The Role of Friendship In Our Development As Human Beings David Treanor DSW CQSW (UUJ), Grad Cert Arts (UNSW), M Pub Admin (UTAS). Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Tasmania 2012 Declaration This dissertation contains no content that has been previously accepted for a degree or diploma awarded by the University of Tasmania or any other institution. The material presented is original except where due acknowledgement is given ________________________ David P Treanor __________________ Dated Authority of Access This dissertation is made available for loan and limited copying in accordance with the Copyright Act, 1968. _______________________ David P Treanor ______________________ Dated 2 Abstract The development of community living programs for people with intellectual disabilities in western nations is now both policy rhetoric and a feature of the service system landscape. This change in policy and practice has helped change - the lives of people with intellectual disabilities and has honoured claims for everyone to be treated as equal citizens with the same rights. This thesis develops the argument that although individuals may differ in both their chronological age and cognitive abilities, they can form and maintain meaningful friendships of different types, which incorporate diversity and in which the parties involved remain distinct individuals, though unified through their shared emotional life. To defend this claim it will be necessary to refute the claims of those utilitarian thinkers who would deny full human status to people with intellectual disabilities. Furthermore, it is argued there is validity to prioritising a relational view to personhood. The method adopted is broadly phenomenological by using analysis of actual personal narratives in order to take account of the historical and existential factors that operate in the development of friendships. Aristotle‘s theory that humans are social by nature, and that friendship is essential to human life is developed and applied in order to demonstrate that the interdependence of individuals and the enrichment that follows from human encounters enables us to realize our potential as human beings. This argument not only provides an ethical justification for people with intellectual disabilities to be treated as equal citizens and as having the same rights as other people, but it also provides us with a vision of human society and of our personal identity that can be realised and integrated through the experience of living and interacting together. 3 Acknowledgements The central argument of this thesis is that we exist in a network of friendships (philia) that provides our lives with meaning. The very completion of my thesis is a testimony to this reality, and I am thankful to many people for both their technical and personal support to me over the last few years. Many people supported me with their specialised knowledge. My first debt of gratitude is to Dr Anna Alomes with whom I commenced my journey. My sincere thanks Anna, for your inspiration and encouragement. I met my current supervisor, Professor Wayne Hudson, through Anna. Wayne, I thank you for your guidance, assistance and encouragement along the way to my completing this work. The University of Tasmania provided me with grant to attend the 10th International Conference on the Study of Persons and I am very grateful for the opportunity this gave me to meet other personalist philosophers. At this time, I was also fortunate to meet Dr Alan Ford from the John Macmurray Fellowship and I am very grateful for his scholarship. Through my own financial resources, I was able to attend a conference hosted by the Centre for Contemporary Aristotelian Studies in Ethics and Politics in the United Kingdom on the philosophy of Martha Nussbaum. It was here I was fortunate to meet Professor Ruth Abbey who has provided me with much support and an introduction to Professor Ian Thompson. Ian, I am very thankful for your guidance, wisdom, encouragement and support for this was essential to the completion of this work; Ian, I cannot thank you enough except to say ‗Go raibh maith agat mo anamchara’. There are of course many other philoi in my personal life that have supported, shared, listened and journeyed with me in both my frustrations and luminous explorations. I am especially thankful to each one of you and of course to my family, Cindy, Alex, Stella and Niamh for their support over the last few years. My sincere thanks to everyone. 4 Table of Contents Page _______________________________________________ Abstract 4 Acknowledgements 5 Contents 6 List of Figures 8 List of Tables 8 List of Photos 8 Abbreviations 9 A Note on Terminology 9 Introduction 10 Background 10 Structure of the Argument 14 Conclusion 17 Chapter 1 A Context to Friendship 18 1.1 Introduction 18 1.2 Friendship and Disability 18 1.3 Rationale for the Use of Narratives 24 1.4 Conclusion 33 Chapter 2 Limitations of Utilitarianism anthropology 35 2.1 Introduction 35 2.2 Utilitarianism 35 2.2 Compassion 45 2.4 Conclusion 58 Chapter 3 Critique of Singer‘s Account of Human Interests 60 3.1 Introduction 60 3.2 Equal Consideration of Interests 60 3.3 The Four Dimensions 65 3.4 First Dimension 68 3.5 Second Dimension 73 3.6 Third Dimension 82 3.7 Fourth Dimension 86 3.8 Conclusion 106 Chapter 4 The Nature of Friendship 107 4.1 Introduction 107 5 4.2 The Importance of Friendship 107 4.3 Meaning of Friendship 115 4.4 Types of Friendship 126 4.5 Matrices of Friendship 131 4.6 Conclusion 137 Chapter 5 Ousia and Friendship 138 5.1 Introduction 138 5.2 Ousia 138 5.3 Phronesis 147 4.4 Conclusion 171 Chapter 6 Goodwill within Human Nature 172 6.1 Introduction 172 6.2 Goodwill and Friendship 172 6.3 The Narrative 180 6.4 Conclusion 191 Chapter 7 Sociability and Human Dignity 192 7.1 Introduction 192 7.2 Sociability 192 7.3 Adam and Henri 211 7.4 Human Dignity 214 7.5 Ubuntu 218 7.6 Conclusion 219 Chapter 8 Personalism and Identity Thresholds 222 8.1 Introduction 222 8.2 Pulitzer Prize Photograph 222 8.3 Identity Thresholds 229 Thymos 231 Eros 243 8.4 Conclusion 249 Synopsis 251 Introduction 251 The Value of the Thesis 251 The Limitations of the Thesis 253 Conclusion 255 Bibliography 256 6 List of Figures Figure 1: Philia and Sociability 32 Figure 2: A Possible Continuum to Philia relations 203 Figure 3: Generic