The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence, by A. T. Mahan This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org Title: The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence Author: A. T. Mahan Release Date: August 27, 2005 [EBook #16602] Language: English Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 *** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK NAVAL OPERATIONS *** Produced by Steven Gibbs, William Flis, and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net THE MAJOR OPERATIONS OF THE NAVIES IN THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE BY A.T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D. CAPTAIN, U.S. NAVY AUTHOR OF 'THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY, 1660-1783,' 'THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE, 1783-1812,' 'THE RELATIONS OF SEA POWER TO THE WAR OF 1812,' 'NAVAL STRATEGY' ETC. WITH PORTRAITS, MAPS, AND BATTLE PLANS LONDON SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON & COMPANY, LIMITED Overy House, 100 Southwark Street, S.E. Remains of the Revenge, one of Benedict Arnold's Schooners on Lake Champlain in 1776. Now in Fort Ticonderoga. [pg iv] Copyright, 1913, By A.T. MAHAN All rights reserved Published, October, 1913 The University Press, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A. PREFACE The contents of this volume were first contributed as a chapter, under the title of "Major Operations, 1762-1783," to the "History of the Royal Navy," in seven volumes, published by Messrs. Sampson Low, Marston, and Company, under the general editorship of the late Sir William Laird Clowes. For permission to republish now in this separate form, the author has to express his thanks to the publishers of that work. In the Introduction following this Preface, the author has summarized the general lesson to be derived from the course of this War of American Independence, as distinct from the particular discussion and narration of the several events which constitute the body of the treatment. These lessons he conceives to carry admonition for the present and future based upon the surest foundations; namely, upon the experience of the past as applicable to present conditions. The essential similarity between the two is evident in a common dependence upon naval strength. There has been a careful rereading and revision of the whole text; but the changes found necessary to be made are much fewer than might have been anticipated after the lapse of fifteen years. Numerous footnotes in the History, specifying the names of ships in fleets, and of their commanders in various battles, have been omitted, as not necessary to the present purpose, though eminently proper and indeed indispensable to an extensive work of general reference and of encyclopædic scope, such as the History is. Certain notes retained with the initials W.L.C. are due to the editor of that work. A.T. MAHAN. December, 1912. CONTENTS Preface v List of Illustrations xix List of Maps xxi List of Battle-Plans xxiii INTRODUCTION THE TENDENCY OF WARS TO SPREAD Macaulay quoted on the action of Frederick the Great 1 Illustration from Conditions of the Turkish Empire 2 Lesson from the Recent War in the Balkans, 1912-1913 2 The War of American Independence a striking example of the Tendency of Wars to Spread 3 Origin and Train of Events in that War, Traced 3 Inference as to possible Train of Future Events in the History of the United States 4 The Monroe Doctrine Simply a Formulated Precaution against the Tendency of Wars to Spread 4 National Policy as to Asiatic Immigration 4 Necessity of an Adequate Navy if these two National Policies are to be sustained 4 Dependence on Navy Illustrated in the Two Great National Crises; in the War of Independence and in the War of Secession 4 The United States not great in Population in proportion to Territory 5 Nor Wealthy in Proportion to exposed Coast-Line 5 [pg v] [pg vii] Special Fitness of a Navy to meet these particular conditions 5 The Pacific a great World Problem, dependent mainly on Naval Power 5 CHAPTER I THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 1775-1776 Preponderant effect of Control of the Water upon the Struggle for American Independence 6 Deducible then from Reason and from Experience 6 Consequent Necessity to the Americans of a Counterpoise to British Navy 6 