THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE DMSION I SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE CGSC FORM 160 Army-CGSC-PI-1367-29 Mar 51-5M 13 Mar 51 AN ACCOUNT OF ITS OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN EUROPEAN CAMPAIGN, 1944-1945 IVI'l/ i~ ht .~ l; _,_, \ ----------~~--------~.:...-=.-=-----=-------~ INDEX P~e Foreword....•'•.. ". •... .•.. . . . . . . . . .. . . ••••. •••.. .••• ..•.•••. •• .3 I In.troduc·t1on•••••••• I,' •••••' •••••••••••••••••• ~ • • • • • • •• 5 II Ba,ok:g:ro'U:Eld••••••••••••••••• 9 t.•••••••••'. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• III Nature of Psychologic·al. Warfare ••••••••••••••••••••••• 12 TV' Plans and Directives Section•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 16. V Operation of FWD Intelligenoe •••••••• ·••••••••••••••••• 20, VI Radio .... 25 t"•••••••••••'. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • •• VII I,eaflets .' . .. 4 ••••••••••••••••• '••••••• ~ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• ,1 VIII Speoial Operations ••••••••••••• , 40­ IX Allied Information Servioe. ~ 44 it ••••••••• '•••••• , •••••• ••• X Publioations and Displ8.Y'••••••.• ',' •••••••'~ ••• •••••• •• •• 49. XI Preels . ~ .......•-.....•..... ~ ... 57 "f • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• XII Cinema....•..................•........', 59 'f ••••••• '·f • • • •• XIII Piotorial Seotion•• ~ .••••••• ' J' • • • • • • •• •• • • •• 61 XTV' Strasbourg Episode ••• ~ ••••• ',' ••••••••••••••••••••• •.• •• 62 XV Displaoed Persons ••••••••••••••••••••••••• '.••••••.' '. • ... 66 XVI Control of German Information Se"ioes•••••••••• ,69 f ••••• XVII The Newspaper at Aaohen.. • •• • ... • • • • • •• • ••••••'•••••••• 71 XVIII COJrIDlunioations •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.• ,.. '73 XIX Finanoial and Business Management •••• 77 t •••••••••••••••• XX SupplY' and Transport ",' ••••-••• '•.•• 79 XXI The,Problem of Newsprint•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 80 XXII status of Control of German Information Servioes 1n the Amerioan Zone ~s of the end of September '1945.,. •• 83 Appendix "A" SHAEF Operation Memorandum No. 8...'..'....'. '\' ... 89 (The FWD Charter) " "B" Voioe of'SHAEl'!·Texts........................ ,; ..... 90 '(Beginning with No. 68) . " "e " MilitarY' GOvernment Talks •••••••••••••••'••••••• 95 (The'se talks undertook to explain to the German ~ople what laY' in store for them under Allied,. Oocupation. TheY' were used on the radio and in leaflets) (Beginning with No. 11) " "D" Standing Directive for Psyohologioal Warfare Against Members of the German Armed ForCes ••••• 96 " "E" Psychologioal Warfare Operations against Gel"DlaIl Army Coirmlanders to Induoe S~ender............. 104 (Recommendations to G-3 from ~ relative to .Development of teohnique 1;lased on experienoe to date - November 13, 1944) " ''F'' Final Report on Leaflet Operation•••••••••••••• 107 " "G" FWD Organtzation Chart••'••••••••••••••••••••••• 125 " ''n'' Organization Chart of Information Control Division, Headquarters, U. S. Foroes European, Theater. and Information Control Service, U.S. Group Control Counoil (Ger1DaIl) ••••••••••••••••• 127 1 FOREWORD The account which follows is by no means a definitive history of the Psychological Warfare Division (PWD) SHAEF. It does not presume to relate everything that PWD did. The aim has been to describe the development of the organization, the operations in which it engaged, and to give, where possible, the circumstances in which this development took place. In general, the activities of PWD appeared to fall into three categories: (a) operations against the enemy in the field and at home, and operations Ciirected toward Occupied peoples, (tl) so-called consolidation operations in liberated Allied area, (c) control of German information services. The work of at least one operating section, Leaflets, was involved solely with (a) above. It had no functions in consolidation or relative to German information services. Others, however, like Radio, covered all three areas of activity. An attempt has been made to. describe the activities of the various operating sections in two parts. Where a section dealt in both combat and consolidation fields, these have been described together. The German control operation, on the other hand, has been described separately.' Thus, although the German control experiment with the newspaper in Aachen began long before the sur· render of the Wehrmacht, it is described separately from the consolidation press operations in France. > A separate chapter has been allotted to Special Operations, rather than to attempt to detail the activities of the various