THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION In matters of rights, constitutions tend to avoid settling controversies. With few exceptions, rights are formulated in open-ended language, seeking consensus on an abstraction without purporting to resolve the manymoral–politicalquestionsimplicatedbyrights.Theresultingview hasbeenthatrightsextendeverywherebutareeverywhereinfringedby legislationseekingtoresolvetheverymoral–politicalquestionsthecon- stitutionseekstoavoid. TheNegotiableConstitutionchallengesthisview.Arguingthatunder- specified rights call for greater specification, Grégoire C.N. Webber drawsonlimitationclausescommontomostbillsofrightstodevelopa newunderstandingoftherelationshipbetweenrightsandlegislation.The legislatureissituatedasakeyconstitutionalactortaskedwithcompleting the specification of constitutional rights. In turn, because the constitu- tional project is incomplete with regards to rights, it is open to being re-negotiated by legislation struggling with the very moral–political questionsleftunderdeterminedattheconstitutionallevel. grÉgoire c.n. webber isLecturerinLawattheLondonSchoolof EconomicsandPoliticalScience.Previously,heservedaslawclerktothe HonourableJusticeIanBinnieofthe SupremeCourtofCanadaandas seniorpolicyadvisorwiththePrivyCouncilOfficeinCanada. THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION On the Limitation of Rights GRÉGOIRE C. N. WEBBER CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge,NewYork,Melbourne,Madrid,CapeTown,Singapore, SãoPaulo,Delhi,Dubai,Tokyo CambridgeUniversityPress TheEdinburghBuilding,CambridgeCB28RU,UK PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyCambridgeUniversityPress,NewYork www.cambridge.org Informationonthistitle:www.cambridge.org/9780521111232 ©GrégoireWebber2009 Thispublicationisincopyright.Subjecttostatutoryexception andtotheprovisionsofrelevantcollectivelicensingagreements, noreproductionofanypartmaytakeplacewithoutthewritten permissionofCambridgeUniversityPress. Firstpublished2009 PrintedintheUnitedKingdomattheUniversityPress,Cambridge AcataloguerecordforthispublicationisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary ISBN978-0-521-11123-2Hardback CambridgeUniversityPresshasnoresponsibilityforthepersistenceor accuracyofURLsforexternalorthird-partyInternetwebsitesreferredto inthispublication,anddoesnotguaranteethatanycontentonsuch websitesis,orwillremain,accurateorappropriate. CONTENTS Prefaceandacknowledgements pagevii Introduction:onthelimitationofrights 1 1 Theconstitutionasactivity 13 2 Thereceivedapproachtothelimitationofrights 55 3 Challengingtheageofbalancing 87 4 Constitutingrightsbylimitation 116 5 Thedemocraticactivityoflimitingrights 147 6 Justifyingrightsinafreeanddemocraticsociety 181 Conclusion 213 Bibliography 218 Index 226 v PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This book explores the limitation of constitutional rights. In matters of rights, constitutions proceed largely in abstractions, seeking agreement on grand formulations that abstract away from the controversies of specific rights-claims. Yet, until they undergo a process of limitation, constitutionalrightslackjustificationandsenseasclaims.Thelimitation clauses of most domestic and international charters of rights make explicittheprocessoflimitationnecessaryfortranslatingunderdetermi- nateconstitutionalrightsintodeterminaterightssuitableforapplication. The argument defended in this book is that the limitation of constitu- tional rights remains open to re-negotiating by the legislature. It is argued that constitutions for the most part leave the difficult, contested andcontingentprocessoflimitationunresolvedwithintheconstitution itselfandinstead,throughalimitationclause,authorizethelegislatureto complete the limitation of constitutional rights. In this way, the consti- tution,andespeciallythelimitationofconstitutionalrights,isconceived of as an activity. Because the limitation of constitutional rights is pro- vided by legislation, re-negotiating is always available and may proceed through regular democratic channels. In this way, the constitution, far frombeingabstractedfromdemocraticactivity,isforevernegotiableby thatveryactivity. Iamgratefultomanypeoplewhohavecontributed,invariousways,to thedevelopmentofthisbook.Someofthechaptersarerevisedfrommy