This obtained through Burgoyne's Surrender 6 The Surrender of Burgoyne traceable directly to the Naval Campaigns on Lake Champlain, 1775, 1776 7 The subsequent Course of the War in all Quarters of the world due to that decisive Campaign 7 The Strategic Problem of Lake Champlain familiar to Americans from the Wars between France and Great Britain prior to 1775 8 Consequent prompt Initiative by Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold 8 Energetic Pursuit of first Successes by Arnold 9 Complete Control of Lake Champlain thus secured 9 Invasion of Canada by Montgomery, 1775 9 Arnold marches through Maine Wilderness and joins Montgomery before Quebec 10 Assault on Quebec. Failure, and Death of Montgomery 10 Arnold maintains Blockade of Quebec, 1776 10 Relief of the Place by British Navy 11 Arnold Retreats to Crown Point 12 Arnold's Schemes and Diligence to create a Lake Navy, 1776 13 Difficulties to be overcome 13 Superior Advantages of the British 13 The British by building acquire Superiority, but too late for effect in 1776 13 Ultimate Consequences from this Retardation 14 Constitution of the Naval Force raised by Arnold 14 He moves with it to the foot of Lake Champlain 15 Takes position for Defence at Valcour Island 15 Particular Difficulties encountered by British 15 Constitution of the British Lake Navy 16 Land Forces of the Opponents 17 Naval Forces of the Two at the Battle of Valcour Island 17 Magnitude of the Stake at Issue 18 Arnold's Purposes and Plans 18 [pg viii] Advance of the British 19 Arnold's Disposition of his Flotilla to receive Attack 20 The Battle of Valcour Island 21 The Americans Worsted 22 Arnold Retreats by night Undetected 23 Pursuit by the British 24 Destruction of the American Vessels 25 British Appreciation of the Importance of the Action, as shown 26 Criticism of the conduct of the Opposing Leaders 26 Arnold's Merit and Gallantry 27 End of the Naval Story of the Lakes 27 Effect of the Campaign upon the Decisive Events of 1777 28 CHAPTER II NAVAL ACTION AT BOSTON, CHARLESTON, NEW YORK, AND NARRAGANSETT BAY—ASSOCIATED LAND OPERATIONS, TO THE BATTLE OF TRENTON 1776 Necessity that Force, if resorted to, be from the first Adequate 29 Application to National Policy in peace 29 To the Monroe Doctrine 29 Failure of the British Government of 1775 in this respect 30 Consequences of such failure 30 General Howe evacuates Boston and retires to Halifax. Extent of his Command 30 Dissemination of Effort by British Government 30 Expedition against South Carolina 31 Local Conditions about Charleston 32 Description of Fort Moultrie 33 Plan of British Naval Attack 33 The Battle of Fort Moultrie 34 Failure of the Attack. British Losses 36 Comment upon the Action 37 The Expedition retires to New York 38 The Howes, Admiral and General, arrive in New York Bay 39 Operations about the City 39 Continuous and Decisive, but Inconspicuous, Part played by the British Navy 40 Description of Local Conditions about New York 40 American Preparations for Defence 41 Crucial Weakness of the Scheme 42 [pg ix] The Advance of the British 42 Washington withdraws his Army from the Brooklyn side 43 Success of this Withdrawal due to British Negligence 44 Subsequent Operations, and Retreat of Washington to New Jersey 45 Retreat continued to Pennsylvania, where he receives reinforcements 46 Slackness of Sir William Howe's actions 47 The British take possession of Narragansett Bay. Importance of that position 48 Washington suddenly takes the Offensive. Battle of Trenton 48 He recovers most of the State of New Jersey 49 CHAPTER III THE DECISIVE PERIOD OF THE WAR. SURRENDER OF BURGOYNE AND CAPTURE OF PHILADELPHIA BY HOWE. THE NAVAL PART IN EACH OPERATION 1777 British Object in Campaign of 1777 the same as that in 1776 50 Part assigned to Burgoyne 50 Slowness of his Progress at the beginning 51 Sir William Howe, instead of coöperating, takes his Army to the Chesapeake 52 Criticism of this Course 52 Howe's Progress to Philadelphia, and Capture of that City 53 Admiral Lord Howe takes the Fleet from the Chesapeake to the Delaware 53 Surrender of Burgoyne and his Army 53 British Naval Operations in Delaware Bay 54 Brief Tenure—Nine Months—of Philadelphia by British 55 The general Failure of the British Campaign determined by Howe's move to the Chesapeake 55 General Results of the Campaign 56 Part played by the British