Editor’s Introduction Modernising military capabilities; familiar security challenges A surge in high-profle terrorist atacks at the end of 2015 Nonetheless, it was noteworthy that the UN Security added to the increasing crises, conficts and sense of uncer- Council in November 2015 adopted Resolution 2249, which tainty preoccupying the planning stafs of defence minis- said that ISIS constituted an ‘unprecedented’ threat to inter- tries worldwide. national peace and security, and that UN member states Major atacks by Islamist terrorists took place in France with the capacity should ‘take “all necessary measures” to and Mali, and in the air above the Sinai Peninsula, adding to prevent and suppress its terrorist acts on territory under its earlier incidents in Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, Afghanistan control in Syria and Iraq’. But it was still difcult to see what and many other locations. Grinding confict and relentless this might mean in practical terms. So, too, it was difcult to instability continued in Syria, Libya, Yemen and the Sahel, see what might result from the activation of the EU’s mutual not just acting as a recruiting tool for terrorist groups, but assistance clause, Article 42.7, after a request from France. also feeding into a narrative used in their sophisticated Undoubtedly, the November atacks placed further stress information operations. These groups were – together with on French armed forces that had experienced another year other non-state groups – both driving these conficts and of continual missions, but the EU’s act was frstly political, deriving energy from them. At the same time, this increas- with France subsequently entering into discussion about ingly diverse range of actors was making confict resolution what assistance might be required to ensure the decision did even harder. not remain symbolic. Heightened instability and savage violence added to This raised a broader issue, over the partnerships that the factors propelling populations to leave. For instance, it might be required to tackle security crises. Were formal alli- was apparent that in 2015 a large part of Syria’s middle class ances the best course? What degree of bureaucratic decision- had had enough of war. Events also indicated that terrorist making process was tolerable? For instance, NATO’s VJTF groups, perhaps unsurprisingly, took advantage of this vast is intended to create a high-readiness spearhead forma- population movement. In late year this caused pause for tion as part of the Alliance’s Readiness Action Plan (RAP), thought in the West, notably in Europe where some coun- but deployment still requires approval through the North tries had opened their doors to refugees. Europe’s periphery Atlantic Council. Indeed, for some of the security threats had been in turmoil for years; in 2015, Europe’s ability to worrying NATO’s East European members, what is perhaps secure its borders came under increased scrutiny. just as important is an improved partnership and beter Meanwhile, the continued murder of innocents by the cooperation between NATO and the EU. For many of the nihilistic adherents of ISIS in Syria and Iraq – together with issues that preoccupy NATO’s East – such as hybrid threats other groups for whom ISIS became the latest franchise of from Russia – the EU possesses many of the capabilities that choice – reinforced the reality that combating terrorism was NATO does not, including a wide range of development, a global, not just a regional, issue. security and justice tools. These include the ability to broadly But without greater cooperation, and agreement on assess Europe’s vulnerabilities, and to produce a ‘risk some form of strategy for combating ISIS and addressing register’ of areas including critical national infrastructure to broader instability and state failure, it was unlikely that the help indicate when hybrid actions might be under way. group would be dismantled any time soon. Russia deployed However, in Europe, there was an uncomfortable reality combat airpower to Syria in late 2015. Its aircraft might that, while the threats and risks to European security had indeed have hit ISIS targets but Moscow’s main objective increased, the fnancial and material means to address was actually to bolster the Assad administration and help them had not. Indeed, while a pledge was made at the 2014 defeat the other rebel groups there. It is likely that to defeat Wales Summit for defence spending to meet a 2% of GDP the group militarily in Iraq and Syria, ground forces will be target within a decade, the facts starkly illustrated the chal- required at some point. lenge ahead. At end-2015, four NATO European states met But in any case ISIS, and the groups around the world this fgure, and for the rest, a combined increase of around that have pledged allegiance to it, cannot be eradicated US$100bn would be needed to meet that target in 2015. solely by military means. Tackling these groups will require Meanwhile, without the boost to readiness to which the multinational atention and the concerted and long-term 2% pledge, and the RAP, might lead, other questions arose application of policies and tools blending political, mili- including how, then, to efectively deter further Russian tary, security, information and development capacities, and revanchism. Looking towards the 2016 Warsaw Summit, agreement on ends as well as means: the track record on