he oad to the ayton ccords T R D A This page intentionally left blank he oad to the ayton ccords T R D A tudy of merican tatecraft A S A S Derek Chollet THEROADTOTHEDAYTONACCORDS © Derek Chollet,2005. Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2005 978-1-4039-6500-4 All rights reserved.No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2005 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue,New York,N.Y.10010 and Houndmills,Basingstoke,Hampshire,England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St.Martin’s Press,LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States,United Kingdom and other countries.Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 978-1-349-52860-8 ISBN 978-1-4039-7889-9 (eBook) DOI 10.1057/9781403978899 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Chollet,Derek H. The road to Dayton :a study in statecraft / by Derek Chollet. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index. 1.United States—Foreign relations—Bosnia and Hercegovina.2.Bosnia andHercegovina—Foreign relations—United States.3.Dayton Peace Accords (1995).4.Yugoslav War,1991–1995—Bosnia and Hercegovina.5.Yugoslav War, 1991–1995—Peace.6.Yugoslav War,1991–1995—Diplomatic history.7.United States—Foreign relations—1993–2001.8.Diplomacy—Case studies.I.Title. E183.8.B67C58 2005 949.703—dc22 2005047209 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd.,Chennai,India. First edition:November 2005 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 In memory of Andrew Carpendale This page intentionally left blank ontents C Foreword by Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke ix Author’s Note xvii Prologue: America and the Bosnia Nightmare 1 1 Over the Waterfall: May–July 1995 11 2 Through the Window of Opportunity: The Endgame Strategy 31 3 Tragedy as Turning Point: The First Shuttle, Mt. Igman, and Operation Deliberate Force 47 4 The Way to Geneva: The Patriarch Letter and NATO Bombing 63 5 Bombs and Diplomacy: NATO’s Campaign Ends, the Western Offensive Continues 81 6 Inching Forward: The New York Agreement and a Ceasefire 99 7 Preparing for Peace: A Deal with Russia, A Decision on IFOR 115 8 A Slow Start: Dayton, November 1–10 133 9 Endgame: Dayton, November 11–21 157 Epilogue: America and Dayton 183 Notes 203 Sources 235 Index 239 This page intentionally left blank oreword F By Richard Holbrooke T here were over 30 ceasefires and agreements in Bosnia prior to the Dayton Peace Accords. All of them collapsed. Yet what was agreed upon at Dayton not only survived, it established the basis for a country that, with all its problems, is moving forward, however painfully, towards becoming a peaceful participant in twenty-first-century Europe. In the ten years since Dayton—the name of the city has become not only a simple shorthand for the entire Bosnian peace process, but an internation- ally understood metaphor for taking an aggressive, engaged approach to conflict resolution—there have been numerous negotiations in conflict areas around the world which have not been successful, most notably of course, in the Middle East. Dayton, therefore, has contemporary relevance not because of the inherent drama in the negotiation—although there was plenty of that—but because it succeeded; in short, it ended a war. By the time negotiations began behind a high barbed-wire fence at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base on November 1, 1995, the Bosnian war had become the worst in Europe since 1945, posing a real and present threat to the stability of post–Cold War Europe. Parts of Bosnia were becoming a sanc- tuary for Islamic terrorists, some of whom belonged to an organization whose name was still unknown in the West, Al-Qaeda. Criminal gangs ran much of the country, sometimes pretending to be nationalist movements. The Bosnian Serbs were openly seeking the destruction of Europe’s largest Muslim community in an ancient homeland—a clear case of genocide. And most Bosnian Croats would not have objected if the Serbs had succeeded. A “war within a war” between Croats and Muslims had destroyed most of the once beautiful medieval city of Mostar and its historic bridge. Refugees by the hundreds of thousands had fled to Western Europe, overburdening the resources of countries such as Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. Yet, for the four preceding years, the European Union and the United States had done little to stop the war. Their mediation efforts were puny and poorly coordinated; NATO was involved only as an accessory to a pathetic UN effort, which the UN’s own Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, did every- thing he could to hamper and undermine. Both Washington and Brussels refused to even threaten, let alone use, decisive force against Bosnian Serb