THE POLITICS OF DISCRETION PUFENDORF AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF NATURAL LAW Leonard Krieger Chicago & London THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 65-14428 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO & LONDON The University of Toronto Press, Toronto 5, Canada © 1965 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved Published 1965. Printed in the United States of America ~TO ESTHER* PREFACE History may be narrative, descriptive, interpretive, ana lytical, or significant. It usually exhibits these qualities in combination. No single quality or combination of qualities is inherently preferable to the others. The nature of the histori cal object and, even more, the kind of question asked of it determine the type of history to be written. This book deals in interpretation, analysis, and significance, not only because these dimensions seem particularly appropriate to the history of ideas, but also because each of them is a response to a reason for undertaking the work. A historical interpretation tells where an event (in its broadest sense) came from. Since a chief purpose of this book is the inquiry into the process of intellectual diffusion through the examination of an intermediate stage in it, I have tried to establish for each category of thought the rele vant ideas and circumstances available to the disseminator and interpretive of his assumptions. A historical analysis tells what the event was composed of. Since a second purpose of the book is to gain an internal view of natural-law political thinking through the examination of a secondary interpreter whose mental processes are the more penetrable for their lack of either flawless logic or leaps of [vii] Preface genius, I have presumed to take apart a complex of ideas in order to determine in detail how they were fitted together. Historical significance tells where the event went to or toward. I have inquired along this line on two different levels. First, I have asked the obvious question about the converse effects of the ideas studied here upon the more general currents in which they were spawned. Second, the subject was chosen and its meaning plumbed-as the title indicates-for its contribution to the solution of a perennial problem, constant in Western history and relevant today. In its broadest terms, this problem involves the tension inherent in man's simultaneous commitment to logical coherence and to a reality that splinters logical coherence, and it involves further the adjustment which men make in their ideas to resolve the tension. Because the problem is a continuing one through various times and circumstances, the meaning for it of the historical events here under consideration connects history with fundamental human concerns that transcend history and by the same token connects the history that is to be understood with the historian who tries to do the under standing. Seventeenth-century Europe is not a favored field of American study. My acknowledgments, consequently, are few, but all the more profoundly felt for that. I have dedi cated this book to my wife because she understands better than anyone I know the inimitable truths that only the structure of a crystal can deliver about the world at large, and because she appreciates more than anyone I know the value of writing about them. Hajo Holborn, ever my friend and still my teacher, first indicated the figure of Pufendorf as a provocative historical problem and then, with infinite pa tience and wisdom, abetted my efforts to solve it. Carl Briden J. baugh, Bernard Bailyn, and Daniel Boorstin graciously [viii] Preface entered into dialogues on the American dimension of Pufen dorf's influence, establishing a desirable communication be tween the traditional divisions of history. To Yale University, the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, the Institute for Advanced Study, and the University of Chicago go my thanks for underwriting the release from academic duties which facilitated the prepara tion and completion of this work. A note on the use of sources: Pufendorf's three basic works on political theory-the Elementorum jurisprudentiae universalis, the De jure na turae et genti-um, and the De officio hominis et civis-have all had competent English translations (Oxford, 1931, 1934, 1927, respectively) . For the convenience of American read ers, all references to these works are to these translations save in those particular cases where the translation does not convey the precise political connotation. For each of these cases I have specified the Latin edition used. Unless so specified, the reference is to the English translation. [ix]