The Philosophy of Metacognition The Philosophy of Metacognition Mental Agency and Self-Awareness e¨ Jo lle Proust 1 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries #Joe¨lleProust2013 Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin2013 Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2013953490 ISBN 978–0–19–960216–2 Asprintedandboundby CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. Foreword Why would philosophers of mind or epistemologists find scientific studies such as thosereferencedinwhatfollowsrelevanttotheirownwork?Theparticularbrandof naturalism that inspires the present book needs to be briefly presented. McDowell (1994a) has defended the full autonomy of philosophy of mind with respect to science,thatis,theclaimthatanappropriateanswertothecentralquestionsofthe philosophyofmindshouldbedeliveredbyphilosophicalinvestigationandargument alone,withoutrelyingondataorargumentsfromtheempiricalsciences.Naturalist philosophers of mind, in contrast, consider that no serious conceptual inquiry, whether descriptive or normative (e.g. about mental or rational activity), can be brought to fruition without detailed knowledge of the informational processes involved.1 This is not to concur with Quine’s plea for a ‘naturalized epistemology’, thatis,withtheradicalviewthatphilosophicalepistemologyisboundtobecome‘a chapterofpsychologyandhenceofnaturalscience’.2Itiscompatiblewithnaturalism that philosophy of mind enjoys a certain methodological autonomy from the sci- ences. Such methodological autonomy is not the full autonomy that McDowell claims for philosophy; it does not mean that philosophy can freely apply forms of inferencethatareunacceptableinscience,orthatphilosophicalactivitycanoccasionally relaxitsstandardswithrespecttoscientificevidence.Methodologicalautonomymani- festsitself,rather,inthewayitsquestionsareframed.Thesequestionsmaycutacross fields of empirical research, semantic analysis, and first-person experience. They may sometimesbeposedintheabsenceofcurrentevidence,eitherbecausetheyareconjec- tures, or because no empirical test allows us to discriminate alternative conceptual analyses. The methodological autonomy of philosophy also manifests itself in how proposals are evaluated. They may be accepted merely because they are coherent and relevant,orbecausetheyopenupthespaceofpossiblesolutions.Naturalistphilosophers committedtothismethodologythusdonotaimsimplytoadjustphilosophicalclaimsto scientific evidence. Their activity has its own agenda: it is to raise problems, explore avenues,thattherelevantscientistsdonotgenerallyenvisage,andoffergeneralizations thatscientistsareneithertrainednormotivatedtooffer.Themaingoalofthisbookisto showhowmetacognition,arelativelyrecenttopicinthecognitivesciences,isapotential sourceoffruitfulphilosophicalworkofthiskind.Inparticular,itopensnewpathsinthe studyofmentalagency,practicalrationality,andselfhood,whichmight,hopefully,also helpscientiststolookatmetacognitionfromadifferentangle. 1 Foradefence,seeProust(2002b). 2 Quine(1969). Acknowledgements This book would not be the same without the major contribution of three persons: twoanonymousreviewers,whomadedetailedcriticalcommentsonapriorversion, and my colleague Dick Carter, who has provided insightful remarks, and has linguistically revised the manuscript. To these three contributors, I express my deep gratitude. The research contained in this book would not have been possible either without collaboration with a number of distinguished scientists. Research projects, common seminars, fellowships, or other cooperative endeavours have given me the privilege of extensive discussions with neuroscientists Laurence Conty, Jean Decety, Julie Gre`zes, Chris Frith, the late Marc Jeannerod, the late Jacques Paillard, Stan Dehaene, developmental psychologists Fabrice Cle´ment, Jacqueline Nadel, Josef Perner, Markus Paulus, Hannes Rakoczy, James Russell, PhilippeRochat, Atsushi Senju and Beate Sodian, psychologists of action Guenther Knoblich, Wolfgang Prinz, Natalie Sebanz, psychologist of metacognition Asher Koriat, psychiatrist Henri Grivois, comparative psychologists Michael Beran, Josep Call, Daniel Haun, Carla Krachun, Richard Moore, Daniel Povinelli, David Smith, MichaelTomasello,anthropologistsRitaAstutiandMauriceBloch,andmathemat- iciansJean-PierreAubinandHelenaFrankowska.Iamverygratefultoallofthemfor their trust and support. All my thanks to philosophers Ingar Brinck, Peter Car- ruthers,Je´roˆmeDokic,FabianDorsch,IgorDouven,PaulE´gre´,NaomiEilan,thelate Susan Hurley, Pierre Jacob, Julian Kiverstein, Pierre Livet, Robert Lurz, Matthew Nudds, Lucy O’Brien, Gloria Origgi, Elisabeth Pacherie, Christopher Peacocke, Franc¸ois Recanati, Georges Rey, Nicholas Shea, Barry Smith, Matthew Soteriou, Dan Sperber, Tillman Vierkant, for relevant discussions and critical comments. Special thanks go to my PhD students: Anna Loussouarn and Anne Coubray, for acute objections, stimulating creativity and support, to student participants in my seminars Martin Fortier and Joulia Smortchkova, to postdoctoral epistemologists KirkMichaelianandConorMcHugh,forhelpfulfeedback,andtoSamWilkinsonfor hislinguisticrevisionofoneofthechapters.Thanksareduetootoaudiencesofthe APIC seminar, of the ESPP and Eurocogsci conferences, and the many European workshopswherethisresearchhasbeendiscussed. ResearchcollectedinthisbookwassupportedbyfundsfromtheCNRSandtheEC SixthFrameworkProgramme(CNCC)underContractno.ERAS-CT-2003-980409; by a ZIF fellowship on Embodied Communication, in 2006, at the University of Bielefeld; by a Humboldt Fellowship on animal metacognition in 2007 at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, Leipzig, and at the Max Planck InstituteofCognitiveNeuroscience,Leipzig,Germany;byFrenchANRfundsasso- ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vii ciatedwiththeKnowjustprogramfrom2009to2011,and,from2011onward,byan ERC senior grant # 269616 entitled DIVIDNORM. Thanks are due to all the insti- tutions involved, and to Institut Jean-Nicod and the Foundation Pierre-Gilles de Gennes(EcoleNormaleSupe´rieure)wheremyrecentresearchhasbeenconducted. Allmythanksareextendedtothepublishersofthejournalsandbookswherean initial version of these chapters was published, for accepting the present edition including their revised versions: Cambridge University Press, Oxford University Press,ConsciousnessandCognition,The Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society,and PhilosophicalIssues.IfinallywanttoexpressspecialthankstoPeterMomtchilofffor hissupportintheeditorialprocess. Contents ListofFigures x ListofAbbreviations xi 1. Introduction 1 2. AnEvaluativistProposal:CognitiveControlandMetacognition 13 3. MetacognitionasCognitionaboutCognition:AttributiveViews 29 4. MetacognitionorMetarepresentation?ACritical DiscussionofAttributivism 53 5. PrimateMetacognition 79 6. ARepresentationalFormatforProceduralMetacognition 111 7. MentalActsasNaturalKinds 149 8. TheNormsofAcceptance 169 9. EpistemicAgencyandMetacognition:AnExternalistView 185 10. IsThereaSenseofAgencyforThought? 207 11. ThinkingofOneselfastheSame 227 12. ExperienceofAgencyinSchizophrenia 243 13. ConversationalMetacognition 265 14. Dual-systemMetacognitionandNewChallenges 293 Glossary 309 Bibliography 325 AuthorIndex 355 Index 360