media sections in each such operation. The background of the activities of the Allied Information Service-the name under which PWD operated in friendly liberated countries-also is described in a separate chapter, but in a rather genf!ral way. More details of the activities of the various media in AIS are given in the special chapters allotted to them. Because of tlie unique character of the PWD operation and because of the ebb and flow of personnel, certain files concerning minor details are necessarily lacking. However, it is submitted that the broad philosophy underlying the missions and accomplishments of PWD is clearly defined. I. INTRODUCTION Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarte:os Allied Expeditionary Force, was a spec~al staff division of SHAEF charged with responsibility for the prosecution of psychological warfare in the area of continental Europe con­ tr<>lled by the Supreme Commander. Unlike the other divisions of SHAEF. PWD had both staff-planning and operationai functions. The missions of PWD were: (a) To wage psychological warfare against the enemy. (b) To use the various media available to psychological warfare to sustain the morale of the people of friendly nations occupied by the enemy and to cause the people of these countries to acquiesce in the wishes of the Supreme Commander. (c) To conduct so-called Consolidation Propaganda operations in liberated friendly countries. (d) To control information services.in Allied-occupied Germany. Propaganda against the enemy fell into two categories: (a) Combat propaganda, which is tactical propaganda conducted in the forward areas and toward those relatively limited groups of the populations immediately behind the enemy lines. (b) Strategic propaganda, the function of which is to further long-term strategic aims; Propaganda also divides into three categories along another line. There are white, black, and gray propaganda. In its simplest terms, white propaganda is propaganda whose source is clearly indicated. l In black propaganda, an attempt is made to cause the target audiences to believe that the source is something other than it really is. Gray,propaganda falls between the other two. Its source is not indicated one way or another. PWD was the ag~ncy which coordinated psychological warfare operations within the juzisdiction of the Supreme Allied Commander. However, it must be borne in mind that certain civilian agencies of the British and American governments dealt in strategic propaganda, which, because of the range of powerful radio transmitters, entered this theater. i Beyond this, political policy directives under which PWD operated stemmed l. originally from civilian agencies. The political policies of America and Britain are developed by the State Department and the Foreign Office, The propaganda aspects of these policies were developed on the American side by the Office of War Information and on the British side by the Political Intelligence" Depart­ ment of the Foreign Office (PID) and the Ministry of Information (MOl). Directives governing these propaganda policies reached PWD through military channels, however, and with the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Thus, although the origins of PWD's directives were civilian in character, the operation of PWD itself was a military one under military command. It is obvious that this dual nature of PWD implied an unusual intricacy of relationships. Psychological Warfare Division, SHAEF was the first agency, military or civilian, to coordinate successfully in Western Europe the efforts of the numerous 5 mWtary and civ'illan alilenele. which had waliledAnlillo-Ameritan ,p.ychoI9Iical warfare .ince the betinninl of the war.. On the American Iide there had existed for lome yean in MIS. 0-2. War .umm.r Department, a .mall P.ycholotical Warfare Section. In the la~e of 1941. a few month. before Pearl Harbor. the Otfice of the Coordinator of Information (COI)wal eatabU.hed in Wuhlntton. The COl had within it th'e ,lementa which liter were .•eparated into the Office of Strategic Service. (OSS) and the Over.... .Brl.lnch of the Office· of War Information (OWl). The cor Initiated official American IOvernment Ihort wave broadcast. to enemy and enemy-occupied countrie.· in the Autumn of 1941. On the Britilh .Ide, PID, MOl and the BBC were directinl b~dca.taand droppinl leafletl on enemy and enemy-occupied countrlel from the be,mninl 01 the ·war in September. 