doctoral dissertation, others are new. But the general orientation of the argument was developed during my time at the University of Oxford. I beginbythankingmydoctoralsupervisor,JohnFinnis,forhisinvaluable support. He has helped me struggle, far better than I could have done alone, with the ideas explored in this book. I also owe special thanks to Chris McCrudden and my two examiners, Richard Bellamy and Leslie Green,whoencouragedmetopursuemyprojectandwhochallengedme on some of its core premises. I gratefully acknowledge the support offered by the doctoral scholarship I received from the Pierre Elliott vii viii preface and acknowledgements TrudeauFoundation, the researchscholarshipfromthe Government of Quebec’sFondsquébécoisdelarecherchesurlasociétéetlaculture,and theORSScholarshipfromtheBritishGovernment. In the course of this project, I have incurred many debts. Many have read drafts (sometimes multiple drafts) of chapters; others provided excellentchallengesindiscussions.Iwishtothank,amongmanyothers, Larry Alexander, Robert Alexy, Jim Allan, Mark Antaki, Nick Barber, David Beatty, David Bilchitz, François Chevrette, Hugo Cyr, David Dyzenhaus, Richard Ekins, John Gardner, Kate Hofmeyr, Grant Huscroft, Vicki Jackson, Jeff King, Matthias Klatt, Hoi Kong, Mattias Kumm, Roderick Macdonald, Margaret Martin, Bradley Miller, Kai Möller, Denise Réaume, Owen Rees, Graham Reynolds, Steve D Smith, Luc B Tremblay, Jim Tully, Jeremy Webber, Daniel Weinstock, Alison Young, Paul Yowell and Jan van Zyl Smit. I also benefited from the opportunitytopresentnumerouschaptersatvariousdiscussiongroups, conferences and workshops and thank all those who participated. I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers contacted by Cambridge University Press for offering excellent comments and suggestions. Finally, I thank Finola O’Sullivan and Richard Woodham at the Press, togetherwiththeirteam,fortheirprofessionalismthroughout. Two special debts are owed. One to Graham Gee for challenging, clarifying, correcting and strengthening the argument at many stages. TheothertoStéphanieVigformakingthisprojectmoreexcitingbecause Icouldshareitwithher. Introduction: on the limitation of rights What is the relationship between freedom of expression and libel, por- nography and political speech? Between the right to life and abortion, euthanasia and assisted suicide? Between the freedoms of religion and conscience and State-funding for religious schools, an official State church, and conscientious objections to military service? With few exceptions,international,constitutionalandlegislativechartersofrights leavetherelationshipbetweenrightsandthese(andother)moral–political questionsopenandunresolved.Itisindeedafeatureofchartersofrights that they proceed largely in abstractions, seeking agreement on grand formulationsinawaythatavoidsthegreatdebates(anddisagreements) animatingrights.Constitutionalrightsareforthemostpartproposedand adopted without being wholly worked out and with their scope and contentstilltobedetermined.Theyare,perhaps,examplesofincompletely theorized agreements on a general principle despite the absence of furtheragreementonthemorespecificmoral–politicalquestions.1 Constitutionalrightsareformulatedinawaythatfinessesreasonable disagreementaboutwhatshouldbewithinthescopeandcontentofthe right.Inthisway,thosewhodisagree,forexample,onthepermissibility of libel and pornography, abortion and euthanasia, State-funded relig- ious schools and conscientious objections can nevertheless agree on freedom of expression, the right to life, and the freedoms of religion and conscience. Through these underdeterminate formulations, consti- tutionalrights can betakento represent afree and democratic society’s commitment to rights all the while concealing the extent of reasonable disagreement about how to specify these rights in relation to the great moral–politicaldebatesaliveinthecommunity. With the notable exception of the US Bill of Rights, most domestic and international charters of rights mediate (without resolving) the 1 This is one of three genres of incomplete theorized agreements developed by Cass R. Sunsteinin‘IncompletelyTheorizedAgreements’(1995)108HarvardLawReview1733 andLegalReasoningandPoliticalConflict(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,1996). 1