The Project Gutenberg EBook of The New York Stock Exchange in the Crisis of 1914, by Henry George Stebbins Noble This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org Title: The New York Stock Exchange in the Crisis of 1914 Author: Henry George Stebbins Noble Release Date: July 18, 2009 [EBook #29443] Language: English Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NY STOCK EXCH--CRISIS OF 1914 *** Produced by Richard J. Shiffer and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was produced from images generously made available by The Internet Archive/American Libraries.) Transcriber's Note Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as possible, including obsolete and variant spellings and other inconsistencies. Text that has been changed to correct an obvious error is noted at the end of this ebook. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE IN THE CRISIS OF 1914 BY H. G. S. NOBLE PRESIDENT GARDEN CITY NEW YORK T H E C O U N T R Y L I F E P R E S S 1915 Copyright, 1915 The Country Life Press INTRODUCTION The year 1914 has no precedent in Stock Exchange history. At the present time (1915), when the great events that have come to pass are still close to us, even their details are vivid in our minds and we need no one to rehearse them. Time, however, is quick to dim even acute memories, and Wall Street, of all places, is the land of forgetfulness. The new happenings of all the World crowd upon each other so fast in the financial district that even the greatest and most far-reaching of them are soon driven out of sight. This being the case, it has seemed to the writer of these pages that some record should be kept among the brokerage fraternity of what was so great an epoch in their history, and that this record could best be written down by one who happened to be very favorably placed to know the story in its entirety. Of course the archives of the Exchange will always contain the minutes of Committees and other documentary material embodying the story of the past, but this dry chronicle is never likely to see the light except when unearthed by law courts or legislative committees. It seems worth while, therefore, to disentangle the essential thread of the tale of 1914 from the mass of unreadable detail in the minute books, and put it in a shape where those who are interested may look it over. This is not an easy task. To differentiate the interesting and the essential from the mass of routine material is, perhaps, not very difficult, but to present this segregated matter in a form that will not be monotonous is much more of a problem. The proceedings of a Committee that has been in continuous session must, when written down, partake of the nature of a diary, and to that extent be tiresome reading. We shall, therefore, have to ask the indulgence of any one who happens to look into these pages, and beg him to pass over the form for the sake of the substance. That the substance itself is of deep interest goes without saying. It was given to the Stock Exchange to play a great part in a momentous world crisis, and it must be of profound interest to know how that part was played. Stock Exchanges are a relatively recent product of modern civilization, and like new comers in every field they are suspected and misunderstood. The most complex of all problems are economic problems, and the functions of Stock Exchanges form a most intricate part of political economy. It has, consequently, been a noticeable phenomenon in all contemporary industrial society that the activities of the stock markets have been a constant subject of agitation and legislative meddling. Most of this meddling has been based upon ignorance and misunderstanding, but in a broad view this ignorance and misunderstanding are excusable owing to the novelty and above all the great complexity of the factors at work. One of the needs of the time, therefore, is that the public, and their representatives in the Legislatures, should be enlightened as fast as possible with regard to the immensely important uses of these institutions, and to the operation of their very delicate machinery. The World crisis of 1914 forced upon us an object lesson on the question of speculative exchanges in general which ought to be of lasting profit. For years agitators had been hard at work all over the country urging the suppression of the Cotton Exchanges, and claiming that they contained gamblers who depressed the price of the cotton growers' product. In the summer of 1914 the dreams of these agitators were realized. The Cotton Exchanges were all closed and the cotton grower was given an opportunity of testing the benefits of a situation where there was no reliable agency to appraise the value of cotton. The result may be summed up in the statement that the reopening of the Cotton Exchanges met with no opposition. A similar object lesson was furnished in the case of the Stock Exchanges. They were all closed, and for a few weeks some profound thinkers in the radical press stated that the country was showing its ability to dispense with them. When the time for their reopening came, however, there was no agitation to prevent it. On the contrary it was hailed as a sign of the resumption of normal financial conditions in the United States. This evidence that the experience of 1914 has cast a much needed light on the public value of speculative exchanges, gives a further excuse for describing in some detail how the experience was passed through by that greatest of all these institutions, the New York Stock Exchange. THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE IN THE CRISIS OF 1914 [Pg i] [Pg ii] [Pg iii] [Pg 3] The New York Stock Exchange CHAPTER I THE CLOSING OF THE EXCHANGE The Stock Exchange is in the second century of its existence and in that long period of time (long relatively to the number of years during which Stock Exchanges have been known to the world) it has been forced to close its doors only twice. The first occasion was the great panic of 1873, the after effect of civil war when trading was suspended for ten days; the second came with the outbreak of the world War in the close of July, 1914. These two