boosting collective self-defence might remain an aspiration such cooperation is mixed at best. for NATO, though achieving it remains a signifcant task. 6 THE MILIA R TY B A L A N CE 2016 But diferent models of coalitions and partnerships have, build Russia’s Su-27 and, a few years later, J-11 aircraft of course, been well tested. Indeed, in the Middle East, states emerged that closely resembled the Su-27. Whether the there had also formed another coalition, this time to tackle Russians have managed to protect certain components of the Houthi rebellion in Yemen. Led by Saudi Arabia, this the Su-35 is unclear, as is whether they have instead decided coalition broadly consisted of GCC states, although other that the sale is more important than the technology at a nations were involved. In that region, a confuence of crises time when Russia is investing in ffth-generation platforms meant that there were greater imperatives than before for such as that envisaged to meet the PAK-FA combat-aircraft practical cooperation among regional states. Facing a near- requirement. victory by Houthi forces in Yemen in March 2015, these Nonetheless, in a year when China’s armed forces countries decided to take action themselves. There was a displayed yet more advanced military hardware at the growing maturity about these military operations, as well September Victory Day parade, the Su-35 announcement will as a more overt acknowledgement of the risks inherent in only heighten anxiety among certain regional states. China’s them. For states that increasingly see the armed forces as a 2015 White Paper exemplifed Beijing’s growing emphasis tool to be used in support of national-security objectives, the on the space and cyber domains, but also the maritime lessons identifed from deployments – and ensuring that the arena. In Asia, tensions escalated during 2015 over China’s armed forces learn from them – will be valuable. accelerating construction activities on features it occupied in Middle Eastern armed forces displayed growing mili- the South China Sea. There was an evident military aspect to tary activism during the Yemen operation, and although these activities. Regional states concerned by this, and which a range of precision munitions formed part of regional air had the means, were looking to bolster their capabilities. The forces’ load-outs, there was sustained criticism over aerial US was doing the same. Washington in 2015 made a point of targeting, which observers atributed to, among other saying that its ‘rebalance’ was continuing and that it would things, a dearth of joint terminal atack controllers. Saudi deploy its fnest maritime capabilities forward in the Asia- Patriot missiles destroyed incoming Scuds fred from Yemen Pacifc, but China’s accelerating capability developments, and there was a signifcant deployment of combat aircraft including anti-access capabilities, would be likely to compli- and land forces. However, Iran remained a principal threat cate Washington’s plans for regional contingencies. driver for regional states and while there was cooperation Aware that its technological edge was being eroded during the campaign in Yemen, developing this within by the increasing difusion of advanced capabilities, the GCC for other concerns, such as coordinating missile- Washington looked to innovate and generate a new edge. As defence assets to counter Iran’s ballistic-missile arsenal, part of the ‘Third Ofset’, the Pentagon created the Defense remained a slower process. Information Unit–Experimental, to help it leverage best Further north, Russia’s armed forces were also utilising lessons from Silicon Valley on issues like big data, analytics, advanced weaponry in Moscow’s new Syria campaign. autonomy and robotics. Innovative technological develop- Russia had earlier displayed its modernising armed forces ments in the 1970s were, the Pentagon said, more often than during Moscow’s May Victory Day parade. Kh-555 and not driven by government programmes; much innovation Kh-101 cruise missiles were among the munitions launched was now being driven by business, and many dual-use at anti-Assad and ISIS forces by Tu-95MS and Tu-160 stra- capabilities had their origins in the commercial sector. tegic bombers in November, while Russian naval vessels in But these technologies are not being pursued solely with the Caspian Sea launched 3M14 Kalibr NK cruise missiles. a view to peer competition; rather, they are seen as having Other aircraft fying from Russian bases, including Tu-22s, utility across the full spectrum of confict, able as much to as well as Russia’s forward-deployed air power, used a leverage big-data analytics to trawl social-media posts by a mix of dumb bombs and GPS-guided weapons. The whole terrorist group, as to generate more efective and devolved operation would, in time, allow analysts an insight into ISR coverage, or produce systems to beter enable concepts the performance of Russia’s air force similar to that for its like prompt global strike. In all this, though, there are ground forces after operations in Ukraine; its risks were laid continuities. Interoperability will always be central within bare by the downing of an Su-24 in November. However, forces and between allies, and while advanced capabili- much of Russia’s display of military prowess seemed aimed ties might create military efect, they cannot by themselves not only at degrading the capability of Assad’s