Salvationthroughwar? 161 cabinet felt the appropriate moment forsuch action had not yetarrived. Wangenheim,inturn,warnedthatbycontinuingtostallintervention,the OttomanEmpirewasincreasinglylosinganyfutureclaimstothespoilsof thewar.Iftheempirewaitedforvictorytobeassuredbeforeitintervened, the German government would hardly reward the Ottomans for their participation. This argument represented Berlin’s principal leverage over its Ottoman ally. Wangenheim urged that the empire fulfill its part of the alliance and make up for its earlier foot-dragging by taking the following steps forthwith. First, the Sublime Porte should demonstrate naval superiority in the Black Sea through decisive action against the Russiannavy,therebywinningoverBulgariaandRomaniatothesideof the Central Powers and elevating its own standing in the Islamic world. Second,thePorteshouldadvanceMuslimagitationagainsttheEntente, towards which end Germany would provide financial and material aid. And, finally, the Ottoman government should keep troops mobilized against Romania in order to keep that Balkan country neutralif itcould notbewonovertotheCentralPowers.23 While Wangenheim was obligated to follow Berlin’s orders to force intervention,hewasatthesametime,aswehaveseen,personallyopposed toit.Hence,whileheclaimedtobedoingeverythinginhispowerstobring the Ottomans to action, the ambassador continued to justify Ottoman passivityinhiscorrespondencewithBerlin.Hepointedoutthat“Liman, the admirals, and I [work] constantly and with greatest efforts” towards Ottoman entry.24 Ottoman non-intervention stemmed from continued uncertainty in the Balkans and the other active theaters of war. The Central Powers’ setbacks in Galicia and the stalemate on the western front were feeding Ottoman doubts and hesitation.25 Wangenheim also remindedhissuperiorsoftheturmoiltheGermandemandswerecreating within the Ottoman government itself. Enver had withdrawn Souchon’s authorizationforallfleetmaneuversintheBlackSeaonlyinthefaceofa major cabinet crisis, in which the grand vezir, Said Halim Pasha, had threatenedtoresign.26 23 PA/AA,R1914,WangenheimtoAuswärtigesAmt,September20,1914,no.848;PA/ AA,R22402,ZimmermanntoJagow,September21,1914,no.505.SeealsoAhmad, “OttomanArmedNeutralityandIntervention,”68–9,andTrumpener,Germanyandthe OttomanEmpire,40–1. 24 PA/AA,R1914,WangenheimtoAuswärtigesAmt,September19,1914,no.834. 25 Ibid. 26 PA/AA, R 1914, Wangenheim to Auswärtiges Amt, September 19, 1914, no. 836. Wangenheim’s telegram toBerlin was basedoninformation providedby Naval Captain Humann,seeBA-MA,RM40–457,sheet350,HumanntoSouchon,September19,1914. 162 TheOttomanRoadtoWarin1914 It is quite possible, however, that the meeting of September 16 pro- ceededmuchlessdramaticallythanEnver’saccounttoHumannsuggests. Wecanneverbeentirelysure,becausealthoughtheoreticallyallcabinet meetings were recordedand cabinetdecisions transmitted tothe appro- priate government agencies for implementation, the meeting of September16wasnot.And,infact,notputtingdowninwritingcabinet decisionsofapoliticalcharacterappearstohavebeentheusualpractice.27 Based on positions taken by Enver during the previous and following weeks, it is likely that Enver consented to the view of his colleagues and thathefavoredpostponementofmilitaryinterventionaswell.Thespecter ofacabinetcrisisandthepossibilityofthegrandvezir’sresignationinfact servedasyetanotherexcusetoBerlinforthedelayinmilitaryaction.The newsofthegrandvezir’sresignationwoulditselfsignalalossofprestige for Germany in a world that was acutely aware of an existing “arrange- ment”betweenthecurrentOttomancabinetandtheCentralPowers.In thepropagandawarwagedbetweenthetwocampsattemptingtowoothe neutral Balkan states and to retain or acquire Italy, Said Halim’s resig- nationwouldhavebeeninterpretedasablowtoGermanyandasignthat itsparamountpresenceinIstanbulcouldnolongerbetakenforgranted. Once again Enver could portray himself as being turned away from an interventionistcourseonlyatthefinalmomentandundertheheaviestof