Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2015/02 The R.101 story: a review based on primary source material and first hand accounts by Peter Davison BA(hons) AMRAeS The editorial assistance of Dr Giles Camplin and Mr Crispin Rope is acknowledged. Abstract The airship R.101 was designed and built at the Royal Airship Works, Cardington, under the Imperial Airship Scheme, to shorten journey times to the Dominions. It crashed near Beauvais in northern France at 2.08am on 5th October 1930 while on a proving flight to Karachi (then in India). After hitting the ground, the airship caught fire, killing 48 of the 54 persons on board, including the Secretary of State for Air, Lord Christopher Thomson. This paper describes the development of the R.101, the background to the Imperial Airship Scheme, the accident and the subsequent Inquiry, largely through quotations from contemporary documents, both official and personal, and interviews with people involved. Preface This paper is the result of a long period of research into the circumstances relating to the Imperial Airship Scheme and the loss of the R.101 in October 1930 during a proving flight to India. Rather than subject myself to the limitations of commercial publishing and with regard to the limited market for the subject at this depth, the authors have decided to place unbound copies with the major archives in the UK for the benefit of future researchers. The paper cannot be conclusive due to uncertainty over the precise cause of the accident and the loss of all those on board with detailed knowledge of the final few minutes over France. However, drawing from material held in various archives and quoting from numerous contemporary sources, we have drawn together what we believe to be an objective review, punctuated with comment and explanation based on our close association with the subject over many years. Although familiar with many more recent published interpretations we have tried, wherever possible, to rely only on primary source material or evidence gleaned from those who sought the first hand recollections of those directly involved at the time. We welcome further dialogue and debate on these matters and continue to offer technical lectures on the subject. As with many contentious historical events, misconceptions and genuine errors do creep into the historical record. We hope to have countered some of these and thrown light on others. None of this should detract from our appreciation of the efforts made by those aeronautical pioneers working under pressure in the conditions of the time. 43 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2015/02 The amount of detail contained in this document makes it unsuitable for conventional book treatment and the amount of comment and conjecture mitigates against its presentation as a learned research document or the final word on what happened to R.101. However, for those with a serious interest or some prior knowledge, the author hopes it sets out much of the primary source material for further analysis. Contents 1. Introduction 47 2. Politics 50 3. The Rigid Airship Explained 54 3.1 Earlier rigid airships 57 4. Air Ministry v Admiralty 59 5. Specification 60 6. Construction 62 6.1 Test Bay 64 6.2 Weight reduction and R.101 extra bay 66 6.3 Stability and Dynamic Lift 71 6.4 Covers, Bags and Valves 73 6.4.1 The cover 73 6.4.2 Fabric deterioration 74 6.4.3 Gas bags 75 6.4.4 Gas valves 78 7. Preparation for India 80 7.1 Staffing provision 81 8. The accident 82 8.1 Survivor and Eyewitness Evidence 86 8.2 Failure of the cover and gas bag 93 8.3 Source of the fire 98 8.4 The weather 100 9. The R.101 Inquiry 103 9.1 On-site investigation 103 9.2 Recorded comments on some of those involved 103 9.2.1 Wing Commander Reginald Blayney Bulteel Colmore OBE 103 9.2.2 Major George Herbert Scott CBE, AFC, AMIMechE 105 9.2.3 Lt. Col. Vincent Crane (Dopey) Richmond OBE, BSc, ARC, 109 AFRAeS 9.2.4 Sqn. Ldr. Frederick Michael Rope 110 9.2.5 Flt. Lt. H. Carmichael (Bird) Irwin AFC 111 9.2.6 Flying Officer Maurice H. Steff 111 9.3 The Inquiry 113 9.4 The Inquiry conclusions 114 44 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2015/02 10. Concluding discussion 119 References 120 Archives 121 The author 122 Appendix 1 Vickers, the Airship Guarantee Co and R.100 123 A1.1 Burney and Wallis at the Airship Guarantee Co. 123 A1.2 Conditions at Howden 129 A1.3 Exchanges of Information 130 A1.4 R.100 to Montreal 133 Appendix 2 Biographies 134 A2.1 Government appointees 134 A2.2 RAW Staff members 138 A2.3 Aircrew 145 A2.4 Academic support staff 149 A2.5 Others 152 Appendix 3 Project Champions 164 Appendix 4 Layout of crew accommodation 165 Glossary and list of people cited AGC - Airship Guarantee Company AMSR - Air Member for Supply and Research DAD – Director of Airship