enemies, secure territory and populations. Doing this requires similar but also at messaging the West and potential customers investments in security as a whole as well as beter policy of Russia’s high-tech military products, evidenced by the development and improved planning and coordination quality of the broadcast footage and the similarity of some within and between nations. It also needs sustained invest- night-time launch shots to those of US Tomahawk cruise- ment in combat training coupled with more specialist skills missile launches. Indeed, Russia’s defence exports notched across government and the civil sector enabling personnel up a signifcant success in November, with the contract to burnish profciencies in languages, regional and cultural inked to sell Su-35 combat aircraft to China. specialisms and intelligence analysis. The goal is for poli- This would constitute yet another capability enhance- cymakers to receive the best possible military and security ment for China’s air force, which displays its domestic ffth- advice for each contingency, to complement and inform any generation combat-aircraft aspirations in the J-20 and ‘J-31’ possible use they might consider making of the increasingly programmes. Twenty years ago, China agreed to licence- capable toolkit that will be at their disposal. Chapter One Armoured fghting vehicles: renewed relevance; technological progress The year 2015 saw the hundredth anniversary of the nology armoured forces could comprehensively over- frst prototype tank, a vehicle originally designed match less modern armoured forces. However, initial to provide infantry with fre support and to breach operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were followed by barbed wire and cross trenches. In 1918, two years long-running and complex insurgencies and subse- after British tanks frst appeared on the batlefeld, quent counter-insurgency campaigns where inter- the United Kingdom was developing armoured national forces at frst struggled to adapt. Indeed, personnel carriers (APCs) to transport accompanying counter-insurgency activities in Iraq and Afghanistan infantry. Subsequent decades saw a steady growth often saw fghting as intense as that experienced in in the roles undertaken by armoured fghting vehi- the Second World War and the Korean War. Infantry cles (AFVs), as well as in the numbers felded, and was essential, as were the armoured infantry fghting they dominated ground combat in some theatres of vehicles (AIFVs), APCs or Mine-Resistant Ambush- confict in the twentieth century. Protected (MRAP) vehicles in which troops travelled. There have been signifcant developments in the Along with tanks, they provided useful supporting capabilities and tactics deployed to defeat AFVs, but frepower. there have also been considerable advances in the The unanticipated scale and resulting casual- technical sophistication of the vehicles themselves, ties from the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as well as their frepower, protection and mobility. used by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan – when Indeed, though their continued utility has sometimes coupled with the unpopularity of the wars – meant been questioned, AFVs remain vital capabilities for that force protection became the top priority for the military forces, and in an increasingly complex and US and coalition armies (see The Military Balance contested security environment will continue to 2015, p. 19). This in turn led to the development and constitute one of the principal means of delivering felding of new equipment, including new heavy military efect on land. protected patrol vehicles – such as the US MRAP – and a wide variety of counter-IED materiel, including Armour since 9/11: threat and response specialist armoured vehicles, armoured excava- AFVs have played a signifcant role in military tors and, in the fnal stages of the NATO-led ISAF operations over the past decade, including in the mission in Afghanistan, full-sized remotely operated 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq, the 2006 war armoured vehicles. in Lebanon between Israel and Hizbullah, the 2008 Indeed, an action–reaction dynamic developed confict between Russia and Georgia, and the war between insurgents deploying greater frepower and in Afghanistan since 2001. They have also been more sophisticated IEDs, on the one hand, and design employed in such theatres as the 2013 French inter- and technological measures intended to beter protect vention in Mali, the repeated wars between Israel and AFVs, on the other. But these increasing require- Hamas, and wars in eastern Ukraine and Syria. AFVs ments for additional protection, electronic jammers, are also employed by many forces deployed on inter- remotely operated external weapons and air condi- national peacekeeping and peace-support missions, tioning meant that armoured vehicles got heavier. In mainly to improve protection. the US Army, for example: The First Gulf War in 1990–91, the initial stages of the US-led interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and • The M1 Abrams main batle tank (MBT) the 2011 international intervention in Libya, showed received upgraded belly armour, reactive the vulnerability of AFVs to an opponent with air tile armour, improved protection for the superiority and precision weapons. The opening driver’s seat and gunner’s hatch, and elec- stages of 2003’s Operation