1939. In the. Autumn of 1942-atter the COl was .pllt into OSS and OWl-the London Liai.on Section of OWl. and PID, alilreed to i••ue each week a Joint P.ychololillcal Warfare Directive to which tha varlou. p.ycholotical warfare alilenel.. of the two countries would be .ubJect. Thl. wal the flr.t major iIlItance 01 practical cooperation between the p.ychololillcal warfare alilenele. I.n Britain and America. Thll Joint Directive continued al the political policy ellrective "for PWD until the end of It. operation•. The clo...t linealance.tor of PWD/SHAEP appeared in November 1942 when, at the order. of Oeneral Si.enhower. a Joint mUltary-elvllian Anllo-Amerlcan P.ycholollcal Warfare Unit wa. attached to Allied Porce Headquarter. after the Allied landinlil. in Prench North Africa. Thi. alilency wa. known as the P.ycho­ 10lillclal Warfare Branch, APHQ, and It laid many of the foundation. on which PWD/SHABF later wa. to build a much larler and more Intricate .true:ture. It wei In PWBIAPHQ that the early 1..lonl .of Anlillo-Amerlcan clvWan·military cooperation were learned and where much of the trial·and-error involved in the new field of combat p.ychololillcal warfare operation. wa. underlone. Certain of the perlonnel which had had experience in PWB later became a part of PWO. Brlliladler General Robert A. McClure, Chief of PWD. had been E:hief of the Information and Cenlor.hlp Section of Allied Porce Headquarterl. of which PWB wal a branch. Bven before the end· 01 the Battle for Tuni.ia, on April 29, 1943. the fint dI.cu••ion. leadlnlil to the formation of PWD were belnlil c06ducted' in London. On that date a meetinl wal held at the War Office to ellICU•• the orlanization of the Intellililence Directorate at COSSAC and durinl the coune of the meetinl reference was made to the need for a .eparate dlvl.IQn for Publlc:lty and Propa­ liIandaWarfare activltles in order to divorce .uch responslblUties fromlntelUlence. Two months later, a plan for the creation ofa Directorate of Pres. and Propa­ ianda (DPP) was submitted to the Joint Intelliience Committee of the War Cabinet and approved by them. This was on June 29, 1943. The next day this plan was approved by the Chiefs of Staff Comlttee. On July 5, Lt. Colonel Thor M. Smith was appointed by BTOUSA as the United States representative on the DPP Planninl Staff. Durin, the next three months the DPP plan reached the chart staie and copiel were circulated to all concerned in Britain and America. In October the name Presl and Propaaanda was chanliled to Publicity and Psychological Warfare. Late in October the Combined Chief. of Staff in Washinlilton alreed to the DPP plan In principle but decided to leave the .taff orlanization to the deci.ion of the Supreme Commander when he should be named. The Combined Chief. of Staff recommended that there be two helld., one British and one American, for the Pllblicity and Psycholoaical Warfare Divi.lon. The Briti.h Chief. of Staff \4 6 Committee did not concur and urged reconsideration of the single head principle. On November 11, 1943 the U.S. Chiefs of Staff replied that the decision should be left to the Supreme Allied Commander. On November \3 Brigadier General McClure arrived in London, from AFHQ to assume the duties as chief of the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Division. On February 14, 1944 Brigadier General McClure was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6, which was the new designation of the P and PW Division. On April 13 announcement was made of the discontinuance of the G-6 Division as a general staff division of SHAEF. In its place two special divisions were announced. Orie was the 'Public Relations Division under Brigadier General Thomas J. Davis and the other, the Psychological Warfare Division under Briga­ dier General McClure. The SHAEF General Orders announcing the foregoing also Itated that, where necessary, the Public Relations Division and the Psychological Warfare Division would share communications and censorship facilities. Although the internal organization of PWD/SHAEF changed materially through the months, PWD's relationship to other Staff Divisions and to the Supreme Allied Commander remained substantially the same from this point onward until the dissolution of SHAEF. SHAEF was dissolved officially as of 2400 hours 13 July 1945. With the dissolution of SHAEF, the Anglo-American aspect of PWD's operation disap­ peared, On the British side an organization known as the Information Services Control Brl3nch, Control Commission for Germany, came into being. On the American side, the successor to PWD was designated the Information Control Division, Hqs. U.S. Forces European Theater, and the Information Control Service. U.S. Group Control Council. Brigadier General McClure was Chief of both of thete American organIzations. The reader should recognize that despite these changes in designation, and despite the separation as between Britain and America, the activities of the successors to