Development, Royal Airship Works DCA - Director of Civil Aviation NPL - National Physical Laboratory RAW - Royal Airship Works, Cardington S of S - Secretary of State People involved in the Imperial Airship Scheme, the accident and subsequent inquiry Atherstone, Noel Grabowsky (Grabby) - R.101 First Officer Bairstow, Professor Leonard - Airworthiness of Airships Panel – Professor, Imperial College Baker, Sir John, later Lord Baker of Windrush – R.101 design team Bateman, Harry – NPL Scientist and Assistant Observer survived R.38 disaster Bell, A. V. – R.101 engineer, aft engine car (Survivor) Binks, J. H. – R.101 engineer, aft engine car (Survivor) Booth, Ralph – R.100 Captain Brabazon, Lord (Col. J. T. C. Moore) - Inquiry assessor Brancker, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Sefton W. - Director of Civil Aviation (DCA) Bulman, Major G. P. – Air Ministry, Director of Engine Development Burney, Commander Sir Dennistoun – Entrepreneur, founder of AGC and author 45 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2015/02 Campbell, C. I. R. - Designer R.23-38 Cave-Browne-Cave, Wng/Cmdr. Thomas R. - RAW Powerplants Church, Sam – R.101 rigger (Survived until 8/10/30) Collar, Roderick - NPL Aerodynamicist Collins, T. S. D. - RAW Design team, Head of Stressing Office Colmore Wng.Cmdr. Reginald B. B. – RAW Director of Airship Development (DAD) Cook, A.J. – R.101 engineer, port midship engine car (Survivor) Darling, George - Englishman staying near Allonne who was among first to arrive at the wreck site Dean, Sir Maurice - Assistant Principal, Air Ministry (received the 0230 message from Disley) Organised the Ministry response to the accident. Disley, Arthur - Electrician/Wireless operator R.101 (Survivor) Dowding, Air Chief Marshal Hugh C. T. – AMSR at time of crash (From 31/8/1930) Dyer, J. W. W. - RAW Head of Fabrics, RAW expert and chemist Gerrish, A. E. – Shed Manager RAW Griffith Brewer, - Hon. Advisor to the Airship and Kite Balloon Services, 1915-18 Hall, Arthur Henry, - RAW officer in charge of Production over Gerrish, 1926-28 Higgins, Air Marshall Sir John; AMSR 27/12/1926 to 31/8/1930 Hoare, Sir Samuel – Secretary of State for Air 1922-1923, 1924-1929; Chairman of the Airship Committee 1922-23 Hunt, G. W. – R.101 Chief Coxswain Irwin, Flt.Lt. H. Carmichael - R.101 Captain Johnston, Sqn.Ldr. Ernest L.- Navigator on R.100 and R.101 Johnston, E. A. - Son of Sqn.Ldr. Johnston, Navigator Jones, Dr. R. - Aerodynamicist NPL Leech, A. H. – R.101 foreman engineer (Survivor) MacDonald, Ramsay - Prime Minister at time of R.101 crash Meager, George – R.100 first officer Nixon, Sqn/Ldr. S. - RAW Administrator, became head of the technical staff at RAW after the accident. North, John Dudley. - Chairman and Managing Director of Boulton and Paul Limited. Norway, Nevil Shute – R.100 Calculator and novelist Pippard, A. J. Sutton - Airworthiness consultant to the Ministry, Professor Bristol University Pugsley, Sir Alfred, FRS - a Technical Officer at Cardington 1926-31 Rabouille - French witness Radcliffe, W. G. – R.101 rigger (Survived until 6/10/30) Reynolds, Major Louis - Thomson’s Principle Private Secretary. Richmond, Lt. Col. Vincent C. – R.101 designer Rogers, Woodis, Captain – i/c RAW gas plant Rope, Crispin - son of Sq/Ldr. Rope Rope, Sq/Ldr. Frederick Michael – RAW, Assistant to DAD (Technical) Roxbee-Cox, Dr. Harold, later Lord Kings Norton – R.101 design team Salmond, Air Vice-Marshal Sir Geoffrey - AMSR 1922- 27/12/1926 Savory, V. – R.101 engineer, starboard midship engine car (Survivor) Scott, Major George Herbert - RAW Asst. Director of Airship (Flying and Training) AD(FT) Simon, Sir John - Chairman of R.101 Inquiry 46 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2015/02 Speed, Les A. - RAW Draughtsman Steff, Maurice H. – R.100 and R.101 second officer Thomson, Lord Christopher - Secretary of State for Air 1924, 1929-1930 Uren, J. – RAW Head of Drawing Office Villiers, Major Oliver - Brancker’s Assistant at Department of Civil Aviation Wallis, Barnes Neville – R.100 Designer Other persons cited Bergel, Hugh - Author Boothby, Commander Robert - Politician, broadcaster and author Brooks, Peter - Historian and author Chamberlain, Geoffrey - Historian and author Higham, Dr Robin - Historian and author Masefield, Sir Peter – Aviation administrator and author Mowthorpe, Ces - Historian and author Robinson, Douglas - Historian and author Rosendahl, Admiral C. E. - Officer commanding U.S. Naval Airship Station at Lakehurst, NJ Topping, Dr A. D. - Historian and author Ventry, Lord - Historian and author Walding, Roy - Historian 1. Introduction The loss of His Majesty’s airship R.101 on 5th October 1930 marked a turning point in the development of long distance air travel. The accident stopped the development of rigid airships in the