c\ ey i" (* '\J 0 THS PRINCIPLE OF FTN1ITY ;JTD TKJ P?vGBLM OF OONTR .CUPTIOF by James B. Sullivun, O.M.I., M.A. ^.r-'« <*'0^ s/auoTHfou > * LlBKAK.tS 1 DlSSiElTVTION Presented to "Ehe Faculty of jtrts of the University of Ottawa in partial fulfillment of the tte^-ir ©infants for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy M UMI Number: DC53884 INFORMATION TO USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI® UMI Microform DC53884 Copyright 2011 by ProQuest LLC All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION i Chapter 1 CHANCE AND THE SCIENTIST-PHILOSOPHERS 1 I. Chance as Explanation of World Order.. 2 II. A Modern Dissociation of Intellect and Reality 9 III. Intellect in Direct Contact with the Real 14 IT. The Eleatic Objection and the Aristotelian Answer 24 Chapter 2 THE PRINCIPLE OF FINALITY AND MAN 33 I. Finality, Created Being, and CreatineIntelligence 34 II. Varying Measure of Act in Creature Operations 40 III. Aristotelian-Thomistie Teaching on Human Finality 43 IT. St.Thomas vs Aristotle (A) 52 V. St.Thomas vs Aristotle (B) 59 Chapter 3 THE PRINCIPLE OF FINALITY AND THS MORAL PRECEPTS 68 I. An Outline of Scholastic Moral Teaching 69 II. The Common Good ..74 III. Finality and Concrete Determination of Common Good 81 IT. Finality or Consequences 85 V. Two Basic Assumptions? 94 Chapter 4 THE COMMON GOOD AND THJ] FINALITY OF CONJUGAL SOCIETY 104 I. St. Thomas and Personalist End of Marriage 110 I I. Thomism and Dignity of Personalist End 114 I I I. Thomism and Nature of Personalist End 123 IT. ±-L Modern Personalist View Criticized 130 V. Finality, Common Good, and the Use of Marriage 135 Chapter 5 APPLICATIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF CGFTRACEPTIC:? 142 I. Critical Appreciation of Social argument vs Contraception 143 I I. Critical Appreciation of Personalist Argument vs Contraception 151 Explanatory Notes 3&61 BIBLIOGRAPHY I N T R O D U C T I ON This dissertation, first of all, proposes an exposit ion and a defence of the ontological value of the principle of finality against what may be understood as a, or even the popular, modern view on the subject. Thereupon follows an application of the principle to human morality: first, in its broad outlines and later, in the more restricted sphere of marital ethics, especially with respect to the problem of contraception. The following pages of the introduction contain our discussion as presented in synoptical form and blocked off in accordance with the chapter-divisions of the text. Chapter 1. The mechanistic denial of the finalist conception of the universe is today bereft of whatever specious plausible ity it had been able to derive from the science of the 19th century. Nevertheless, the defence of finality can take scant comfort from the philosophizing, 20th century scientists, especially if the teachings of Eddington, Jeans, Planck and Russell may be adduced as representative. Here, we encounter a blunt denial of finality and the substitution of chance ii by Bertrand Russell. And if finality is admitted by the others, it is understood as a purely subjective creation of the mind which either entirely absorbs reality (Eddington) or mimics it so successfully that the assertion of finality (or at least, order) may be accepted as not more than a prob ability or a postulate of "scientific faith" (-Je^ns, Planck). This being a fairly accurate picture of the "modern" attitude towards finality, therefore we begin our study with an outline of the Aristotelian-Thomistic teaching on the true concept of chance and the logical impossibility of establishing it at the root of the world's order. But it must be establish ed (especially against today's pseudo-scientific subjectivism) that a logical impossibility is also an ontological impossibil ity. Hence follows a justification of the human intellect's ability to seize the real, especially in the metaphysical sphere. The affirmation of the analogical character of meta physical being against Parmenides leads us to its presentation as a composite of existence and essence, and (more fundamentally of act and its complementary, which in all exemplifications of metaphysical being except one is denominated as potency. Chapter 2. The fundamental duality of created being in terms of potency and act to which the discussion of the first chapter has led us is now applied in our analysis of the principle of finality. From page 33 to page 40 , the finality of nature, i ii whether in existence or operation, is viewed from the side of its intrinsic potentiality and consequent need of a Creator Who should be also a Creative Intelligence. Next, there is discussed the varying measure of si intrin'cism whereby the Divinely imposed ordination allows to the ascending hierarchical scale of creatures an increasingly large autonomy in the attainment of their respective ends. This autonomy is at its peak in the free will of man. Indeed, as we suggested on p 41, this autonomy, which involves the transit from physical to moral obligation in the Divine ordin ation, alone represents autonomy in any strict sense, -jid yet, in spite of this particularity, man in common with animals, plants and inanimates, is possessed of a. determined nature creatively ordained to a determined end. This end in man, as in animals or plants or inanimates, likewise, does not mean anything other than the fulfillment of natural inclination. The natural human inclination, which is nothing else than the ineluctable drive in every man towards happiness, is now analyzed in accordance with .-Liistotelian-Thomistic teaching. Its true nature is exposed both in relation to its subjective expression (which we called, "satisfaction") and its relation to the complexity of nature and tendency that constitutes the human composite. And the resulting conclusion for both Aristotle and St.Thomas is that man is fulfilled only in the cognitional possession and consequent volitional quiescence in the unlimited good: that is to say, God. iv Thus far, the Stagirite and his greatest commentator are in agreement. From this point onwards, however, they part company, vi/hereas Aristotle presents this human fulfillment as something hardly more than _JI unobtainable ideal, the philo sophy of St. Thomas understands its attainment to follow a good life (i.e., a life obedient to the exigencies for the fulfill ment of its nature) as normally ^s the fruit follows its bloss om. (Indeed, for the ^jigelic Doctor, it is more than a normal consequence. It is inevitable. An accidental frustration here would imply, not merely contingL \oy, but & lie and an injustice at the very foundations of nature, and consequently in nature's God). Likewise, whereas Aristotelian Eudaemonism (at least, by its silence) might merit the Kantian taunt of egoism, the larger Thomistic conception of finality gives the primacy to disinterested love without rendering it unnatural by separating it from personal fulfillment. Chapter 3. The last chapter had emphasized the finality of human nature in founding human morality, particularly in its norm ative aspects. This present chapter will emphasize the some finality as basic in determining the content of human morality. Far from being a merely extrinsic norm of conduct (either as a regulation arbitrarily imposed by a Deity conceived after the manner of on absolute despot or as an apotheosized 'categoric al imperative') the moral law is truly intrinsic to man: being