politicalpressureinthecabinet.28 Inmid-September1914,therefore,thecabinetasserteditselfsuccess- fully in staying out of the war in the face of Berlin’s strong demands for intervention. At the same time, however, the alliance was becoming increasinglyfragile.TheGermanslettheOttomansknowthattheywere in real danger of squandering any claims to a serious role in peace negotiationsatwar’send.ThatprospectdashedOttomanhopesforfuture internationalsecuritywithGermanprotection.Theheatedconfrontation overnavalmaneuverswaseventuallyeasedbytheeffortsofAmbassador Wangenheim, who instructed Souchon to be patient and filed a lengthy report detailing the ways in which neutrality actually benefited the Germanwareffort.TheSublimePorteforitspartpromisedtoauthorize Black Sea maneuvers under Souchon after the latter had officially been madeanOttomanadmiral.Increasingly,theOttomanleaderswereforced 27 SeetherecordsoftheOttomancabinet,Meclis-iVükelâ,attheOttomanArchivesofthe TurkishPrimeMinistry,BOA,MV190–MV194andMV235–MV237,coveringthe periodJuly–November1914. 28 Evaluating the same telegram of September 19, 1914, Ulrich Trumpener expressed similarconcerns:GermanyandtheOttomanEmpire,42. Salvationthroughwar? 163 to choose between the alliance with Germany and their policy of non-belligerence. According to a colleague, Talat for one was aware of thedanger:“Wearecaughtvacillatinginthemiddle.Eachpassingdaywe lose the confidence of our allies while compounding the enmity of the others.That’scalledeatingupyourcapital;therefore,wemustmakeup ourminds.”29 Allianceorneutrality? Indeed,inBerlintheAuswärtigesAmtwasconsideringdrasticmeasures. Jagow asked General Liman von Sanders to report on possible ways by whichtheOttomanEmpirecouldbecoercedintowar.AlthoughLiman’s actual reply has not turned up in the archives and may have been destroyed, we can deduce his recommendations from Wangenheim’s assessmentofthem,solicitedbyJagowonSeptember23. LimanhadadvisedthattheGermansthreatentowithdrawallsupport andofficers,atacticWangenheimwarnedcouldresultinamajordiplo- matic debacle for Germany. The Entente’s proposals for an Ottoman alliance had foundered precisely on this point: the dismissal of the German officers. If Germany were to recall its officers on its own, it would be virtually throwing the Ottomans into the arms of the Entente; theSublimePortewouldsurelypresentthedepartureoftheGermansas meeting Entente conditions for an alliance: “Herr von Liman would appreciate Turkish benevolent neutrality more, if he knew about the incredible efforts the Triple Entente is making in order to remove us from our position here.”30 Wangenheim thus contradicted Liman’s assertion that the empire’s neutrality only drained German resources. “I rather believe that benevolent Turkish neutrality is currently much morevaluabletousthanaprematureTurkishdeclarationofwar.”31He explained: TurkeycurrentlycontrolstheStraitsandtheBlackSea.Ithasmobilizedanarmy ofoverhalfamillionandisthusanimportantfactorinallquestionsregardingthe 29 Ahmad,“OttomanArmedNeutralityandIntervention,”65–6,citingHalilBey(Mentes¸e), Cumhuriyet,November15,1946,Ali˙IhsanSâbis,HarpHatıralarım:BirinciDünyaHarbi (Istanbul:Nehir,1990),vol.II,33–5,Y.T.Kurat,“HowTurkeyDriftedintoWorldWarI,” andBayur,Türk˙InkılâbıTarihi,vol.III/i,1914–1918GenelSava¸sı,229–30. 30 PA/AA,R22402,WangenheimtoJagow,September24,1914,no.3,arrivinginBerlinon themorningofSeptember26,1914.Asecondcopy[Abschrift]isfoundinPA/AA,R1914. Wangenheim’stelegrambypassedZimmermann,whoinstructedWangenheimtoresend it,seePA/AA,R1914,ZimmermanntoWangenheim,October7,1914[draft],no.895. ForZimmermann’sinquiryregardingWangenheim’smissingtelegram,seePA/AA,R 22403,ZimmermanntoJagow,October10,1914,no.689. 31 PA/AA,R22402,WangenheimtoJagow,September24,1914,no.3. 