PWD continued separately in much the same paths on July 14 as they had been traversing jointly before midnight on July 13. However, since this is not a history of psychological warfare and its corollaries in general but of PWD/SHAEF, no more than a glimpse cf what lay beyond the date of the dissolution of SHAEF can be given here. * Through most of the life of PWD, until the beginning of the German Infor­ mation Control operation, the Chief of PWD was assisted by four deputies, one representing each of the four civilian agencies which contributed personnel to PWD, namely, OWL, OSS, PID, and MOl. For a period there was a fifth who served as the Chief's deputy on purely military matters.' Some months before the German surrender, the civilian deputy representing OSS was withdrawn for other duties, and later the post of military deputy was abolished. While the four civilian deputies functioned. the various operating sections were divided among them as their primary responsibilities. These sections were: (a) Plans and Directives (el Press (b) Intelligence (f) Films (cl Radio (g) Publications and Display (d) Leaflets (hI Special Operations CiviliaI,l and military administration, warehousing-transport-supply, and personnel were placed under the Executive Office. • The deputies were: Mr. C. D. Jackson (OWl); Mr. R. H. S. Grossman (PlD); Mr. Dennis Routh (Mal); Mr. Fred Oechsner (aSS); Colonel Harold D. Kehm. 7 For a time there was also a post known as Chief of Operations whose occupant funct~oned below the deputies and above th, operating sections. This post was abolished early in July 1944. ' In AFHQ, PWB (the prototype of PWO/SHAEF) had performed all staff and operational functions in the ,field of psychological warfare. A history of all psychological warfare activities -in'AFHQ and a history of PWB!AFHQ ,could not but be, the same paper. This was not literally true of PWO/SHAEF. SHABF Operation ~emorandum No.8 dated March 11, 1944, defined the responsibilities fQr the control. coordination, and' operation of psychological warfare within the Allied Expeditionary Force. In paragraph 5B under the title "Combat Propaganda," the memorandum stated that "combat propaganda will be confined within the terms of directives issued by SHAEF to Army Groul" and, as necellsary, to Allied Naval Expedition.ary Force and Allied Expeditionary Air Force." Parag~aph 50 then stated "In order to execute psychological war­ flUe planr prepared under these directives, Army Groups will raise, administer and operate psychological warfare field operational units capable of carrying Ol1t" these activities. Paragraph 6 of the memorandum, titled "Consolidation Propaganda," .tated that consolidation propag"oda would nc~rmal1y be carried out by Supreme Headqtrarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. When desirable and practicaQle, tasks will be decentralized to Army Groups under special directives." Finally, paragraph 7 of the memorandumre-emphasized that "the successful outcome of psychological warfare demands centralized control and coordination of propa­ ganda themes and aima. Any departure from the principle can only lead to ineffective OJ disa~trous results." SUb-paragraph C under paragraph 7 stated that "Any departure required by Commanders-in-Chief (Commanding General.), Army Groups, or !Subordinate commanders from the terms of directives issued to them will be referred to and receive the prior concurrence of Supreme Headquarters." Thus the conduct of Combat psychological warfare was removed from PWO/SHAEF. On the other hand, Consolidation Propagandaoperati(~)Ds were made the specific responsibility of SHAEP. Finally PWO/SH.bLEp's policy control of Army Group Psychological Warfare through directives was established. Within the context of Operation Memorandum No.8, 'PWD/SHAEF's general funttions were: (a) Staff planning. (ll) Issuance of policy directives to Army Groups, (c) Supply 6f certain personnel and equipment to Army Group combat teams. (d) Supervision of training of personnel for Army Group teams. (e) Production and dissemination of leaflets by strategic aircraft. tf) Certain strategic radio. (g) Consolida.tion propaganda in friendly liberated countries. [This was done by a separate organization stemming from PWD which was known as Allied Information Service (AIS).] , (h) Operation of captured fixed radio transmitters on the continent. (i) Liaison assistance in certain circumstances to G-l and G-5. (j) Control of information services in Germany. This paper will attempt to describe in some detail all of the foregoing functions. 