Iraqi Freedom showed that tronic countermeasures (ECM). As a conse- well-trained, modern and networked high-tech- quence, the vehicle’s weight increased from 8 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2016 62 tonnes to 71–76 tonnes, depending on the tion against mines and roadside bombs by variant. defecting the blast wave. • The weight of the Bradley AIFV increased Many of these enhancements are now being retro- from 25 tonnes to almost 41 tonnes. Despite fted to the entire Abrams, Bradley and Stryker feets improved suspension, this additional weight as part of extensive mid-life update programmes; it meant that ground clearance was reduced is envisaged that all three vehicles will provide the from 46cm to 28cm. core US AFV capability for the foreseeable future. The • Stryker wheeled APCs received additional US is also to replace the many 1960s-era M113 APCs armour and ECM, and many were upgraded still in service in support roles with a new Armoured so that the hull was altered to a ‘double-V’ Multi-Purpose Vehicle based on reworked Bradleys. confguration, designed to improve protec- Additionally, the ubiquitous un-armoured HMMWV noit om VFA naisuR asinred In 2015, midway through an ambitious rearmament T-15 heavy IFV programme, Russia unveiled prototypes of three new Armata also forms the basis for the T-15 heavy IFV, with armoured vehicle platforms: Armata, Kurganets-25 and the engine relocated to the front to provide troop- Bumerang. If accepted for serial production these could carrying capability and access at the rear. The T-15 is form the mainstay of Russian armoured forces in future Russia’s latest attempt to produce a heavy IFV, after the decades, replacing diverse Soviet-era legacy systems. lighter BMP-series IFVs were found lacking in both ar- Each platform provides the base for multiple variants mour and frepower during the conficts in Afghanistan which, while they share common components and sub- and Chechnya. Providing MBT-level protection comple- systems, will perform distinct roles in their respective mented by APS, the T-15 uses the Epoch Almaty remote weight and mobility classes. Some commonality also turret armed with a 30mm automatic cannon, 7.62mm exists across the three platforms’ weapon systems. For coaxial machine gun and four Kornet ATGM launchers. example, the observed Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) T-16 ARV variants of each carry the same Epoch Almaty remote The T-16, also known as BREM-T, is an Armoured Re- turret. This increased level of standardisation ofers covery Vehicle (ARV) based on the Armata platform. It benefts in terms of production, maintenance and op- features improved defensive armament over its prede- eration. cessors, mounting a 12.7mm remote weapons station. Armata 2S35 SPG There are reportedly a dozen variants of the heavy It is believed that the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV Self-Propelled tracked Armata platform under consideration or de- Gun will also be based on Armata, although the ob- velopment. Many will likely perform non-combat roles, served 152mm gun turret intended for the 2S35 has and only the following four variants have yet been ob- yet to be seen integrated with the Armata chassis. served: Kurganets2- 5 T-14 MBT The lighter tracked Kurganets-25 platform has been ob- On its entry into service, Armata in its principal T-14 served in both the APC and more heavily armed IFV vari- MBT variant will be the frst all-new Russian tank for ants, although others are expected. On service entry, it 40 years; hitherto, Moscow has relied primarily on up- will gradually replace the ageing BMP-series of vehicles graded T-72 variants. Its crewless turret is a revolution- and potentially other tracked series such as the MT-LB. ary development for an operational tank, potentially delivering better protection for a crew now situated Bumerang in a smaller compartment embedded within the front The 8x8 wheeled, amphibious Bumerang, projected as chassis. Not having a crew in the turret might also en- a BTR-80 series replacement, also appears initially in the able the placement of a larger-calibre gun, with re- APC and IFV roles, with the same weapons stations as the ports that the current 125mm smooth-bore main gun tracked Kurganets-25 system. In a signifcant departure could be later upgraded to 152mm. The prototypes from its predecessors, it has a front-mounted engine en- also integrate a hard-kill APS, designed to physically abling troop ingress at the rear of the vehicle. This is in con- intercept incoming projectiles such as ATGW and RPG trast to the more exposed, and often criticised, side access rounds. on the BTR-60/-70/-80 series. Armoured fghting vehicles 9 light utility vehicle, which initially received ad hoc from the outset with integral APS, as observed on its and later systematic armour retrofting in Iraq and Armata T-14 prototype displayed in 2015. Afghanistan, is to be replaced by the fully armoured Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. Contemporary feets A similar emphasis on AFV protection can be seen Developing new AFVs can be expensive and tech- in other NATO armies. The latest German Leopard 2A7 nologically demanding; after costly wars in Iraq and MBT incorporates similar upgrades to those planned Afghanistan and the 2008 global fnancial crisis, the for the M1 Abrams. Improved protection was fted to US and many NATO countries have