164 TheOttomanRoadtoWarin1914 NearEast,particularlytheBalkans.SinceTurkeyknowsthatitsstrengthdepends almostentirelyonourofficers,itwillhavetosuititspoliciestoGermany’swishes for as long as [it] needs our officers. Germany is hence currently in charge of Turkishaffairs andisthereforeabletocontrol, throughTurkey,theStraits,the BlackSea,and,toacertainextent,alsotheBalkans.32 Ottomanaction,Wangenheimwrote,“dependsonoursuccesses”inthe war,“andparticularlyonAustria,aswellasontheattitudeofBulgaria.”33 To Jagow’s question of whether forcing the empire into war “prior to a decision in Galicia would compromise the expedition against Egypt,”34 the baron left no doubt. “A sudden declaration of war on Russia would probablyprecludethemuchmoresignificantexpeditionagainstEgypt.”35 Premature intervention might also lead to a political shake-up in the capital and remove the leading pro-German figures from their current positions. And “in any case,” he added, “it is better that Turkey strike at a moment when it is ready to carry out the tasks it has been given, when the Caucasus and Egypt [expeditions] have been sufficiently pre- pared.”36 Thus Wangenheim continued to support the Porte’s policy of non-interventiontheninplace,onehesawasworkingtoGermany’sown advantage,andrecommendedthatBerlinacceptitaswell. Wangenheim’sreasoning,however,wasnotsharedbyBerlin.Alarmed by recent news about a substantial British offer of political and financial supportinexchangeforOttomanneutrality,37Berlinexhortedimmediate action.Fromatacticalperspective,too,militaryspecialistswerepointing totheneedtoactrapidly.InadetailedoperationalreportofSeptember3, 1914, Lieutenant Colonel Kress von Kressenstein warned that a naval strike against Odessa and the landing of troops there would have to be launched by the end of September at the latest because of weather con- ditions.38 Thus despite its plausible argument, Wangenheim’s report 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 PA/AA,R1914,JagowtoConstantinople[AmbassadorWangenheim],September23, 1914,no.13. 35 Ibid. 36 PA/AA,R22402,WangenheimtoJagow,September24,1914,no.3. 37 BA-MA,RM40–4,sheets125–6,VertraulicheMitteilungenvom22.9.14[Confidential ReportofSeptember22,1914]. 38 BA-MA,RM40–130,sheets343–5, KresstoHeadquarters,Gesichtspunktefürdie DurchführungeinerUebersee-Expedition[ConsiderationsfortheExecutionofaNaval Expedition], September 3, 1914. Kress suggested landing four army corps at Odessa under the command of General Liman; received by the Ottomans as ATASE,BDH, Klasör46,YeniDosya215A,Fihrist3and3–1,KresstoOttomanGeneralHeadquarters, September3,1914;seealsoBA-MA,RM40–281,sheets306–8,KresstoHeadquarters, Beurteilung der Lage am 4. September 1914 [General Assessment of September 4, 1914]. Salvationthroughwar? 165 failedtoconvincehissuperiors,whocontinuedtopushforaquickstrike againstRussia. Atthesametime,theOttomanleadershipwasbracingitself,ingrowing recognitionthatthewarwasunfoldinginunexpectedways.FromCemil Bey in Berlin arrived extensive analyses of recent military developments and their implications for Ottoman policy. The German plan on the western front had “partially failed,” and the German army there now faced “a very difficult assignment.” Thus, “it will not be possible to occupyFranceinafewweeks’timeashadbeenthought,”andheadded thatinstead“itwillmostlikelybenecessarytoadvancepiecebypieceand thistaskwilltakemuchlongerthanpreviouslythought.”Cemilexplained that“becauseofthissituationBerlinwishesverymuchthatweenterthe war against Russia right away.” From recent conversations “with high-rankingindividualsatthe[German]foreign,war,andnavyoffices,” Cemilhadlearnedevenworseintelligence.Austria-Hungary’sforcesran the risk of suffering substantial defeats against the Russian armies. One immediateconsequencemightbethelossofRomaniatotheEntente,and thus perhapsBulgaria aswell.For that reason, Cemil concluded, Berlin was urging the Ottomans to take control of the Black Sea and to attack Russianportsthere.TheGermanforeignofficehadalsorepeatedlyurged thattheOttomanThirdArmyadvanceintotheCaucasus.39 ThesecallsforinterventionintensifiedastheCentralPowers’military machinebegantosputter.InCemil’swords,“originallytheircallsforour