United Kingdom and heralded the development of the aeroplane for all aspects of commercial air travel. In the 1920s the government was concerned with Imperial communications, particularly for mail and financial transactions. Oceanic journeys were all by ship and therefore slow. At this time aeroplanes were severely limited in payload and range; range was between 300 and 500 miles and they flew only by day, with very unreliable engines. In 1927, Lindbergh was only the third person to cross the Atlantic, non-stop, by aeroplane, and then only eastbound, assisted by prevailing winds. By that date, over a hundred persons had crossed by rigid airship in both directions. The potential lifting power of the rigid airship, which needed no runways and whose inherent buoyancy made it safe in the air, independent of engine power, made it attractive to the British Government. The Imperial Airship Scheme was conceived to shorten journey times for those few passengers and documents requiring safe passage to the Dominions, in particular, India, 47 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2015/02 Canada, Australia and South Africa. After long deliberations between 1921 and 1924, the Air Ministry decided to initiate design, production and flight testing of two competing designs of airship. A common specification was issued to both the Royal Airship Works at Cardington, near Bedford, and to the Airship Guarantee Company, a subsidiary of Vickers, at Howden, Yorkshire. Once designed and constructed, both airships would undergo flight trials at Cardington prior to route proving. The reader should appreciate the size of the R.101; longer than three Boeing 747s with a girth that would just allow passage beneath Tower Bridge. The Canary Wharf tower is six feet shorter than the R.101 in its final configuration. Two enormous airship sheds remain at Cardington, near Bedford, home of the then Royal Airship Works (RAW). Figure 1 The R.101 at the mast at Cardington Photograph In late 1929 both the completed prototypes, running late and over budget at a time of approaching recession, were found to be severely limited in lifting capacity and recognised as being really only a stepping stone on the way to a commercial solution. The Vickers product, R.100, was fairly conventional and based on Zeppelin practice. It succeeded in making a risky but commendable return flight to Montreal in the summer of 1930, whilst the more innovative R.101 attempted the more difficult overland flight to Karachi (then in India), as specified in the original contract. A number of coincident factors and errors of judgement resulted in the R.101 striking the ground at night near Beauvais, France with the resultant fire killing 48 of the 54 on board. The victims included the Secretary of State for Air, Lord Christopher Thomson, and the Director of 48 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2015/02 Civil Aviation, Sir Sefton Brancker, plus many of the experts responsible for the ship’s design and construction. Lord Christopher Thomson of Cardington, a loyal friend and colleague of Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald, was in his second term as Secretary of State for Air. Having supported the launch of the programme in 1924 he found it running late, and over budget, on his return to office in 1929. A supporter of the airship scheme and favoured as the next Viceroy of India, he was almost obsessive over the R.101. The emotional effect of the disaster was on a scale not seen since the Titanic. The public outpouring of grief and sympathy in the immediate aftermath and the subsequent inquiry, coupled with media and technical speculation, marked the end of the programme in 1931. The accident to the Zeppelin ‘Hindenburg’ in 1937 had a similar global effect. The onset of World War Two, which forced the rapid development of larger aeroplanes and the construction of long paved runways, secured the future for heavier-than-air flight. The publication of various written records, notably Sir Peter Masefield’s To Ride the Storm (Masefield, 1982) and Neville Shute (N S Norway)’s Slide Rule (Shute (Norway), 1954) have added both fact and, occasionally fiction, to the story. Further study, as more public records have been made available and first generation sensitivity has dissipated, have led to a deeper understanding of the programme and its consequences. This paper attempts to cast light on the major issues whilst acknowledging that, as nobody from the R.101 control car survived, we will never know exactly what happened on that fateful night over northern France. Pertinent comments from Masefield’s writings include (from the Masefield Archive, Brooklands*): “Close analysis, from an objective aviation viewpoint (with some knowledge of the people concerned) leads to a clear pattern emerging