cancelled or UK Warrior AIFVs employed in Afghanistan, which delayed new AFV types – including the US Future increased the vehicles’ base weight from 27 tonnes to Combat System and the UK Future Rapid Efects 40 tonnes by 2010. Furthermore, Warrior is to undergo System. Today, it remains difcult to get the require- a mid-life update (the Warrior Capability Sustainment ment right, and to develop an efective platform that Programme), which includes modular armour ofers both value for money and upgrade potential. allowing diferent confgurations for diferent threat In future, increasing complexity, as well as tactical environments, improved digitisation, a new turret and technical ambition, may make this task harder and the fting of the new CT40 weapon system. still. Other states with signifcant armoured feets are AFVs often now serve for much longer than was also adding more sophisticated protection. Israel, predicted when they entered service, and often in for instance, has long emphasised protection as a very diferent roles and theatres than at frst envis- primary requirement for its AFVs and has deployed aged – as shown in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. the Namer heavy APC with tank levels of protection This means that capability upgrades have increased based on the Merkava MBT chassis. Earlier, it felded in importance. Indeed, many countries are contin- the Achzarit heavy APC based on the T-55 hull, and uing to upgrade existing vehicles, even as they move the Nagmachon and Nakpadon based on the Centurion to procure replacements. The British Army, for Sho’t hull. example, is upgrading its Challenger 2 MBT feet and However, improved protection for AFVs now has contracted to purchase the new Ajax armoured takes many forms. While reactive armour has long reconnaissance vehicle. France, meanwhile, has intro- been employed to counter incoming projectiles, duced the VBCI wheeled AIFV and has an ambi- Israel has been among the states pioneering the use tious programme for new wheeled APCs and combat of active protection systems (APS). An APS can take reconnaissance vehicles. Germany is introducing the the form of ‘hard-kill’ or ‘soft-kill’ systems: the former Boxer wheeled APC and tracked Puma AIFV. Both consists of a device designed to physically intercept countries have agreed to jointly develop a new MBT an incoming projectile; the later involves the use of to replace the Leclerc and Leopard 2. Poland has ambi- systems like ECM or electro-optical interference to try tious plans for a wide range of new wheeled and to disrupt or degrade ofensive capabilities. tracked AFVs. The Israel Defense Forces have responded to While some of these programmes are driven by Hizbullah’s efective use of anti-armour weapons, feet requirements, others are motivated by geopo- and anti-armour threats faced in recent Gaza litical priorities. The Ukraine crisis has not only had campaigns, by fting the Trophy APS to its already an efect on European defence spending, it has also heavily armoured Merkava MkIV MBT (see The infuenced some European states’ armoured ambi- Military Balance 2015, p. 312). On operations, Trophy tions. Germany has bought back 100 Leopard 2 tanks has proved capable of destroying incoming rocket- from manufacturer KMW, Lithuania is reportedly propelled grenade (RPG) warheads and Kornet anti- interested in acquiring Boxer APCs and Latvia is tank guided weapons (ATGW). purchasing ex-British Army Scimitar and Spartan However, Israel is far from the frst nation to armoured reconnaissance vehicles. employ APS on armour. Russia was at the forefront of Armour is also a key area of capability develop- these developments in the 1970s, with its Drozd hard- ment in other parts of the world. Even with modest kill system reportedly tested on some tanks deployed additional AFV purchases and upgrades announced to Afghanistan, and later capabilities like the Arena in 2014–15, US and European AFV industries have hard-kill and Shtora soft-kill systems. Today, Russia considerable excess production capacity and have is believed to be the frst nation to design a vehicle been increasing eforts to export AFVs to Latin 10 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2016 America, the Middle East and Asia. These have met armoured forces. For example, successful felding of with some success, including the sale of US, French APS has the potential to change current armour/anti- and German AFVs to Egypt and Gulf states. However, armour dynamics, with systems such as the Israeli the export endeavours of Western AFV manufac- Trophy displaying the ability to engage incoming turers often have to compete with locally produced ATGW and unguided anti-armour weapons with systems as well as vigorous Russian and Chinese hard-kill capabilities. Current APS may be countered eforts to export their AFVs. by simultaneous volleys of ATGW or RPGs fred to Both Russian and Chinese AFVs are highly compet- overmatch defences, but the overall efectiveness itively priced. Although often less well protected than of these weapons will be considerably reduced by their Western counterparts, they have traditionally modern APS. been lighter, simpler and easier to use. This has made Current APS are unable to defeat high-velocity them very atractive globally. For example, the large anti-tank projectiles fred from guns – a situation Indian armoured forces are almost entirely equipped likely to continue for some