Navy. Analogous to that in Spain, 1808-1812, and in many other instances 57 CHAPTER IV WAR BEGINS BETWEEN FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN. BRITISH EVACUATE PHILADELPHIA. NAVAL OPERATIONS OF D'ESTAING AND HOWE ABOUT NEW YORK, NARRAGANSETT BAY, AND BOSTON. COMPLETE SUCCESS OF LORD HOWE. AMERICAN DISAPPOINTMENT IN D'ESTAING. LORD HOWE RETURNS TO ENGLAND 1778 France recognizes the Independence of the United States, and makes with them a defensive Alliance 58 A French Fleet sails for America under Comte d'Estaing 59 Unprepared condition of the British Navy 59 Admiral Byron sails with a Reinforcement for America 59 Ill effect of Naval Unreadiness upon British Commerce; and especially on the West Indies 60 Admiral Keppel puts to Sea with the British Channel Fleet 61 [pg x] [pg xi] First Guns of the War with France 62 Extreme Length of Byron's Passage 62 He turns back to Halifax 62 D'Estaing's slowness allows Howe to escape from Delaware Bay. Howe's Celerity 62 Evacuation of Philadelphia by British Army, and its precipitate Retreat to New York 63 Escape of both Army and Fleet due to d'Estaing's Delays 63 Rapid Action of Lord Howe 64 D'Estaing Arrives off New York 64 Howe's elaborate Dispositions for the Defence of New York Bay 65 Statement of British and French Naval Force 66 D'Estaing decides not to attempt Passage of the Bar, and puts to Sea 67 Anchors off Narragansett Bay 69 Forces the Entrance to Newport and Anchors inside the Bay 70 The British garrison besieged by superior American and French forces 70 Howe appears with his Fleet and anchors off the entrance, at Point Judith 71 Sustained Rapidity of his action at New York 71 D'Estaing Withdraws from Siege of Newport and puts to Sea 73 Manœuvres of the two Opponents 74 D'Estaing quits the Field, and both Fleets are scattered by a heavy Gale 75 Howe returns to New York and collects his Fleet 76 D'Estaing calls oft Newport; but abandons the Siege finally, taking his Fleet to Boston 77 Critical Condition of British garrison in Newport. D'Estaing's withdrawal compels Americans to raise the siege 77 Howe follows d'Estaing to Boston 77 Discussion of the Conduct of the opposing Admirals 78 Howe gives up his Command and returns to England 80 CHAPTER V THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPE. THE BATTLE OF USHANT 1778 Admirals Keppel and D'Orvilliers put to Sea from Portsmouth and Brest 82 Instructions given to the French Admiral 83 Preliminary Manœuvres after the two Fleets had sighted one another 83 The Battle of Ushant 84 A Drawn Battle. The respective Losses 91 The Significance of the Battle in the fighting Development of the British Navy 93 The "Order of Battle" 93 The Disputes and Courts Martial in Great Britain arising from the Battle of Ushant 94 [pg xii] Keppel Resigns his Command 97 CHAPTER VI OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES, 1778-1779. THE BRITISH INVASION OF GEORGIA AND SOUTH CAROLINA Influence of Seasonal Conditions upon Naval Operations in America 98 Commercial Importance of the West Indies 98 The French seize Dominica 99 D'Estaing Sails with his Fleet from Boston for Martinique 100 A British Squadron under Hotham sails the same day for Barbados, with Five Thousand Troops 100 Admiral Barrington's Seizure of Santa Lucia 101 D'Estaing sails to Recapture it 102 Rapidity and Skill shown in Barrington's Movements and Dispositions 102 D'Estaing's attacks Foiled, both on Sea and on Shore 103 He Abandons the attempt and Returns to Martinique 104 Importance of Santa Lucia in Subsequent Operations 104 Byron Reaches Barbados, and takes over Command from Barrington 105 D'Estaing Captures the British Island Grenada 105 Byron goes to its Relief 106 The Action between the two Fleets, of Byron and d'Estaing, July 6, 1779 106 Criticism of the two Commanders-in-Chief 110 D'Estaing returns to Grenada, which remains French 112 Byron returns to England. British North American Station assigned to Admiral Arbuthnot, Leeward Islands to Rodney 113 British Operations in Georgia and South Carolina. Capture of Savannah 113 Fatal Strategic Error in these Operations 114 D'Estaing's attempt to Retake Savannah Foiled 115 His appearance on the coast, however, causes the British to abandon Narragansett Bay 115 D'Estaing succeeded by de Guichen in North America. Rodney also arrives 115 CHAPTER VII THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPEAN WATERS, 1779. ALLIED FLEETS INVADE THE ENGLISH CHANNEL. RODNEY DESTROYS TWO SPANISH SQUADRONS AND RELIEVES GIBRALTAR Spain declares War against Great Britain 116 Delays in Junction of French and Spanish Fleets 116 They enter the Channel. Alarm in England 117 Plans of the French Government 118 Their Change and Failure. The Allied Fleets return to Brest 119 Criticism of the British Ministry 120 [pg xiii] Divergent views of France and Spain 120 Prominence given to Gibraltar, and the resulting Effect upon the general War 121 Exhaustion of Supplies at Gibraltar 121 Rodney with the Channel Fleet Sails for its Relief, with ultimate Destination to Leeward Islands Command 121 He Captures a large Spanish Convoy 122 And Destroys a Second Spanish Squadron of Eleven Sail-of-the-Line 123 Distinction of this Engagement 124 Gibraltar and Minorca Relieved 125 Rodney proceeds to the West Indies 126 The Channel Fleet returns to England 126 CHAPTER VIII RODNEY AND DE GUICHEN'S NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES. DE GUICHEN RETURNS TO EUROPE AND RODNEY GOES TO NEW YORK. LORD CORNWALLIS IN THE CAROLINAS. TWO NAVAL ACTIONS OF COMMODORE CORNWALLIS. RODNEY RETURNS TO WEST INDIES 1780 Rodney's Force upon arrival in West Indies 128 Action between British and French Squadrons prior to his arrival 129 Rodney and de Guichen put to sea 130 Action between them of April 17, 1780 131 Cause of Failure of Rodney's Attack 133 His Disappointment in his Subordinates 135 His Expression of his Feelings 135 Discussion of the Incidents and Principles involved 137 The Losses of the Respective Fleets 140 They Continue to Cruise 141 The Action of May 15, 1780 142 That of May 19, 1780 144 The Results Indecisive 144 Contrary Personal Effect produced upon the two Admirals by the encounters 145 De Guichen asks to be Relieved 145 Rodney's Chary Approval of his Subordinates in these two instances 145 Suspicion and Distrust rife in the British Navy at this period 146 Twelve Spanish Sail-of-the-Line, with Ten Thousand Troops, Arrive at Guadeloupe 147 They refuse Coöperation with de Guichen in the Windward Islands 147 De Guichen Accompanies them to Haïti with his Fleet 147 He declines to Coöperate on the Continent with the Americans, and sails for Europe 148 Rodney Arranges for the protection of the Homeward West India Trade, and then proceeds to New York 149 [pg xiv] Effect of his coming 150 The Year 1780 one of great Discouragement to Americans 151 Summary of the Operations in the Carolinas and Virginia, 1780, which led to Lord Cornwallis's Surrender in 1781 151 Two Naval Actions sustained by Commodore Cornwallis against superior French forces, 1780 153 The Year 1780 Uneventful in European seas 157 Capture of a great British Convoy 157 The Armed Neutrality of the Baltic Powers 158 The Accession of Holland to this followed by a Declaration of War by Great Britain 158 The French Government withdraws all its Ships of War from before Gibraltar 158 CHAPTER IX NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN WEST INDIES IN 1781. CAPTURE OF ST. EUSTATIUS BY RODNEY. DE GRASSE ARRIVES IN PLACE OF DE GUICHEN. TOBAGO SURRENDERS TO DE GRASSE Effects of the Great Hurricanes of 1780 in West Indies 159 Rodney's Diminished Force. Arrival of Sir Samuel Hood with reinforcements 160 Rodney receives Orders to seize Dutch Possessions in Caribbean 160 Capture of St. Eustatius, St. Martin, and Saba 161 The large Booty and Defenceless state of St. Eustatius 161 Effect of these Conditions upon Rodney 161 Hood detached to cruise before Martinique 162 De Grasse arrives there with Twenty Ships-of-the-Line 163 Indecisive Action between de Grasse and Hood 164 Criticism of the two Commanders 166 Junction of Rodney and Hood 166 De Grasse attempts Santa Lucia, and Fails 167 He captures Tobago 168 He decides to take his Meet to the American Continent 168 CHAPTER X NAVAL OPERATIONS PRECEDING AND DETERMINING THE FALL OF YORKTOWN. CORNWALLIS SURRENDERS 1781 Summary of Land Operations in Virginia early in 1781 169 Portsmouth Occupied 170 A French Squadron from Newport, and a British from Gardiner's Bay, proceed to the Scene 170 They meet off the Chesapeake 171 Action between Arbuthnot and des Touches, March 16, 1781 171 The Advantage rests with the French, but they return to Newport. Arbuthnot enters the [pg xv] Chesapeake 174 Cornwallis