1 The Problem of Authority in Arendt and Aristotle Andrew Benjamin Abstract: The aim of the paper is to examine the limits of Aristotle and Arendt’s contribution to a philosophical anthropology. By focusing on the concept of ‘potentiality’ – and thus the ‘good life’ as a potentiality awaiting actualization – the limit emerges from the way Aristotle understands ‘life’. His discussion of slavery is pivotal in this regard. Keywords: Hannah Arendt, Aristotle, authority, dignity, being-in-place, being-in-common. Justice refers to the ethical category of the existing, virtue the ethical category of the demanded. Walter Benjamin: Notes to a Work on the Category of Justice If there is a predicament, one in which ‘we’ are – one in which this ‘we’ is understood as designating a relationship between forms of experience and therefore both subjectivity and a sense of historical time, where time is there to be thought philosophically - then what arises as a concern to be addressed pertains to the categories or concepts in which this predicament is to be thought.1 The present demands to be thought. What is central to the philosophical project is how to distinguish between differing and conflicting correlations. However, it is the ineliminability of thought that generates the following opening question: What are the categories, the modes of thought appropriate to the predicament in which ‘we’ are and thus in which ‘we’ take a stand? Though it should always be noted that this ‘we’ is itself the site of an already present asymmetrical relation between the ‘we’ that is held as a yet-to-be determined potentiality and the ‘we’ whose overdetermined presence is assumed as simply given by a certain conception of both law and politics. The latter is the ‘we’ of a posited and 2 then naturalized normativity, while the former is the ‘we’ that is always there as the sense of collectivity – community and subjectivity – resulting both from this exposure and the undoing of processes of naturalization; hence, the undoing of normativity in the name of an-other possibility. Within the present predicament in which predicament as praedicamentum names the state or the condition, thus the categories in terms of which what is, is presented and constrains thought, that constraint, thus the constrained, involves, at the same time, as much an appeal to the logical and to reason as it does to the understanding. There is, moreover, an inevitable link to praedicare and thus to stating or declaring. The predicament can be stated. There is a condition which in conditioning leads to forms of utterance and thus to speech. Without understating the predicament, in other words, without thinking thinking’s own predicament, thought is refused an address; equally, thought would have failed to address. As a point of departure therefore it becomes possible to ask the question of the predicament within which Aristotle may have responded to the demand to think; questions of this nature pertain, equally, to Arendt. While she may have engaged with Aristotle and thus with Ancient thought more generally, that engagement was set by the predicament constraining thought. Borrowings and engagements will have always been determined in advance by their own predicament. 1. Life as understood by Aristotle bequeaths a number of problems. The one that is of direct concern in this instance is the relationship between ‘life’ and ‘the good life.’ How is such a distinction to be understood? What type of distinction is it? These questions are to be approached here initially in terms of the temporality of eudaimonia and thus, equally, of the position of the eudaimon. Once this position can be generalised it indicates the presence of a founding reciprocity between time, and the ontology of being a subject. This point arises in Arendt’s engagement with Aristotle’s use of 3 the terms ‘eudaimon’ and ‘eudaimonia.’ In this regard she argues the following: To be eudaimon and to have been eudaimon, according to Aristotle, are the same, just as to live well (εὖ ζῇ) and to have ‘lived well’ are the same as long as life lasts; they are not states or activities which change a person’s quality, such as learning and having learned, which indicates two altogether different attributes of the same person at different times.2 ‘Learning’ and ‘having learned’ have beginnings and ends. If there is a capacity to learn then its actualization is ‘having learned.’ Arendt’s claim is that for Aristotle being a eudaimon is importantly different. In making this point her reference is, of course, to the discussion of what can be described as the modal identity of ‘living well’ and to ‘have lived well’ as it is presented in Metaphysics 1048b25. The significant elements of the passage read as follows: We are living well and have lived well, we are happy and have been happy, at the same time [εὖ ζῇ καὶ εὖ ἔζηκεν ἅμα, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν] otherwise the process would have had to cease at some time . . . but it has not ceased at the present moment; we both are living and have lived [ἀλλὰ ζῇ καὶ ἔζηκεν].3 Eudaimonia, at least in its first iteration here, is the predicate of a subject.4 However, two issues arise here: the first concerns coming to live well and the production of the subject as the eudaimon and