THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND An Introduction PETER SMITH and O. R. JONES CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP, United Kingdom CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, United Kingdom 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia © Cambridge University Press 1986 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1986 Reprinted 1987, 1988, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997 Typeset in Sabon A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available ISBN 0-521-32078-X hardback ISBN 0-521-31250-7 paperback Transferred to digital printing 2005 CONTENTS Preface vii Analytical Table of Contents ix PART I: Dualism, For and Against 1 I Introduction 3 II Arguments for Dualism 16 III Descartes's Argument 31 IV Difficulties for the Dualist 45 V Assessing the Dualist Theory 62 PART II: Towards a Better Theory of the Mind 69 VI An Aristotelian Framework 71 VII Perception and Sense-Data 85 VIII Perception and the Acquisition of Beliefs 103 IX Action and Volition 119 X Two Theories of Belief 135 XI The Function of Beliefs 152 XII Functionalism and Folk Psychology 163 XIII Assessing the Functionalist Theory 177 PART III: Sensation, Thought and Freedom 191 XIV Sensations: The Phenomenological Theory 193 XV Sensations: Functionalism and Consciousness 207 XVI Thinking 223 XVII Reasons and Causes 237 XVIII Causality and Freedom 252 vi Contents Chronological Table 269 Guide to Further Reading 270 Bibliography 275 Index 279 PREFACE This book is aimed principally at undergraduates who are taking a first course in the philosophy of mind, though it should be readable by anyone with a serious interest in the issues we discuss. It has developed from a course of lectures for complete beginners in philosophy which we have given together for some years. We have tried to keep our intended audience firmly in mind without succumbing to the temptation of addressing our profes- sional colleagues instead. We certainly haven't aimed to get all the way to the 'frontiers'; our main concern is to present clearly some introductory arguments in the philosophy of mind, in such a way as to make them available to someone new to the area. Those who think that these familiar arguments are to be vigorously criticised in one way or another will still, we hope, welcome a book which presents them frankly and perspicuously. We can't pretend that the book is consistently an easy read, and the discussions inevitably get significantly more difficult as the book proceeds, particularly in Part III. Real philosophy in our preferred analytical style requires following the twists and turns of complex chains of argument, and to the uninitiated this process can seem a little intimidating. But we have tried to keep the pace fairly gentle, especially in Part I. Instead of breaking up the text with cryptic section-headings, we have provided a descriptive Analytical Table of Contents; this rather old-fashioned device should prove much more helpful in using the book. We have also appended a Chronological Table for those hazy about the dates of the 'great dead philosophers' and a brief Guide to Further Reading. Cross-references within the book are by chapter and section: the system of references to other works is explained in the preamble to the Bibliography. We are extremely grateful to the friends and colleagues who have generously commented at length on drafts of this book. We should vn viii Preface mention in particular David Cockburn, Jonathan Dancy, Lucy Littlehailes, Gregory McCulloch, Susan Mendus, Fred Stoutland and Ian Tipton. John FitzGerald gave advice about translations and George Botterill helped us to see what we meant in Chapter VIII. We have had helpful comments from three (officially anonymous) readers for C.U.P. And many first-year Aberystwyth students have — less voluntarily — provided written comments on individual chapters which have been very useful. Real thanks to everyone. We are also grateful to Professor T.A. Roberts whose support resulted in our being very well provided with word-processing facilities, without which this project would undoubtedly have taken very much longer and been considerably less enjoyable. Last, but certainly not least, special thanks are due to our wives, Patsie and Jean, who had to put up with us being even more preoccupied with philosophy than usual. Aberystwyth P.J.S. April 1986 O.R.J. ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS PART I: DUALISM, FOR AND AGAINST Chapter I: Introduction 1 Questions about the nature of the mind arise very naturally. 2 They are philosophical questions insofar as they force us to re-examine critically what we ordinarily take for granted. 3 We begin with the question: are we composed of two distinct components, a physical body plus an immaterial self? 4 On the two-component view, mental characteristics be- long to our immaterial component, and physical characteristics to the body. 5 This theory was defended by Plato and Descartes. 6 To dispute their theory is not to say that people don't have minds in the ordinary sense. 7 The question whether dualism (as it will be called) is true cannot be settled by searching to find our alleged immaterial components. We cannot directly observe other people's Cartesian Minds; nor, as Hume remarked, can we find our own by introspection. We must resort to argument. Chapter II: Arguments for Dualism 1 We examine eight arguments for dualism. (A) Mental properties and physical properties are so different that they must be had by different things. (B) Merely material things cannot think or feel at all, so we are not merely material. (C) Material things cannot have higher mental characteristics like the capacity to appreci- ate art, so we are not merely material. 2 Argument (A) is hopeless. 3 Arguments (B) and (C) also fail. 4 Underlying (B) and (C) is the thought (D) that things made of physical stuff alone IX