8 II. BACKGROUND In order to explain the exact nature of PWD's coordinating function' in psychological warfare in the area controlled by the Supreme Commander, it appears necessary to give here a brief description of the psychological warfare activities which were going on in this general area before PWD came into being The most important single instrument for psychological warfare in this area was the British Broadcasting Corporation. The European Service of the BBC, using many powerful transmitters, represented the official voice of the British government tho the people of Europe, whether enemy, enemy-occupied, or neutral Beyond this, because of the proximity of Britain to the Continent, the BBC Home Service, in its own way, was an instrument for psychological warfare since its signal was audible on the Continent. The BBC functioned under its own directives which were based on the PID directives, and, later, on the Joint OWI/PID directives referred to in Chapter I of this paper. In America, certain short wave transmitters controlled by the OWl beamed programs in many languages to the same audiences as those reached by BBC. As time went on, an increasing number of OWl "Voice of America" programs were relayed by BBC under the general title "America Calling Europe." Before D-Day (June 6, 1944) OWI.inaugurated broadcasting over transmitters erected in Britain which were linked under the name of the American Broad· casting Station in Europe (ABSIE). These transmitters-BBC and ABSIE-were managed and operated by the civilian a&encies. They continued to be managed and operated by the civilian agencies. Their programs were heard not only within the area con­ trolled by the Supreme Commander, but far beyond those limits as well. How­ ever, they formed one of the most important of the media available ·to PWD. Thus, when shortly before D-Day PWD inaugurated continuing broadcasts of instructions known as "The Voice of SHAEF," BBC and ABSIE were the outlets. Special directives from the Supreme Commander were channel~d through PWD for BBCand ABSIE. In the field of leaflets, as in radio, large scale operations had been conducted by OWl and PIO before PWD came on the scene. On the British side, PID had been engaging in leaflet operations since the beginning of the war, using the Royal Air Force as its dissemination medium. OWl had been conducting leaflet operations since the summer of 1942. In the beginning, the RAF was used by OWl in the absence of Am~rican aircraft. As time went on, OWl's leaflet operation expanded until a special squadron of B-l1s of the Eighth U.S. Air Fbrce was assigned exclusively to this work: . It was against this background of already existing activities that PWD took up the task of coordinating Anglo-American psychological warfare on a military rather than a civilian basis under the specific directives of the Supreme Allied Commander. In the beginning, PWD was largely without personnel or equipment. It was an idea rather than an operation, In order to pass from the idea stage to the .operational stage it was required that the four civilian agencies detail person­ nel 'and equipment to PWD. Like the other Divisions 9f SHAEF, PWD WIlS to utilize British and American personnel interchangeably. Beyond this/· and unlike the other Divisions of SHAEF, PWD was to utilize civilian personnel from the ·1 The P.y~hologl~al Warfare 9 four civilIan agencies in bothpianning and opeFational functions. It, must be borne in mind that because of the nature of psychological warfare, and in view of the background of the civilian agencies, civilians at first formed the largest group of trained operational personnel available to PWP. Despite the experience gained in PWBIAFHQ, the agencies in London did not at first comprehend the relationship that was to exist between them and PWD/SHAEF in the western European military operation. This relationship was, in point of fact, quite simple: all psychological warfare activities against the enemy, and all consolidation propaganda activities conducted in liberated coun­ tries were to be conducted or controlled by PWD/SHAEF as the representative of the Supreme Commander. PWD was to be, in effect, the umbrella under which everyone, military and civilian, engaged in psychological warfare activities would function. The civilian agencies were to assign personnel to PWD, and so long as such individuals were on .assignment to PWD, they were under the immediate direction of the Chief of PWD and not under the direction of the clUefs of the several agencies. Instructions and directives governing the activi­ ties of these individuals did not reach them 'directly from their o'riginal agen­ cies, but through military channels and the office of the Chief of PWD. It was~envisagedthat, when military exigencies no longer demanded; military control of Consolidation Propaganda activities