education; a handbook for the preparation of Antarctic Treaty have been well documented (Chaturvedi, protected area management plans; detailed protocols for 1996). By pulling many of the environmental protection environmental monitoring of human impacts; checklists for elements from CRAMRA and rationalizing the many inspections of protected areas and incinerator emissions; conservation and management recommendations already input to the Liability Annex discussions, bioprospecting, agreed, the Consultative Parties were able to draft the and marine acoustic impacts; and a detailed revision of protocol much more quickly than might have been ex- every management plan for a Specially Protected Area or pected for such a key international document. Such was Site of Special Scientific Interest proposed or revised. the speed that SCAR, although present, was largely left out of the loop as the meetings concentrated on agreeing the form of the text and its limitations rather than dealing GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES in detail with its implementation. As far as science is con- cerned the Protocol on Environmental Protection estab- In undertaking science in Antarctica it has always lished a much more coherent approach to conservation been necessary to be able to name topographic features and environmental management and finally brought some so that specimen collection localities can be identified and much needed tools (like environmental impact assess- maps produced of biological and geological observations. ment) into normal use. As is often the case with Antarctic The early expeditions provided some names, but as explo- Treaty legislation, it provides careful ambiguity in some ration and then the IGY progressed, names began to be a key areas (for example, what exactly are “associated and problem. dependent ecosystems” or “minor or transitory impacts”) The disputes over sovereignty were a major part of and sets out goals with little indication of how they can the problem the Consultative Parties had in acting at the be achieved. Nevertheless, by establishing the Committee Antarctic Treaty level, and as more and more maps began for Environmental Protection (CEP) it provided a poten- to appear with duplicate names the possibility of chaos tially powerful forum for developing environmental ad- loomed. The SCAR Working Group on Geodesy and vice independent of SCAR. Geographic Information had been tracking the problem The SCAR saw both opportunities and drawbacks in for many years, noting how individual countries promul- the new system. In order to cope with the increased num- gated new names for existing named features, the lack of ber of environmental requests from the Antarctic Treaty, any agreed nomenclature for describing features, and the the SCAR Executive Committee had decided in 1988 to poor positional data that often accompanied new names. convert the Subcommittee on Conservation to the Group By scientific standards many countries were doing a very of Specialists on Environmental Affairs and Conservation poor job. At XXII SCAR in 1992 in Bariloche the work- (GOSEAC). Initially chaired by Nigel Bonner and then ing group resolved to compile a composite gazetteer, with later by David Walton, it was required (SCAR, 1988) Italy volunteering to compile the database and Germany developing a set of toponymic rules for naming. The SCAR to advise SCAR on matters directly related to environmental af- Composite Gazetteer of Antarctica was first published in fairs and conservation in the SCAR area of interest, in particular: 1998 (SCAR, 1998) and has been continually updated ever since. Although originally issued as a printed publica- • identification of environmental criteria relating to re- tion, it soon became available online. search activities and associated logistic support, as well None of this work was either requested or supported as to relevant commercial activities and the selection of by Treaty Parties, yet the arrival of the final product gave sites for all types of stations, a new tool to everyone. Since SCAR had been careful to 84 • SCIENCE DIPLOMACY include all names that could be validated without suggest- the auspices of Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, which ing which one should be used, the gazetteer was as politi- added some more details to the SCAR publications and cally anodyne as it could be and is now the basic reference again highlighted the lack of any solid data from the Ant- source for all. arctic on which to base regulations (Anonymous, 2004). For some within Germany this information was not suf- ficient, and they turned to promoting the application of MARINE ACOUSTICS the precautionary principle instead. It was made clear to the Consultative Parties by SCAR on several occasions Sometimes actions for environmental protection can that a sensible regime needed new research to establish not have major consequences for science, and SCAR has had only which species might be affected, the degree of impact, to employ considerable resources over a long period in and its severity but also the effectiveness of the mitigation order to ensure that policies are based on the best science measures proposed. It would appear that the appeal fell on available rather than on political agendas. An excellent ex- deaf ears, and no such research was funded. Although the ample is the difficulties raised by a licensing authority over Polarstern initially used foreign licences to operate multi- certain types of marine research. national geophysics cruises, there were eventually changes There have been a variety of cases around the world in the restrictions on low-p ower seismic systems, and some where whale stranding appears to have been associated science was able to be undertaken. No other Consultative with marine noise or where some measure of disturbance Party followed Germany in restricting its geophysics re- has been credited to nearby military, commercial, or sci- search, and there are still no new data from the Southern entific activities (Weilgart and Whitehead, 2004), but the Ocean to substantiate the need for restrictions. evidence is very confusing, partial, and possibly species specific. In 1998 Germany decided that the deployment of seismic instruments in the Southern Ocean was likely to ACCESS TO DATA cause unacceptable impact on marine mammals. Since Ger- man ships needed a permit from the Federal Environment One of the fundamental elements of the Antarctic Agency (Umwelt Bundes Amt) to operate, this effectively Treaty (Article III, paragraph 1(c)) is that all data collected stopped all marine geophysics programmes. The German within the Antarctic Treaty area should be freely available SCAR Committee asked if there really was evidence to to all. The development of databases in World Data Cen- support this contention. The SCAR decided to establish an tres during and after IGY was an important step in this ad hoc group to look at marine acoustics and produced direction for some scientific fields. However, these centres an initial information paper for the ATCM promising to did not encompass all aspects of Antarctic science, and it follow up with more detailed evidence (SATCM, 2000). became clear that a new initiative was necessary to allow The output from a SCAR workshop in Cambridge in 2001 access to the very considerable amounts of data that were (O’Brien, 2004) provided the basis for two papers to the being produced. In 1985 at the XIII ATCM, during discus- Antarctic Treaty (ATCM, 2002a, 2002b) whose general sions on human impacts on the environment, Consultative conclusions were that the evidence available did not justify Parties decided that there was scope for improvement in a ban on seismic surveys or scientific echo sounders in Ant- data management and, in Recommendation XIII- 5, asked arctic waters but that mitigation strategies should be used SCAR what steps could be taken to improve the compa- as a precautionary measure. There was a further paper rability and accessibility of scientific data. The SCAR- in Madrid (ATCM, 2003 ), and then SCAR held another COMNAP ad hoc Planning Group on Antarctic Data international workshop in Cadiz. The final discussion on Management was formed in June 1992, and its first report marine acoustics took place at the Edinburgh ATCM in proposed developing an Antarctic Data Directory Sys- 2006, where SCAR provided a report on the Cadiz work- tem comprising National Antarctic Data Centres linked shop (which included a new risk assessment system for seis- through an Antarctic Master Directory. This proposal was mic studies) (ATCM, 2006a )and a case study of ship noise reported to the Antarctic Treaty (ATCM, 1992), and these based on the Polarstern (ATCM, 2006b) and COMNAP ideas, elaborated at the second meeting (SCAR, 1994), be- provided a detailed breakdown of all seismic equipment came the basis for all future developments. on Antarctic research vessels (ATCM, 2006c). Meanwhile, In 1997 COMNAP and SCAR finally reached agree- in 2002 the Conference on the Impact of Acoustics on ment on joint funding and joint oversight for the commit- Marine Organisms had been organized in Berlin, under tee, and the ad hoc committee became the Joint Committee