THE POLITICS OF BRITISH DEFENCE, 1979-98 Also by Lawrence Freedman THE ATLAS OF GLOBAL STRATEGY BRITAIN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY MILITARY POWER IN EUROPE (editor) THE PRICE OF PEACE The Politics of British Defence, 1979-98 Lawrence Freedman Professor and Head of Department Department of War Studies King's College London First published in Great Britain 1999 by MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG2l 6XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-1-349-14959-9 ISBN 978-1-349-14957-5 (eBook) DOI10.1007/978-1-349-14957-5 First published in the United States of America 1999 by ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., Scholarly and Reference Division, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. IOOIO ISBN 978-0-312-22273-4 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Freedman, Lawrence. The politics of British defence, 1979-98 I Lawrence Freedman. p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-3 I 2-22273-4 (cloth) I. Great Britain-Military policy. 2. National security-Great Britain. 3. Great Britain-Politics and government-1979- I. Title. UA647.F7324 1999 355'.03304l-DC2l 98-35648 CIP Selection, editorial matter and Chapters 7, 9, 11 and l3 ©Lawrence Freedman 1999 Chapters 2 and 6 ©Macmillan Press Ltd 1994 and 1983 (respectively) Chapter I © Oxford University Press 1989; Chapter 3 ©Review of International Studies 1995; Chapter4 © NDU Review 1995; Chapter 5 © Praeger Publishers 1980; Chapter 8 © International Security 1981; Chapter lO © Brassey's 1993; Chapter 12 ©International Affairs 1987; Chapter 14 ©Public Law 1996 Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1999 978-0-333-74667-7 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. 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This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 l 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99 Contents Preface vii Acknowledgements XI PART I PRIME MINISTERS Thatcher 3 2 Major 12 PART II GRAND STRATEGY 25 3 Alliance and the British Way in Warfare 27 4 Britain, NATO and Europe 47 PART III DEFENCE REVIEWS 61 5 Defence Policy: 1980 63 6 After the Falklands 81 7 Labour's Strategic Defence Review 95 PART IV NUCLEAR STRATEGY 103 8 An Ex-Nuclear Power? 105 9 Two Nuclear Elections 131 10 Nuclear Policy after the Cold War 146 11 Nuclear Revelations 170 PARTY INDUSTRIAL ISSUES 173 12 Westland and Helicopters 175 13 EFA 's Radar and the Case of Ferranti 203 14 The Scott Report 220 Index 243 v Preface The essays in this book were all written over the past two decades and cover the period from the Conservative election victory in May 1979 to the publication of the Labour government's strategic defence review in July 1998. They have been chosen to provide a reasonably comprehens ive account of the politics of defence policy over this period. There is, unfortunately, nothing on Northern Ireland and I have only discussed in passing the three major operations of this period-in the Falklands, the Gulf and Bosnia. They are touched upon as influences upon the development of policy, but I decided not to deal with them directly in order to sustain a focus on the policy-making process itself. These are works of policy analysis more than policy advocacy, hoping to encourage a debate between competing views that is as well informed as possible. Following this approach need not require indif ference to the implications of alternative courses of action and the suspension of judgement. If the gaps in policy are to be exposed, contradictions explored and rationales probed then the analyst should always want more information than a government considers it prudent to disclose and express a reluctance to take anything at face value. It is possible to adopt a generally critical stance even without feeling a raging discontent over the broad lines of governmental policy. Nor have I ever felt so completely confident in my own views that I found it easy to dismiss those of others. I believed that the Cold War had to be taken seriously and that NATO was the right instrument for its con duct-but I was always wary of exaggerated claims about the potential Soviet 'threat'. I would have preferred that NATO place less reliance on nuclear deterrence - but was never convinced that it could be discarded completely. I always found the case for a British nuclear force marginal-but I found the debate surrounding its future fascinat ing. My basic instincts have always been internationalist and interven tionist - but I know only too well the pitfalls of excessive meddling in other people's affairs. Inevitably, any analysis of policy-making over this period was con stantly drawn to the tension between available resources and stated commitments, leading to regular warnings of hard choices ahead. It has always seemed to me to be legitimate to argue that particular commit ments could simply not be met at certain levels of expenditure, but less Vll viii Preface legitimate to argue, as a defence specialist, that expenditure should therefore be raised in this area. Public expenditure decisions raise basic questions of political priorities and I was well aware that health and education specialists could make eloquent cases as to why impor tant national objectives in these areas could not be met without more money. As a voter I had views on appropriate priorities but as a narrow specialist I was in no position to argue for cuts elsewhere or insist on certain fiscal policies. I