of two airships which were, both, very much experimental prototypes; neither of them meeting in full the design specifications optimistically laid down in 1924. Both were, however, capable of further development and improvement, given sufficient time and money.” “There were some who went out of their way to denigrate R.101 and its design team for complex personal reasons but – taking into account the fact that, from the start, R.101 was deliberately intended to be an experimental prototype in which to try out new and advanced ideas (to compare with the more conventional R.100 – not of geodetic structure, incidentally) as that great German designer, Ludwig Dürr, rightly stated, it was exceedingly well conceived and built.” Masefield to Dean, 21/3/1977 (Masefield Archive, Brooklands): “... the correction of historical myths and misconceptions which for devious reasons have grown up around the R.101 story and repeated I see (one from another) by _______________________________________________________________________ * The Masefield Archive is not organised systematically, merely boxed by subject, so a more detailed reference cannot be given for many of the quotations from this archive 49 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2015/02 Neville Shute Norway, Robin Higham, Jack Morpungo, David Beatty and Montgomery Hyde. It really is time that all that nonsense was put right.” In his lecture to the RAeS in 1962 Cave-Browne-Cave comments on Shute’s writings: “ The public understanding of the important period of R.100 and R.101, I think, has been distorted by a widely read, but in my opinion unreliable, account written by a novelist…He was eminent as the author of most attractive fiction. He included his airship story in his autobiography for that purpose – not as authentic history.” 2. Politics Flight 19/5/1921: “There is little doubt that for long-distance non-stop journeys the airship scores over the heavier-than-air type of craft, and while to organise an ‘all-red’ route to India and Australia or South Africa would be a difficult undertaking with aeroplane and/or seaplanes, a few mooring masts and one or two more permanent bases would be practically all that would be required to start an airship service to these Dominions overseas.” Flight correspondent, following a flight in R.36, 14/6/1921: “During my short span of years I have journeyed fairly long distances by boat, train, motor-car, and aeroplane but have never experienced such travel-comfort as in an airship – no dust, no smoke, no sway, no draught, very little noise and practically no vibration. We could sit in our arm-chairs – or stroll about – and talk without the slightest difficulty.” Burney to Hoare 18/10/1923, Airship Guarantee Company (AGC) Archive (The AGC was set up as a subsidiary company by Vickers, under Sir Dennistoun Burney, to enable the construction of R.100 at Howden, Yorkshire): “I have been negotiating with the British Government on the project of the England- India service for the past two years. If, therefore, negotiations for setting up airship lines to Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa are likely to take a comparable length of time, it seems advisable that such negotiations should begin now, so that by the time the first ship has made a flight to India, we should be in a position to proceed with any contracts which might have been arranged in the interval.” Flight editorial 20/11/1924: “We have got to make airships pay, certainly, but above all we have to make them safe.” Sir Samuel Hoare, Flight 20/11/1924: “We are very conscious of the fact that in the past there had been many airship disasters, and they were determined to check each constructional step in every way 50 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2015/02 possible as it was made, the main object always being to make sure, if somewhat slow, progress.” Wallis to Lloyds Register Staff Association 10/2/1926 (Paper No.5 ‘Some Technical Aspects of the Commercial Airship’ R.101; Box B Masefield Archive, Brooklands) “To discuss the advantages of airship transport is not within the scope of this paper. The advantages of speedy intercommunication are obvious to all who have studied the political economy of a scattered Empire such as ours; and the airship is now admitted to be the ideal vehicle for this purpose even by those who have devoted their interests to the development of its only rival – the aeroplane.” Flight, 25/11/26 p769, during an Imperial Conference: “This first ship does not aim at the ultimate ideal in every direction. Some desiderata have had to be postponed for further research. One such matter is the provision of a substitute for goldbeater’s skin in the gasbags. It would not be worthwhile to hold up the ship pending the result of the research now in