and certain of the civilian per­ sonnel would be returned to the civilian agencies, which would then take over, on a national rather than joint basis, and as civilians, the continuing tasks which had been begun under military control by PWD. Under the tel"ms of Operation Memorandum No.8, referred to in Chapter I of this paper, Army Groups began the task of assembling psychological war­ fare teams in the early spring of 1944. Only one Army Group, the 21st, was to be in the field at the beginning of the Normandy operation. At the same time, the. Headquarters of a U.S. Army Group was located in London. This Army Group was to become operational when the Third U.S. Army would join the First U.S. Army in France. Then the First Army would be withdrawn from 21st Army Group and a purely American Army Group would operate beside the British 21st. The 12th U.S. Army Group became operational in July 1944, and control of the P.W. Team of First U.S. Army reverted to the Psychological Warfare Branch of 12th Army Group. On the American side, the basis of personnel for psychological warfare in the field was a purely military unit known as a Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company (MRBC). The first MRBC had been assigned to PWD/AFHQ. As time went on, the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th MRBCs operated with the American armies in France. Other personnel, both military and civilian, was attached for the purposes of lift, administration, etc. to one or another of the MRBCs. On the BJitish side there was no such unit basis as this and personnel was attached to the Psychological Warfare Branch, 21st Army Group on an individual basis. In both Army Groups, the Psychological Warfare Branch was part of a com­ bined Publicity and Psychological Warfare Division, similar to that which had existed in SHAEF before April 13, J944, when Publicity and psychoiogical War­ fare were separated. Assignment of personnel by i:he civilian agencies and by the British and American forces to PWDfSHAEF proceeded through the late winter of 1943 and spring of 1~44. When the Staff-planning sections were complete, PWD/SHAEF began the additional task of re-assigning personnel to Army Groups. On the American side there was a further re-assignment from the Army Group to First U.S. Army. This personnel later was to be brouRht back to 12th Army Group when it became operational. 10 ./ PWO, with the aid of certain already established British and American agencies, undertook the screening and training of personnel to be offered for assignment to Army Groups. At the same time, specific operational planning was going forward within the sections of PWD/SHAEF. A plan for taking over information services in Europe under "RANKIN" CASE C conditions was presented to the Chie~ of Staff, Latei the PWD plans for "OVERLORD" and other operations were completed. Liaison was initiated with representatives of the several exiled Allied lovernments in London, Stockpiling of radio, press and publications material was coordinated among the several contributing agencies by PWD. The News Section experimented with a special radio news file which later was to form the bastll of press activities on the Continent, The Leaflet Section undertook to coordinate the separate British (PIO) and American (OWl) leaflet operations, and a joint PIO/OWI printing-production directorate was set up in order .to make the most effective use of the.e fadUtiea 1n the United Kingdom, . As has been noted previously, the "Voice of SHAEP" broadcasts began on SSC and ABSIB before D-Day. The.e were to continue throughout the Ufe of SHABP and represented the radio aspect of the relatively simple basic pattern that all PWD activities assumed in the Western European operation. PWD, as the articulation of the Supreme COmmander to the people of enemy and enemy­ ocoupied countries, utilized all its available media for the simple purpose of telling the various audiences what the Supreme Commander wished them to do, why they should do it, and what they might expect if they carried out the Su­ preme Commander's wishes, Thus, although PWD/SHAEF did not by any means perform all psychological warfare operations in Western Europe, its directive control was sufficient to permit it to coordinate the efforts of the agencies and individuals which contributed toward the total psychological warfare impact and to coordinate these efforts along the simple line of the Supreme Comman­ der's specific expressed wishes, PWD/SHAEP was the channel that extended back to the political policy-making agendes in London and Washington and forward to the extreme front lines where Psychological Warfare Team. were in. Immediate contact with the enemy. 11