remarkable events differ profoundly in the gravity of the circumstances which brought them about. In 1873, although the financial disturbance was one of the greatest the United States has ever experienced, the trouble was mainly local and did not seriously involve the entire world. The Exchange was not closed in anticipation of a catastrophe but was obliged to shut down after the crash had taken place, in order to enable Wall Street to gather up its shattered fragments. The measure of this crisis was the ten days during which trading was suspended. Far different from these were the circumstances surrounding July 31st, 1914. On that eventful date a financial earthquake of a violence absolutely without precedent shook every great center of the civilized world, closing their markets one by one until New York, the last of all, finally suspended in order to forestall what would have surely been a ruinous collapse. The four and a half months during which this suspension continued stand to the ten days closing of 1873 in a proportion which fitly illustrates the relative gravity of the two historic upheavals. In the light of these facts we are justified in asserting that the events of 1914 are the most momentous that have so far constituted the life and history of the New York Stock Exchange, and consequently that some record of, and commentary upon, these facts may be of value to the present members of that body and of interest and profit to its future members. It is in the nature of panics to be unforeseen, but the statement may be truly made that some of them can be more unforeseen than others. The panic of 1907 was preceded by anxious forebodings in the minds of many well informed people, whereas the Venezuela panic in 1895, being due to the sudden act of an individual, came out of a clear sky. To the latter class distinctively belongs the great convulsion of 1914. While the standing armies of Europe were a constant reminder of possible war, and the frequent diplomatic tension between the Great Powers cast repeated war shadows over the financial markets, the American public, at least, was entirely unprepared for a world conflagration. Up to the final moment of the launching of ultimata between the European governments no one thought it possible that all our boasted bonds of civilization were to burst over night and plunge us back into mediæval barbarism. Wall Street was therefore taken unaware, and so terrific was the rapidity with which the world passed, in the period of about a week, from the confidence of long enduring peace to the frightful realization of strife, that no time was given for men to collect their thoughts and decide how to meet the on-rushing disaster. Added to the paralyzing effect of this unheard of speed of action, there came the disconcerting thought that the conditions produced were absolutely without precedent. Experience, the chart on which we rely to guide ourselves through troubled waters, did not exist. No world war had ever been fought under the complex conditions of modern industry and finance, and no one could, for the moment, form any reliable idea of what would happen or of what immediate action should be taken. These circumstances should be kept clearly in mind by all who wish to form a clear conception of this great emergency, and to estimate fairly the conduct of the financial community in its efforts to save the day. The conditions on the Stock Exchange, when the storm burst, were in some respects very helpful. Speculation for several years had been at a low ebb, so that values were not inflated nor commitments extended. Had such a war broken out in 1906, with the level of prices then existing, one recoils at the thought of what might have happened. Furthermore, the unsettled business outlook due to new and untried legislation had fostered a heavy short interest in the market, thereby furnishing the best safeguard against a sudden and disastrous drop. This short interest was a leading factor in producing the extraordinary resistance of prices in New York which caused so much favorable comment during the few days before the closing. It were well if ill-informed people who deprecate short selling would note this fact. During the week preceding July 31st, therefore, in the face of a practical suspension of dealings in the other world markets, the New York market stood its ground wonderfully. The decline in prices, though it became violent on July 30th, showed no evidence of collapse. There was a continuous market everywhere up to the last moment, and call money was obtainable at reasonable prices. Here was a perplexing problem when the closing of foreign Bourses raised the question of how long we should strive to keep our own Exchange open. To close the recognized public market for securities, the market which is organized and safeguarded and depended upon as a standard of values, is an undertaking of great responsibility in any community. To take this step in New York, [Pg 3] [Pg 4] [Pg 5] [Pg 6] which is one of the four preeminent financial centers of the world, involved a responsibility of a magnitude difficult adequately to estimate. Upon the continuity of this market rest the vast money loans secured by the pledge of listed securities; numberless individuals depend upon it in times of crisis to enable them to raise money rapidly by realizing on security investments and thus safeguarding other property that may be unsaleable; the possessor of ready money looks to it as the quickest and safest field in which to obtain an interest return on his funds; and the business world as a whole depends upon it as a barometer of general conditions. Add to this the fact that speculative commitments by individuals from all over the world, which have been based upon the expectation of an uninterrupted market, are left in hopeless and critical suspense if this market is suddenly removed, and it becomes apparent that to close the Exchange is manifestly to inflict far-reaching hardship upon vast numbers of people. It is also sure to be productive of much injustice. In bad times sound and solvent firms are anxious to enforce all their contracts promptly so as to protect themselves