progress.” Prior to the agreement on Air Estimates for 1929 that included the Airship Continuity Programme 27/1/1928 (AIR11/23*): “As far as can be seen at present R.100 will carry out the first Canadian Demonstration Flight; R.101 the first flight to India, and the South African Demonstration flight, and that R.101 will probably be employed from October 1929 to March 1930 carrying out operations from Karachi” Lord Thomson following his second flight 18/10/1929 (The Times 19 November 29 and Masefield (1982) p.130) “Much work and many further trials remain to be completed and, so long as I am in charge, no pressure will be brought to bear on the technical staff – or anyone else – to undertake any long-distance flights until everything is ready and all is completely in order. Subject to this, I hope that perhaps it may be possible for me to travel to India during the Parliamentary recess after Christmas. But whether this is possible or not, the whole policy of the airship programme is “safety first” – and “safety second” too.” Although it is clear that Lord Thomson exerted considerable pressure on the two teams, particularly the R.101, those at Cardington clearly saw him as their champion. His reputation and cross-party popularity also equipped him to exert pressure on the Treasury to continue their financial support, based often on his own charisma in the House of Lords and his close relationship with Ramsay MacDonald. Without Thomson’s backing the scheme might never have started and would certainly have faced cutbacks in the face of an approaching recession. __________________________________________________________________________ * References of the form ‘AIRn/n’ are to files in the National Archives, formerly the Public Records Office. 51 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2015/02 It is clear that had Samuel Hoare exerted similar pressure in his terms as Secretary of State for Air the programme would not have fallen as far behind by Thomson’s return in 1929. However, Thomson was always under extreme pressure from the Treasury and had to use his considerable charm and persuasion to balance the need for expenditure against future requirements. Masefield to Bergel 7/3/1983, (Masefield Archive, Brooklands): “Christopher Thomson always emphasised that, making allowance for his desire to press the programme, he would invariably rely on the technical judgement of his officials.” Lord Thomson and the Director of Civil Aviation, Sir Sefton Brancker, were both air enthusiasts, driving Air Force expansion, the creation of flying clubs and the 1929 Schneider Trophy bid. Thomson was Chairman of the Royal Aero Club from 1926-29 so retained his influence and interest in aviation when out of office. As Secretary of State for Air from January to November 1924 and from June 1929 to October 1930, Thomson enjoyed rare cross-party support. Sir Sefton Brancker, champion of Britain’s need for air-mindedness, cautioned against the India flight without further testing and the building of additional intermediate mooring masts, but without success. He was, however, keen to participate in the prestigious journey to India. Thomson to the House of Lords on 3/6/1930 (Hansard; HL Deb 03 June 1930 vol 77 cc1341- 68, particularly col 1360) “This is one of the most scientific experiments that man has ever attempted and there is going to be no risk, while I am in charge, of this being rushed or of any lives being sacrificed through lack of foresight. It is far too scientific and important a matter for that. … I have always been an enthusiast in these matters. I take special pride in the fact that I introduced the programme and I want to see it through to ultimate success. ... It is essentially a vehicle for going over wide-open spaces. It is not much for going over land. It would link up our Empire overseas in a way that – so far as I can see no other means of transport can approach.” Atherstone comments before the MP’s flight on 20/11/29 (unpublished diary, copy with Airship Heritage Trust): “This wretched attempt to lunch 100 MPs onboard and fly them round for a couple of hours is still seriously being considered, but how on earth its going to be done I simply don’t know. The ship really hasn’t got the lift to do this kind of stunt and its damned unfair of the Air Ministry to lurk us in this way. The ship has not finished her trials, has not got her Certificate of Airworthiness and has not got enough lift to cart 12 tons of humans about with any degree of safety. It is only a cheap and vulgar form of eyewash at the least, and it doesn’t say much for the brains at the Air House if this is the only way they can think of for getting Parliamentary support for airships. I hope something will happen to prevent this stupid flight, because it is really stretching things too far 52