THE NATURAL WORLD AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy Founding Editor †James M. Edie General Editor Anthony J. Steinbock Associate Editor John McCumber T H E N A T U R A L W O R L D A S A P H I L O S O P H I C A L P R O B L E M Jan Patocˇka Edited by Ivan Chvatík and L’ubica Ucˇník Translated by Erika Abrams Foreword by Ludwig Landgrebe Afterword by the Author Northwestern University Press Evanston, Illinois Northwestern University Press www.nupress.northwestern.edu Copyright 2016 by Jan Patočka Archives, Prague. English translation copyright 2016 by Erika Abrams. Published 2016 by Northwestern University Press. First published in Czech as Přirozený svět jako filosofický problém (1936) and “Přirozený svět” v meditaci svého autora po třiatřiceti letech (1970). Foreword by Ludwig Land- grebe previously published as the Einleitung to Die natürliche Welt als philoso- phisches Problem (1990). Author’s afterword first published as the postface to Le Monde naturel comme problème philosophique (1976). All rights reserved. Translated with the support of the Australian Research Council (ARC), within the framework of the 2010–12 research project Judgment, Responsibility and the Life-World. Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data Names: Patočka, Jan, 1907–1977, author. | Chvatík, Ivan, editor. | Učník, Ľubica, editor. | Abrams, Erika, translator. | Landgrebe, Ludwig, 1902–1991, writer of foreword. Title: The natural world as a philosophical problem / Jan Patočka ; edited by Ivan Chvatík and Ľubica Učník ; translated by Erika Abrams ; foreword by Ludwig Landgrebe ; afterword by the author. Other titles: Přirozený svět jako filosofický problém. English | Northwestern University studies in phenomenology & existential philosophy. Description: Evanston, Illinois : Northwestern University Press, 2016. | Series: Northwestern University studies in phenomenology and existential philosophy | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016021660 | ISBN 9780810133617 (pbk. : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780810133624 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN 9780810133631 (e-book) Subjects: LCSH: Cosmology. | Human beings. | Subjectivity. | Language and languages—Philosophy. Classification: LCC BD516 .P3713 2016 | DDC 113—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016021660 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48– 1992. Contents Foreword, by Ludwig Landgrebe ix Introduction 3 1 Stating the Problem 6 1. The Naive Life- World and the World of Science 7 2. The Impact of the Scientific Worldview on Our Life- Feeling 9 3. Attempt at a Historical Typology of Possible Solutions to the Problem. Berkeley, Reid, Jacobi, Goethe. Modern Positivism: Avenarius, Mach, Bertrand Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, Physicalism. 11 4. Anticipating Our Own Proposed Solution. The Transcendental Theory of Experience Is in a Position to Reconcile the Supposed Opposites. Subjectivism as against All Sorts of Objectivism. 19 2 The Question of the Essence of Subjectivity and Its Methodical Exploitation 23 1. Descartes’s Cogito Cogitans and Cogito Cogitatum 23 2. Kant’s I of Transcendental Apperception and Empirical I 24 3. Fichte’s Creative I and Finite I. Fichte’s Subjective Method Is Synthetic. 28 4. Absolute Subjectivity and the Dialectical Method. Is the Essence of Subjectivity Identical with the I? Schelling. 31 5. Schelling’s and Hegel’s “Absolute Skepticism.” The Realization of This Idea in the Phenomenological Epoche¯ and Reduction. 34 6. The Method of Phenomenology Is Analytic and Descriptive. Reduction Is Not a Method for Acquiring Eidetic Cognitions. The Method of Guiding Clues. Constitution and Its Problems. Eidetic Intuition. 41 7. The Objection of Solipsism. Transcendental Intersubjectivity as the Presently Attained Stage of the Subjective Reduction. 48 3 The Natural World 52 1. Description of the Situation of Man in the World. The Form of Being- in- the- World. Home and Alien. The Temporal Dimension of the World. The Subjective and Mood Dimensions of the World. 53 2. Reference to the Historical Development of the Problem. Kant, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Dilthey, Simmel, Husserl, Heidegger, etc. 60 3. The Subjective Attitude. The Concepts of Act- and Horizon- Intentionality. 63 4. The Concept of Horizon Already Anticipated prior to Husserl: Kant, Droysen 66 5. Attempt at a Constitutive Sketch of the Genesis of the Naive World. Time as the Constitutive Basis. Original Time, Distinct from World-T ime, Is Retention and Creation. The Process of Constitution Is Punctuated by the Process of the Objectification of Time. Progression: Qualitativeness, Space, Thing. 67 6. The Fundamental Tendencies Guiding the Articulation of Experience Are the Dispositional and the Communicative Tendency 78 4 A Sketch of a Philosophy of Language and Speech 85 1. Description of Language Comprehension, Disposing of Language (Speech), and the Phenomenon of Language Itself 86 2. An Attempted Ideal Genesis of Language. Language Possible Only by Virtue of the Fact That Man Lives as a Free I. 93 3. Passive Experience and Its Mastering by Thought through Language 98 4. The Sensible Aspect of Language 101 5. Language as Objective Meaning: The Thought- Schema and Its Mirroring in Language 105 5 Conclusion 112 Proper Theory Becomes Possible Only on the Basis of Language. Outlook on the Genesis of Theory and, in specie, of Modern Science Supplement to the Second Czech Edition (1970): “The Natural World” Remeditated Thirty- Three Years Later 115 Afterword to the First French Translation (1976) 181 Translator’s Note 191 Notes 195 Index 217 Foreword Ludwig Landgrebe To write on Jan Patočka’s philosophy, for someone who was linked with him in close friendship for over forty years, can mean only to speak of him also as a person and of the world in which he lived and through which his way of understanding his task took shape. For such reminiscences, one can hardly avoid using the first person. My knowledge of his philo- sophical ideas and their deep- rooted impulses comes indeed not so much from what was published in German during his lifetime as rather from our debates— which took place for nights on end in my Prague years between 1933 and 1939— and from our correspondence, which reached its highest pitch in the 1970s. Having been barred by Hitler from Ger- man universities, I experienced my Prague years as a kind of exile, and during this time Patočka was not only the only discussion partner with whom, given our common philosophical background, I found myself in unique agreement, but also my indefatigable helper in all the difficulties and hardships I encountered. I cannot imagine how I could have with- stood these years without him. From the very beginning— in the fall of 1933, he had just returned from his scholarship time in Freiburg with Ed- mund Husserl— our conversations were never purely philosophical. Talk of personal life, family, comments on the alarming political situation in Europe, common concern for the future of Germany, also a concern of his— all this was always closely connected as backdrop to the question of the specific task of philosophy. This was to remain so in our subsequent correspondence.1 For me, the development of Patočka’s philosophy is inseparably linked with the history of a friendship. It would be impos- sible to say on any given point which of the two of us was on the giving or receiving end— though he, in his immense humility, would not have agreed with that. It is almost symbolic that he lived next door to the battlefield of the White Mountain, where the destiny of his native Bohemia was decided upon for nearly three hundred years. In Prague’s magnificent yet disqui- eting Old Town below, as well as in the Castle above, nearly every stone bears witness to this tragic history. A history still so much alive among the population that even today’s2 rulers are obliged to take care to p reserve ix