therefore secondly the problem of who is the subject of eudaimonia given that this subject position is produced. Here, the important point is that eudaimonia is the telos of life and thus that which orientates life. The formulation of this position in the Nichomachean Ethics is clear: 4 The good life, therefore, appearing as something final and self- sufficient, is the end to which all actions aim [τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος].5 While the argument that life takes as its end the life that is lived properly (where the sense of propriety is set by life itself and is thus intrinsic to life, hence value is not external) and while it is also possible to identify the qualities of that life, the question that endures is on one level what occasions the move from life to ‘the good life’; implicit in that demand however is another: namely, what would it mean here to participate in life? The second question has to wait. In regards to the first, however, part of the answer depends upon the capacity of logos – understood as both reason and speech - to identify and thus to articulate the presence of this position. What is proper to life is shown – ‘manifested’ - by logos. Hence the claim in the Politics that, Logos makes manifest (shows) the beneficial and the harmful’ [ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν].6 Recognizing that the ‘beneficial’ and the ‘harmful’ pertain to life in its unfolding, in other words they pertain to life in its being lived, means that, as a consequence, understanding the force of Aristotle’s position hinges on what ‘showing’ or ‘manifesting’ mean in this instance. To argue that eudaimonia is the telos of life is to make the claim for which the following argument can be adduced: namely, that the ontology of being human has to be explained in terms of the living out of that which is proper to the being of being human. There can be therefore no founding separation of the ontological and the teleological. The latter is the former’s unfolding. Consequently, though it will be important to return to this point since what will emerge is the necessity to incorporate a founding division such that the distinction between potentiality and actuality marks an ontological divide, at this stage the founding interarticulation of the ontological and the teleological provides the framework within which to understand the famous 5 claim made in both the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics concerning the description of the being of being human: “the human, in terms of its being, is a political animal” [ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον].”7 What is identified here is the originality of what can be called being-in-place.8 The human, in virtue of being human, is polis dwelling, and therefore for Aristotle what can be described as placedness is an already present quality of human being. Moreover, it is placedness that human beings have in common. Indeed, if the detail of Aristotle’s own argument is followed there is an extension from being-in-place to being-in-common. They are mutually reinforcing. Their interconnection delimits the always already present status and condition of human being and needs to be understood, not only as that which delimits the being of being human, but that such a setting also marks how the already present interarticulation of the ontological and the teleological is to be understood. They are combined insofar as being human is the living out of being-in-place (a position that reoccurs in Arendt in terms of the indispensability of the ‘space of appearance’ as the space of human being.9) However, there is a fundamental caveat here, one that will have a determining effect on the argumentation to come. The caveat pertains to what Aristotle has already recognised in regards to a general understanding of the power of any capacity or potentiality (dynamis). The claim is that every dynamis is linked to a contrary adynamis. The formulation is the following: Incapacity and the incapable [ἡ ἀδυναμία καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον] is the privation contrary to capacity [δυνάμει] in this sense; so that every ‘capacity’ has a contrary incapacity [τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσα δύναμις ἀδυναμίᾳ] for producing the same result in respect of the same subject.10 This general position opens up what might be described as the problem of the contingency of actualization. The necessity of contingency is a state of affairs that arises precisely because of the always already present nature of adynamis. Specifically, what this means here is that it does not follow from the necessity of identifying that which is proper to human being, which is to 6 say the grounding of ‘the good life’ in the being of being human, that it has to be actualised as such. Virtue for Aristotle is ‘a state of potentiality.’11 And yet the problem of actualization will continue to haunt Aristotle’s engagement with the complex relationship between potentiality and ‘self- sufficiency.’ Nonetheless, it is precisely the necessity of the founding ontological configuration and the inscription of the teleological within it – even knowing that actualization has an inevitable contingency – that guides the assessment of the lived life as ‘the good life.’ The guide emerges since life as lived cannot be separated either from this initial description of the being of being human, or from the necessity that the human life has to be lived out within the setting created by that which defines human being, namely the polis (the latter, again, as the place of human being). What logos makes clear therefore, or at least this would be the argument, is the current state of either individual or communal being as it is defined by the living out of the ‘good life.’ Having created this setting the question that arises is the following: What does it mean to claim that ‘the good life’ (εὐδαιμονία), working on the basis that it provides life with its telos, is ‘self-sufficient’ (αὔταρκες)? (Given that this is the claim of Nichomachean Ethics 1098a8.) Taken more generally, what is at stake here can be understood as having a fundamental commensurability with the problem of actuality and thus of actualization (and then with the production of the subject as the eudaimon). If ‘the good life’ is a telos, and if it is recognized that ‘the good life’ is not an endpoint but is inextricably bound up with life as lived, then self-sufficiency becomes the possibility, where possibility and inevitability coincide, of the continual actualization of the telos of life. Within this setting the success of a life being ‘the good life’ is a proposition that can be assessed in terms of the criteria yielded by life as that which is – is what it is - in its being lived out. In sum, it is only possible to be self-sufficient within a setting in which eudaimonia is ‘self-sufficient.’12 However, an addition needs to be made here since this position in the argumentation of the passage is immediately qualified. (A qualification that marks the introduction in the text of the 7 Nicomachean Ethics of the position noted above that human being is being- in-place.) The qualification is that ‘self-sufficiency’ does not pertain to a ‘life lived in isolation’ but to a life lived within a complex network of relations. This is the life afforded by logos. What then of the claim of ‘self- sufficiency’ knowing that it is not the project of any one individual subject, if that subject position were taken as an end in itself, but rather of a subject inscribed within the always already present set of relations that define human being as being-in-place and being-in-common? In other words, what arises once it has to be assumed that both place and commonality are at work? They produce the subject. As a result that subject then lives out that production as a placed entity.13 At a slightly later stage in his engagement with ‘the good life’ (and formulations that have a similar extension) Aristotle links ‘the good life’ and ‘virtue’ (aretê). The significance of the connection is that it opens up, once again, actualization as a problem. While it is possible to account for the presence of virtue where that presence is not enacted, such a state of affairs would be the exception. In a complex formulation of what is intended to counter any possible account of virtue in which virtue was characterized by its presence as a mere disposition, Aristotle writes of virtue that it, in active exercise cannot be inoperative – it will of necessity act and act well [τὴν δ᾽ ἐνέργειαν οὐχ οἷόν τε: πράξει γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, καὶ εὖ πράξει].14 Again there is a similar structure. Virtue is such that it is in its being acted out. Virtuous activity allows for the identification of praxis and eupraxia. It cannot be that which is other than what is there in its being acted out. Hence ‘acting’ and ‘acting well’ do not lend themselves to any form of radical disassociation. Indeed it can be argued that in the formulation in Metaphysics 1048b25 – “We are living well and have lived well, we are happy and have been happy, at the same time [εὖ ζῇ καὶ εὖ ἔζηκεν ἅμα, καὶ 8 εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν]” – the temporal marker ἅμα sustains the position that there is a temporal continuity rather than a disjunction that would have demanded the actualization of ‘living well’ or ‘the good life.’ There is a sense of what can be termed at-the-same-timeness that enforces continuity rather than allowing for the staging of a discontinuity.15 As will emerge it is the presence of an opening marking the move from potentiality to actuality that demands a reconfiguration of at-the-same-timeness. Within the immediate context of Aristotle’s presentation of virtue however, the latter, once present, will continue to present itself. Virtue’s potentiality becomes its actuality. This is what virtue’s self-sufficiency would be. There is an essential additional point here that indicates that what is operative is both virtue and ‘the good life.’ Logos becomes that in relation to which self-sufficiency, once set within the structure of at-the-same-timeness, is staged. As part of a discussion of Politics 1253a 14-15 Adriel Trott writes that it is in logos we make what is good for us what life is the good life, apparent. We cannot understand what this is before we work it out with others.16 While this is right insofar as it correctly assumes that ‘the good life’ is a project that is inherently relational a problem still persists. It arises because of the conditions in relation to which it is, or is not, possible to participate with others. The problem does not inhere in the accuracy of Trott’s description of Aristotle. Rather the problem can best be positioned in terms of a distinction between, in the first instance, an agonistic sense of relation in which deliberation and judgement have a regulative force, and then in the second, a form of relationality defined in terms of fundamental disequilibria of power. With the latter the presence of power relations have an effect on relationality and thus participation in decision making. Rationality may allow for a sense of negotiation in which it is possible to sustain a sense of 9 concord in which differences are lived out. Equally, however, rationality may define contestation within power relations in which the possibility of concord is impossible as a result of the exclusion from what Arendt would call the ‘space of appearance’ of those between whom concord would need to obtain.17 Hence the twofold claim made in the Nichomachean Ethics that, in the first instance, “the good life” is the “end of human life” and that ‘it consists in activity in accordance with virtue.”18 At work in both of these interrelated formulations there is the reiterated presence of abstract human life. And yet there is another conception of life. This is the life that is not life, a conception that is made clear in Aristotle’s claim that “no one allows a slave any measure of the good life, any more than a life of his own.”19 The formulation is precise. The slave is allowed a relation of pleasure to the body but not a relation to life: εἰ μὴ …βίου. Hence, as a result of this separation, bodily life – the life of the body – is not life. This is of course a position that is presented with equal clarity in the Politics in which slaves are linked to “lower animals” and “do not participate in the good life or a deliberative life [νῦν δ᾽οὐκ ἔστι, διὰ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν εὐδαιμονίας μηδὲ τοῦ ζῆν κατὰ προαίρεσιν].”20 The use of the Platonic formulation of ‘participation’ (μετέχειν) as that which provides identity should be noted. Participating ‘in life’ (τοῦ ζῆν) would yield the one participating in it as alive. Hence while bodily, indeed it is the slave’s body which allow it to function as ‘living labour,’ the slave is not to be identified as alive and thus as living a life. The slave is excised. The significant point here however is that the distinction within life in which the slave as alive does not ‘participate’ in life would itself have both secured and maintained by logos. It is in terms of logos that the slave comes to be described. Logos secures the distinction within life hence logos would have been essential to the production of the slave is aneu logon. As Arendt notes the slave is, deprived, of course, not of the faculty of speech, but of a way of life in which speech and only speech made sense and where the central concern of all citizens was to talk with each other.21 10 Having a body the slave still speaks. And yet, of course, logos is that which serves to secure the slave’s non-relation to logos. In other words, this means that logos cannot be taken as end in itself. And it is precisely this particular identification of the limit of logos that opens what might be called the problem of authority. Logos can no longer function as that which guarantees acts that have, or should have, a singular status. The consequence is that the ground of authority can no longer be assumed by that which is held in place by ‘self-sufficiency’ as secured by this specific instance of the temporality of at-the-same-timeness. There is an additional point that needs to be made. The result of limiting logos in this way is that it undermines the possibility of ‘self- sufficiency’ if the latter is taken as a given rather than as produced. Once produced, of course, then ‘self-sufficiency’ is the after-effect of a founding site of difference, citizen/slave for example, that is itself the locus of an original differential of power. While a return will be made to the formulation concerning the interplay between the production of subject positions and power, it is essential in this regard to note the description of the slave as outside a life that takes place κατὰ προαίρεσιν namely, it occurs outside a life lived ‘according to deliberation’. The consequence of such a position is that the slave cannot act virtuously in the strict sense of the term in which virtue is the result of deliberation. Hence, the slave cannot participate in the realm of deliberation and decision making that was itself regulated by logos.22 As has been argued there is a structuring effect, namely the creation here of a position in which logos works to exclude the slave from relations that are defined by logos. More generally therefore the claim is not that virtue and ‘the good life’ preclude any form of self-definition, it is rather that their actualization cannot be assumed since what restricts the actualization of that potentiality is external to the structure of self-sufficiency. If this is the case then a fundamental result of such a state of affairs is that the absence of a modal distinction between life and ‘the good life’ would then have to be taken up.