participation stemmed from the wish to gain an ally. Now they feel the needforoursupportinthelightofever-increasingdifficulties.Theyput more hope in us than Romania or Bulgaria.” Despite these military set- backs,andevensomeinstancesofpanicamongGermanranks,Cemilfelt thattheiralliancepartnerwouldemergevictoriousintheend.Headdeda crucial qualification, however: if the French armies were not decisively defeated soon, an eventual German success could amount to no more thana“weakvictory.”40 Wilhelm II’s instructions of September 24 to Souchon reflect the mounting urgency Cemil Bey had described: “In coordination with the ambassador [Wangenheim] continue insisting on taking the entire Turkish fleet [into the Black Sea].”41 When Berlin inquired a few days 39 ATASE,BDH,Klasör243,YeniDosya1009,Fihrist24–1to21–5,CemiltoEnver, 11Eylül1330(September24,1914). 40 Ibid. 41 PA/AA, R 22402, Pohl to Auswärtiges Amt [forwarding the kaiser’s instructions for Souchon],September24,1914,no.135;PA/AA,R1914,JagowtoAuswärtigesAmt, September24,1914,no.191;BA-MA,RM40–454,sheet319,WilhelmtoSouchon, September24,1914. 166 TheOttomanRoadtoWarin1914 later about the admiral’s immediate plans, Souchon replied that he intended“soontoengagetheRussianfleetandcommercial vessels with the Goeben,theBreslau ,and the Turkish fleet. Aslongasthisisnotpos- sibleforpoliticalreasons,IwillcontinuetrainingtheTurkishshipsandplan to stage a naval demonstration in the Black Sea,” thereby making a showofOttomannavalpower,directedtowardsRomaniainparticular.42 Souchon’sresponsecausedjawstodropinBerlin.EvidentlyWangenheim had persuaded the admiral to remain patient and await further develop- ments.“Pleasecableassoonaspossible,”theAuswärtigesAmtdemanded, “which politicalreasonscurrentlypreventourshipsandtheTurkishfleet from striking against Russian naval forces and commerce.”43 Since the Ottoman cabinet had offered to make Souchon an admiral in the Ottoman navy, with the authority to maneuver with the entire fleet, Berlin insisted, “a naval strike seems ready even without the explicit approval of the Porte, particularly now that the Dardanelles have been minedshut.ThePorteapparentlywantstobeforcedintoadecision[Die PfortewilloffenbarzurEntscheidunggezwungenwerden].”44 ThusforBerlinOttomaninterventionwasonlypartiallyaboutmilitary power, that is, about diverting Russian and British troops; it was also about prestige and effect. Intervention could be employed to woo the Balkanstatesand,aswehaveseen,tosparkanti-colonialrebellionsamong theEntente’sMuslimsubjects. On October 1, 1914, Mahmud Muhtar, the Porte’s ambassador in Berlin,metwith Deputy ForeignSecretary Zimmermann, whowas well awareoftheOttomans’growingfinancialconstraintsandwhohadalready proposed a loan-for-entry deal on September 10. Mahmud Muhtar requested a loan of over 5 million Ottoman pounds. He explained that the loan was “needed urgently in order to maintain mobilization.” Zimmermann replied that “the money was available immediately upon the Porte’s” entry into the war. Now Mahmud Muhtar sought to nego- tiate,inquiringwhetherasmaller loanofhalfamillion poundscouldbe 42 BA-MA,RM40–457,sheet338reverse,SouchontoWangenheim[forZimmermann], September30,1914;PA/AA,R1914,WangenheimtoAuswärtigesAmt,September30, 1914,no.940,andforwardedtoJagownextday,seePA/AA,R22403,Zimmermannto Jagow,October1,1914,no.618. 43 PA/AA,R1914,AuswärtigesAmttoWangenheim,October4,1914,no.862. 44 Ibid.(Emphasisinoriginal.)ThisisadraftpreparedbytheDeputyForeignSecretary, Arthur Zimmermann. The Straits had been closed after an Ottoman ship exiting the StraitsintotheAegeanhadbeenturnedaroundbytheBritishonSeptember27,1914.See BA-MA,RM40–1,sheets12–13,UsedomtoWilhelmII,October15,1914. Salvationthroughwar? 167 grantedwithoutintervention.