reaches Petersburg, Virginia, May 20 175 Under the directions of Sir Henry Clinton he evacuates Portsmouth and concentrates his forces at Yorktown, August 22 175 The French Fleet under de Grasse Anchors in the Chesapeake, August 30 176 British Naval Movements, in July and August, affecting conditions in the Chesapeake 176 Admiral Graves, successor to Arbuthnot at New York, joined there by Sir Samuel Hood, August 28 177 Washington and Rochambeau move upon Cornwallis 178 The British Fleet under Graves arrives off the Chesapeake 179 Action between de Grasse and Graves, September 5 179 Hood's Criticism of Graves's Conduct 181 The British, worsted, return to New York. De Grasse, reinforced, re-enters the Chesapeake, September 11 184 Cornwallis Surrenders, October 19 184 De Grasse and Hood Return to West Indies 185 CHAPTER XI NAVAL EVENTS OF 1781 IN EUROPE. DARBY'S RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR, AND THE BATTLE OF THE DOGGER BANK Leading Objects of the Belligerents in 1781 186 The Relief of Gibraltar by Admiral Darby 186 Capture of British Convoy with the spoils of St. Eustatius 188 The French and Spanish Fleet under Admiral de Cordova again enters the English Channel 188 Darby in inferior Force shut up in Tor Bay 188 The Allies Decide not to attack him, but to turn their Efforts against British Commerce 189 Minorca Lost by British 189 The Battle of the Dogger Bank, between British and Dutch Fleets 190 CHAPTER XII THE FINAL NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST INDIES. HOOD AND DE GRASSE. RODNEY AND DE GRASSE. THE GREAT BATTLE OF APRIL 12, 1782 Capture and Destruction near Ushant of a great French Convoy for the West Indies opens the Naval Campaign of 1782 195 Attack upon the Island of St. Kitts by de Grasse and de Bouillé 197 Hood sails for its Relief from Barbados 197 His Plan of procedure 198 Balked by an Accident 199 He Succeeds in dislodging de Grasse and taking the Anchorage left by the French 200 Unsuccessful Attempt by de Grasse to shake Hood's position 203 St. Kitts nevertheless compelled to Surrender owing to having insufficient Land Force 205 [pg xvi] Hood Extricates himself from de Grasse's Superior Force and Retires 205 Rodney arrives from England and joins Hood 205 Project of French and Spaniards against Jamaica 206 De Grasse sails from Martinique with his whole Fleet and a large Convoy 207 Rodney's Pursuit 208 Partial Actions of April 9, 1782 209 British Pursuit continues 211 It is favored by the Lagging of two Ships in the French Fleet, April 11 211 An Accident that night induces de Grasse to bear down, and enables Rodney to force Action 212 The Battle of April 12 begins 214 A Shift of Wind enables the British to Break the French Order in three places 217 Consequences of this Movement 218 Resultant Advantages to the British 219 Practices of the opposing Navies in regard to the Aims of Firing 219 Consequences Illustrated in the Injuries received respectively 220 Inadequate Use made by Rodney of the Advantage gained by his Fleet 220 Hood's Criticisms 220 Hood's Opinion shared by Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's Chief-of-Staff 222 Rodney's own Reasons for his Course after the Battle 222 His Assumptions not accordant with the Facts 223 Actual Prolonged Dispersion of the French Fleet 224 Hood, Detached in Pursuit, Captures a small French Squadron 224 Rodney Superseded in Command before the news of the victory reached England 225 The general War Approaches its End 226 CHAPTER XIII HOWE AGAIN GOES AFLOAT. THE FINAL RELIEF OF GIBRALTAR 1782 Howe appointed to Command Channel Fleet 227 Cruises first in North Sea and in Channel 228 The Allied Fleets in much superior force take Position in the Chops of the Channel, but are successfully evaded by Howe 229 The British Jamaica Convoy also escapes them 229 Howe ordered to Relieve Gibraltar 229 Loss of the Royal George, with Kempenfelt 229 Howe Sails 229 Slow but Successful Progress 230 [pg xvii] Great Allied Fleet in Bay of Gibraltar 230 Howe's Success in Introducing the Supplies 231 Negligent Mismanagement of the Allies 231 Partial Engagement when Howe leaves Gibraltar 232 Estimate of Howe's Conduct, and of his Professional Character 232 French Eulogies 232 CHAPTER XIV THE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1783. THE CAREER OF THE BAILLI DE SUFFREN Isolation characteristic of