time. Consequently, with Russian AFVs, while Pakistan makes great use armies that have to counter AFVs fted with APS will of Chinese systems. African armed forces also have fnd the guns on tanks and the cannons on AIFVs of signifcant amounts of Russian and Chinese armour. increasing importance. As such, there is a potential Many African armies consider AFVs heavier than 30 for an action–reaction dynamic emerging in AFV and tonnes unsuited for African roads and bridges, and anti-armour technology and tactics. their armoured forces’ missions might not require AFV feets in the US, NATO allies and Russia the levels of protection seen in Western systems. That greatly reduced in number after the Cold War. said, the fact that many of these systems are decades However, as long as NATO perceives Russia’s old also indicates that Cold War politics, as well as modernising AFV capability as a potential threat capability requirements, played some part in feet – whether or not in Russian service – Western AFV development. feets are unlikely to further reduce. This is particu- However, Russia is now displaying prototypes larly true of tank feets. In fact, the so-far relatively of a new range of AFVs that appear both beter modest increases in modern AFV holdings in Europe protected and heavier than its previous systems. The may continue. Armata system, in particular, is a radical departure Globally, the modernisation of AFV feets is likely from previous Russian tank designs (see p. 167.). to continue with a combination of upgrade and replacement. Overall – given emerging technical stnempole v ed e rutu F developments – armoured warfare, armoured forces If it is successfully introduced into service, Armata and AFVs are likely to still constitute key land-force will have considerable impact, not least on NATO capabilities for the foreseeable future. C hina’s ballistic missil es: more systems; improved designs At its September 2015 military parade commemo- range of 3,500 kilometres, emerged on the Chinese rating the 70th anniversary of victory in the Second internet shortly after that. China is also reported to be World War, China showed several new or upgraded continuing to test what could be a MIRV-ed version ballistic-missile systems for the frst time. The appear- of the DF-31, known as the DF-31B, which also uses a ance of weapons including the DF-26 intermediate- new transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicle. range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the DF-5B (US reporting name: CSS-4 Mod. 3) liquid-fuelled inter- MIRV progress continental ballistic missile (ICBM) served as a The development and adoption of MIRV-ed warheads reminder that Beijing is continuing to make signif- could be part of an efort to ensure a second-strike cant strides in ballistic-missile research and develop- capability sufciently damaging to be a credible ment (R&D). deterrent. The US DoD assessed in its 2015 report Given the lack of transparency concerning China’s that: ‘China will likely continue to invest consider- strategic weapons, there has been long-standing able resources to maintain a limited, but survivable, uncertainty over the nature of its strategic R&D proj- nuclear force to ensure the PLA [People’s Liberation ects, whether it was capable of bringing them all to Army] can deliver a damaging responsive nuclear fruition and what impact these programmes would strike.’ A further example of this efort is the WU-14 have on the structure and capability of the country’s hypersonic glide vehicle, which increases the chal- nuclear forces. The limited deployment of the DF-31A lenge for China’s opponents of defending efectively (CSS-10) ICBM and long-running difculties with against a mixed strike possibly comprising ballistic the JL-2 (CSS-NX-14) submarine-launched ballistic- re-entry vehicles and glide bodies. missile (SLBM) programme, for example, served to The WU-14 project also poses an interesting ques- underscore this caution. tion about future elements of China’s overall ICBM In recent years, however, it has become increas- programme. Hypersonic glide vehicles – ultra-high- ingly clear that China continues to make headway speed warhead carriers – will almost certainly be in the technical ambition of its strategic systems. The signifcantly heavier and larger than the current JL-2, successor to China’s frst SLBM, the JL-1, is on re-entry vehicles used on ICBMs. In Russia, the devel- the brink of a frst operational deployment on board opment of a hypersonic vehicle, the so-called ‘Project one of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 4202’, likely served as a trigger for the development Jin-class ballistic-missile submarines, according to the of the Strategic Rocket Forces’ liquid-fuelled Sarmat US Ofce of Naval Intelligence. The US Department of ICBM. None of the Chinese solid-fuelled ICBMs Defense (DoD) also claimed in its 2015 annual assess- currently in production or development are capable ment of Chinese military capability that the DF-5B of carrying such a vehicle. It remains unclear whether ICBM had been deployed with a multiple indepen- China will look to a liquid-fuelled system, such as the dently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) capability. DF-5, as the basis for an operational delivery system A key system absent from the 2015 parade was for the WU-14. the solid-fuelled DF-41 (CSS-X-20) ICBM, which Alongside an improved