“Suchademonstrationoffriendship,”the ambassador pleaded, “would have an enormous impact on the morale in the entire Muslim world.” The loan would also expose those in Istanbul who argued that “Germany would not be able to provide the necessaryfinancialassistancetothePorte”throughoutthewar.Mahmud Muhtar added special force to his request by stressing his supposed personal commitment to intervention: Souchon should simply attack the Russian fleet in the Black Sea and “thereby pull along the elements that are hesitating.”45 In Mahmud Muhtar’s request we see once again the Ottoman tactic of playing on the German hope for a Muslim anti-colonial and anti-Entente uprising. It was also characteristic of Ottoman–German relations during this period that although the Sublime Porte had no intentions of publicizing the German loan the ambassador did not hesitate to speak of the loan’s “enormous impact” amongMuslimstheworldover. Once Zimmermann obtained the nod from Arthur Gwinner, the speaker ofthe Deutsche Bank, and Karl Helfferich, the German finan- cialadvisorattheSublimePorte,Zimmermannrecommendedaloanof 5millionOttomanpounds.Theloanwouldcarrya5to6percentrateof interest,andwouldbepaiddirectlytotheOttomangrandveziratewith- outgoingthroughtheFinanceMinisterCavidBey,whoseoppositionto intervention was well known – a back-room deal that opened wide the doorforcorruption.While250,000Ottomanpoundswouldbepaidout right away, an amount of 750,000 pounds would follow after interven- tion. Furthermore, half a million Ottoman pounds would be paid out each month until the payments had reached the total of 5 million. Theinitialloan,therefore,wasdesignedtocoveramaximumperiodof eight months. Did the Ottomans assume the war would last no longer thanthat,ordidtheycountonasubsequentloan?Inhismemorandum recommendingtheloan,Zimmermannpointedoutthatintheeventthe Ottomans took the money without striking against Russia, the loss would be kept to the relatively small amount of a quarter of a million Ottoman pounds. “At the same time,” he concluded, “the danger of a partial demobilization for lack of money would be eliminated.”46 That very night, October 1, the Auswärtiges Amt agreed to meet the Ottoman request and approved Zimmermann’s method for handling the loan.47 45 PA/AA,R22403,ZimmermanntoJagow,October1,1914,no.613. 46 Ibid. 47 PA/AA,R22403,JagowtoZimmermann,October1,1914[draft],no.65. 168 TheOttomanRoadtoWarin1914 The Germans took several more days to work out the exact terms,48 without,however,informingtheSublimePorteofitsapproval,49possibly withtheintentionofstrainingOttomannerves.Intheattempttoencour- age a favorable decision, Grand Vezir Said Halim approached Wangenheim with a proposition that once again demonstrated the Ottoman leaders’ long-term vision of their cooperation with Germany. HesuggestedthecreationofaGermannavalbaseintheSeaofMarmara, withGermannavalforcesresponsiblefortheprotectionanddefenseofthe OttomanEmpireagainstanynavalthreat.Souchonfoundthecreationof such a “protection fleet” to be “very practical” and pointed out that it wouldaffordnotonlyGermancontrolovertheSeaofMarmara,but“over theBosporusaswell.”50Likethegrandvezir,TalatandEnveralsooffered assurances.51InameetingwithHumannonOctober2,Enverstatedthat the Dardanelles would remain closed despite Entente efforts to reopen them,andheemphasizedthattheclosurewouldhaveanadverseeffecton theeconomiesofbothRomaniaandRussia.AsforOttomanmobilization, the war minister explained, an army of over 300,000 men had been mobilized,pluslaborbattalions(ameletaburları),intowhichhehad“put alltheunreliables: Greeks,Armenians,etc.”52AGermanloanin return for these efforts, the Ottomans argued, was therefore well deserved. HumannreportedthatEnverhadalsomadeanideologicalpoint: Inthisgreatmobilization,he[Enver]alwaysbelievedthatthegreatsacrificesthat the people have to make must primarily advance the people’s national identity 48 The loanagreementwasconcluded onOctober5, 1914,seeBA-MA,RM5 –2308, Capelle to Tirpitz, October 6, 1914, which also makes clear that Zimmermann, in particular,pressedforanavalattackonRussiabytheOttomanfleetunderSouchon.See alsoBA-MA,RM40–457,sheet223,October5,1914,forSouchon’snotificationofthe loan agreement. The Ottoman cabinet apparently took a decision endorsing the loan agreement, see BOA, MV 237–102 and 102A [draft], [29 Tes¸rin-i Evvel 1330 (November11,1914)].ThedraftapprovesaloanfromtheGermangovernmentofover 5millionOttomanliraat6percentinterest.Thedraftbearsnosignatures. 