against those that are overextended; an obligatory suspension of business compels these solvent firms, in many cases, to help carry the risks of the insecure ones and deprives the provident man of the safety to which he is entitled. When such facts as these are duly weighed by the agencies having the authority to close the stock market, it becomes clear that duty dictates a policy of hands off as long as a continuous market persists and purchasers continue to buy as the decline proceeds. This was well illustrated in the acute panic of 1907 when an enormous open market never ceased to furnish the means by which needy sellers constantly liquidated, and the possessors of savings made most profitable investments. To have closed the Exchange during that crisis—assuming it to have been possible—would have been an unmixed evil. The violent decline in prices was the natural and only remedy for a long period of over-speculation, and it would have been worse had it been artificially postponed. Considerations of this general character, up to July 30th, caused the authorities of the New York Stock Exchange to take no action, although the other world markets had all virtually suspended dealings. On July 30th, the evidences of approaching panic showed themselves. An enormous business was done accompanied by very violent declines in prices, and, although money was still obtainable throughout the day, at the close of business profound uneasiness prevailed. On the afternoon of July 30th, the officers of the Stock Exchange met in consultation with a number of prominent bankers and bank presidents, and the question of closing the Exchange was anxiously discussed. While the news from abroad was most critical, and the day's decline in prices was alarming, it was also true that no collapse had taken place and no money panic had yet appeared. The bankers' opinion was unanimous that while closing was a step that might become necessary at any time, it was not clear that it would be wise to take it that afternoon, and it was agreed to await the events of the following day. Meanwhile, several members of the Governing Committee of the Exchange had become convinced that closing was inevitable and, in opposition to the opinion of the bankers, urged that immediate steps be taken to bring it about. It may seem strange to people outside of Wall Street that the night before the Exchange closed such apparent indecision and difference of opinion existed. It was, however, a perfectly natural outcome of an unprecedented situation. The crisis had developed so suddenly, and the conditions were so utterly without historic parallel, that the best informed men found themselves at a loss for guidance. During the evening of July 30th the conviction that closing was imperative spread with great speed among the large brokerage firms. Up to a late hour of the night the President of the Exchange was the recipient of many messages and telegrams from houses not only in New York, but all over the country, urging immediate action. The paralysis of the world's Stock Exchanges had meanwhile become general. The Bourses at Montreal, Toronto and Madrid had closed on July 28th; those at Vienna, Budapest, Brussels, Antwerp, Berlin, and Rome on July 29th; St. Petersburg and all South American countries on July 30th, and on this same day the Paris Bourse was likewise forced to suspend dealings, first on the Coulisse and then on the Bourse itself. On Friday morning, July 31st, the London Stock Exchange officially closed, so that the resumption of business on that morning would have made New York the only market in which a world panic could vent itself. The Governing Committee of the Exchange were called to meet at nine o'clock (the earliest hour at which they could all be reached, for it was summer and many were out of town) and at that hour they assembled in the Secretary's office ready to consider what action should be taken. In addition to the Committee many members of prominent firms appeared in the room to report that orders to sell stocks at ruinous prices were pouring in upon them from all over the world and that security holders throughout the country were in a state of panic. It would be hopeless to try to describe the nervous tension and excitement of the group of perhaps fifty men who consulted together under the oppressive consciousness that within forty-five minutes (it was then a quarter past nine) an unheard of disaster might overtake them. It was determined that the Governing Committee should go into session at once as there was so little time to spare. Just as they started for their official meeting room a telephone message was received from a prominent banking house stating that the bankers and bank presidents were holding a consultation and suggesting that the Exchange authorities await the conclusion of their deliberations. There is an employee of the Exchange whose duty it is to ring a gong upon the floor of the big board room at ten [Pg 7] [Pg 8] [Pg 9] [Pg 10] o'clock in the morning. Until that gong has rung the market is not open and contracts are not recognized. This employee was instructed not to ring the gong until he had received personal orders to do so from the President; a permanent telephone connection was established with the office in which the bankers were conferring, and amid a horrible suspense the outcome of their conference was awaited. For twenty minutes this strain continued. It was a quarter before ten and only fifteen minutes remained in which to act. Meanwhile the brokers were fast assembling upon the board room floor, orders were piling in upon them to sell at panic prices, ten o'clock was approaching, and although all felt that the opening should not be permitted no one had a word from the Governing Committee as to what was going to be done. At a quarter of ten, no word having come from the bankers, the receiver of the telephone which had been connected with their meeting place was hung up, and the Governing Committee were called in session to take action. As they took their seats two messages reached them. One was brought by a prominent member of their body who had gone to the office of the President of