Forms of Communication 207 List of Tables Table 1: Aristotle‘s Account of Psyche 95 Table 2: Intimacy in Philia 103 List of Photos Photo 1: Kevin Carter Pulitzer Photo 223 7 Abbreviations DeA De Anima FOJ Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality and Species Membership GPT Greek Philosophy Terms: A Philosophical Lexicon Meta Metaphysics NE Nicomachean Ethics OCF On Civic Friendship PE Practical Ethics PR Persons In Relation A Note on Terminology In this thesis I have chosen to use the term ‗intellectual disability‘ to refer to the general condition associated with people who are assessed as having an impairment of intellectual functioning measured by contemporary psychometric tests. This term has greater international recognition although I acknowledge it is not the preferred term of self-advocates in the United Kingdom. The previous terms used in professional circles to identify this group of people include mental handicap and mental retardation to connote intellectual disability. People assigned to this category, most often, are deemed to have a communicate impairment. If I am speaking about actual people I will use the term ‗persons with intellectual disabilities‘ as opposed to other terms as this reflects a more respectful and professional approach to discussing real people and their lives. 8 Introduction Background This thesis offers a new approach to understanding friendship. Contemporary philosophers typically ignore friendships between people with and people without intellectual disabilities for the former are usually placed outside the criteria of moral personhood1. It is possible that an explanation for the exclusion of people with intellectual disabilities from this criterion results from the limited forms of personal engagement assumed to be possible between people with and people without intellectual disabilities. It is my belief that exploring real encounters between people with and people without intellectual disabilities will assist us to better understand the nature of human friendship and may also offer insight into the role friendship can have in our development as human beings or persons. Friendship is described by Aristotle as an expression of mutual kindness, warmth and personal respect or regard for a friend for their sake without any expectation of self-interest. Is Aristotle‘s account of friendship satisfactory and is it satisfactory to reflect our actual experiences of inter-personal relationships? Are we justified to take his definition for granted as a premise for our argument? This thesis explores friendship from a broadly Aristotelian perspective, analysing different forms of human relationships, and the possible emotional and motivational dispositions associated with these relationships. In real life, tension often occurs in relationships because the parties involved have different views about the nature of their relationship and different expectations of their ‗friendship‘. The strength of the tension is mostly influenced by the degree of psychological intimacy 1 What I suggest is that there are few actual examples in the writings of philosophers that detail the forms of friendships that might exist between people with and people without intellectual disabilities. 9 the individuals perceive they experience with each other, and this can easily intensify and develop into adverse relations when the expectations are not resolved. In this dissertation, I argue or defend the thesis that goodwill is the most critical component of philia2 and that an example of where this constituent is expressed and most fully realised as a way of living is in the L’Arche Communities. These are networks of people with and people without intellectual disabilities, who share life together in small households, and are bound, together by a network of friendships with other households from the local and wider community. L’Arche was founded in France in 1964 by Jean Vanier3 and is an intentional4; faith- based5 international association held together by adherence to the Charter of L’Arche6, though each is legally incorporated in its own respective nation state. Vanier has written extensively7 and what is of interest to this thesis is the notion in L’Arche of people with and without intellectual disabilities ‘being with’ each other8. This notion 2 In this context I use the word philia to incorporate a range of interpersonal relationships including friendships. 3 Jean Vanier‘s doctoral dissertation was on the principles of Aristotle‘s ethics. J Vanier Le Bonheur principle et fin de la morale aristotelicienne, (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1963). Prior to starting L’Arche, he taught at St. Michael‘s College in Toronto. 4 By ‗intention‘ is meant that people without intellectual disabilities who live and work in a community environment make a personal commitment to this way of life. This means they actively pursue personal friendships with people with intellectual disabilities who are also members of the community. 5 L’Arche began in France with the support of Fr. Thomas Philippe, a Catholic Priest and mentor to Jean Vanier, and while faith acts as a central tenet to the organisation, L’Arche also operates in countries where other non-Catholic faith traditions are dominant. Each community is required to be respectful to the faith tradition of the people who come to the community and to support people to deepen their faith experience and values - whether these people locate themselves within a faith tradition or outside of it. 6 For details see: http://www.larche.org.au/about-us/index.cfm?loadref=24 accessed and printed on 8/8/2010. 7 For example, J. Vanier, From Brokenness to Wholeness, (New York: Paulist Press, 1972); J. Vanier, Community & Growth, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1979); J. Vanier, Becoming Human, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1998); J. Vanier, Encountering ‘the Other’, (Dublin: Paulist Press, 2006); J. Vanier, Befriending the Stranger, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 2007). 8 This term ‗being with’ is coined by Vanier and called such in Letters of L’Arche, no. 52, June 1987, p. 3. It is called ‗Living with‘ by Sue Mosteller, S. Mosteller ‗Living With‘ in The Challenge of L’Arche, (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1982), (ed.), 10