Military and Naval Operations in India 234 Occurrences in 1778 234 Sir Edward Hughes sent to India with a Fleet, 1779 235 The Years prior to 1781 Uneventful 235 A British Squadron under Commodore Johnstone sent in 1781 to seize Cape of Good Hope 236 A Week Later, a French Squadron under Suffren sails for India 236 Suffren finds Johnstone Anchored in Porto Praya, and attacks at once 237 The immediate Result Indecisive, but the Cape of Good Hope is saved by Suffren arriving first 238 Suffren reaches Mauritius, and the French Squadron sails for India under Comte d'Orves 239 D'Orves dies, leaving Suffren in Command 240 Trincomalee, in Ceylon, captured by Hughes 240 First Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, February 17, 1782 240 Second Engagement, April 12 242 Third Engagement, July 6 244 Suffren captures Trincomalee 247 Hughes arrives, but too late to save the place 247 Fourth Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, September 3 248 Having lost Trincomalee, Hughes on the change of monsoon is compelled to go to Bombay 251 Reinforced there by Bickerton 251 Suffren winters in Sumatra, but regains Trincomalee before Hughes returns. Also receives Reinforcements 251 The British Besiege Cuddalore 252 Suffren Relieves the Place 253 Fifth Engagement between Hughes and Suffren, June 20, 1783 253 Comparison between Hughes and Suffren 254 News of the Peace being received, June 29, Hostilities in India cease 255 Glossary of Nautical and Naval Terms used in this Book 257 [pg xviii] Index 267 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Remains of the Revenge, one of Benedict Arnold's Schooners on Lake Champlain in 1776. Now in Fort Ticonderoga. Frontispiece Major-General Philip Schuyler 12 Edward Pellew, afterwards Admiral, Lord Exmouth 12 Benedict Arnold 27 Attack on Fort Moultrie in 1776 33 Richard, Earl Howe 78 Charles Henri, Comte d'Estaing 78 Admiral, the Honourable Samuel Barrington 104 Comte de Guichen 144 George Brydges, Lord Rodney 144 François-Joseph-Paul, Comte de Grasse, Marquis de Tilly 204 Admiral, Lord Hood 204 Sir Edward Hughes, K.B. 254 Pierre André de Suffren de Saint Tropez 254 LIST OF MAPS Lake Champlain and Connected Waters 8 New York and New Jersey: to illustrate Operations of 1776, 1777, and 1778 40 Narragansett Bay 70 Leeward Islands (West Indies) Station 99 Island of Santa Lucia 101 Island of Martinique 164 Peninsula of India, and Ceylon 234 North Atlantic Ocean. General Map to illustrate Operations in the War of American Independence 280 LIST OF BATTLE-PLANS D'Orvilliers and Keppel, off Ushant, July 27, 1778 Figure 1 86 Figures 2 and 3 90 D'Estaing and Byron, July 6, 1779 106 Rodney and De Guichen, April 17, 1780, Figures 1 and 2 132 Rodney and De Guichen, May 15, 1780 143 Cornwallis and De Ternay, June 20, 1780 156 Arbuthnot and Des Touches, March 16, 1781 172 Graves and De Grasse, September 5, 1781 180 [pg xix] [pg xxi] [pg xxiii] Hood and De Grasse, January 25, 1782, Figures 1 and 2 201 Hood and De Grasse, January 26, 1782, Figure 3 203 Rodney and De Grasse, April 9 and 12, 1782 Figures 1 and 2 210 Figure 3 212 Figures 4 and 5 215 Figure 6 218 Johnstone and Suffren, Porto Praya, April 16, 1781 237 Hughes and Suffren, February 17, 1782 240 Hughes and Suffren, April 12, 1782 243 Hughes and Suffren, July 6, 1782 243 Hughes and Suffren, September 3, 1782 249 The Major Operations of the Navies in the War of American Independence INTRODUCTION THE TENDENCY OF WARS TO SPREAD Macaulay, in a striking passage of his Essay on Frederick the Great, wrote, "The evils produced by his wickedness were felt in lands where the name of Prussia was unknown. In order that he might rob a neighbour whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on the coast of Coromandel, and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes of North America." Wars, like conflagrations, tend to spread; more than ever perhaps in these days of close international entanglements and rapid communications. Hence the anxiety aroused and the care exercised by the governments of Europe, the most closely associated and the most sensitive on the earth, to forestall the kindling of even the slightest flame in regions where all alike are interested, though with diverse objects; regions such as the Balkan group of States in their exasperating relations with the Turkish empire, under which the Balkan