the bank Clearing House and had been told by him, after consulting with some of his fellow officers, "We concur; under no circumstances is it our suggestion, but if the Exchange desires to close, we concur." The other was sent, through a member of the Exchange, from one of the leading bank Presidents who stated that closing would be a grave mistake and that he was opposed to it. The roll was called and thirty-six out of the forty-two members answered to their names. The Chair having announced the purpose of the meeting, Mr. Ernest Groesbeck moved that the Exchange be closed until further notice. This motion was carried, not unanimously but by a large majority. Mr. Groesbeck then moved that the delivery of securities be suspended until further notice, and, this being carried unanimously, made a third motion that a special Committee consisting of four members of the Governing Committee and the President be appointed to consider all questions relating to the suspension of deliveries and report to the Governing Committee at the earliest possible moment. The third motion, like the second was carried unanimously and the Committee adjourned. It was then four minutes of ten. On the instant that the first motion closing the Exchange was passed, word was sent to the ticker operators to publish the news on the tape. In this way the seething crowd of anxious brokers on the floor got word of the decision before ten o'clock struck. Immediately upon the adjournment of the Committee Mr. George W. Ely the Secretary of the Exchange ascended the Chairman's desk in the board room and made the formal announcement, which was greeted with cheers of approbation. The President promptly appointed Messrs. H. K. Pomroy, Ernest Groesbeck, Donald G. Geddes, and Samuel F. Streit to constitute, with himself, the Committee of Five, and the long suspense and anxiety of four months and a half began. These events, which were crowded into a few feverish hours, and which seemed to those who participated in them more like a nightmare than like a reality, present some aspects that are especially worthy of detailed description. It is noticeable that the vote to close the Exchange was not unanimous. This shows the immense complexity of a situation, which, even at the last moment, left some two or three conscientious men undecided. It is a fact of profound importance, and one that never should be forgotten by stock brokers or by the public, that the Exchange closed itself on its own responsibility and without either assistance or compulsion from any outside influence. Many false assertions by professional enemies of the institution have been made to the effect that the banks forced the closing, or that its members were unwillingly coerced by outside pressure. The facts are that the influential part of the membership, the heads of the big commission houses, made up their minds on the evening of July 30th that closing was imperative, and that on the morning of July 31st their representatives in the Governing Committee took the responsibility into their own hands, the bankers having been unable as yet to reach a conclusion. Immediately after the closing the President of the Exchange visited the prominent bank president who had served notice at the last moment of his disapproval of this procedure. He was found in his office in consultation with a member of one of the great private banking houses. Both the bank president and the private banker agreed that, in their opinion, the closing had been a most unfortunate mistake. It was an opportunity thrown away to make New York the financial center of the world. The damage was done and would have to be made the best of, but had the market been allowed to open the banks would have come to the rescue and all would have gone well. These gentlemen admitted that the Exchange was to some extent excusable owing to the negligence of the bankers in not notifying them that they were ready to protect the money market. It may safely be stated that within twenty-four hours after this interview neither the two bankers in question nor any one else in Wall Street entertained these opinions. The rise of exchange on London to $7—a rate never before witnessed; the marking of the Bank of England's official discount rate to 10%, accompanied by a run on that institution which resulted in a loss of gold in one week of $52,500,000; the decline of the Bank's ratio of reserve from the low figure of 40% to the paralyzing figure of 14-5/8%; together with the fact that the surplus reserves of our New York Clearing House banks fell $50,000,000 below their legal requirements, were reasons enough in themselves to convince the most skeptical of the necessity of what had been done. The frightful gravity of the situation which had arisen became clearer and more defined in people's minds a few days after the first of August than it was on the morning of July 31st. European selling had been proceeding for some time before the outbreak of War and in the last few days before closing had been temporarily arrested by the prohibitive [Pg 11] [Pg 12] [Pg 13] [Pg 14] level of exchange and the risk of shipment at sea. The American public itself, however, was seized with panic on the evening of July 30th, and on the morning of July 31st brokers' offices were flooded with orders to sell securities for what they would bring and without reference to values. Had the market been permitted to open on that Friday morning the familiar Wall Street tradition of "Black Friday" would have had a meaning more sinister than ever had been dreamed of before. In all previous American panics the foreign world markets were counted upon to come to the rescue and break the fall. Imports of gold, foreign loans, and foreign buying were safeguards which in past crises had been counted upon to prevent utter disaster. On this occasion our market stood by itself unaided; an unthinkable convulsion had seized the world; panic had spread; even the bargain hunter was chilled by the unprecedented conditions; there were practically no buyers. A half hour's session of the Exchange that morning would have brought on a complete collapse in prices; a general insolvency of brokerage