ballistic-missile arsenal, remains in the test and development phase. This is there are growing indications that Beijing intends to a road-mobile ICBM that will almost certainly be create a more capable air element of its nuclear triad. MIRV-capable. Further evidence of progress on this An article in the ofcial China Daily newspaper in July signifcant project could be gleaned from an August 2015 discussed the air force’s need for an advanced 2014 comment on the website of the Shaanxi provin- long-range bomber. At present, China manufactures cial government’s environmental-monitoring centre, the Xian H-6K bomber, an upgraded version of the which mentioned a second stage in the expansion of Russian Tu-16 Badger. The H-6K has been fted with production capacity at a facility associated with the the Russian D-30KP2 turbofan engine, and has a modi- DF-41. Photos of the DF-26 IRBM, with an estimated fed airframe and an improved avionics suite. It also 12 THE MILITARY BALANCE 2016 carries the DH-20 land-atack cruise missile, which frms’ precise business focus is complicated because may be nuclear-capable. The H-6K, however, is an some strategic-weapons companies are atempting interim solution, and there is widespread speculation to expand their activity in the realm of conventional that China is working on a new bomber programme. tactical weapons. Unlike the conventional-weapons The scale of China’s strategic-weapons R&D sector, though, the strategic-weapons industry is currently places it more on a level with the United centralised and relatively free from competition, States and Russia than the United Kingdom and enabling it to concentrate eforts on a limited number France, although its warhead holdings, assuming a of programmes. Meanwhile, conventional-weapons conservative estimate, are not much larger than those producers expend signifcant resources developing later states. Many of China’s missiles appear to be competing systems. However, corporate entities that equipped with conventional warheads. Progress in compete in tactical-weapons development often work China’s missile-development projects, however, together on strategic systems. including the deployment of MIRVs, will likely result in its warhead stocks increasing. Whether Beijing will snoit asinag ro y e K adhere to what it views as a minimum credible deter- The Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics rent remains an open question, although there is litle (CAEP) is responsible for the design and produc- evidence that it has any intention to eventually move tion of nuclear weapons. With 23,000 employees, towards parity with the US and Russia. Changes in according to the CAEP website, it appears to be larger China’s strategic deterrent will also have implications than the two US nuclear-weapons-related national for how it stores its warhead stockpile. For decades laboratories combined. But like those facilities (the it has been assumed that warheads and delivery Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore national labo- systems were held separately, with warhead storage ratories), CAEP is responsible for many research proj- and maintenance overseen by a unit of the Second ects that are not directly related to nuclear-weapons Artillery known as Base 22. Such an approach might programmes. CAEP projects include, for example, have been appropriate when the country’s primary tactical-weapons-related laser technology, while deterrent force was built on a liquid-fuelled ICBM, others are purely civilian in nature. But there is a but introducing a sea-based nuclear component botleneck in China’s nuclear-weapons complex: the implies that Beijing will have to consider changes in main warhead fnal-assembly facility. warhead holdings and management. This plant, called Factory 903 or the Sichuan Institute of Materials and Technology, is located 40km paeces sno cige t ro w- a t rt S from the city of Myanyang and employs more than China’s strategic-weapons industry is undergoing 1,000 staf. It has an aggressive and rigorous recruit- signifcant change. While R&D capacity might be ment policy designed to employ some of China’s broadly comparable to that of the US or Russia, the best scientists; around one-ffth of its staf hold PhDs, sector has hitherto been dependent on a limited and it boasts at least three members of the Chinese number of key production facilities. These appear Academy of Engineering. smaller in scale than similar facilities in Russia, The China Aerospace Science and Technology and they have run a large number of diferent Corporation (CASC) and China Aerospace Science programmes. This began to change at the beginning and Industry Corporation (CASIC) cooperate at the of the decade. Existing facilities were expanded, and heart of Chinese strategic-ballistic-missile manu- corporate restructuring led to additional resources facture, though they are rivals in the tactical-missile being concentrated in the sector. sector. Both are highly diversifed industrial corpo- The sector’s two main branches are the nuclear- rations that garner signifcant revenue from the weapons industry and the missile industry. The scale commercial sector, and are divided into several of both can be assessed broadly by using publicly so-called ‘academies’ – specialised subsidiary compa- available materials on Chinese corporate, educational nies. Together, they produce a variety of space and HR services websites, which