did, however, find it amusing to note how advocates of higher spending on almost anything else seemed to assume that defence could always be cut by way of compensation. One reason for my preference for policy analysis is that I have found over the years that my judgement has been more sure when discussing how policy is likely to develop than how it should develop. There is always a temptation to show how one's preferences fit in with the line of history, that they are firmly in the realm of the feasible. This not only may lead to disappointment but may be less than helpful for those simply trying to make sense of the line of history. As will be seen in the following pages, none of this should be taken to suggest that my grasp of the line of history was flawless. I have not attempted to rewrite these pieces to reinforce my reputation for pre science. This is the case even with the previously unpublished items. In each case I hope that they contain enough substance for them still to be relevant for those interested in the history of policy-making, and that those aspects which are obviously dated have some value in conveying how events seemed at the time. The first two chapters assess the record in defence policy of the two Conservative Prime Ministers of this period - Margaret Thatcher and John Major-and so provide an overview of the main issues covered in the rest of the book. The next two might be said to deal with grand strategy, the first addressing the importance of allies to the British way of warfare, and the second with the competing claims of NATO and the European Union after the Cold War. There are then three pieces on defence reviews. The first, written early in the Conservative govern ment, looks back at the 1970s, an unusually difficult period for defence planners, and considers the choices the government was likely to face. The story is picked up again after the choices had been confronted, and a clear policy had been adopted, only to be queried as a result of the Falklands conflict. The last of this trio brings the story up to date with a brief discussion of the current Labour government's defence review. This is followed by a quartet on nuclear policy, the first considering the durability of the national nuclear force after the Trident decision, and Preface IX in the light of the Labour Party's opposition, the second noting the difficulties the Labour Party found itself in as a result of this opposi tion, and the third reporting on the revisions to nuclear policy made by the conservatives after the Cold War. I have added to this section a brief note on the nuclear aspects of the 1998 strategic defence review. In the concluding section I turn to industrial policy, exploring the defence issues surrounding one of the great political upsets of the Thatcher years-the 1986 crisis over the future of Westland helicopters. The next piece considers a far less well known but to my mind quite intriguing industrial battle over the choice of a radar for the European Fighter Aircraft. The final essay provides an analysis of the Scott report into the 'arms for Iraq' affair. It will be seen that I think that this report represents a missed opportunity. LAWRENCE FREEDMAN Acknowledgements 'Thatcher' (Chapter 1) appeared as 'Thatcherism and Defence', in Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon (eds), The Thatcher Effect: A Decade of Change (Oxford: OUP, 1989) pp. 143-53, and 'Major' (Chapter 2) as 'Defence Policy', in Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon (eds), The Major Effect (London: Macmillan, 1994) pp. 269-82. 'Alliance and the British Way in Warfare' (Chapter 3) was first pub lished in Review of International Studies (April 1995), published by Cambridge University Press, while 'Britain, NATO and Europe' (Chapter 4) was published in Joint Force Quarterly (Summer 1994). 'Defence Policy: 1980' (Chapter 5) first appeared as 'Britain's Defense Policy', in Edwin H. Fedder (ed.), Defense Politics of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980) pp. 49-66. 'After the Falklands' (Chapter 6) appeared as 'British Defence Policy After the Falklands', in John Baylis (ed.), Alternative Approaches to British Defence Policy (London: Macmillan, 1983) pp. 62-75. 'Labour's Stra tegic Defence Review' (Chapter 7) was written for this volume. 'An Ex-Nuclear Power?' (Chapter 8) appeared as 'Britain: The First Ex-Nuclear Power', International Security, vol. 6, no. 2 (Fall 1981) pp. 80-104, published by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 'Two Nuclear Elec tions' (Chapter 9) is based on a paper first prepared under the auspices of the Nuclear History Program and presented to the first conference of the Study and Review Group in Ebenhausen in July 1987; it has not been previously published. 'Nuclear Policy after the Cold War' (Chap ter 10) first appeared as 'Britain and Nuclear Weapons', in Michael Clarke and Philip Sabin (eds), British Defence Choices for the Twenty First Century (London: Brassey's, 1993) pp. 220-41. 'Nuclear Revelations' (Chapter 11) was written for this volume. 'Westland and Helicopters' (Chapter 12) appeared as 'The Case of Westland and the Bias to Europe', International Affairs (1987) pp. 1-19. 'EFA's Radar and the Case of Ferranti' (Chapter 13) was written in 1992 but pre viously unpublished. 'The Scott Report' (Chapter 14) appeared as 'Even-handedness, Guidelines and Defence Sales to Iraq', Public Law (Autumn 1996) pp. 391-409, published by Sweet & Maxwell. xi