houses would have forced the suspension of all business; the banks, holding millions of unsaleable collateral, would have become involved; many big institutions would have failed and a run on savings banks would have begun. It is idle to speculate upon what the final outcome might have been. Suffice it to say that these grave consequences were prevented in the nick of time by the prompt and determined action of the Stock Exchange, and by that alone. Any decisive step whether right or wrong always finds its critics. There were a few people who criticised the Exchange for closing too soon and thought that the feeling of panic was increased by this action. These few were mostly converted from their opinions as the situation became clearer. There was a larger number who took the ground that the Exchange had not closed soon enough, and urged that had the step been taken a few days sooner a considerable decline in values would have been prevented. It is strange that the latter critics did not stop to reflect on how great an advantage it was, all through the anxious days of August, to have had the New York market liquidated as far as it could be without disaster, and the level of closing prices relatively low. How vastly greater would have been the task of safeguarding the situation in the face of declining prices in the "New Street Market" had the closing prices on the Exchange been ten or fifteen points higher. The truth is that the Exchange was closed at the very best possible moment. The market was kept open as long as liquidation could safely be carried on (thus immensely diminishing the pressure to be withstood during the suspension) and it was closed at the very instant that a collapse was threatened. The above facts suggest some reflections with regard to the agitation for governmental interference with or control of the Exchange. The act of closing necessitated the prompt decision of men thoroughly familiar with the circumstances in a period of time actually measured by minutes. If it had been necessary to reach government officials unfamiliar with details, convince them of the necessity of action, and overcome the invariable friction of public machinery, the financial world would have been prostrated before the first move had been made. If the Exchange had been an incorporated body, and had been closed in the face of the difference of opinion and possible conflict of interests that existed at the time, it would have been possible for a temporary injunction to have been brought against its management restraining its freedom to meet the emergency. Long before the merits of such an injunction could have been argued in court the harm would have been done, and ruin would have overtaken many innocent people. The full power of a group of individuals thoroughly familiar with the conditions to act without delay or restraint prevented a calamity which can safely be described as national. It is a fact, which will probably never be appreciated outside of the immediate confines of Wall Street, that the Exchange was unexpectedly thrown into a position where the interests of the whole country were put in its hands, and that through the prompt and energetic action of the thirty-six men who faced the awful responsibility on July 31st financial America was saved. It is true that in saving the community they saved themselves, but so do the soldiers who win upon the battle-field, and in neither case is the obligation cancelled by the selfish considerations involved. When in future the perennial outcry against the Exchange is being fostered by those whose minds are exclusively occupied with the evils that are inseparable from every human institution, let us hope that once in a while some friendly voice may be raised to remind the world of July thirty-first, nineteen hundred and fourteen. CHAPTER II THE PERIOD OF SUSPENSION During the same morning on which the momentous action of closing was taken the Committee of Five met and elected the President of the Exchange as their Chairman. The acute crisis was over, the danger of a cataclysm had been averted, but the situation that remained was big with problems full of menace and uncertainty. Just what effect the closing of the market would have was a matter of doubt. On all previous occasions when the facilities of the Exchange had been inadequate, or had been shut off, an unregulated market had established itself in public places and proceeded uncontrolled. Thus during the Civil War, when the volume of speculation had completely [Pg 15] [Pg 16] [Pg 17] [Pg 18] outgrown the limited machinery of the old Board of Brokers, a continuous market developed partly in the street and partly in a basement room called the "Coal Hole" and flourished during the day, while in the evening it was continued in the lobby of the Fifth Avenue Hotel. This market did more business than was done upon the Exchange itself, and a few years after the War, many of its members, who had organized into the "Open Board of Brokers," were admitted to the Stock Exchange in a body. The suspension of business in 1873 was too brief to allow of the formation of a market such as the above, but, while it continued, cash transactions for securities were being carried on every day in the financial district. Would results such as these obtain on this occasion? Much depended upon the length of time before the Exchange could re-open, but this in itself was a problem for which no one could venture a solution. Again, a vast volume of contracts made on July 30th had been suspended. How long could the enforcement of these contracts be successfully prohibited, and above all how long would the banks and financial institutions which were lending money on Stock Exchange collateral refrain from calling loans when they were deprived of any measure of the value of their security? Over its own members the New York Stock Exchange might exercise a rigid control, and it could safely be assumed that the other Stock Exchanges of the country would coöperate with it, but numberless outside agencies existed such as independent dealers unaffiliated with exchanges, and auctioneers, any of whom might establish a market. If declining