contain information systems and most of China’s tactical missiles. on the number of employees, locations and profle of Though many CASC and CASIC industrial units work of each enterprise. It is easier to track develop- are involved in China’s strategic programmes, the ments in the missile industry, as it is more open in few that have strategic projects as their principal task its commercial activities but overall, assessment of require special focus, specifcally the 4th Academy of China’s ballistic missiles 13 CASIC, responsible for the overall design and fnal Academy of Aerospace Solid Propulsion Technology production of long-range solid-fuelled missiles, and Also known as CASC’s 4th Academy, this concern the handful of research institutes and factories in the produces large-diameter rocket motors for solid- 1st and 4th Academies of CASC. fuelled ballistic missiles and space-launch vehicles. Located in Xi’an, it is the major national centre of Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT) expertise for solid-fuelled-propulsion development Also known as CASC’s 1st Academy, CALT has in general and is likely responsible for the frst- and 28,000 staf and its primary role is the manufacture second-stage motors of the DF-31 and DF-41 ICBMs of space-launch vehicles. CALT used to be respon- and the JL-2 SLBM. In fact, it concentrates on ICBM sible for China’s liquid-fuelled ballistic-missile and SLBM work. Like CALT, the CASC 4th Academy programmes and, while Beijing appears to have has one key R&D facility – Research Institute 41 – halted production of liquid-fuelled systems, existing which is responsible for the design of solid-fuelled weapons such as the DF-4 and DF-5 still require rocket motors and also conducts independent R&D maintenance and upgrade. This work is carried out projects on tactical missiles. Its Research Institute 42 by CALT’s Factory 211, which is also known as the is responsible for the development of new types of Beijing Space Machinery Factory. The plant is also solid fuel, while Institute 43 develops and produces responsible for the fnal assembly of the solid-fuelled composite materials and components used in the JL-2 SLBM and DF-31 ICBM. CALT’s involvement construction of solid-rocket motors. The main produc- in submarine-launched systems dates back to 1986, tion facilities, located in Xi’an, are Factory 7414, which when it was given development responsibility for the is responsible for fabricating metal components for JL-2 – even though it lacked experience in submarine- engines, and Factory 7416 (Xi’an Aerospace Chemical launched systems (the JL-1 SLBM had been devel- Propulsion Plant), which is responsible for the fnal oped by CASIC’s 4th Academy). assembly of rocket engines. Work on ICBMs is, for CALT, a task now second only in importance to the production of space-launch China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation systems, and the frm is now responsible for the fnal (CASIC) assembly of solid-fuelled ICBMs. CALT does not Like CASC, CASIC is a diversifed organisation that is produce engines for solid-fuelled rockets, however; similarly subdivided into specialised academies and production of these is split between the CASIC 6th research organisations. CASIC’s 4th Academy is the Academy and the CASC 4th Academy. CALT’s key main centre of expertise for the development of solid- research facility, the 1st General Design Bureau, fuelled missiles and is responsible for the overall remains one of the centres of expertise in ballistic- design and fnal assembly of solid-fuelled IRBMs. missile design. Other important contributors, all The 4th Academy developed the JL-1 SLBM and the Beijing-based, include: Research Institute 12, special- DF-21, China’s frst mobile solid-fuel medium-range ising in missile-control systems; Research Institute 14, ballistic missile (MRBM), and is likely responsible for responsible for strategic-missile re-entry vehicles; and the new DF-26 IRBM. Indeed, its production facili- Research Institute 15, which produces ground-launch ties are perhaps the main determinant for the pace of equipment, including TELs. growth in China’s IRBM inventory. Another signifcant production facility is Factory The concern was merged with CASIC’s 9th 519 – located in Changzhi, in Shanxi Province – which Academy in 2011; the later was responsible for is responsible for the production of launch equipment the DF-11 (CSS-7) short-range missile system. The for both space-launch vehicles and ballistic missiles. merger tripled the size of the 4th Academy. The new Indeed, while CALT production and research facili- corporation was still known as the 4th Academy, but ties play an important role in strategic-weapons it changed its name to the ‘CASIC Sanjiang Group’ production programmes, with some also working on and moved to Wuhan. The company has the capa- projects being implemented by CASIC, its production bility to design, assemble and produce a number of capabilities now appear to be mostly dedicated to the critical subsystems for solid-fuelled ballistic missiles, space programme. For instance, Factory 211’s main including some types of re-entry vehicle. responsibility is the fnal assembly of Long March Medium-diameter solid-fuelled rocket motors rockets, and the facility assembled 122 space-launch used on ballistic missiles are the responsibility of vehicles between 1970 and 2012. CASIC’s 6th Academy, headquartered in the Inner