peoples see constantly the bitter oppression of men of their own blood and religious faith by the tyranny of a government which can neither assimilate nor protect. The condition of Turkish European provinces is a perpetual lesson to those disposed to ignore or to depreciate the immense difficulties of administering politically, under one government, peoples traditionally and racially distinct, yet living side by side; not that the situation is much better anywhere in the Turkish empire. This still survives, though in an advanced state of decay, simply because other States are not prepared to encounter the risks of a disturbance which might end in a general bonfire, extending its ravages to districts very far remote from the scene of the original trouble. Since these words were written, actual war has broken out in the Balkans. The Powers, anxious each as to the effect upon its own ambitions of any disturbance in European Turkey, have steadily abstained from efficient interference in behalf of the downtrodden Christians of Macedonia, surrounded by sympathetic kinsfolk. Consequently, in thirty years past this underbrush has grown drier and drier, fit kindling for fuel. In the Treaty of Berlin, in 1877, stipulation was made for their betterment in governance, and we are now told that in 1880 Turkey framed a scheme for such,—and pigeonholed it. At last, under unendurable conditions, spontaneous combustion has followed. There can be no assured peace until it is recognised practically that Christianity, by the respect which it alone among religions inculcates for the welfare of the individual, is an essential factor in developing in nations the faculty of self-government, apart from which fitness to govern others does not exist. To keep Christian peoples under the rule of a non-Christian race, is, therefore, to perpetuate a state hopeless of reconcilement and pregnant of sure explosion. Explosions always happen inconveniently. Obsta principiis is the only safe rule; the application of which is not suppression of overt discontent but relief of grievances. The War of American Independence was no exception to the general rule of propagation that has been noted. When our forefathers began to agitate against the Stamp Act and the other measures that succeeded it, they as little foresaw the spread of their action to the East and West Indies, to the English Channel and Gibraltar, as did the British ministry which in framing the Stamp Act struck the match from which these consequences followed. When Benedict Arnold on [pg 1] [pg 2] [pg 3] Lake Champlain by vigorous use of small means obtained a year's delay for the colonists, he compassed the surrender of Burgoyne in 1777. The surrender of Burgoyne, justly estimated as the decisive event of the war, was due to Arnold's previous action, gaining the delay which is a first object for all defence, and which to the unprepared colonists was a vital necessity. The surrender of Burgoyne determined the intervention of France, in 1778; the intervention of France the accession of Spain thereto, in 1779. The war with these two Powers led to the maritime occurrences, the interferences with neutral trade, that gave rise to the Armed Neutrality; the concurrence of Holland in which brought war between that country and Great Britain, in 1780. This extension of hostilities affected not only the West Indies but the East, through the possessions of the Dutch in both quarters and at the Cape of Good Hope. If not the occasion of Suffren being sent to India, the involvement of Holland in the general war had a powerful effect upon the brilliant operations which he conducted there; as well as at, and for, the Cape of Good Hope, then a Dutch possession, on his outward voyage. In the separate publication of these pages, my intention and hope are to bring home incidentally to American readers this vast extent of the struggle to which our own Declaration of Independence was but the prelude; with perchance the further needed lesson for the future, that questions the most remote from our own shores may involve us in unforeseen difficulties, especially if we permit a train of communication to be laid by which the outside fire can leap step by step to the American continents. How great a matter a little fire kindleth! Our Monroe Doctrine is in final analysis merely the formulation of national precaution