prices were made through media of this description, and the press felt called upon to furnish them to the public, the closing of the Exchange might not suffice to prevent panic and disaster. Oppressed by these considerations, and by an appalling sense of responsibility, the new Committee of Five began its labors in the morning of July 31st. The first step decided upon was to communicate with the Bank Clearing House Committee. Mr. Francis L. Hine, President of the Clearing House, was invited to meet the Committee of Five which he did, a little later in the day, and presented to them the following statement of the action taken by the Clearing House. "There was a meeting of the Clearing House Committee this morning in view of the closing of the New York Stock Exchange. It was the opinion of the Committee that the business and financial condition of New York and the entire country was sound but that the situation in Europe justified extreme prudence and self-control on the part of the United States; that the closing of the Stock Exchange was a wise precaution by reason of the disposition of all Europe to make it the market for whatever it wished to sell, and that in this country there was no occasion for any serious interruption of the regular course of business, either financial or mercantile." After the retirement of Mr. Hine, the Chairman of the Committee on Clearing House of the Exchange stated that all the checks given to the Clearing House had been certified, and a notice was thereupon sent out instructing members to call for their drafts at the usual hour. Thus all the differences due on the day's transactions of July 30th were settled, and a first encouraging step was taken. It was also decided to permit the offering of call money on the floor of the Exchange. The Committee held its second meeting on August 1st and the first of the long series of problems growing out of the closing of the market was at once presented to it. A letter from a brokerage house doing business with Europe was received in which it was pointed out that "arbitrageurs" who had sold stocks in New York and bought them in London during the previous fortnight had made their deliveries by borrowing stock in New York; that the stock purchased in London was due to arrive on this side, and that the usual process of financing it by returning the previously borrowed stock had been cut off through the suspension of unfulfilled contracts. This was likely to lead to very grave embarrassment because call money had practically disappeared and houses to whom this foreign stock was consigned might not be able to meet their obligation to pay for it as it arrived. There being no arrivals of foreign stock expected that day, the Committee deferred action, and thus gained time to think out ways and means of meeting the difficulty. The second problem presented came in the form of a request for permission to sell securities outside of the Exchange. The firm of S. H. P. Pell & Co. had suspended, and a house which had been lending them money wished to be authorized to sell out the collateral. This was the first of many cases brought before the Committee, during its long tenure of office, in which individuals sought for a special privilege to sell securities they were anxious to market while trading in general was forbidden. In this case the applicants were referred to that section of the Constitution of the Exchange in which it is provided that members having contracts with insolvents shall close out these contracts in the Exchange when the securities involved are listed. The Exchange being closed, this provision answered the question without necessitating any independent action on the part of the Committee. From the moment of the closing of the Exchange a growing pressure arose to determine just when and how it should be re-opened. The desire for information on this point was widespread, and when the gravity of the situation became clearer to the community, a great anxiety developed that the re-opening should, above all, not be premature. Realizing that the fear of sudden and ill considered action on this question was becoming dangerous to the restoration of confidence, the Committee of Five, at its meeting of August 3rd authorized the following statement. "Announcement is made by the President of the Stock Exchange, in answer to inquiries as to when the Exchange will open, that ample notice of such opening will be given." In spite of this notice fear that the Stock Exchange might act injudiciously lingered for some time longer until the constant reiteration by its officers of their intention to act only in conjunction and in consultation with the banks permanently [Pg 19] [Pg 20] [Pg 21] [Pg 22] allayed it. By Monday, August 3rd, a steady stream of letters had begun to pour in upon the Committee asking advice and direction upon any number of questions raised by the closing of the market, and offering every kind of suggestion and advice. In addition to this it soon became evident that interviews would have to be held with large numbers of people for the purpose of securing their cooperation, influencing their conduct, and obtaining information. The resolution of the Governing Committee by virtue of which the Committee of Five was brought into being merely stated that questions such as these should be considered and reported back "at the earliest possible moment." Clearly here was an impossible situation. The immense detail of the work which was beginning to unfold itself could never be handled by so large a body as the Governing Committee itself. Realizing that this difficulty must be met without a moment's delay the Committee of Five requested the calling of a special meeting of the Governors for twelve o'clock the same day and presented to them the following resolution, which was unanimously adopted. "Resolved: That the Special Committee of Five, appointed by the Governing Committee on July 31st, be, and it hereby is, authorized during the present closing of the Exchange, to decide all questions relating to the business of the Exchange and its members." This action of the Governing Committee, while it was rendered necessary by the peculiar