‘THE ONLY FATHERLAND’ Communists, ‘Quit India’ and the Soviet Union ARUN SHOURIE HarperCollins Publishers India For our Adit again who puts up with so much with such nobility and fortitude Contents 1.Introduction 2.1942: Was There a Deal? 3.The Communists on What They Did 4.‘Decadent’, ‘Traitors’, ‘Vultures’ 5.Motives and Recantations 6.‘Stick the Convict’s Badge’ 7.Postscript: The Collapse of the Fatherland Notes and References Index About the Author Copyright Also by Arun Shourie with HarperCollins Does He Know a Mother’s Heart?: How Suffering Refutes Religions The World of Fatwas: Or the Shariah in Action Worshipping False Gods: Ambedkar, and the Facts Which Have Been Erased Falling over Backwards: An Essay Against Reservations and Against Judicial Populism Self-Deception: India’s China Policies: Origins, Premises, Lessons 1 Introduction To every question our communists have an answer. The answer accords with a line. The line they say flows directly from a theory. It is a Master Theory of course, a Revelation they would say, if only they could bring themselves to use the word. If your answer does not accord with their line, they come down on you as an avalanche – of denunciation, of vicious abuse, of their sudden discoveries about your motives. ‘If your answer does not accord with their line…’ is in fact too optimistic. For their line changes often, as often as their convenience. Actually, it changes even more often: it changes as often as their perception of their convenience changes. And that is at least every few years. Hence, the sentence really should begin, ‘If your answer does not accord with their line of the moment…’ The line as well as its revisions are of course only for the furtherance of the Revolution, of the Emancipation of Man. Obviously therefore, when your answer deviates from their line, they show no mercy. In the interest of Man, of the Future, they cannot. Nothing I had done or written had attracted any adverse notice of the established communist parties till late 1983. On the contrary, on a visit to Cochin I was invited to the office of one of the principal publications of the CPI(M) in Kerala. Several office-bearers of the party and some journalists connected with it were kind enough to be present. I was told that a well-known editor, who was a senior member of the CPI(M) in Kerala and was present, had laboured long and hard to translate a book of mine, Hinduism: Essence and Consequence. This was the first I had heard of the translation. The book had dealt with the explanation of suffering in our scriptures and with the difficulty of deriving the case for socially relevant action from the world view they contained. The persons present were generous in their expressions about the book, so much so that they did not pay much heed to my saying that the book had been written at a time of great personal tragedy, that I had grown out of much that I had written in it. I was informed that the translation was in fact almost ready to go to press. It was a warm and pleasant visit. Early in 1984 Mr V.M. Tarkunde asked me to deliver the M.N. Roy Memorial Lecture for the year. I had been planning to do a book – alas! the heap of notes still stares at me – on Indian liberals and communists – about how the former were unduly defensive, almost apologetic in their dealings with the latter; about how the latter had a purely instrumental view of the former. A chapter in it was to set out how the communists’ ideology had become a set of blinkers – and how it had led them into adopting positions that were totally unjustifiable, how it had made them so very cynical of everyone else, in particular of liberals. That they had become skilful in rationalizing whatever they did – from the history they rewrote, from the falsehoods they propagated, to the use they made of others, including their followers and colleagues – only compounded the problem: it ensured that their inconsiderateness would go farther, it ensured too that they would persist in an error longer. This facility in rationalizing owed and owes much to native talent of course – many of the communists had in a sense been among ‘the brightest and the best’. But the presumptuousness of that millenarist ideology more than anything else is what produces the rationalizations. I had selected the Communist Party of India’s 180 degree turn in 1942 to illustrate the matter. In studying it I was greatly helped by the staff of the National Archives, who allowed me to read the files of the period, and by Mr Sita Ram Goel, who loaned me his collection of communist publications. As my reading on this bit had progressed farther than on the other chapters, I sought Mr Tarkunde’s permission to choose that episode as the subject for the Roy Lectures. Pritish Nandy, the editor of The Illustrated Weekly of India, was kind enough to carry the lectures – barring passages which dealt with details – in the Weekly. He carried them with the flair and aplomb which are his hallmark. The denunciation and abuse and pasting of motives commenced at once. And they were a torrent. ‘It is an old canard,’ both the communist parties, their intellectuals, their journalists shouted. But how did that affect its significance or veracity? ‘He has not established the authenticity of his so-called documents,’ they shouted. And simultaneously, ‘There is nothing new. The documents have all been published earlier.’ ‘He has paid no attention to the world situation which necessitated the new line,’ they said. And simultaneously, ‘The Party has already, and long ago, acknowledged the error.’ Pamphlets were printed in several languages. Press conferences were addressed. The plan to publish the translation of Hinduism by the CPI(M) luminary and editor was aborted. The senior ideologue of the CPI(M) sent a turgid reply to the Illustrated Weekly which at great length dealt with nothing that I had said. E.M.S. Namboodripad, the general secretary of the CPI(M), led the pack. He declared that I was an agent of the right, that I had resurrected this old canard as the forces of which I was a mouthpiece had been unnerved by the growing strength of progressive and secular forces. It was the timing which was important, he said: I had done all this in view of the elections which were round the corner. A torrent of falsehood – from the fact that no elections were round any corner to the fact that there was nothing selective about the date: the lectures had been delivered as they are every year on M.N. Roy’s birth anniversary. As the abuse was so much to form, and as the traducers had found no specific fault with what I had said, instead of dealing with what they were saying about 1942 I was led to write a general essay on the roots of their verbal terrorism, and on what we should do to face it.1 And as the communists were but a special example, though of course the most virulent one, of a widespread habit, I dealt with them as but an example. The essay was thus a sequel to the lectures. Accordingly, it has been included here after the account of the 1942 episode. The episode itself remains stuck as a bone in the communists’ throat. When they were first charged with having worked to sabotage the Quit India movement, they denounced those who had levelled the charge – the socialists in particular had levelled it, as hounding them down had been a special target of the collaboration. The communists denounced them most ferociously, and insisted that there had been absolutely no liaison with the British. In his book A History of Indian Freedom Struggle, the English edition of which was published in 1986, E.M.S. Namboodripad however acknowledges the liaison, in the oblique as well as the self-righteous way so characteristic of the communists, in particular of their ‘leading theoreticians.’ Congress policy was wrong and suicidal, he says. Gandhi had not thought the matter through, he says, and had left no instructions on how the struggle should be carried on in the event of the principal leaders being arrested, he says. The Congress had not prepared for guerilla war against the advancing Japanese, he says. It had not thought of providing medical assistance to the victims of bombing, he says, nor had it thought of mobilizing the masses against profiteers and hoarders. It was the Communist Party which took up these tasks, and accordingly, says Namboodripad, ‘It did not hesitate to establish contact with the government and accept the assistance necessary for carrying out this programme.’2 To somewhat modest results, it would seem. ‘The Japanese forces had to retreat even before entering India,’ EMS records. ‘The Communist Party, however, did make some efforts, in a small way though, to meet any Japanese attack.’ And then the acknowledgement that the liaison had been closer than may be inferred from the admission about obtaining assistance merely to stage demonstrations against black marketeers: ‘The authorities had come forward to give training in guerilla warfare to the Communists for that purpose,’ EMS writes. ‘The party did not hesitate to obtain assistance from the departments concerned for organising defence against air raids, etc.’3 EMS’s defence is the familiar blend of indignation, apologia, explanation and evasion. There were disagreements in the Congress too, he says. Other leaders too were confused, he says. Gandhi had not thought through the matter, he says. In fact, being imprisoned enabled the Congress leaders to escape responsibility for what had to be done, he says. Violence and sabotage broke out and Gandhi did not condemn these, he says. At the back of the Congress leaders’ decision to launch the movement was the object of furthering their bourgeois class interests by eventually negotiating and compromising with the British rulers, he says. It is the Communist Party, not the Congress, which acted in accordance with the resolutions of the Congress, he says. Though the Communist Party opposed the Quit India struggle, it simultaneously organized campaigns against the general policies of the government, he says.4 The mixture of half-truths, smears, non sequiturs, contradictions becomes pitiable in the end. And his ultimate verdict remains ambivalent. ‘This, however, does not mean,’ he writes, ‘that the Communist Party did not commit any error in translating its general approach towards the Quit India struggle into practical activities. Failing to properly appreciating (sic) the popular feeling behind the struggle, the party had often displayed a tendency to denounce those participating in the struggle as fascist agents. It had also made certain errors in organising mass struggles during this period. All such errors were subjected later to severe self-criticism, particularly in the Second Party Congress held in Calcutta in 1948.’5 But clearly that failure to appreciate ‘the popular feelings behind the struggle,’ those ‘certain errors in organising mass struggles,’ were just minor tactical errors. ‘Despite the omissions and commissions,’ the party general secretary concludes, ‘the Party adopted a policy which was by and large correct during the Quit India struggle.’6 And that follows from the fact that even forty years after the War ended, the party’s understanding of its nature remains exactly what it was. The capitalist-imperialist nations were engaged in a gigantic conspiracy, EMS says, to set Hitler upon the Soviet Union. The British did not go to the aid of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, he says. ‘There was reason behind this ambivalence on the part of Britain,’ he declares. ‘They wanted to push the Soviet Union, the consistent enemy of fascism, into a war against Germany while keeping themselves aloof from it and provide an opportunity to Hitler to destroy the Soviet Union.’ But naturally, the latter, equipped as it was with the Great Theory which enabled it to see through and beyond, was not going to be fooled. ‘Leaders of the Soviet Union saw through this imperialist design,’ the general secretary says. ‘The Soviet German no-war pact (the pact between Stalin and Hitler which has since been denounced most severely by the Soviets themselves) was a clever counter-move to this imperialist design.’ Its consequence was immediate, decisive and beneficient: ‘Hitler could now turn westwards,’ says the general secretary.7 The general secretary remains absolutely certain to this day about the justification, about the brilliance as well as about the success of this pact. ‘To anyone who examines the later events,’ he reiterates, ‘it would be clear now that the Soviet-German no-war pact was a clever move on the part of the Soviet Union to expose and oppose the strategy of the imperialist powers of turning Hitler against the Soviet Union without engaging themselves in the war.’8 And yet again: ‘The strategy adopted originally by Britain and France,’ he says, ‘was to afford all facilities to Hitler to destroy the Soviet Union, the sworn enemy of capitalism and imperialist domination. They expected that in the event of a German invasion of Poland, the Soviet Union would go to the defence of Poland which would eventually result in a war between Germany and the Soviet Union. But the German-Soviet no-war pact frustrated the design of Britain and France. It made (it) possible for Hitler to turn to the west after conquering Poland.’9 All this in a book published in 1986! Hitler of course proved perfidious, and eventually attacked the Soviet Union. But that too, the Theory (much like Nostradamus) is said to have foretold. Hitler’s invasion is said to have been ‘the culmination’ of the same, long- standing, imperialist conspiracy to destroy the Soviet Union.10 The assessment of the nature of the war therefore remains unchanged. And so does the touchstone by which such events had to be and are to be judged. ‘The characterization of the war by the communists as “imperialist” in its first phase and as “people’s war” in the second phase was based on one and the same principle,’ writes the general secretary. ‘It is certainly a crucial issue what