49 TheSublimePortewasnotifiedoftheloan’sapprovalbyAmbassadorWangenheimon theafternoonofOctober5,1914,seePA/AA,R2123,VertraulicheMitteilungenvom5. Oktober 1914 [Confidential Report of October 5, 1914], compiled by Naval Captain HumannandsubmittedtotheAuswärtigesAmtbyErnstJäckh;cf.ErnstJäckhPapers, YaleUniversityLibrary. 50 BA-MA,RM40–456,sheets310–12,VertraulicheMitteilungenvom1.Oktober1914 [ConfidentialReportofOctober1,1914]andSouchon’smarginaliaingreenpencil.A copy of the report,compiled byNaval CaptainHans Humann and distributed to the variousGermanagenciesintheOttomancapital,wasforwardedtotheAuswärtigesAmt byErnstJäckhandisfoundinPA/AA,R1914. 51 ForTalat:PA/AA,R1914,VertraulicheMitteilungvom2.X.14[ConfidentialReportof October2,1914]. 52 PA/AA,R1914,BesprechungmitEnverPaschaam2.Oktober1914[Conversationwith EnverPashaonOctober2,1914],reportedbyHumann,andalsofoundinBA-MA,RM 40–4,sheets94–7. Salvationthroughwar? 169 [vornehmlich seiner völkischen Erziehung zugute kommen sollen]. He looks at the currentexamplesetbyGermany:thetirelesswillingnessofalltosacrifice,commit- mentofthewholepersontothefatherland.Apeople[whichlackssuchcommit- ment]hasnorighttoexist.Itisamostdifficulttasktoteachthishighestandmost important virtue to the people of Abdülhamid [II], but it is indispensable. The Balkanwarwaslostatthetimemainlybecauseeveryonethoughtofhimself,no oneofthefatherland[Vaterland],he[Enver]believes.Thepeoplemustembrace theideathatitisshamefultodonothingwhenthefatherlandisindanger.53 Still unaware that the loan had already been approved, the next day Enver discussedwithHumanntheseverefinancialdifficulties facingthe empireandtheabsolutenecessityofaGermanloan.Theentirearmyhad been placed on half-pay and Finance Minister Cavid was urging the cabinettoadoptadecisionforpartialdemobilizationforfinancialreasons. Playing on the great importance Berlin attached to the Suez expedition, Enverwarnedthatfinancialproblems“sloweddownespeciallytheprep- arations [for the expedition] against Egypt,” and he added that the Ottoman army urgently needed howitzer cannons for the expedition as well.54 Withtheapprovaloftheloan,Germany’smilitaryandpoliticalleaders expected immediate and tangible results. Zimmermann impressed on the German representatives in Istanbul and Tehran that “the sooner Russia enters into conflict with Turkey and Persia the better. Please worktowardsthisaimbyanypossiblemeans.”55Wangenheimtriedone lasttimetopersuadehissuperiorsthattheywereharmingGermany’sown interests. On October 6, he resubmitted to Zimmermann his report of September24.56“Iamtodaystilloftheopinion,”theambassadorinsisted, “thatTurkey’sneutrality,benevolenttowardsus,is”ofgreatervaluethan “Turkey’sprematureinvolvementinthewar,whichwouldbeaveryrisky undertaking [aleatorisches Unternehmen].” Saying he lacked confidence in the strength of the Ottoman armed forces, Wangenheim feared a swift defeat of the empire that would put an end to German influence in the region. “If Turkey declares war,” he commented, “[Turkey] will be of valuetousonlyforaslongasitremainsundefeated…oneluckytorpedo bytheRussianfleetincapacitatingtheGoebenwouldmeanthedestruction of the entire Turkish fleet and render impossible any further military 53 Ibid. 54 PA/AA,R1914,BesprechungmitEnverPaschaam3.Oktober1914[Conversationwith EnverPashaonOctober3,1914].SamereportinBA-MA,RM40–4,sheets91–2. 55 PA/AA,R1914,ZimmermanntoWangenheim,October4,1914[draft],no.872. 56 PA/AA,R22402,WangenheimtoJagow,September24,1914,no.3.Asindicatedabove, Wangenheim’s telegram had bypassed Zimmermann, who instructed Wangenheim to resenditonOctober7,seePA/AA,R1914,ZimmermanntoWangenheim,October7, 1914[draft],no.895.