requirements of the situation, was unprecedented in the history of the Exchange, for never before had such powers and such responsibilities been put in the hands of so few individuals. It was one of a series of "war measures" by means of which ends were achieved that would not have been reached in any other way. Clothed with complete authority the Committee met again in the afternoon of August 3rd and was at once confronted with a request for a ruling on the question of how far members were to be restrained from dealing outside of the Exchange. After a lengthy discussion the following was approved as their opinion. "It was the intention in closing the Stock Exchange that trading should be stopped and it is the duty of loyal members to comply. If cases come into your office where it is absolutely necessary to trade, do so as quietly as possible and prevent the quotation from being published." It will be noticed that the policy adopted here was less stringent than what came later when the growth of an outside market increased the dangers of the situation. With the question of outside dealings there at once arose the closely connected question of the danger arising from having price quotations of such dealings made public. The quotation machinery of the Exchanges had been silenced by the closing of those institutions, but there remained the public auctioneers whose sales, if they took place, would be disseminated by the press and might spread panic among security holders and money lenders. The auctioneers in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, and Chicago were at once approached, not only directly but through their bankers and other advisers. It was a disagreeable task as these auctioneers had to be urged to cease doing business, but it was rendered unexpectedly easy by the courtesy and friendliness with which they coöperated for the general welfare. So loyal were these various agencies that not a single sale, either of listed or unlisted securities, occurred in any auction room of the country until the urgent phases of the crisis had passed. It was not in auction rooms alone, however, that prices might be made; dealings were liable to occur in any unexpected locality, and it was urgent that prices of an alarming character should be kept from the public. For this most important purpose the coöperation of the press was absolutely necessary. To obtain this, at the outset, was no easy matter. The closing of the Stock Exchange placed the financial news writers of the daily press in a curious position. With them were allied that group of financial writers connected with the various Wall Street news agencies, the several financial journals that are exclusively devoted to Wall Street affairs, and the financial correspondents of out of town newspapers. All told there were about one hundred salaried men in these various groups, men experienced in financial affairs, widely known and respected, engaged in a work which had never been interrupted and which, as far as could be foreseen, promised to furnish them with a continuous vocation. The first effect of the war was a general curtailment of newspaper advertising, a rise in the price of paper, and a greatly increased cost of the news of the day owing to excessive cable charges for foreign dispatches. Thus the newspapers suffered a rapidly diminishing revenue, and they found it necessary to discharge many of their employees and to reduce the salaries of others. With the Stock Exchange closed, naturally the salaried financial writers were among the first to feel this hardship. Those whose services were retained throughout this crisis were confronted with divided responsibilities. It was their duty to interpret a mass of more or less fantastic rumors at a time when nerves were overwrought and points of view magnified and distorted. They wished to prevent the publication of anything of an incendiary nature, while at the same time a necessity arose for presenting to the public the news to which it was entitled. Placed in such a position there was a very natural impatience here and there to have the Exchange reopened, while now and then a tendency became manifested to publish certain news of the day which, while interesting to the public, tended to handicap the efforts of those bent only on reassurance and calm counsel. At times it became somewhat difficult to prevent the publication of [Pg 23] [Pg 24] [Pg 25] [Pg 26] some of these matters, particularly of the prices made in the so called "gutter" market which sprang up in New Street. And yet on the whole nothing could have exceeded the fairness and the spirit of coöperation of these gentlemen in this trying time. One newspaper even went so far as to cease the publication of a remunerative page of small advertisements having to do with dealings in outside securities. This was done at the request of the Committee without hesitation. Others coöperated in the suppression of advertising on the part of questionable people, while correspondents of out of town newspapers, both foreign and domestic, cheerfully acceded to requests to suppress all disturbing financial reports. In a word, the financial department of the whole newspaper press accepted the situation philosophically, bearing their losses without complaint and supporting without cavil the restrictive measures which it was necessary to employ. This loyal conduct of the press and of the auctioneers was one of the great factors without which the critical days of the suspension of business could not have been successfully surmounted. It will be remembered that in the morning of July 31st, the Governing Committee not only voted to close the Exchange but also declared that the delivery of securities should be suspended until further notice. The motive of this latter action was to prevent the possible insolvencies that were likely to be forced if purchasers were compelled to pay for their securities in the absence of a call money market. At the earliest moment that attention could be given to it the Committee of Five requested the Chairman of the Stock Exchange Clearing House to place before it the exact figures of the outstanding contracts. These