OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/05/19, SPi THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/05/19, SPi OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/05/19, SPi The Politics of Presidential Term Limits Edited by ALEXANDER BATURO and ROBERT ELGIE 1 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/05/19, SPi 1 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © Oxford University Press 2019 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2019 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. 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Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work. OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/05/19, SPi Contents List of Figures ix List of Tables xi List of Contributors xiii 1. Presidential Term Limits 1 Alexander Baturo and Robert Elgie SECTION I 2. Theorizing Presidential Rotation 19 Peter Stone 3. One Size Does Not Fit All: The Provision and Interpretation of Presidential Term Limits 37 Tom Ginsburg and Zachary Elkins 4. Term Limits and the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Doctrine: Lessons from Latin America 53 David Landau, Yaniv Roznai, and Rosalind Dixon 5. Continuismo in Comparison: Avoidance, Extension, and Removal of Presidential Term Limits 75 Alexander Baturo SECTION II 6. Presidential Term Limits in Latin America: c.1820–1985 103 Leiv Marsteintredet 7. Presidential Term Limits as a Credible-Commitment Mechanism: The Case of Brazil’s Military Regime 123 Octavio Amorim Neto and Igor P. Acácio 8. The Politics of Presidential Term Limits in Mexico 141 Joseph L. Klesner 9. Presidential Term Limits in Nicaragua 159 David Close 10. The Politics of Presidential Term Limits in Tunisia 179 Alessandra Bonci and Francesco Cavatorta OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/05/19, SPi vi Contents 11. Presidential Term Limits in Togo: Electoral Accountability Postponed 199 John R. Heilbrunn 12. Presidential Terms in Kazakhstan: Less is More? 221 Dmitry Nurumov and Vasil Vashchanka 13. China: Limiting and Regularizing Top Political Power 247 Zhengxu Wang and Anastas Vangeli 14. Term Limits and Succession in Dictatorships 269 Natasha Ezrow SECTION III 15. The Politics of Presidential Term Limits in Malawi 291 Peter VonDoepp 16. Should I Stay or Should I Go? Term Limits, Elections, and Political Change in Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia 311 Nic Cheeseman 17. Senegal (1970–2016): Presidential Term Limit Reforms Never Come Alone 339 Charlotte Heyl 18. Presidential Term Limits in Burkina Faso 363 Sophia Moestrup 19. The Uses and Abuses of Presidential Term Limits in Russian Politics 385 Paul Chaisty SECTION IV 20. The Politics of Presidential Term Limits in the United States 405 Michael J. Korzi 21. Presidential Term Limits in Europe 429 Robert Elgie 22. Term Limits in South Korea: Promises and Perils 451 Fiona Yap 23. The Politics of Presidential Term Limits in Argentina 473 Mariana Llanos 24. The Politics of Presidential Term Limits in Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras 495 Juan Muñoz-Portillo and Ilka Treminio Contents vii 25. The Politics of Presidential Term Limits in Latin America: From Re-democratization to Today 517 José Antonio Cheibub and Alejandro Medina 26. Presidential Term Limits in Bolivia 535 David Doyle SECTION V 27. Presidential Term Limits and the International Community 557 Christina Murray, Eric Alston, and Micha Wiebusch 28. Effects of Presidential Term Limits 585 Akisato Suzuki 29. What Have We Learned about Presidential Term Limits? 607 Alexander Baturo and Robert Elgie Index 623 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/05/19, SPi OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 28/05/19, SPi List of Figures 3.1 Maximum term length (term length × term limit) 40 3.2 Variation in kinds of term limits over time 42 3.3 Term limits in and outside Latin America over time 44 5.1 When do presidents carry out continuismo? 88 5.2 How continuismo ends 90 5.3A Presidential continuismo, 1945–2017 93 5.3B Presidential continuismo, 1945–2017 94 6.1 Development of models for presidential term limits in Latin America c.1820–1985 107 7.1 Durability of authoritarian regimes (1946–2010) 124 7.2 Durability of military regimes (1946–2010) 124 7.3 Weighted vs non-weighted tension events per year (1946–85) 131 7.4 Weighted total of tension events related to presidential succession vs. total score per year (1964–1985) 132 7.5 Brazil’s gross domestic product growth (1960–90) 136 19.1 Predicted probability that opponents/supporters of stricter term limits agreed with the statement: “The protest meetings in Moscow and other cities against the results of the December 2011 elections to the State Duma were justified.” 397 25.1 Classification of presidential term limit regimes in Latin America, 1946–2016 524 25.2 Proportion of Latin American countries by presidential reelection rules, 1946–2016 528 28.1 Conditional average marginal effects on the probability of the onset of repression 598 28.2 Predicted probability of the onset of repression 598 28.3 Conditional average marginal effects on the severity of repression 599