that, as far as in its power to prevent, there shall not lie scattered about the material which foreign possessions in these continents might supply for the extension of combustion originating elsewhere; and the objection to Asiatic immigration, however debased by less worthy feelings or motives, is on the part of thinking men simply a recognition of the same danger arising from the presence of an inassimilable mass of population, racially and traditionally distinct in characteristics, behind which would lie the sympathies and energy of a powerful military and naval Asiatic empire. Conducive as each of these policies is to national safety and peace amid international conflagration, neither the one nor the other can be sustained without the creation and maintenance of a preponderant navy. In the struggle with which this book deals, Washington at the time said that the navies had the casting vote. To Arnold on Lake Champlain, to DeGrasse at Yorktown, fell the privilege of exercising that prerogative at the two great decisive moments of the War. To the Navy also, beyond any other single instrumentality, was due eighty years later the successful suppression of the movement of Secession. The effect of the blockade of the Southern coasts upon the financial and military efficiency of the Confederate Government has never been closely calculated, and probably is incalculable. At these two principal national epochs control of the water was the most determinative factor. In the future, upon the Navy will depend the successful maintenance of the two leading national policies mentioned; the two most essential to the part this country is to play in the progress of the world. For, while numerically great in population, the United States is not so in proportion to territory; nor, though wealthy, is she so in proportion to her exposure. That Japan at four thousand miles distance has a population of over three hundred to the square mile, while our three great Pacific States average less than twenty, is a portentous fact. The immense aggregate numbers resident elsewhere in the United States cannot be transfered thither to meet an emergency, nor contribute effectively to remedy this insufficiency; neither can a land force on the defensive protect, if the way of the sea is open. In such opposition of smaller numbers against larger, nowhere do organisation and development count as much as in navies. Nowhere so well as on the sea can a general numerical inferiority be compensated by specific numerical superiority, resulting from the correspondence between the force employed and the nature of the ground. It follows strictly, by logic and by inference, that by no other means can safety be insured as economically and as efficiently. Indeed, in matters of national security, economy and efficiency are equivalent terms. The question of the Pacific is probably the greatest world problem of the twentieth century, in which no great country is so largely and directly interested as is the United States. For the reason given it is essentially a naval question, the third in which the United States finds its well-being staked upon naval adequacy. CHAPTER I THE NAVAL CAMPAIGN ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN 1775-1776 At the time when hostilities began between Great Britain and her American Colonies, the fact was realised generally, being evident to reason and taught by experience, that control of the water, both ocean and inland, would have a preponderant effect upon the contest. It was clear to reason, for there was a long seaboard with numerous interior navigable watercourses, and at the same time scanty and indifferent communications by land. Critical portions of the territory involved were yet an unimproved wilderness. Experience, the rude but efficient schoolmaster of that large portion of mankind which gains knowledge only by hard knocks, had confirmed through the preceding French wars the inferences of the thoughtful. Therefore, conscious of the great superiority of the British Navy, which, however, had not then attained the unchallenged supremacy of a later day, the American leaders early sought the alliance of the Bourbon kingdoms, France and Spain, the hereditary enemies of Great Britain. There alone could be found the counterpoise to a power which, if unchecked, must ultimately prevail. [pg 4] [pg 5] [pg 6]