figures when presented showed that there were stock balances open on Clearing House order amounting to $38,700,000 and Ex-Clearing House contracts amounting to about $61,000,000. Roughly speaking there had been about $100,000,000 of stock sold in the Exchange on July 30th, the delivery of which to the purchasers had been suspended by the action of the Governing Committee. Obviously a first great step toward clearing up the situation and preparing the ground for the ultimate reopening of the market was to get this great volume of contracts settled, so that if any failures were inevitable they would be disposed of beforehand. It being probable that many of the purchasers of stock on July 30th were in a position to finance their purchases even in the midst of the crisis the Committee deemed it wise to offer every possible facility for the immediate settlement of contracts when the purchaser was in this position. They therefore issued the following notice on August 4th: "The Special Committee of Five appointed to consider questions connected with the closing of the Exchange state that the resolution of the Governing Committee suspending deliveries until further notice does not mean that settlement may not be made by mutual consent wherever feasible. The Clearing House of the Exchange is prepared to advise and assist, and inquiries should be made in person there." At the request of the Committee of Five the Committee on Clearing House at once undertook the task of assisting members of the Exchange in closing up these contracts and used its clerical force for that purpose, thus involving much careful and detailed work. They held daily continuous meetings, giving their personal attention in assisting members, and using a care that involved both tact and arduous labor. Through their efforts such extraordinary progress was made, in this complex and difficult task, that by September 22nd announcement was made that the delivery of all Clearing House balances had been completed with the exception of those of the few firms whose affairs were in the hands of receivers. These were settled shortly afterwards and at the same time the great volume of Ex-Clearing House contracts were also completely fulfilled. This is one of the most extraordinary and gratifying experiences of the great crisis. In about seven weeks, at a time when money was unobtainable and the condition of panic was at its height, this huge volume of unsettled contracts was met and consummated by voluntary coöperation and without compulsion of any kind. In some few cases selfishness or indifference delayed action on the part of individuals, but these were all brought to a final adjustment by the influence and persuasion of the Committee. This achievement not only reflects undying credit upon the members of the Exchange by showing both the sound condition of their business and their zeal to act for the general welfare, and creates a deep sense of obligation to the Clearing House Committee who for many long weeks worked unceasingly to overcome the difficulties that beset the path, but it justifies and confirms the wisdom of the New York Stock Exchange in adhering to the practice of daily settlements. In all the great European centers, where trading on the fortnightly settlement basis is in vogue, the restoration of dealings was terribly complicated by the herculean task of clearing up back contracts that extended over many days. In New York, when conditions so shaped themselves as to warrant reopening the Exchange, the back contracts of its members had all been settled up two months before. Had our system, like the European, involved "trading for the account," every additional day of back contracts added to the $100,000,000 worth of July 30th would have stood in the way of a final settlement, and the reopening of the market (which was long postponed as it was) would have been much further delayed. On August 4th, a problem which had loomed upon the horizon the day after the closing of the Exchange, was brought squarely before the Committee. A delegation of houses dealing in securities for European account appeared and stated [Pg 27] [Pg 28] [Pg 29] that approximately $40,000,000 to $50,000,000 of securities were to arrive "this week, beginning to-morrow, Wednesday," and that they would be accompanied by sight drafts which would have to be financed. This alleged great volume of securities had been sold in this market for foreign account and borrowed in New York in order to make the immediate deliveries that our day to day system requires. The suspension of the fulfillment of contracts declared by the Exchange made it impossible to return this borrowed stock, and the houses doing this business were therefore obliged either to allow the drafts to go to protest or finance the incoming stock until the free enforcement of contracts was again permitted. With money practically unobtainable, and general panic prevailing, it is needless to say that these statements of the delegation of houses doing foreign business were a severe shock to the Committee of Five. A remedy proposed by one or two of these banking houses was that the people from whom they were borrowing stock should be required to take it back. This simple expedient, while eminently satisfactory from the standpoint of the borrower of stock, was not very helpful to the Committee, as it would merely have shifted the problem of financing the stock from one set of brokers to another, and would have raised the dangerous question of a general enforcement of contracts in borrowed securities. It was an interesting illustration, among some others to be subsequently experienced, of the manner in which certain minds can become entirely absorbed in that aspect of a question which deals solely with personal interest. After careful discussion it was determined that the coöperation of the Clearing House banks should be sought in solving the difficulty. The Committee of Five thereupon sent a communication to the Bank Clearing House committee setting forth all the circumstances connected with the expected consignment of securities as stated by the delegation of banking houses and requested an appointment to m...